THE GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN CONFLICT THROUGH THE EYES OF BAKU
By Fariz Ismailzade
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
DC
The escalating conflict in Georgia--with its unexpected military
developments and great humanitarian losses--seems to have caught
Azerbaijani officials and the public off guard. Azerbaijanis are not
new to the world of Russian political games in the Caucasus. Baku
itself suffered greatly from Russian intervention in 1990 and after
that from the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet, the rapid
and aggressive style of Russian intervention in Georgia in the past
few days has created far greater security and economic dilemmas for
Azerbaijan than even the most pessimistic analysts in the country
could have predicted only a week ago.
Russian jet fighters have bombed both civilians and military airports
in Georgia, forcing all airlines, including Azerbaijani Airlines
(AZAL), to stop flights. Moreover, for several days in a row the
Russians bombed the Black Sea port of Poti, which serves as the main
terminal for the export of Azerbaijani energy products as well as
other cargo. With the explosions on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline
last week, Azerbaijan was looking for Georgian railways, ports and
pipelines as an important alternative for the export of Caspian energy
supplies to Western markets. All of this has stopped, putting both
Georgia and Azerbaijan in economic difficulties. Nonetheless, there
is little fear in official circles in Baku that Russia will bomb the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and other energy-related infrastructures
to destroy the successful East-West transport and energy corridor
between Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Azerbaijan is Georgia's strategic ally. Both countries are united
not only by geopolitical interests and world-class pipelines, but
also by the regional security organization GUAM. GUAM, although
passive for most of the decade, has lately been re-energized and
even played with the idea of establishing its own peacekeeping and
security forces. Under such a situation, it seems like GUAM would be a
convenient venue to express support and solidarity with the Georgians.
Azerbaijan, however, finds itself in a very difficult situation. On
the one hand, there is enormous public support for Georgia
throughout Azerbaijan. In private conversations, almost all
Azerbaijanis blame Russia for aggression and express frustration
with the imperialist policies of the Kremlin in the South
Caucasus. A group of intelligentsia went to the Russian embassy
on August 10 to protest against the military actions in Georgia
(http://ilgarmammadov.livejournal.com). This was repeated by members
of youth organizations (www.day.az, August 11). The main opposition
party Musavat issued a statement on August 11, calling for "respect
of the territorial integrity of Georgia and an immediate stop to the
aggressive policy of Russia" (Musavat party press release). The party
called on the Azerbaijani government to show a "principled position"
on the conflict. A similar statement came from the Democratic Party
of Azerbaijan.
For its pro-Georgian coverage of the events, the most popular
Azerbaijani news website www.day.az was attacked by Russian special
forces on August 11 and had to cease its activities temporarily
(www.day.az press release, August 11). Elnur Baimov, the editor in
chief of www.day.az said on August 11 that "we all saw the diplomatic
loss of Russia."
Government officials have been relatively calm about the situation,
considering the fragile relations between Moscow and Baku and the
desire of the latter not to ruin bilateral relations between the two
countries. The spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Khazar
Ibrahim told journalists on August 8, however, that "Azerbaijan favors
the solution of the South Ossetia conflict based on the territorial
integrity of Georgia and Georgian adherence to international law"
(www.day.az).
On August 11, ANS TV reported that 50 Azerbaijanis had gathered in
Georgia's Azerbaijani-populated provinces to go to the war for the
defense of their country. It is noteworthy that Russians have bombed
Azerbaijani populated areas of Georgia for three days in a row, killing
four and wounding dozens. The possibility is not excluded that this
was done in hopes of fomenting strife between Azeris and Georgians.
The present situation in Georgia presents huge security concerns for
official Baku. If Russia manages to squeeze Georgia, then it would
put an end to the economic independence of Azerbaijan as well. Many
analysts in Baku believe that the real purpose of the pressure on
Georgia is the Kremlin's desire to control Azerbaijan.
Thus, it is vital for Azerbaijan to provide all necessary assistance
to its strategic ally. Considering the political realities between
Baku and Moscow, it is unlikely that the Azerbaijani government will
provide any military assistance to Georgia. Economic and humanitarian
assistance, however, is definitely an option. Azerbaijan remains the
only viable international outlet for Georgia, and many Georgians have
already started using the territory of Azerbaijan to travel abroad.
Azerbaijani political analysts believe that the war in Georgia is a
long-term loss for the Kremlin. By showing its neo-imperialist face,
Russia may have lost the Caucasus forever. The political analyst
Ilgar Mammadov says that "If Georgia stays strong for few more days,
we will all see the defeat of Russia from the Caucasus." Another
analyst Vugar Seidov says "The departure of Russia from Abkhazia and
South Ossetia is historically inevitable" (Regnum, August 10).
By Fariz Ismailzade
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
DC
The escalating conflict in Georgia--with its unexpected military
developments and great humanitarian losses--seems to have caught
Azerbaijani officials and the public off guard. Azerbaijanis are not
new to the world of Russian political games in the Caucasus. Baku
itself suffered greatly from Russian intervention in 1990 and after
that from the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet, the rapid
and aggressive style of Russian intervention in Georgia in the past
few days has created far greater security and economic dilemmas for
Azerbaijan than even the most pessimistic analysts in the country
could have predicted only a week ago.
Russian jet fighters have bombed both civilians and military airports
in Georgia, forcing all airlines, including Azerbaijani Airlines
(AZAL), to stop flights. Moreover, for several days in a row the
Russians bombed the Black Sea port of Poti, which serves as the main
terminal for the export of Azerbaijani energy products as well as
other cargo. With the explosions on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline
last week, Azerbaijan was looking for Georgian railways, ports and
pipelines as an important alternative for the export of Caspian energy
supplies to Western markets. All of this has stopped, putting both
Georgia and Azerbaijan in economic difficulties. Nonetheless, there
is little fear in official circles in Baku that Russia will bomb the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and other energy-related infrastructures
to destroy the successful East-West transport and energy corridor
between Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Azerbaijan is Georgia's strategic ally. Both countries are united
not only by geopolitical interests and world-class pipelines, but
also by the regional security organization GUAM. GUAM, although
passive for most of the decade, has lately been re-energized and
even played with the idea of establishing its own peacekeeping and
security forces. Under such a situation, it seems like GUAM would be a
convenient venue to express support and solidarity with the Georgians.
Azerbaijan, however, finds itself in a very difficult situation. On
the one hand, there is enormous public support for Georgia
throughout Azerbaijan. In private conversations, almost all
Azerbaijanis blame Russia for aggression and express frustration
with the imperialist policies of the Kremlin in the South
Caucasus. A group of intelligentsia went to the Russian embassy
on August 10 to protest against the military actions in Georgia
(http://ilgarmammadov.livejournal.com). This was repeated by members
of youth organizations (www.day.az, August 11). The main opposition
party Musavat issued a statement on August 11, calling for "respect
of the territorial integrity of Georgia and an immediate stop to the
aggressive policy of Russia" (Musavat party press release). The party
called on the Azerbaijani government to show a "principled position"
on the conflict. A similar statement came from the Democratic Party
of Azerbaijan.
For its pro-Georgian coverage of the events, the most popular
Azerbaijani news website www.day.az was attacked by Russian special
forces on August 11 and had to cease its activities temporarily
(www.day.az press release, August 11). Elnur Baimov, the editor in
chief of www.day.az said on August 11 that "we all saw the diplomatic
loss of Russia."
Government officials have been relatively calm about the situation,
considering the fragile relations between Moscow and Baku and the
desire of the latter not to ruin bilateral relations between the two
countries. The spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Khazar
Ibrahim told journalists on August 8, however, that "Azerbaijan favors
the solution of the South Ossetia conflict based on the territorial
integrity of Georgia and Georgian adherence to international law"
(www.day.az).
On August 11, ANS TV reported that 50 Azerbaijanis had gathered in
Georgia's Azerbaijani-populated provinces to go to the war for the
defense of their country. It is noteworthy that Russians have bombed
Azerbaijani populated areas of Georgia for three days in a row, killing
four and wounding dozens. The possibility is not excluded that this
was done in hopes of fomenting strife between Azeris and Georgians.
The present situation in Georgia presents huge security concerns for
official Baku. If Russia manages to squeeze Georgia, then it would
put an end to the economic independence of Azerbaijan as well. Many
analysts in Baku believe that the real purpose of the pressure on
Georgia is the Kremlin's desire to control Azerbaijan.
Thus, it is vital for Azerbaijan to provide all necessary assistance
to its strategic ally. Considering the political realities between
Baku and Moscow, it is unlikely that the Azerbaijani government will
provide any military assistance to Georgia. Economic and humanitarian
assistance, however, is definitely an option. Azerbaijan remains the
only viable international outlet for Georgia, and many Georgians have
already started using the territory of Azerbaijan to travel abroad.
Azerbaijani political analysts believe that the war in Georgia is a
long-term loss for the Kremlin. By showing its neo-imperialist face,
Russia may have lost the Caucasus forever. The political analyst
Ilgar Mammadov says that "If Georgia stays strong for few more days,
we will all see the defeat of Russia from the Caucasus." Another
analyst Vugar Seidov says "The departure of Russia from Abkhazia and
South Ossetia is historically inevitable" (Regnum, August 10).