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Beyond David and Goliath

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  • Beyond David and Goliath

    The Canberra Times, Australia
    Aug 18 2008



    Beyond David and Goliath

    ARIS GOUNARIS
    18/08/2008 9:36:00 AM


    When push came to shove, Georgia never stood a chance of defending
    these parts of its territory (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) against the
    military might of its northern neighbour, Russia. Arguably, the
    decision of Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili to forcibly wrest
    control of South Ossetia from so-called Russian peacekeepers was
    foolish in the extreme. In David-versus-Goliath battles like this,
    Goliath usually wins.

    Russia has violated Georgia's territorial integrity. But whether it
    was justified in doing so is yet to be determined. Much of the
    analysis and debate triggered by this conflict centre on the recent
    actions and consequences of the Russian and Georgian military
    forces. The violation of Georgia's sovereign rights, it is argued, is
    bad. Defending democracies against the threats posed by authoritarian
    states, the argument follows, is good.

    Such views are, of course, simplistic. Sovereign rights are not
    inviolable. There are sometimes good reasons for violating a state's
    territorial integrity, particularly as a remedy against systematic
    human rights abuses. Russia has justified its actions along these
    lines. But our knowledge of the facts on the ground before the
    outbreak of war remains sketchy. It is therefore difficult to assess
    the validity of Russia's claims properly.

    I do not defend Russia's actions. Instead, I make a broader point
    about the justifiability of unilateral secession, that is, the
    forcible break-up of a sovereign state. Perhaps if there were some
    consensus among policy-makers about the circumstances in which
    separatism should be supported, there might be less of an ad hoc
    approach to the recognition of breakaway states such as South Ossetia
    and Kosovo.

    International law states that nations or ''peoples'' have a legal
    right to self-determination or statehood. But this runs counter to the
    legal principle of sovereignty, which permits states to defend their
    territory with deadly force. Russia, China, Turkey, Burma, Thailand,
    Indonesia and the Philippines, among others, have sought to justify
    the suppression of separatist forces in their respective countries by
    reference to sovereign rights.

    States should retain the right to defend their territory. But, if the
    cost of doing so is the continued oppression of minority groups, we
    need an exception to this rule. After all, a state's primary function
    is to protect the basic rights of its citizens. If it fails to protect
    these rights, a state's legitimacy is compromised. Aggrieved citizens
    and groups would then be entitled to take remedial action in defence
    of their basic rights.

    In extreme cases, secession may be the only way to defend the rights
    of oppressed groups in the long term. Sovereign rights must give way
    to human rights. What does this mean in practice? It means that third
    parties should not stymie an oppressed group's attempt to be
    self-determining. It also means that third parties would be justified
    in aiding the separatists.

    Consider the Georgian example. If it could be shown that the citizens
    South Ossetia or Abkhazia were systematically oppressed by Georgia
    (notwithstanding the presence of Russian forces in these breakaway
    regions), then Russia would be justified in supporting the
    separatists, assuming its intentions were noble. If, on the other
    hand, Georgia's rule were benevolent, there would be no justification
    for unilateral secession.

    Georgia is a fledgling democracy. It is also a multi-ethnic state
    which has been accused of paying lip service to rights. Saakashvili
    promised ''equal opportunity'' to all Georgian citizens, irrespective
    of ethnic identity. The Government has also adopted many conventions,
    including the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
    Minorities.

    But in Georgia word does not match deed. Those who do not speak
    Georgian find it harder to access justice, education and employment
    than those fluent in Georgian. For example, the Azeri and Armenian
    minorities of Georgia are compelled to have official documents
    translated into Georgian a language in which they lack proficiency
    before submitting them to courts or administrative bodies (something
    they did not need to do as Soviet citizens).

    University entry is also difficult for Georgia's ethnic minorities,
    given that national exams for higher education include a compulsory
    Georgian-language test. For many ethnic Armenian and Azeri students,
    studying abroad is the only option.

    The International Crisis Group believes that the political will to
    protect and promote minority interests and rights in Georgia is
    lacking. Many ethnic Armenians have publicly protested against what
    they deem to be ''Georgianisation'' policies and have called for
    limited autonomy.

    These are serious shortcomings for a state that claims to be
    democratic. If such discrimination is not ameliorated by a more
    enlightened approach to policy-making there is a real chance that
    political tensions will persist, leading to more separatist violence.

    Arguably, Georgia's inadequacies are indicative of a long and
    difficult transition from one-party rule to liberal democracy. Under
    communist rule, they say, you could speak any language so long as you
    didn't criticise the regime. Under post-communist rule, you can say
    what you like provided that you use the state's official language.

    For now, the world's gaze is fixed on the war in Georgia. Sensational
    images from the warzone continue to be flashed across the
    world. Short-term solutions have been sought. US President George
    W.Bush, has indicated his desire to see a return to the status quo of
    before August 6. France, for its part, has brokered a ceasefire. Early
    reports suggest it's failing to hold.

    I suspect that this conflict will disappear off the media radar as
    soon as the violence stops. But the underlying problem of how the
    international community ought to deal with separatist conflict
    persists. Powerful states such as Russia will continue to act of their
    own accord. But middle-ranking powers, such as Australia, must adopt a
    principled approach rather than simply throw in their lot with a
    powerful ally as these crises arise.

    The remedial principle which holds that systematically oppressed
    groups may secede if other modes of redress are unavailable provides a
    useful framework for assessing the justifiability of secession in
    particular cases. This framework looks beyond the immediate causes of
    violent conflict to properly identify both victim and culpable
    aggressor.

    If middle-ranking powers were to allow this framework to inform their
    foreign policy, they might, through force of numbers, show up the
    Goliaths of this world who often justify their aggression on
    humanitarian grounds. More consistency in this area of international
    relations might also serve to expedite the resolution of violent
    separatist conflicts which continue to rage in parts of many parts of
    Asia, Africa and Europe.

    Aris Gounaris is a PhD candidate at La Trobe University. His doctoral
    dissertation in philosophy and history examines theories of secession
    and self-determination. Case studies include Kosovo, Chechnya and
    Aceh.
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