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From: Robert Bedrosian <[email protected]>
Subject: Georgia: Reckless Saakashvili took on Russian Goliath Putin
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world /europe/article4500160.ece
>From The Times
August 11, 2008
Georgia: Reckless Saakashvili took on Russian Goliath Putin
Michael Evans, Defence Editor
Georgia's attempt to seize control of the secessionist South Ossetia
region has been a gamble too far, reckless in its timing and founded
on a fundamental misjudgment.
President Saakashvili of Georgia thought that he had the West on his
side but he has been outsmarted by Vladimir Putin, the Russian Prime
Minister, who now holds all the cards.
Although Mr Saakashvili has had American military personnel training
his army to serve in Iraq, there was never any question of Washington
taking on the Russians on his behalf.
The military adventure had all the hallmarks of rushed planning and a
fingers-crossed strategy, launched in the hope and expectation that
the Russians would not react, but that if they did, the Americans and
Georgia's other Nato friends would come to his aid in one form or
another. With President Bush at the Beijing Olympics, was, perhaps,
the US eye off the ball when the Russians moved in?
After only three days, the Georgian leader has had to pull back,
partly because his troops failed to seal off the Roki tunnel, 2½ miles
(4km) long, that links South Ossetia with North Ossetia and provided
passage for dozens of Russian tanks and armoured vehicles. It was a
military blunder.
Five battalions of Russia's 58th Army, which fought in Chechnya, drove
through the tunnel. With 150 tanks, heavy artillery and overwhelmingly
superior firepower, the Russian troops were able to seize control of
all the heights around Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia.
The 58th, which is based at Vladikavkaz in the North Caucasus military
district in Russia, was backed by ground-attack aircraft, presenting a
formidable fighting package. At the same time there were indications
that the Russians planned a second front, moving into Abkhazia. The
tiny Georgian Army never stood a chance.
It was also a classic misreading on Mr Saakashvili's part of the
relationship between Washington and Moscow, and a misunderstanding of
what Mr Putin was prepared to do to maintain his image as the tough
guy in the region and on the world stage.
Mr Putin has on a number of occasions publicly dismissed any
possibility that the Cold War could return. But the decision by Mr
Saakashvili gave the Russian leader the opportunity he was waiting for
to stamp his authority over Georgia and at the same time to cock a
snook at the West. He knew that he could get away with pouring troops,
armoured vehicles and artillery into South Ossetia to "protect" the
majority Russian passport-holding inhabitants. All he had to do was
wait for Mr Saakashvili to make the first move.
The seeds of the Georgian misadventure were sown in Bucharest at the
Nato summit in April, where alliance leaders gave out mixed messages
about their enthusiasm for Georgia to join the US-dominated
organisation. Adroit diplomatic pressure by Mr Putin when he was
Russian President forced a split in the alliance, with President Bush
finding himself in a minority when he urged his colleagues to sign up
Georgia for Nato's membership action plan, the key stage to joining as
a full member eventually.
Despite the summit's declaration that both Georgia and Ukraine would
definitely, some day, join the alliance, Mr Putin would have realised
that Nato was not yet prepared to go all the way, fearing the damage
that it might cause to relations with Moscow.
Mr Saakashvili put on a bold front, despite his disappointment,
especially after Mr Bush had been so publicly in favour of Georgia
joining Nato, and, probably, at that moment, started thinking about
launching a military operation against the secessionists in South
Ossetia, and, if successful, possibly to move against Abkhazia, the
other separatist region. Perhaps he judged that Nato would then be
spurred into action.
However, with Russian troops never far away, it was always going to be
David versus Goliath. But this time a slingshot was not good enough.
He had Mr Putin to deal with and there was never any doubt who would
win that battle.
Subject: Georgia: Reckless Saakashvili took on Russian Goliath Putin
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world /europe/article4500160.ece
>From The Times
August 11, 2008
Georgia: Reckless Saakashvili took on Russian Goliath Putin
Michael Evans, Defence Editor
Georgia's attempt to seize control of the secessionist South Ossetia
region has been a gamble too far, reckless in its timing and founded
on a fundamental misjudgment.
President Saakashvili of Georgia thought that he had the West on his
side but he has been outsmarted by Vladimir Putin, the Russian Prime
Minister, who now holds all the cards.
Although Mr Saakashvili has had American military personnel training
his army to serve in Iraq, there was never any question of Washington
taking on the Russians on his behalf.
The military adventure had all the hallmarks of rushed planning and a
fingers-crossed strategy, launched in the hope and expectation that
the Russians would not react, but that if they did, the Americans and
Georgia's other Nato friends would come to his aid in one form or
another. With President Bush at the Beijing Olympics, was, perhaps,
the US eye off the ball when the Russians moved in?
After only three days, the Georgian leader has had to pull back,
partly because his troops failed to seal off the Roki tunnel, 2½ miles
(4km) long, that links South Ossetia with North Ossetia and provided
passage for dozens of Russian tanks and armoured vehicles. It was a
military blunder.
Five battalions of Russia's 58th Army, which fought in Chechnya, drove
through the tunnel. With 150 tanks, heavy artillery and overwhelmingly
superior firepower, the Russian troops were able to seize control of
all the heights around Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia.
The 58th, which is based at Vladikavkaz in the North Caucasus military
district in Russia, was backed by ground-attack aircraft, presenting a
formidable fighting package. At the same time there were indications
that the Russians planned a second front, moving into Abkhazia. The
tiny Georgian Army never stood a chance.
It was also a classic misreading on Mr Saakashvili's part of the
relationship between Washington and Moscow, and a misunderstanding of
what Mr Putin was prepared to do to maintain his image as the tough
guy in the region and on the world stage.
Mr Putin has on a number of occasions publicly dismissed any
possibility that the Cold War could return. But the decision by Mr
Saakashvili gave the Russian leader the opportunity he was waiting for
to stamp his authority over Georgia and at the same time to cock a
snook at the West. He knew that he could get away with pouring troops,
armoured vehicles and artillery into South Ossetia to "protect" the
majority Russian passport-holding inhabitants. All he had to do was
wait for Mr Saakashvili to make the first move.
The seeds of the Georgian misadventure were sown in Bucharest at the
Nato summit in April, where alliance leaders gave out mixed messages
about their enthusiasm for Georgia to join the US-dominated
organisation. Adroit diplomatic pressure by Mr Putin when he was
Russian President forced a split in the alliance, with President Bush
finding himself in a minority when he urged his colleagues to sign up
Georgia for Nato's membership action plan, the key stage to joining as
a full member eventually.
Despite the summit's declaration that both Georgia and Ukraine would
definitely, some day, join the alliance, Mr Putin would have realised
that Nato was not yet prepared to go all the way, fearing the damage
that it might cause to relations with Moscow.
Mr Saakashvili put on a bold front, despite his disappointment,
especially after Mr Bush had been so publicly in favour of Georgia
joining Nato, and, probably, at that moment, started thinking about
launching a military operation against the secessionists in South
Ossetia, and, if successful, possibly to move against Abkhazia, the
other separatist region. Perhaps he judged that Nato would then be
spurred into action.
However, with Russian troops never far away, it was always going to be
David versus Goliath. But this time a slingshot was not good enough.
He had Mr Putin to deal with and there was never any doubt who would
win that battle.