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ABC Newspaper, Spain
Aug 14 2008
NATO to blame for conflict in Caucasus region
[Commentary by Javier Ruperez: "Georgia, Kosovo: so far, yet so
close"]
A few days ago - on 21 July in ABC - I argued that Ukraine and Georgia
should become NATO members, meeting the wishes expressed by both
countries in this sense. Given the tragic events that are taking place
in South Ossetia, which forms part of Georgia, the least that can be
argued is that if NATO had met those demands, the Georgian troops
would not have intervened militarily in the separatist territory, nor
would the Russian troops have invaded Georgian territory.
At first glance, the Georgian President's decision to put an end to
the secession in South Ossetia by force seems to be an obscene
miscalculation. The history of tensions between Tbilisi and Moscow
since the Caucasian Republic proclaimed independence is long and the
constant meddling of the Russian authorities in Georgian internal
affairs is sufficiently known. The secessionist territories of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been openly backed by Russia and the
secessionist leaders of these territories have never concealed their
affection for the Kremlin. A military action against South Ossetia by
Georgia had of necessity to result in a confrontation with the heirs
of the Soviet Union. And it does not take a military expert to know
where the reality of power lies.
If the Georgian attack had been planned to coincide with the beginning
of the Beijing Olympics, expecting that the non-existent Olympic truce
would prevent Russia from reacting or to find help in the West, the
decision could not have been more short-sighted. The Russians are not
willing to jeopardize its position in the Caucasus, and the West,
apart from its usual expressions of solidarity, is not planning to
engage its forces in a conflict aimed at reunifying Georgia. On the
other hand, it is obvious that the news about recent clashes have not
been welcomed in European capitals, not only because of the reminder
they contain, but due to the nuisance they entail.
And, in fact, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili might have made a
mistake in beginning hostilities, in choosing the appropriate moment
to launch the attack, in the reasons that led him to make such a
serious decision, or in assessing the consequences. And many people
will certainly be willing to rebuke him for it, namely all those who
closed their eyes to the dormant conflicts in Georgia and other parts
of the Caucasus, hoping that time, like a magic ointment, will help to
resolve them peacefully.
However, demanding Georgia's territorial integrity be respected was no
mistake. The secessions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were
systematically encouraged by Russia, have contributed to destabilizing
Georgia, as happened in Upper Karavaj, the Armenian enclave in
Azerbaijan, and the Dniester Republic, Moldova's eastern strip, which
was chosen as a retirement haven by Russian senior military officials
and kept by Moscow as its particular stronghold. The numerous
mediation efforts made by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to stamp out these sources of tension
have been systematically hindered by Moscow's inflexibility. It is no
wonder that the legitimate holders of the respective national
sovereignties are attempting to impose by force what they were denied
by reason and law. We should not forget the continuous and blatant
provocations carried out by Russia in the pursuit of its interests and
of the destabilization of its rival. A few days ago, Tbilisi denounced
and the international observers confirmed the constant violations of
the Georgian airspace by Russian aircraft. Saakashvili does not seem
to be a wonder of diplomatic self-restraint, but we should ask
ourselves: Who would be able to keep calm with such aggressive and
surly neighbours?
If NATO had been favourably disposed towards Georgia's accession to
the club, Georgia's decision to intervene militarily in South Ossetia
would not have been made. The consultation and decisionmaking
mechanisms within the Alliance would have curbed the eagerness of the
pro-American Georgian president. And, of course, the Russians should
have taken into account the costs stemming from an attack on a NATO
member. Everything has been thrown into the bottomless pit of lost
opportunities.
And South Ossetia will probably be annexed de facto, if not de jure,
to Russia's sovereignty and to North Ossetia. Russia's gross violation
of the border and territorial integrity of a sovereign state, which is
a member of the UN and the OSCE, will result in many reproaches
against Russia, several useless sessions of the UN Security Council, a
significant rise in international tension in the region, and nothing
else. Is anyone in the West willing to die for Georgia's territorial
integrity? And, furthermore, who will believe in the demands
advocating the return to that territorial integrity when a few weeks
ago the same people demanding it were not ashamed to deny it to Serbia
by recognizing Kosovo's independence?
Russia has not resigned itself to losing the Soviet Union's
territorial extension and the western countries have not assessed
properly the consequences of the post-imperial syndrome. Washington
insists on dealing with Moscow as if Stalin - who, by the way, was
Georgian - continued to occupy the Kremlin and the western European
countries oscillate between being afraid of the bad-tempered Russian
bear [as published] and flattery towards it as an energy power. The
result is a mistaken and unsteady policy: Kosovo should have never
been granted independence and Georgia and Ukraine should have been
accepted into NATO, as were Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Today,
with the Russian troops in Georgia, it is too late to do something,
apart from attempting to settle serious problems and prevent tension
from reaching a point of no return.
International politics have never been a paragon of coherence, hence
they are not very different from any human being's life. But the
mistakes made by those who control and implement those policies
usually lead to risks that result in considerable disasters.
Everything usually begins with small miscalculations, insignificant
improvisations, and hesitations. One day is the mistake in Kosovo; the
next day the refusal to grant NATO membership to Georgia, Ukraine, and
Macedonia. Later, it may be the monstrous refusal to start EU
accession talks with Turkey. Shortly before this, it was the untinged
belief that the intelligence services chiefs - how ironic! - know
everything, even the number of weapons of mass destruction that the
enemy has in its possession. Thus, step by step, we have found the
Russian troops 60 km away from Tbilisi. Within the cacophony [as
published], nobody is in charge of counting the dead. After all, as
Macbeth said, life "is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and
fury, signifying nothing." Perhaps, Brussels, Washington, and Moscow
should read Shakespeare before it is too late.
[translated]
Aug 14 2008
NATO to blame for conflict in Caucasus region
[Commentary by Javier Ruperez: "Georgia, Kosovo: so far, yet so
close"]
A few days ago - on 21 July in ABC - I argued that Ukraine and Georgia
should become NATO members, meeting the wishes expressed by both
countries in this sense. Given the tragic events that are taking place
in South Ossetia, which forms part of Georgia, the least that can be
argued is that if NATO had met those demands, the Georgian troops
would not have intervened militarily in the separatist territory, nor
would the Russian troops have invaded Georgian territory.
At first glance, the Georgian President's decision to put an end to
the secession in South Ossetia by force seems to be an obscene
miscalculation. The history of tensions between Tbilisi and Moscow
since the Caucasian Republic proclaimed independence is long and the
constant meddling of the Russian authorities in Georgian internal
affairs is sufficiently known. The secessionist territories of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been openly backed by Russia and the
secessionist leaders of these territories have never concealed their
affection for the Kremlin. A military action against South Ossetia by
Georgia had of necessity to result in a confrontation with the heirs
of the Soviet Union. And it does not take a military expert to know
where the reality of power lies.
If the Georgian attack had been planned to coincide with the beginning
of the Beijing Olympics, expecting that the non-existent Olympic truce
would prevent Russia from reacting or to find help in the West, the
decision could not have been more short-sighted. The Russians are not
willing to jeopardize its position in the Caucasus, and the West,
apart from its usual expressions of solidarity, is not planning to
engage its forces in a conflict aimed at reunifying Georgia. On the
other hand, it is obvious that the news about recent clashes have not
been welcomed in European capitals, not only because of the reminder
they contain, but due to the nuisance they entail.
And, in fact, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili might have made a
mistake in beginning hostilities, in choosing the appropriate moment
to launch the attack, in the reasons that led him to make such a
serious decision, or in assessing the consequences. And many people
will certainly be willing to rebuke him for it, namely all those who
closed their eyes to the dormant conflicts in Georgia and other parts
of the Caucasus, hoping that time, like a magic ointment, will help to
resolve them peacefully.
However, demanding Georgia's territorial integrity be respected was no
mistake. The secessions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were
systematically encouraged by Russia, have contributed to destabilizing
Georgia, as happened in Upper Karavaj, the Armenian enclave in
Azerbaijan, and the Dniester Republic, Moldova's eastern strip, which
was chosen as a retirement haven by Russian senior military officials
and kept by Moscow as its particular stronghold. The numerous
mediation efforts made by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to stamp out these sources of tension
have been systematically hindered by Moscow's inflexibility. It is no
wonder that the legitimate holders of the respective national
sovereignties are attempting to impose by force what they were denied
by reason and law. We should not forget the continuous and blatant
provocations carried out by Russia in the pursuit of its interests and
of the destabilization of its rival. A few days ago, Tbilisi denounced
and the international observers confirmed the constant violations of
the Georgian airspace by Russian aircraft. Saakashvili does not seem
to be a wonder of diplomatic self-restraint, but we should ask
ourselves: Who would be able to keep calm with such aggressive and
surly neighbours?
If NATO had been favourably disposed towards Georgia's accession to
the club, Georgia's decision to intervene militarily in South Ossetia
would not have been made. The consultation and decisionmaking
mechanisms within the Alliance would have curbed the eagerness of the
pro-American Georgian president. And, of course, the Russians should
have taken into account the costs stemming from an attack on a NATO
member. Everything has been thrown into the bottomless pit of lost
opportunities.
And South Ossetia will probably be annexed de facto, if not de jure,
to Russia's sovereignty and to North Ossetia. Russia's gross violation
of the border and territorial integrity of a sovereign state, which is
a member of the UN and the OSCE, will result in many reproaches
against Russia, several useless sessions of the UN Security Council, a
significant rise in international tension in the region, and nothing
else. Is anyone in the West willing to die for Georgia's territorial
integrity? And, furthermore, who will believe in the demands
advocating the return to that territorial integrity when a few weeks
ago the same people demanding it were not ashamed to deny it to Serbia
by recognizing Kosovo's independence?
Russia has not resigned itself to losing the Soviet Union's
territorial extension and the western countries have not assessed
properly the consequences of the post-imperial syndrome. Washington
insists on dealing with Moscow as if Stalin - who, by the way, was
Georgian - continued to occupy the Kremlin and the western European
countries oscillate between being afraid of the bad-tempered Russian
bear [as published] and flattery towards it as an energy power. The
result is a mistaken and unsteady policy: Kosovo should have never
been granted independence and Georgia and Ukraine should have been
accepted into NATO, as were Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Today,
with the Russian troops in Georgia, it is too late to do something,
apart from attempting to settle serious problems and prevent tension
from reaching a point of no return.
International politics have never been a paragon of coherence, hence
they are not very different from any human being's life. But the
mistakes made by those who control and implement those policies
usually lead to risks that result in considerable disasters.
Everything usually begins with small miscalculations, insignificant
improvisations, and hesitations. One day is the mistake in Kosovo; the
next day the refusal to grant NATO membership to Georgia, Ukraine, and
Macedonia. Later, it may be the monstrous refusal to start EU
accession talks with Turkey. Shortly before this, it was the untinged
belief that the intelligence services chiefs - how ironic! - know
everything, even the number of weapons of mass destruction that the
enemy has in its possession. Thus, step by step, we have found the
Russian troops 60 km away from Tbilisi. Within the cacophony [as
published], nobody is in charge of counting the dead. After all, as
Macbeth said, life "is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and
fury, signifying nothing." Perhaps, Brussels, Washington, and Moscow
should read Shakespeare before it is too late.
[translated]