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TWO WAYS OUT FOR GEORGIA
Kommersant, Russia
April 28 2008
You can consider the possibility of using force addressing the
Georgian-Abkhazian and the Georgian-South ossetian conflicts only
when you compare two variants of the developments.
According to the first scenario, President Saakashvili won't dare use
military force against the unrecognized republics, understanding what
consequences this might have for his relations with Russia. Acting this
way, Mikhail Saakashvili would give Moscow every reason to believe that
the policy it has conducted towards Tbilisi can be justified. The
policy suggests that the relations between Russia and Georgia
must be improved, with the pressure in trade, post communications
and visas decreased; and at the same time Moscow should make no
concessions regarding the frozen conflicts and Georgia's admission
to NATO. Besides Moscow and the unrecognized republics, Georgia's
neighbors disputing Nagorno-Karabakh will be among those benefiting
from this scenario. "Georgia didn't dare use force in Abkhazia,
and neither will Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh," they'll think in
Yerevan. In case the use of force can be avoided, Europe will feel
the sense of relief because it simply doesn't want the situation to
escalate. Only Washington can feel disappointed, considering another
opportunity to demonstrate its hard line on Moscow to be lost.
But it's Mikhail Saakashvili who will hardly benefit from the
scenario. From the viewpoint of the Georgian nation, he will lose
another sufficient element of his charisma, which was initially based
on his image of "the gatherer of the Georgian lands." As a result, he
will lose to the Georgian opposition, whose line on the unrecognized
republics is even tougher. You can have no doubt that the opposition
will use its chance to accuse the president, with his reputation
already spoiled, of conceding to the Kremlin.
The second possible variant suggests military escalation. We'll
proceed from the assumption that Georgia will be defeated in
this case. Paradoxically, this military defeat will turn out a
political victory for President Saakashvili. First, he will retain
his charisma, appearing a hero in the view of his nation, and uniting
society. Second, the military conflict will worsen the prospects of
the Georgian opposition, exploiting the theme of patriotism. Third, a
clear message will be sent to Moscow: Putin's plan concerning Georgia
doesn't work. Such a scenario will imply that it's impossible to
develop normal relations with Tbilisi without resolving the Abkhazia
and South Ossetia conflicts. For Europe - Germany, France and Italy
- the military scenario will appear a real headache. In Washington
they'll probably say, "You see, Georgia is weak, it needs to be placed
under the NATO umbrella as soon as possible."
Conclusion: Mikhail Saakashvili can risk it, convincing himself that
"nothing ventured, nothing gained." His career as the leader of the
nation is at stake today. And it's his last chance to stay afloat.
Kommersant, Russia
April 28 2008
You can consider the possibility of using force addressing the
Georgian-Abkhazian and the Georgian-South ossetian conflicts only
when you compare two variants of the developments.
According to the first scenario, President Saakashvili won't dare use
military force against the unrecognized republics, understanding what
consequences this might have for his relations with Russia. Acting this
way, Mikhail Saakashvili would give Moscow every reason to believe that
the policy it has conducted towards Tbilisi can be justified. The
policy suggests that the relations between Russia and Georgia
must be improved, with the pressure in trade, post communications
and visas decreased; and at the same time Moscow should make no
concessions regarding the frozen conflicts and Georgia's admission
to NATO. Besides Moscow and the unrecognized republics, Georgia's
neighbors disputing Nagorno-Karabakh will be among those benefiting
from this scenario. "Georgia didn't dare use force in Abkhazia,
and neither will Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh," they'll think in
Yerevan. In case the use of force can be avoided, Europe will feel
the sense of relief because it simply doesn't want the situation to
escalate. Only Washington can feel disappointed, considering another
opportunity to demonstrate its hard line on Moscow to be lost.
But it's Mikhail Saakashvili who will hardly benefit from the
scenario. From the viewpoint of the Georgian nation, he will lose
another sufficient element of his charisma, which was initially based
on his image of "the gatherer of the Georgian lands." As a result, he
will lose to the Georgian opposition, whose line on the unrecognized
republics is even tougher. You can have no doubt that the opposition
will use its chance to accuse the president, with his reputation
already spoiled, of conceding to the Kremlin.
The second possible variant suggests military escalation. We'll
proceed from the assumption that Georgia will be defeated in
this case. Paradoxically, this military defeat will turn out a
political victory for President Saakashvili. First, he will retain
his charisma, appearing a hero in the view of his nation, and uniting
society. Second, the military conflict will worsen the prospects of
the Georgian opposition, exploiting the theme of patriotism. Third, a
clear message will be sent to Moscow: Putin's plan concerning Georgia
doesn't work. Such a scenario will imply that it's impossible to
develop normal relations with Tbilisi without resolving the Abkhazia
and South Ossetia conflicts. For Europe - Germany, France and Italy
- the military scenario will appear a real headache. In Washington
they'll probably say, "You see, Georgia is weak, it needs to be placed
under the NATO umbrella as soon as possible."
Conclusion: Mikhail Saakashvili can risk it, convincing himself that
"nothing ventured, nothing gained." His career as the leader of the
nation is at stake today. And it's his last chance to stay afloat.