Tweet
TURKEY IN THE BALANCE? INSIDE THE IMPROBABLE TURKEY-IRAN PARTNERSHIP
By Alexander Sherbany
Harvard Political Review
Aug 5 2008
MA
For much of the last 50 years, through the Cold War, Iranian
Revolution, and Iran-Iraq War, Turkey and Iran have weathered
ideological tension and mutual mistrust to maintain a peaceful
coexistence. Over the objections of the United States, in the
past decade Turkey has moved to solidify a pragmatic economic and
geopolitical partnership with oil-rich Iran.
Turkey, a NATO ally seeking membership in the European Union, has
long been the Muslim world's best prospect for a secular, democratic
state close to the United States and Europe. Yet the country is divided
over the issue of the Iraq-based Kurdistan Worker's Party. The party,
also known as the PKK, is recognized as a terrorist organization by
Turkey, the United States, and the European Union. The tension between
the PKK and Turkey has drawn the latter closer not to the U.S. or EU,
but to the region's staunchest enemy of the West, the Shia theocracy
of Iran. As Washington attempts to isolate Tehran, stabilize Iraq,
and address the PKK issue, it must simultaneously assure Iraq of
its sovereignty and Turkey of its security. American relations with
Turkey and policy towards Iran could be undermined by a Turkey-Iran
relationship more cordial than one might expect, given their divergent
histories, internal politics, and relations with the West.
Turkey's War on Terror As is often the case, diplomacy makes strange
bedfellows. For much of the last 25 years, the Turkish military
has been involved in a sporadic but continuous guerilla war with
the PKK, a Kurdish separatist faction whose goal is to establish an
independent Kurdistan in the largely Kurd-inhabited area comprising
parts of northern Iraq, southeastern Turkey, Syria, and Iran. With
over 30,000 lives claimed by the conflict since 1984, Turkey--which
has a significant Kurdish minority--considers the PKK a threat both to
its national security and territorial integrity. Many Turks perceive
the PKK with the same sense of urgency many Americans feel towards
al-Qaeda, and view Afghanistan as a case study of how to respond when
a country becomes a haven for terrorists that plague their own country.
Warplanes and long-range artillery have been continuously targeting PKK
positions in northern Iraq since December of last year, but in late
February the Turkish military launched an eight-day ground incursion
into northern Iraq to attack PKK hideouts beyond the border. Abdulkadir
Onay, a lieutenant colonel in the Turkish army and Visiting Military
Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told the
HPR that since Turkey has participated in international missions
for the U.S.-led War on Terror, "she expects the same reaction for
terror against Turkey." With troops spread thinly elsewhere, however,
American forces can scarcely afford a bloody entanglement in the
otherwise stable semi-autonomous Kurdish zone of Iraq. Until a few
months ago, Washington was sending a strong message to Turkey not to
enter Iraq for fear of unsettling regional stability.
Polls of the Turkish public have shown record-high levels of
dissatisfaction with American foreign policy, underscoring deeper
anti-American sentiment since the election of the current AKP
government in 2002 and the Iraq War. According to a 2007 survey
by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, only nine percent of Turks
express a favorable view of the United States, down from 30 percent
in 2002. Meanwhile, as the United States attempts to exert pressure
on nuclear-bent Iran, Tehran sees a critical opportunity to bolster
ties with Ankara by carrying out military operations against the PKK
and strengthening cooperation on energy resources.
A Trend of Cooperation As the United States and others move to stifle
Iran's nuclear ambitions, Turkey's strategic security and energy
interests deter it from a supporting role. Robert Olson, Professor of
Middle History and Politics at the University of Kentucky, noted in
an interview with the HPR that Turkey is pursuing a nuclear energy
program itself with plans to build several reactors in the next
few years. In light of this, Olson said, "Turkey would acquiesce
in Iran obtaining nuclear capabilities." It relies on Iran for 20
percent of its oil, maintains a major pipeline for the natural gas
required to heat Turkish homes in the winter, and signed an energy
agreement last year under which it would act as a transit venue and
joint marketer of Turkmen and Iranian gas westward to Europe. In
violation of America's 1996 Libya-Iran Sanctions Act, Turkey also
plans significant investment in Iran with the construction of three
large power plants. Threatened but persistent, Iran is eager to court
its most powerful neighbor and a key ally of the United States. And
Turkey, unwilling to play the obedient mistress in the U.S. campaign
to isolate Tehran, has responded warmly to the wooing.
Tehran, moreover, is adept at turning the public relations game
against Washington. In an interview with the HPR, Soner Cagaptay,
Director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, said that Iran is attempting to "drive a wedge"
between Turkey and the U.S. with what he calls "public diplomacy":
on days when U.S. officials conduct talks in Ankara, Iran bombs
PKK camps and steals headlines in the Turkish newspapers. Despite
U.S. intelligence sharing on rebel positions, Cagaptay says, "the
Iranians have created this semblance in Turkey that when it comes to
the PKK, the Americans talk the talk and Iranians walk the walk."
Repairing Ties Last October, President Bush condemned a particularly
deadly cross-border ambush by the PKK that killed 17 Turkish soldiers,
saying, "the attacks must stop now." A few months later, the day
before the majority of Turkish forces withdrew from Iraq, Bush joined
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in calling for Turkey to get out "as
soon as possible." The rhetorical juggling act illustrates the fine
line that Washington must tread between protecting the sovereignty
of the fledgling Iraqi state and assuring one of its most important
regional allies of the right to dislodge terrorists from border
positions.
There is, however, potential for improved U.S.-Turkey relations
going forward. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan met with President
Bush in November 2007 partly to discuss the PKK, and the United
States has since augmented its sharing of actionable intelligence
to assist Turkish operations. Washington, Cagaptay says, also gave
Turkey the "green light" for its recent incursions into northern Iraq,
improving relations considerably. The defeat of the Armenian genocide
resolution in Congress, a largely symbolic bill that is nonetheless
a highly sensitive issue for Turkey, also eased tensions as the Bush
administration made a strong show of resistance. And although the
United States and Iraq pressured Turkey to withdraw at the end of
February, Colonel Onay predicts that this will not be the last of
Turkish offensives: "Turkey is determined to take all the measures no
matter what it costs, because this problem is a matter of existence
for her."
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Alexander Sherbany
Harvard Political Review
Aug 5 2008
MA
For much of the last 50 years, through the Cold War, Iranian
Revolution, and Iran-Iraq War, Turkey and Iran have weathered
ideological tension and mutual mistrust to maintain a peaceful
coexistence. Over the objections of the United States, in the
past decade Turkey has moved to solidify a pragmatic economic and
geopolitical partnership with oil-rich Iran.
Turkey, a NATO ally seeking membership in the European Union, has
long been the Muslim world's best prospect for a secular, democratic
state close to the United States and Europe. Yet the country is divided
over the issue of the Iraq-based Kurdistan Worker's Party. The party,
also known as the PKK, is recognized as a terrorist organization by
Turkey, the United States, and the European Union. The tension between
the PKK and Turkey has drawn the latter closer not to the U.S. or EU,
but to the region's staunchest enemy of the West, the Shia theocracy
of Iran. As Washington attempts to isolate Tehran, stabilize Iraq,
and address the PKK issue, it must simultaneously assure Iraq of
its sovereignty and Turkey of its security. American relations with
Turkey and policy towards Iran could be undermined by a Turkey-Iran
relationship more cordial than one might expect, given their divergent
histories, internal politics, and relations with the West.
Turkey's War on Terror As is often the case, diplomacy makes strange
bedfellows. For much of the last 25 years, the Turkish military
has been involved in a sporadic but continuous guerilla war with
the PKK, a Kurdish separatist faction whose goal is to establish an
independent Kurdistan in the largely Kurd-inhabited area comprising
parts of northern Iraq, southeastern Turkey, Syria, and Iran. With
over 30,000 lives claimed by the conflict since 1984, Turkey--which
has a significant Kurdish minority--considers the PKK a threat both to
its national security and territorial integrity. Many Turks perceive
the PKK with the same sense of urgency many Americans feel towards
al-Qaeda, and view Afghanistan as a case study of how to respond when
a country becomes a haven for terrorists that plague their own country.
Warplanes and long-range artillery have been continuously targeting PKK
positions in northern Iraq since December of last year, but in late
February the Turkish military launched an eight-day ground incursion
into northern Iraq to attack PKK hideouts beyond the border. Abdulkadir
Onay, a lieutenant colonel in the Turkish army and Visiting Military
Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told the
HPR that since Turkey has participated in international missions
for the U.S.-led War on Terror, "she expects the same reaction for
terror against Turkey." With troops spread thinly elsewhere, however,
American forces can scarcely afford a bloody entanglement in the
otherwise stable semi-autonomous Kurdish zone of Iraq. Until a few
months ago, Washington was sending a strong message to Turkey not to
enter Iraq for fear of unsettling regional stability.
Polls of the Turkish public have shown record-high levels of
dissatisfaction with American foreign policy, underscoring deeper
anti-American sentiment since the election of the current AKP
government in 2002 and the Iraq War. According to a 2007 survey
by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, only nine percent of Turks
express a favorable view of the United States, down from 30 percent
in 2002. Meanwhile, as the United States attempts to exert pressure
on nuclear-bent Iran, Tehran sees a critical opportunity to bolster
ties with Ankara by carrying out military operations against the PKK
and strengthening cooperation on energy resources.
A Trend of Cooperation As the United States and others move to stifle
Iran's nuclear ambitions, Turkey's strategic security and energy
interests deter it from a supporting role. Robert Olson, Professor of
Middle History and Politics at the University of Kentucky, noted in
an interview with the HPR that Turkey is pursuing a nuclear energy
program itself with plans to build several reactors in the next
few years. In light of this, Olson said, "Turkey would acquiesce
in Iran obtaining nuclear capabilities." It relies on Iran for 20
percent of its oil, maintains a major pipeline for the natural gas
required to heat Turkish homes in the winter, and signed an energy
agreement last year under which it would act as a transit venue and
joint marketer of Turkmen and Iranian gas westward to Europe. In
violation of America's 1996 Libya-Iran Sanctions Act, Turkey also
plans significant investment in Iran with the construction of three
large power plants. Threatened but persistent, Iran is eager to court
its most powerful neighbor and a key ally of the United States. And
Turkey, unwilling to play the obedient mistress in the U.S. campaign
to isolate Tehran, has responded warmly to the wooing.
Tehran, moreover, is adept at turning the public relations game
against Washington. In an interview with the HPR, Soner Cagaptay,
Director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, said that Iran is attempting to "drive a wedge"
between Turkey and the U.S. with what he calls "public diplomacy":
on days when U.S. officials conduct talks in Ankara, Iran bombs
PKK camps and steals headlines in the Turkish newspapers. Despite
U.S. intelligence sharing on rebel positions, Cagaptay says, "the
Iranians have created this semblance in Turkey that when it comes to
the PKK, the Americans talk the talk and Iranians walk the walk."
Repairing Ties Last October, President Bush condemned a particularly
deadly cross-border ambush by the PKK that killed 17 Turkish soldiers,
saying, "the attacks must stop now." A few months later, the day
before the majority of Turkish forces withdrew from Iraq, Bush joined
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in calling for Turkey to get out "as
soon as possible." The rhetorical juggling act illustrates the fine
line that Washington must tread between protecting the sovereignty
of the fledgling Iraqi state and assuring one of its most important
regional allies of the right to dislodge terrorists from border
positions.
There is, however, potential for improved U.S.-Turkey relations
going forward. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan met with President
Bush in November 2007 partly to discuss the PKK, and the United
States has since augmented its sharing of actionable intelligence
to assist Turkish operations. Washington, Cagaptay says, also gave
Turkey the "green light" for its recent incursions into northern Iraq,
improving relations considerably. The defeat of the Armenian genocide
resolution in Congress, a largely symbolic bill that is nonetheless
a highly sensitive issue for Turkey, also eased tensions as the Bush
administration made a strong show of resistance. And although the
United States and Iraq pressured Turkey to withdraw at the end of
February, Colonel Onay predicts that this will not be the last of
Turkish offensives: "Turkey is determined to take all the measures no
matter what it costs, because this problem is a matter of existence
for her."
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress