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Cape Times (South Africa)
August 13, 2008 Wednesday
e1 Edition
Basic human rights denied in south ossetia
by Julian Kitipov
Today, separatism affects many nations of our world, but often we find
those nations deliberately misusing the concept per se to launch an
assault against an ethnic class, particular community or other nation.
Is this appropriate in a time when the world needs to unite and focus
on fighting poverty, meeting the United Nations (UN) Millennium
Development Goals, establishing peace and security, presenting
opportunities for shaping global governance in a multilateral
framework, promoting good governance and human rights and, finally,
laying the foundation of international law?
The winds of war are once again sweeping through the Caucasus. Last
week, the Georgian Army, under the command of President Mikhail
Saakashvili, launched an attack against the separatists in the
breakaway region of South Ossetia, prompting military intervention by
Russia. Saakashvili's version of democracy displays a number of
characteristics not seen in any other post-Soviet countries. What are
these special features and why did Saakashvili adopt features that led
to the escalation of the conflicts in the Caucasus?
Saakashvili came to power in 2004 after successfully managing to oust
his former chief and president, Eduard Shevardnadze. On his
inauguration, Saakashvili said that his top priorities were to seek
Georgian membership of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (Nato) and ease the relationship with
Russia. After four years of rule, none of these points has
materialised. In May, Nato rejected the Georgian application for
membership, saying it is too soon; the EU has projected possible
membership in the early 2020s; and Georgia is now at war with Russia.
The Georgian government is still largely permeated by corruption and
the boundless idolatry of its current leader. Often Saakashvili
compares his role to that of the Georgian rulers of 1918-1921, a
period associated with the rise of the Democratic Republic of Georgia,
which was subsequently terminated by the Red Army.
Furthermore, Saakashvili has embarked on an extensive programme of
destroying entire monuments that reminded people of the Soviet era and
replacing them with buildings and statues to his own pro-European era.
The Georgian government's human rights record is disastrous. Political
prisoners have filled the prisons on ridiculous charges, such as
displaying posters demanding that Saakashvili step down. Cases of
physical intimidation of opposition leaders, or even disappearances,
are common. Moreover, Saakashvili has embarked on a policy of the
assimilation of the entire non-Georgian population. What seemed to be
just the intimidation of the Ossetian or Abkhaz population turned into
the denial of basic human rights such as education, free movement and
a free press in their native tongue.
On numerous occasions Saakashvili has been accused by Amnesty
International of using hate speech and very poorly handling mass
demonstrations against his government. Arguably, Georgia has never
experienced a real, genuine de-communisation and democratisation. All
the complexities of post-communism are still there, unsolved and never
talked about.
The "Rose" revolution, which was very skilfully and spectacularly
organised by Saakashvili, was accomplished with propagandistic acumen
against Russia, and most of the democratisation agenda was utterly
demagogic. I suspect that Saakashvili played the Titoist card
primarily to consolidate his international image, especially for the
EU, and to create for himself the status of a democratic leader. Under
these circumstances, the cult of Saakashvili has become the main
instrument to continue a pro-European leadership.
But during all those years, Saakashvili's main concern was the growing
expansion of the separatists' power in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The
two separatist territories decided to break away from the rest of
Georgia after the country proclaimed independence with the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991. Both territories have their own political
systems with governments and parliaments, but both of them lack
recognition from the capital Tbilisi and the international community,
including the Russian Federation.
In 1992, the Commonwealth of Independent States, in its attempt to
avert possible war in the separatist areas, agreed to station
peacekeepers there, although Saakashvili, since his inauguration, has
strongly opposed these peacekeeping missions, arguing that the
majority of the personnel are Russian citizens, which makes the
missions partisan.
There are a number of reasons why these two areas would like to break
away from Georgia. First is the lack of dialogue with Tbilisi. In
order to discourage the separatists, Saakashvili has embarked on a
mission to isolate the two areas from the rest of the world. He
stopped the supply of fresh water and electricity to the areas, thus
forcing the separatist governments to seek help from neighbouring
Russia and international aid agencies.
Furthermore, Saakashvili deliberately continues to obstruct UN aid
efforts and, more specifically, the efforts of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees. Since 2007, Saakashvili's government has
not allowed a single UN truck with aid and construction materials to
reach refugee camps in the two areas.
The second reason is the ongoing supply of the Georgian Armed Forces
by Nato countries and the military buildup around their borders. The
Georgian army consists of 37 000 soldiers, which is double the usual
amount for a Nato country of its size. In 2007, the Georgian
government agreed to increase defence spending to about $989 million,
which is a 50% boost in the last five years. More recently, the
Georgian army has purchased, from the United States and Turkey,
armoured personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, helicopters,
and tanks. Moreover, the Georgian army is five times stronger than the
Abkhaz and Ossetian armies put together.
Therefore, were it not for the peacekeepers stationed in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, Saakashvili would have overthrown the local governments
with ease.
The third reason is Saakashvili himself. In 2007, the president stated
in a public appearance that anyone who does not feel Georgian should
leave the country. Perhaps one should remind Saakashvili that Georgia
is a multi-ethnic country with a large minority population (Azeris,
Armenians, Russians, Ossetians and Turks). His comments wage a cruel
war on the ethnically diverse population, something that even the EU
should step up and criticise.
The latest developments in South Ossetia have had only one objective:
to show off Georgia's new sophisticated (Nato) military
technology. Saakashvili's military assault in South Ossetia aimed to
speed up Georgia's impending Nato membership and to induce Nato
statesmen to re-think their decision.
However, Saakashvili's impulsive and provocative leadership could
gradually plunge his state into chaos. Yes, Nato membership would
certainly bring political and economic incentives for Saakashvili, but
the million dollar question remains whether Georgia will ever be at
peace having Russian and Nato soldiers standing on its soil
simultaneously.
Furthermore, Saakashvili should not dismiss the Kosovo factor. Since
the declaration of independence of the Serbian breakaway province,
South Ossetia and Abkhazia have demanded international recognition
from the world. Even though there was no response to their calls,
except from Moscow, which tried to unfreeze this issue at the UN
Security Council, but failed to secure US and British backing, South
Ossetia and Abkhazia managed to receive, finally after 16 years,
international media coverage. As outlined above, these two territories
have been left with no choice but to seek self-determination.
With the latest military assault on South Ossetia; the 30 000 refugees
who fled to North Ossetia - which is half of the South Ossetian
population - and the killings of nearly 3 000 civilians in the capital
Tskhinvali, I doubt that any Ossetians would ever want to stay in
Georgia. Moreover, this assault could easily qualify as genocide at
The Hague, but most likely Saakashvili will escape with a final
warning from his Western counterparts.
What does Saakashvili really expect from South Ossetia and Abkhazia? A
thank you note?
It takes years to build peace, yet it takes only one gunshot to go to
war. In concluding this overview of Saakashvili, there is an
interesting analogy from the Cold War that could be used to highlight
his governance.
In the 1960s, the Romanian Prime Minister, Ion Maurer, visited his
Greek counterpart. The Greek statesman asked Maurer what was the
secret of Romanian survival and Maurer responded in two words:
"Corruption and cowardice."
l Kitipov is an assistant lecturer in the department of political
sciences, University of Pretoria. The views expressed in this paper
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Centre for International Political Studies (CiPS) or the
University of Pretoria.
August 13, 2008 Wednesday
e1 Edition
Basic human rights denied in south ossetia
by Julian Kitipov
Today, separatism affects many nations of our world, but often we find
those nations deliberately misusing the concept per se to launch an
assault against an ethnic class, particular community or other nation.
Is this appropriate in a time when the world needs to unite and focus
on fighting poverty, meeting the United Nations (UN) Millennium
Development Goals, establishing peace and security, presenting
opportunities for shaping global governance in a multilateral
framework, promoting good governance and human rights and, finally,
laying the foundation of international law?
The winds of war are once again sweeping through the Caucasus. Last
week, the Georgian Army, under the command of President Mikhail
Saakashvili, launched an attack against the separatists in the
breakaway region of South Ossetia, prompting military intervention by
Russia. Saakashvili's version of democracy displays a number of
characteristics not seen in any other post-Soviet countries. What are
these special features and why did Saakashvili adopt features that led
to the escalation of the conflicts in the Caucasus?
Saakashvili came to power in 2004 after successfully managing to oust
his former chief and president, Eduard Shevardnadze. On his
inauguration, Saakashvili said that his top priorities were to seek
Georgian membership of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (Nato) and ease the relationship with
Russia. After four years of rule, none of these points has
materialised. In May, Nato rejected the Georgian application for
membership, saying it is too soon; the EU has projected possible
membership in the early 2020s; and Georgia is now at war with Russia.
The Georgian government is still largely permeated by corruption and
the boundless idolatry of its current leader. Often Saakashvili
compares his role to that of the Georgian rulers of 1918-1921, a
period associated with the rise of the Democratic Republic of Georgia,
which was subsequently terminated by the Red Army.
Furthermore, Saakashvili has embarked on an extensive programme of
destroying entire monuments that reminded people of the Soviet era and
replacing them with buildings and statues to his own pro-European era.
The Georgian government's human rights record is disastrous. Political
prisoners have filled the prisons on ridiculous charges, such as
displaying posters demanding that Saakashvili step down. Cases of
physical intimidation of opposition leaders, or even disappearances,
are common. Moreover, Saakashvili has embarked on a policy of the
assimilation of the entire non-Georgian population. What seemed to be
just the intimidation of the Ossetian or Abkhaz population turned into
the denial of basic human rights such as education, free movement and
a free press in their native tongue.
On numerous occasions Saakashvili has been accused by Amnesty
International of using hate speech and very poorly handling mass
demonstrations against his government. Arguably, Georgia has never
experienced a real, genuine de-communisation and democratisation. All
the complexities of post-communism are still there, unsolved and never
talked about.
The "Rose" revolution, which was very skilfully and spectacularly
organised by Saakashvili, was accomplished with propagandistic acumen
against Russia, and most of the democratisation agenda was utterly
demagogic. I suspect that Saakashvili played the Titoist card
primarily to consolidate his international image, especially for the
EU, and to create for himself the status of a democratic leader. Under
these circumstances, the cult of Saakashvili has become the main
instrument to continue a pro-European leadership.
But during all those years, Saakashvili's main concern was the growing
expansion of the separatists' power in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The
two separatist territories decided to break away from the rest of
Georgia after the country proclaimed independence with the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991. Both territories have their own political
systems with governments and parliaments, but both of them lack
recognition from the capital Tbilisi and the international community,
including the Russian Federation.
In 1992, the Commonwealth of Independent States, in its attempt to
avert possible war in the separatist areas, agreed to station
peacekeepers there, although Saakashvili, since his inauguration, has
strongly opposed these peacekeeping missions, arguing that the
majority of the personnel are Russian citizens, which makes the
missions partisan.
There are a number of reasons why these two areas would like to break
away from Georgia. First is the lack of dialogue with Tbilisi. In
order to discourage the separatists, Saakashvili has embarked on a
mission to isolate the two areas from the rest of the world. He
stopped the supply of fresh water and electricity to the areas, thus
forcing the separatist governments to seek help from neighbouring
Russia and international aid agencies.
Furthermore, Saakashvili deliberately continues to obstruct UN aid
efforts and, more specifically, the efforts of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees. Since 2007, Saakashvili's government has
not allowed a single UN truck with aid and construction materials to
reach refugee camps in the two areas.
The second reason is the ongoing supply of the Georgian Armed Forces
by Nato countries and the military buildup around their borders. The
Georgian army consists of 37 000 soldiers, which is double the usual
amount for a Nato country of its size. In 2007, the Georgian
government agreed to increase defence spending to about $989 million,
which is a 50% boost in the last five years. More recently, the
Georgian army has purchased, from the United States and Turkey,
armoured personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, helicopters,
and tanks. Moreover, the Georgian army is five times stronger than the
Abkhaz and Ossetian armies put together.
Therefore, were it not for the peacekeepers stationed in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, Saakashvili would have overthrown the local governments
with ease.
The third reason is Saakashvili himself. In 2007, the president stated
in a public appearance that anyone who does not feel Georgian should
leave the country. Perhaps one should remind Saakashvili that Georgia
is a multi-ethnic country with a large minority population (Azeris,
Armenians, Russians, Ossetians and Turks). His comments wage a cruel
war on the ethnically diverse population, something that even the EU
should step up and criticise.
The latest developments in South Ossetia have had only one objective:
to show off Georgia's new sophisticated (Nato) military
technology. Saakashvili's military assault in South Ossetia aimed to
speed up Georgia's impending Nato membership and to induce Nato
statesmen to re-think their decision.
However, Saakashvili's impulsive and provocative leadership could
gradually plunge his state into chaos. Yes, Nato membership would
certainly bring political and economic incentives for Saakashvili, but
the million dollar question remains whether Georgia will ever be at
peace having Russian and Nato soldiers standing on its soil
simultaneously.
Furthermore, Saakashvili should not dismiss the Kosovo factor. Since
the declaration of independence of the Serbian breakaway province,
South Ossetia and Abkhazia have demanded international recognition
from the world. Even though there was no response to their calls,
except from Moscow, which tried to unfreeze this issue at the UN
Security Council, but failed to secure US and British backing, South
Ossetia and Abkhazia managed to receive, finally after 16 years,
international media coverage. As outlined above, these two territories
have been left with no choice but to seek self-determination.
With the latest military assault on South Ossetia; the 30 000 refugees
who fled to North Ossetia - which is half of the South Ossetian
population - and the killings of nearly 3 000 civilians in the capital
Tskhinvali, I doubt that any Ossetians would ever want to stay in
Georgia. Moreover, this assault could easily qualify as genocide at
The Hague, but most likely Saakashvili will escape with a final
warning from his Western counterparts.
What does Saakashvili really expect from South Ossetia and Abkhazia? A
thank you note?
It takes years to build peace, yet it takes only one gunshot to go to
war. In concluding this overview of Saakashvili, there is an
interesting analogy from the Cold War that could be used to highlight
his governance.
In the 1960s, the Romanian Prime Minister, Ion Maurer, visited his
Greek counterpart. The Greek statesman asked Maurer what was the
secret of Romanian survival and Maurer responded in two words:
"Corruption and cowardice."
l Kitipov is an assistant lecturer in the department of political
sciences, University of Pretoria. The views expressed in this paper
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Centre for International Political Studies (CiPS) or the
University of Pretoria.