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THE GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN CONFLICT: A TEST FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION
Lili di Puppo
EurasiaNet
Thursday, August 14, 2008
NY
The current Georgian-Russian conflict is a major test for the European
Union and its capacity to engage in conflict resolution in the Caucasus
region. Wary of irritating Russia by a too-visible presence, the EU has
adopted a soft power approach to the region in recent years. France's
mediation of a framework for a later cease-fire agreement between
Russia and Georgia suggests that that role is slotted to change.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the current president of the
European Union, holds that Europe has no choice but to mediate an end
to the current fighting between Russia and Georgia. "Europe cannot
be passive. Europe must express its political will, which is what it
is doing at this moment," Sarkozy told an August 13 press conference
at the presidential residence in Tbilisi.
Tbilisi and Moscow have agreed to a document presented by French
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner that contains six principles for a
future, permanent agreement: 1) the non-use of force by all parties
(Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia); 2) an immediate end to
hostilities; 3) free access to humanitarian aid; 4) the retreat of
Georgian forces to their earlier positions, and the retreat of Russian
forces to their original positions outside of South Ossetia, within
the Russian Federation; 5) additional temporary security arrangements
for peacekeepers in South Ossetia, but only within the bounds of
South Ossetia itself; 6) the start of "international discussions"
about stability and security measures in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The principles, Sarkozy asserted, form "the start of a process which
will permit, France fully hopes, peace in this region . . ."
Foreign Minister Kouchner will present the document to an August 13
meeting of the European Union's 27 foreign ministers in Brussels. Once
approved, the document will go onto the United Nations Security Council
for further discussion and elaboration into a permanent agreement,
pending approval by Russia and Georgia.
While conceding that sizeable obstacles for such an accord still
persist, the French leader asserted that he had "found interlocutors
in Moscow and in Tbilisi ready to do a service for peace. And that's
what counts."
France's role dovetails with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's
own vision of Georgia as a potential EU member, and as a strategically
critical country that should command the European heavyweights'
active interest.
The diplomatic catch is, though, that Tbilisi appears to focus
more on France, than the European Union itself. Speaking in French,
Saakashvili asserted that France's participation has been "much more
effective than the small countries which are represented in the Union."
Differences within the Union over what role it should take in the
Caucasus have been one longtime obstacle to the group taking a more
active role in conflict resolution. To date, the European Union has
relied on a soft power approach to the Caucasus region.
Favored tactics have relied more on economic rehabilitation than
on direct intervention - a cautious approach dictated largely by
sensitivity toward Russia.
One senior European diplomat believes that the current crisis over
South Ossetia will most likely prompt a new take on Europe's role in
the region.
There will be much "reflection, soul searching and drawing lessons"
after the tragic events of the last days in order to prevent such
events from happening in the future, the European Union's Special
Representative for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby told EurasiaNet.
The EU will have a more "refined policy vis-a-vis Russia," Semneby
said. The EU and Russia, he said, now have "a very . . .real-life
situation and experiences to base those relations on." He did not
elaborate.
The outcome of the August 13 meeting of European Union foreign
ministers in Brussels could provide an indication of any such changes,
Semneby added.
Already, signs of a change in EU policy toward the Caucasus have begun
to emerge. Among them: the German foreign ministry's work on a peace
proposal for the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, and the June 2008 visit of
EU High Representative Javier Solana to Abkhazia are the most recent
signs of this evolution.
One analyst argues that the war's most important implications will
be on the EU's relations with Ukraine and its engagement in other
regional conflicts, including Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniester.
Nicu Popescu from the European Council on Foreign Relations in London
believes that the current war has proven that "the Russia-first
approach to the neighborhood is probably the biggest failure not
only in European Neighborhood Policy, but in EU conflict prevention
policies."
Any change would mean a complicated policy tussle, though. EU member
states like Germany view the EU's role in the region more as an honest
broker between Georgia and Russia or Russia and the United States,
while new member states like Poland and the Baltic states would like
to see the EU play a more active, direct role, and take a tougher
line toward Russia.
Uwe Halbach from the German Institute for International and Security
Affairs in Berlin views the role of Russia in regional conflict
resolution as the trickiest question for European peace initiatives.
"It is quite clear that conflict resolution doesn't work without Russia
or in confrontation to Russia," Halbach observed. "But it also doesn't
work without calling into question the role of Russia as a mediator
and monopolist peacekeeper in the Georgian secessionist conflicts."
In Saakashvili's view, any future peace agreement with Russia needs to
do precisely that. "This document has [a] clear indication . . . There
should be internationalization of the process . . . which is to say
there are temporary arrangements for now, but later it should be
replaced with participation from the EU and the UN," he said.
The European Union's own role in such an operation is uncertain,
however. The European Security and Defense Policy is not believed
sufficiently developed to allow for large peacekeeping commitments.
Cautions Sabine Fischer from the European Institute for Security
Studies in Paris: "There is no EU when it comes to conflict resolution
in Georgia, there are only member states."
Editor's Note: Lili Di Puppo is the editor-in-chief of the online
magazine Caucaz.com and a PhD candidate at the European Viadrina
University (Frankfurt/Oder) in Germany.
Lili di Puppo
EurasiaNet
Thursday, August 14, 2008
NY
The current Georgian-Russian conflict is a major test for the European
Union and its capacity to engage in conflict resolution in the Caucasus
region. Wary of irritating Russia by a too-visible presence, the EU has
adopted a soft power approach to the region in recent years. France's
mediation of a framework for a later cease-fire agreement between
Russia and Georgia suggests that that role is slotted to change.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the current president of the
European Union, holds that Europe has no choice but to mediate an end
to the current fighting between Russia and Georgia. "Europe cannot
be passive. Europe must express its political will, which is what it
is doing at this moment," Sarkozy told an August 13 press conference
at the presidential residence in Tbilisi.
Tbilisi and Moscow have agreed to a document presented by French
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner that contains six principles for a
future, permanent agreement: 1) the non-use of force by all parties
(Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia); 2) an immediate end to
hostilities; 3) free access to humanitarian aid; 4) the retreat of
Georgian forces to their earlier positions, and the retreat of Russian
forces to their original positions outside of South Ossetia, within
the Russian Federation; 5) additional temporary security arrangements
for peacekeepers in South Ossetia, but only within the bounds of
South Ossetia itself; 6) the start of "international discussions"
about stability and security measures in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The principles, Sarkozy asserted, form "the start of a process which
will permit, France fully hopes, peace in this region . . ."
Foreign Minister Kouchner will present the document to an August 13
meeting of the European Union's 27 foreign ministers in Brussels. Once
approved, the document will go onto the United Nations Security Council
for further discussion and elaboration into a permanent agreement,
pending approval by Russia and Georgia.
While conceding that sizeable obstacles for such an accord still
persist, the French leader asserted that he had "found interlocutors
in Moscow and in Tbilisi ready to do a service for peace. And that's
what counts."
France's role dovetails with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's
own vision of Georgia as a potential EU member, and as a strategically
critical country that should command the European heavyweights'
active interest.
The diplomatic catch is, though, that Tbilisi appears to focus
more on France, than the European Union itself. Speaking in French,
Saakashvili asserted that France's participation has been "much more
effective than the small countries which are represented in the Union."
Differences within the Union over what role it should take in the
Caucasus have been one longtime obstacle to the group taking a more
active role in conflict resolution. To date, the European Union has
relied on a soft power approach to the Caucasus region.
Favored tactics have relied more on economic rehabilitation than
on direct intervention - a cautious approach dictated largely by
sensitivity toward Russia.
One senior European diplomat believes that the current crisis over
South Ossetia will most likely prompt a new take on Europe's role in
the region.
There will be much "reflection, soul searching and drawing lessons"
after the tragic events of the last days in order to prevent such
events from happening in the future, the European Union's Special
Representative for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby told EurasiaNet.
The EU will have a more "refined policy vis-a-vis Russia," Semneby
said. The EU and Russia, he said, now have "a very . . .real-life
situation and experiences to base those relations on." He did not
elaborate.
The outcome of the August 13 meeting of European Union foreign
ministers in Brussels could provide an indication of any such changes,
Semneby added.
Already, signs of a change in EU policy toward the Caucasus have begun
to emerge. Among them: the German foreign ministry's work on a peace
proposal for the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, and the June 2008 visit of
EU High Representative Javier Solana to Abkhazia are the most recent
signs of this evolution.
One analyst argues that the war's most important implications will
be on the EU's relations with Ukraine and its engagement in other
regional conflicts, including Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniester.
Nicu Popescu from the European Council on Foreign Relations in London
believes that the current war has proven that "the Russia-first
approach to the neighborhood is probably the biggest failure not
only in European Neighborhood Policy, but in EU conflict prevention
policies."
Any change would mean a complicated policy tussle, though. EU member
states like Germany view the EU's role in the region more as an honest
broker between Georgia and Russia or Russia and the United States,
while new member states like Poland and the Baltic states would like
to see the EU play a more active, direct role, and take a tougher
line toward Russia.
Uwe Halbach from the German Institute for International and Security
Affairs in Berlin views the role of Russia in regional conflict
resolution as the trickiest question for European peace initiatives.
"It is quite clear that conflict resolution doesn't work without Russia
or in confrontation to Russia," Halbach observed. "But it also doesn't
work without calling into question the role of Russia as a mediator
and monopolist peacekeeper in the Georgian secessionist conflicts."
In Saakashvili's view, any future peace agreement with Russia needs to
do precisely that. "This document has [a] clear indication . . . There
should be internationalization of the process . . . which is to say
there are temporary arrangements for now, but later it should be
replaced with participation from the EU and the UN," he said.
The European Union's own role in such an operation is uncertain,
however. The European Security and Defense Policy is not believed
sufficiently developed to allow for large peacekeeping commitments.
Cautions Sabine Fischer from the European Institute for Security
Studies in Paris: "There is no EU when it comes to conflict resolution
in Georgia, there are only member states."
Editor's Note: Lili Di Puppo is the editor-in-chief of the online
magazine Caucaz.com and a PhD candidate at the European Viadrina
University (Frankfurt/Oder) in Germany.