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Saakashvili's rescue operation
23:08 | 15/ 08/ 2008
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Fedyashin) - It took
the United States a week to understand the damage Mikheil Saakashvili's
"Ossetian blitzkrieg" has caused him, and its fosterling, the Rose
Democracy.
Now Washington has launched an operation to rescue Saakasvili in real
earnest. At the same time, a diplomatic battle is unfolding around the
Caucasian knot. Regrettably, this struggle will be harder for Russia to
win than any armed conflict. On August 14, U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice arrived in Paris to meet President Nicolas Sarkozy,
and immediately left for Tbilisi to talk with Saakashvili. At the same
time, President George W. Bush sanctioned humanitarian relief to
Georgia. The first S-17 cargo planes have already delivered medicines
and food there. Several U.S. warships are moving to Georgian shores
from the Persian Gulf to prevent Russia from blocking relief aid.
The Pentagon's humanitarian relief effort has little to do with
Georgia's real requirements. But this is the first action in support of
Saakashvili. He did not receive such support in the first days after
the attack, and even began to complain that Washington's initial
criticisms of Moscow's role in the conflict were too mild. This was not
what he expected from those who had pushed him to attack South Ossetia.
Now Bush has accused Russia of "not behaving like the kind of
international partner that it has said it wants to be." The fact that
Washington has only lashed out at Moscow a week after the event is
telling. Usually, the Americans provide thorough propaganda support for
their political or military actions in any part of the globe (the
invasions of Grenada, Panama, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq are all
good examples), and do this preemptively. The flow of inspired leaks
and revelations from anonymous high-rankers usually mounts for weeks
before the decisive blow.
But it did not happen with Georgia. In fact, the U.S. press carried
post factum "confidential" reports that during her visit to Tbilisi
over a month ago Rice warned Saakashvili against military action. But
he either did not get it, or lost his temper, and decided to act at his
own risk. Sometimes pocket rulers get out of hand.
Yet it is hard to believe that a stateswoman as formidable as "Teflon
Condi" could not make it clear to Saakashvili what the White House
wants or does not want him to do. And he is not an Angela Merkel or
Silvio Berlusconi, who can easily afford not to listen to the U.S.
secretary of state.
The White House's recent moves suggest it has overcome the initial
shock and has embarked on what it calls "damage control" by using the
only remaining option - aggressive diplomacy. These moves also point to
its blunder in anticipating Moscow's reaction to Saakashvili's action.
Washington clearly did not expect such a prompt and forceful response
from Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, still less so on the first day
of the Olympics.
The Olympics are also a key to understanding what happened. After the
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics (after the introduction of Soviet
troops into Afghanistan), U.S. leaders became confident that all Soviet
leaders were obsessed with the Olympic Games (which was true), and that
it was easier for them to arrest several hundred dissidents than be
subjected to a denigrating boycott. It is no accident that one of the
possible responses being floated by Western diplomats is a boycott of
the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, a measure designed to cut "the
aggressive Russia" down to size.
That would certainly be unpleasant, but it is not very likely. Too much
may change in the next six years. The Bush administration will be gone,
for one thing. Incidentally, despite all his outspoken criticism of
Russia's "invasion of Georgia," Republican presidential nominee John
McCain said on August 14 that as president he "would not send American
military forces into a conflict in Georgia."
Like Washington, London never misses a chance to step on the Kremlin's
toes. Together they want to give a tough response to Moscow, and choose
those sanctions that would "hit hardest at its prestige," as The Times
put it. Apart from the Olympic boycott, Washington has suggested a
whole package of measures against Russia, including blocking its entry
to the WTO, denying it admission to the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), excluding it from the G8, stopping
the talks on a new strategic partnership agreement with the EU, and
curtailing its Partnership for Peace with NATO.
NATO is to adopt a common position next week, when its foreign
ministers will gather for an urgent meeting in Brussels at Bush's
request. The meeting will take place on Monday or Tuesday (August 18 or
August 19). The worst-case scenario for Russia is that Washington may
persuade the Europeans to welcome Tbilisi and Kiev to the Membership
Action Plan without delay, a proposal France, Italy and Germany
rejected at NATO's April summit in Bucharest. The Kremlin will be
hoping they will choose to disagree again.
As for the new partnership agreement with the EU, Moscow has no reason
to rush it. Russia is quite content with its current status, and Europe
needs the agreement more than we do. Western business is much more
interested in Russia's WTO entry, because it wants to establish itself
firmly here. The OECD is more of a club of economic projects of its 30
members, and we are not rushing there, either. NATO-Russia partnership
has long become a fiction.
Ousting Russia from the G8 looks like a tough measure, but it is not
really. The G8 long ago lost its original essence, and has turned into
little more than an expensive talking shop. If it is to regain its
relevance its format must be changed. It is strange that Canada is a
member of this club, but such huge economies as China, India, or Brazil
are not. Nor does it include a single African nation. It has been clear
since the end of the past century that this is inadequate. If Russia
leaves this club, it will simply cease to exist.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
23:08 | 15/ 08/ 2008
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Fedyashin) - It took
the United States a week to understand the damage Mikheil Saakashvili's
"Ossetian blitzkrieg" has caused him, and its fosterling, the Rose
Democracy.
Now Washington has launched an operation to rescue Saakasvili in real
earnest. At the same time, a diplomatic battle is unfolding around the
Caucasian knot. Regrettably, this struggle will be harder for Russia to
win than any armed conflict. On August 14, U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice arrived in Paris to meet President Nicolas Sarkozy,
and immediately left for Tbilisi to talk with Saakashvili. At the same
time, President George W. Bush sanctioned humanitarian relief to
Georgia. The first S-17 cargo planes have already delivered medicines
and food there. Several U.S. warships are moving to Georgian shores
from the Persian Gulf to prevent Russia from blocking relief aid.
The Pentagon's humanitarian relief effort has little to do with
Georgia's real requirements. But this is the first action in support of
Saakashvili. He did not receive such support in the first days after
the attack, and even began to complain that Washington's initial
criticisms of Moscow's role in the conflict were too mild. This was not
what he expected from those who had pushed him to attack South Ossetia.
Now Bush has accused Russia of "not behaving like the kind of
international partner that it has said it wants to be." The fact that
Washington has only lashed out at Moscow a week after the event is
telling. Usually, the Americans provide thorough propaganda support for
their political or military actions in any part of the globe (the
invasions of Grenada, Panama, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq are all
good examples), and do this preemptively. The flow of inspired leaks
and revelations from anonymous high-rankers usually mounts for weeks
before the decisive blow.
But it did not happen with Georgia. In fact, the U.S. press carried
post factum "confidential" reports that during her visit to Tbilisi
over a month ago Rice warned Saakashvili against military action. But
he either did not get it, or lost his temper, and decided to act at his
own risk. Sometimes pocket rulers get out of hand.
Yet it is hard to believe that a stateswoman as formidable as "Teflon
Condi" could not make it clear to Saakashvili what the White House
wants or does not want him to do. And he is not an Angela Merkel or
Silvio Berlusconi, who can easily afford not to listen to the U.S.
secretary of state.
The White House's recent moves suggest it has overcome the initial
shock and has embarked on what it calls "damage control" by using the
only remaining option - aggressive diplomacy. These moves also point to
its blunder in anticipating Moscow's reaction to Saakashvili's action.
Washington clearly did not expect such a prompt and forceful response
from Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, still less so on the first day
of the Olympics.
The Olympics are also a key to understanding what happened. After the
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics (after the introduction of Soviet
troops into Afghanistan), U.S. leaders became confident that all Soviet
leaders were obsessed with the Olympic Games (which was true), and that
it was easier for them to arrest several hundred dissidents than be
subjected to a denigrating boycott. It is no accident that one of the
possible responses being floated by Western diplomats is a boycott of
the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, a measure designed to cut "the
aggressive Russia" down to size.
That would certainly be unpleasant, but it is not very likely. Too much
may change in the next six years. The Bush administration will be gone,
for one thing. Incidentally, despite all his outspoken criticism of
Russia's "invasion of Georgia," Republican presidential nominee John
McCain said on August 14 that as president he "would not send American
military forces into a conflict in Georgia."
Like Washington, London never misses a chance to step on the Kremlin's
toes. Together they want to give a tough response to Moscow, and choose
those sanctions that would "hit hardest at its prestige," as The Times
put it. Apart from the Olympic boycott, Washington has suggested a
whole package of measures against Russia, including blocking its entry
to the WTO, denying it admission to the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), excluding it from the G8, stopping
the talks on a new strategic partnership agreement with the EU, and
curtailing its Partnership for Peace with NATO.
NATO is to adopt a common position next week, when its foreign
ministers will gather for an urgent meeting in Brussels at Bush's
request. The meeting will take place on Monday or Tuesday (August 18 or
August 19). The worst-case scenario for Russia is that Washington may
persuade the Europeans to welcome Tbilisi and Kiev to the Membership
Action Plan without delay, a proposal France, Italy and Germany
rejected at NATO's April summit in Bucharest. The Kremlin will be
hoping they will choose to disagree again.
As for the new partnership agreement with the EU, Moscow has no reason
to rush it. Russia is quite content with its current status, and Europe
needs the agreement more than we do. Western business is much more
interested in Russia's WTO entry, because it wants to establish itself
firmly here. The OECD is more of a club of economic projects of its 30
members, and we are not rushing there, either. NATO-Russia partnership
has long become a fiction.
Ousting Russia from the G8 looks like a tough measure, but it is not
really. The G8 long ago lost its original essence, and has turned into
little more than an expensive talking shop. If it is to regain its
relevance its format must be changed. It is strange that Canada is a
member of this club, but such huge economies as China, India, or Brazil
are not. Nor does it include a single African nation. It has been clear
since the end of the past century that this is inadequate. If Russia
leaves this club, it will simply cease to exist.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.