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GEORGIA CAUSED THIS WAR
By Vadim Mukhanov
The Moscow Times
13 August 2008
Russia
The war in South Ossetia must be understood for what it really is
-- Georgia's one-sided escalation of the conflict. This places full
responsibility for the bloodshed on Georgia's side. Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili's decision to send in heavy equipment and artillery
late Thursday led to large civilian casualties in South Ossetia.
In all likelihood, the opportunistic Saakashvili saw the opening
day of the Olympics in Beijing on Friday as his best chance for a
successful blitzkrieg against recalcitrant South Ossetia. He also
wagered that Russia's reaction would not be fast or powerful enough to
stop Georgian divisions from seizing a large part of the unrecognized
republic under their control, or from forcing the civilian population
to flee through the Roki Tunnel into neighboring North Ossetia.
Russia's response turned out to be timely and effective. It brought
to a halt Georgia's wanton murder of civilians in South Ossetia and
the bombing of its villages. The Georgian forces that had savagely
destroyed Tskhinvali and surrounding towns were routed.
The main goal of Georgia's leadership is to join NATO and to become
integrated into European political and economic organizations. Toward
that end, Tbilisi regularly complained about the incompetence of
Russian peacekeeping forces in the conflict zones between Georgia and
its breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, requesting that
those forces be replaced with international peacekeepers. Saakashvili
probably thought that the departure of Russia's peacekeepers would
enable him to make the leaders of the unrecognized republics more
compliant and to bring Abkhazia and South Ossetia under Georgia's
control.
Since he was unable to replace the Russian peacekeepers, Saakashvili
opted to resolve the conflict by the simplest of means -- by
force. Georgia's position is undeniably advantageous. Should it
emerge victorious, Georgia would earn the honor and respect of the
United States and the other NATO members. Should it lose and suffer
a retaliatory strike by Russia, NATO will have great sympathy for
Tbilisi. Thus, a tactical defeat could turn into a strategic victory
if NATO decides at its December summit to grant Georgia membership. On
the other hand, Georgia's recklessness may strengthen the position
of NATO members, such as Germany, who are opposed to granting Tbilisi
membership.
It was inevitable that this conflict, which had been simmering for
years, would eventually erupt into open warfare. Moreover, since South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, the other breakaway republic, are allies, the
Abkhaz leadership understood clearly that if Georgia was successful
in Tskhinvali, it would turn its war machine toward Sukhumi.
Georgia's disagreements with South Ossetia and Abkhazia escalated
into open warfare, and this will mean an end to the peace initiatives
for the breakaway republics that were proposed by Russia and the
European Union. Incidentally, Russia's quick and decisive repelling
of Georgia's aggression sent a clear signal to Azerbaijan, which --
not unlike Georgia -- has also considered using military force to
resolve its Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the post-Soviet period, the
key to subduing and managing such conflicts in the Caucasus has been
for Russia to threaten the use of force against the side exhibiting
excessive aggression.
Obviously, as Prime Minister Vladimir Putin correctly stated Saturday,
there is now no chance of South Ossetia or Abkhazia ever being
incorporated into Georgia. Thus, the likelihood of these regions
receiving a Kosovo-like independence is greater than ever.
The past week's events have shown that Georgia, with its current
leadership, is incapable of behaving responsibly, either domestically
or in the international arena. With its $2 billion in foreign debt,
Georgia is on the verge of bankruptcy. But instead of developing its
domestic political and economic programs, Saakashvili's administration
continues to send shock waves throughout the Caucasus.
It seems that relations between Moscow and Tbilisi will be strained for
the foreseeable future, and they could become openly adversarial should
Georgia gain NATO membership. The Russia-Georgia war has already put
a strain on relations with the West and particularly with the United
States. Some of the sharpest statements against Russia have come
from the White House as well as presidential candidate John McCain,
and Russia's relations with the West will only worsen if a peaceful
solution to the conflict is not found.
Vadim Mukhanov is a senior researcher at the Foreign Ministry's
Caucasus Research Center at the Moscow State Institute for
International Relations.
By Vadim Mukhanov
The Moscow Times
13 August 2008
Russia
The war in South Ossetia must be understood for what it really is
-- Georgia's one-sided escalation of the conflict. This places full
responsibility for the bloodshed on Georgia's side. Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili's decision to send in heavy equipment and artillery
late Thursday led to large civilian casualties in South Ossetia.
In all likelihood, the opportunistic Saakashvili saw the opening
day of the Olympics in Beijing on Friday as his best chance for a
successful blitzkrieg against recalcitrant South Ossetia. He also
wagered that Russia's reaction would not be fast or powerful enough to
stop Georgian divisions from seizing a large part of the unrecognized
republic under their control, or from forcing the civilian population
to flee through the Roki Tunnel into neighboring North Ossetia.
Russia's response turned out to be timely and effective. It brought
to a halt Georgia's wanton murder of civilians in South Ossetia and
the bombing of its villages. The Georgian forces that had savagely
destroyed Tskhinvali and surrounding towns were routed.
The main goal of Georgia's leadership is to join NATO and to become
integrated into European political and economic organizations. Toward
that end, Tbilisi regularly complained about the incompetence of
Russian peacekeeping forces in the conflict zones between Georgia and
its breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, requesting that
those forces be replaced with international peacekeepers. Saakashvili
probably thought that the departure of Russia's peacekeepers would
enable him to make the leaders of the unrecognized republics more
compliant and to bring Abkhazia and South Ossetia under Georgia's
control.
Since he was unable to replace the Russian peacekeepers, Saakashvili
opted to resolve the conflict by the simplest of means -- by
force. Georgia's position is undeniably advantageous. Should it
emerge victorious, Georgia would earn the honor and respect of the
United States and the other NATO members. Should it lose and suffer
a retaliatory strike by Russia, NATO will have great sympathy for
Tbilisi. Thus, a tactical defeat could turn into a strategic victory
if NATO decides at its December summit to grant Georgia membership. On
the other hand, Georgia's recklessness may strengthen the position
of NATO members, such as Germany, who are opposed to granting Tbilisi
membership.
It was inevitable that this conflict, which had been simmering for
years, would eventually erupt into open warfare. Moreover, since South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, the other breakaway republic, are allies, the
Abkhaz leadership understood clearly that if Georgia was successful
in Tskhinvali, it would turn its war machine toward Sukhumi.
Georgia's disagreements with South Ossetia and Abkhazia escalated
into open warfare, and this will mean an end to the peace initiatives
for the breakaway republics that were proposed by Russia and the
European Union. Incidentally, Russia's quick and decisive repelling
of Georgia's aggression sent a clear signal to Azerbaijan, which --
not unlike Georgia -- has also considered using military force to
resolve its Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the post-Soviet period, the
key to subduing and managing such conflicts in the Caucasus has been
for Russia to threaten the use of force against the side exhibiting
excessive aggression.
Obviously, as Prime Minister Vladimir Putin correctly stated Saturday,
there is now no chance of South Ossetia or Abkhazia ever being
incorporated into Georgia. Thus, the likelihood of these regions
receiving a Kosovo-like independence is greater than ever.
The past week's events have shown that Georgia, with its current
leadership, is incapable of behaving responsibly, either domestically
or in the international arena. With its $2 billion in foreign debt,
Georgia is on the verge of bankruptcy. But instead of developing its
domestic political and economic programs, Saakashvili's administration
continues to send shock waves throughout the Caucasus.
It seems that relations between Moscow and Tbilisi will be strained for
the foreseeable future, and they could become openly adversarial should
Georgia gain NATO membership. The Russia-Georgia war has already put
a strain on relations with the West and particularly with the United
States. Some of the sharpest statements against Russia have come
from the White House as well as presidential candidate John McCain,
and Russia's relations with the West will only worsen if a peaceful
solution to the conflict is not found.
Vadim Mukhanov is a senior researcher at the Foreign Ministry's
Caucasus Research Center at the Moscow State Institute for
International Relations.