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Pretoria News (South Africa)
August 13, 2008 Wednesday
e1 Edition
Winds of war once again about to sweep through the Caucasus
by Julian Kitipovi
Today, separatism affects many nations of our world, but often we find
those nations deliberately misusing the concept per se to launch an
assault against an ethnic class, particular community or other nation.
But is this appropriate at a time when the world needs to unite and
focus on fighting poverty, meeting the UN Millennium Development
Goals, establishing peace and security in the world, presenting
opportunities for shaping global governance in a multilateral
framework, promoting good governance and human rights and, finally,
laying the foundation of international law?
The winds of war are once again about to sweep through the
Caucasus. On August 7, 2008 the Georgian armed forces under the
command of President Mikheil Saakashvili, launched an aggressive
attack against the separatists in the breakaway region of South
Ossetia.
The international community is still trying to find a diplomatic
resolution in the Caucasus, but if diplomacy fails, Saakashvili said,
Georgia will be forced to further consider its military
options. Saakashvili's version of democracy displays a number of
characteristics not seen in any other post-Soviet countries. What are
these special features and why did Saakashvili adopt features that led
to the escalation of the conflicts in the Caucasus?
President Saakashvili came to power in 2004 after successfully
managing to oust his former chief and president, Eduard
Shevardnadze. On his inauguration, Saakashvili said that his top
priorities were to seek Georgian membership of the EU and Nato and
ease the relationship with Russia. After four years of rule, none of
these points have materialised. In May 2008, Nato rejected the
Georgian application for membership, saying it is too soon; the EU has
projected possible membership in the early 20s; and the situation with
Russia has not improved since 2004 - in fact it has fallen to a record
level.
The Georgian government is still largely permeated with corruption and
the boundless idolatry of its current leader. Often Saakashvili
compares his role to that of the Georgian rulers of 1918-1921, a
period associated with the rise of the Democratic Republic of Georgia,
which was subsequently terminated by the Red Army. Furthermore,
Saakashvili has embarked on an extensive programme of destroying
entire monuments that reminded people of the Soviet era and replacing
them with buildings and statues to his own pro-European era.
The Georgian government's human rights record is disastrous. Political
prisoners have filled the prisons on ridiculous charges, such as
displaying posters demanding that Saakashvili step down.
Cases of physical intimidation of opposition leaders, or even
disappearances, are common. Moreover, Saakashvili has embarked on a
policy of the assimilation of the entire non-Georgian population.
What seemed to be just the intimidation of the Ossetian or Abkhaz
population, turned into the denial of basic human rights such as
education, free movement and a free press in their native tongue.
On numerous occasions Saakashvili has been accused by Amnesty
International of delivering hate speech and very poorly handling mass
demonstrations against his government. Arguably, Georgia has never
experienced a real, genuine decommunisation and democratisation. All
the complexities of post-Communism are still there, unsolved and never
talked about. The "Rose" revolution, which was very skilfully and
spectacularly organised by Saakashvili, was accomplished with
propagandistic acumen against Russia, and most of the democratisation
agenda was utterly demagogic. I suspect that Saakashvili played the
Titoist card primarily to consolidate his international image,
especially for the EU, and to create for himself a status as a
democratic leader. Under these circumstances, the cult of Saakashvili
has become the main instrument to continue a pro-European leadership.
But during all those years, Saakashvili's main concern was the growing
expansion of the separatists' power in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The
two separatist territories decided to break away from the rest of
Georgia after the country proclaimed independence with the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991. Both territories have their own political
systems with governments and parliaments, but both of them lack
legitimacy from the capital Tbilisi and the international community,
including the Russian Federation.
In 1992, the Commonwealth of Independent States, in its attempt to
avert possible war in the separatist areas, agreed to station
peacekeepers there, although Saakashvili, since his inauguration, has
strongly opposed these peacekeeping missions, arguing that the
majority of the personnel are Russian citizens, which makes the
missions partisan.
There are a number of reasons why these two areas would like to break
away from Georgia. First is the lack of dialogue with Tbilisi. In
order to discourage the separatists, Saakashvili has embarked on a
mission to isolate the two areas from the rest of the world. He
stopped the supply of fresh water and electricity to the areas, thus
forcing the separatist governments to seek help from neighbouring
Russia and international aid agencies.
Furthermore, Saakashvili deliberately continues to obstruct UN aid
efforts and, more specifically, the efforts of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees. Since 2007, Saakashvili's government has
not allowed a single UN truck with aid and construction materials to
reach refugee camps in the two areas. The second reason is the ongoing
militarisation of the Georgian Armed Forces by Nato countries and the
military build-up around their borders. The Georgian army consists of
37 000 soldiers, which is double the usual number for a Nato country
of its size. In 2007, the Georgian government agreed to increase the
defence spending to about $989 million (about R7.7 billion), which is
a 50% boost in the last five years.
More recently, the Georgian army has purchased, from the US and
Turkey, armoured personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery,
helicopters and tanks. Moreover, the Georgian army is five times
stronger than the Abkhaz and Ossetian armies put together. Therefore,
were it not for the peacekeepers stationed in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, Saakashvili would have overthrown the local governments with
ease. The third reason is Saakashvili himself.
In 2007, the president stated in a public appearance that anyone who
does not feel Georgian should leave the country. Perhaps, one should
remind Saakashvili that Georgia is a multi-ethnic country with a large
minority population (Azeris, Armenians, Russians, Ossetians and
Turks). His comments wage a cruel war on the ethnically diverse
population, something that even the EU should step up and criticise.
The latest developments in South Ossetia have had only one objective:
to show off Georgia's new sophisticated military technology. President
Saakashvili's military (assault) in South Ossetia aimed to speed up
Georgia's impending Nato membership and to induce Nato statesmen to
rethink their decision. However, Saakashvili's impulsive and
provocative leadership could gradually plunge his state into chaos.
Yes, Nato membership will certainly bring political and economic
incentives for Saakashvili, but the million dollar question remains
whether Georgia will ever be at peace having Russian and Nato soldiers
standing on its soil simultaneously. Furthermore, Saakashvili should
not dismiss the Kosovo factor. Since the declaration of independence
of the Serbian breakaway province, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have
demanded international recognition from the world.
Even though there was no response to their calls, except from Moscow
which tried to unfreeze this issue at the UN Security Council but
failed to secure US and British backing, South Ossetia and Abkhazia
managed to receive, after 16 years, international media coverage. As
outlined above, those two territories have been left with no other
choice but to seek self-determination.
With the latest military assault on South Ossetia; the 30 000 refugees
who fled to North Ossetia - which is half of the South Ossetian
population - and the innocent killings of nearly 3 000 civilians in
the capital Tskhinvali, I doubt that any Ossetians would ever want to
stay in Georgia. Moreover, this assault could easily qualify as
genocide at The Hague, but most likely Saakashvili will escape with a
fright and final warning from his Western counterparts.
In concluding this overview of Saakashvili, there is an interesting
analogy from the Cold War that could be used to highlight
Saakashvili's governance.
In the 1960s, the Romanian Prime Minister, Ion Maurer, visited the
Greek prime minister. The Greek statesman asked Maurer what was the
secret of Romanian survival and Maurer responded: "Corruption and
cowardice".
Julian Kitipov is an assistant lecturer in the Department of
Political Sciences, University of Pretoria. The views expressed in
this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Centre for International Political Studies (CiPS) or the
University of Pretoria
August 13, 2008 Wednesday
e1 Edition
Winds of war once again about to sweep through the Caucasus
by Julian Kitipovi
Today, separatism affects many nations of our world, but often we find
those nations deliberately misusing the concept per se to launch an
assault against an ethnic class, particular community or other nation.
But is this appropriate at a time when the world needs to unite and
focus on fighting poverty, meeting the UN Millennium Development
Goals, establishing peace and security in the world, presenting
opportunities for shaping global governance in a multilateral
framework, promoting good governance and human rights and, finally,
laying the foundation of international law?
The winds of war are once again about to sweep through the
Caucasus. On August 7, 2008 the Georgian armed forces under the
command of President Mikheil Saakashvili, launched an aggressive
attack against the separatists in the breakaway region of South
Ossetia.
The international community is still trying to find a diplomatic
resolution in the Caucasus, but if diplomacy fails, Saakashvili said,
Georgia will be forced to further consider its military
options. Saakashvili's version of democracy displays a number of
characteristics not seen in any other post-Soviet countries. What are
these special features and why did Saakashvili adopt features that led
to the escalation of the conflicts in the Caucasus?
President Saakashvili came to power in 2004 after successfully
managing to oust his former chief and president, Eduard
Shevardnadze. On his inauguration, Saakashvili said that his top
priorities were to seek Georgian membership of the EU and Nato and
ease the relationship with Russia. After four years of rule, none of
these points have materialised. In May 2008, Nato rejected the
Georgian application for membership, saying it is too soon; the EU has
projected possible membership in the early 20s; and the situation with
Russia has not improved since 2004 - in fact it has fallen to a record
level.
The Georgian government is still largely permeated with corruption and
the boundless idolatry of its current leader. Often Saakashvili
compares his role to that of the Georgian rulers of 1918-1921, a
period associated with the rise of the Democratic Republic of Georgia,
which was subsequently terminated by the Red Army. Furthermore,
Saakashvili has embarked on an extensive programme of destroying
entire monuments that reminded people of the Soviet era and replacing
them with buildings and statues to his own pro-European era.
The Georgian government's human rights record is disastrous. Political
prisoners have filled the prisons on ridiculous charges, such as
displaying posters demanding that Saakashvili step down.
Cases of physical intimidation of opposition leaders, or even
disappearances, are common. Moreover, Saakashvili has embarked on a
policy of the assimilation of the entire non-Georgian population.
What seemed to be just the intimidation of the Ossetian or Abkhaz
population, turned into the denial of basic human rights such as
education, free movement and a free press in their native tongue.
On numerous occasions Saakashvili has been accused by Amnesty
International of delivering hate speech and very poorly handling mass
demonstrations against his government. Arguably, Georgia has never
experienced a real, genuine decommunisation and democratisation. All
the complexities of post-Communism are still there, unsolved and never
talked about. The "Rose" revolution, which was very skilfully and
spectacularly organised by Saakashvili, was accomplished with
propagandistic acumen against Russia, and most of the democratisation
agenda was utterly demagogic. I suspect that Saakashvili played the
Titoist card primarily to consolidate his international image,
especially for the EU, and to create for himself a status as a
democratic leader. Under these circumstances, the cult of Saakashvili
has become the main instrument to continue a pro-European leadership.
But during all those years, Saakashvili's main concern was the growing
expansion of the separatists' power in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The
two separatist territories decided to break away from the rest of
Georgia after the country proclaimed independence with the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991. Both territories have their own political
systems with governments and parliaments, but both of them lack
legitimacy from the capital Tbilisi and the international community,
including the Russian Federation.
In 1992, the Commonwealth of Independent States, in its attempt to
avert possible war in the separatist areas, agreed to station
peacekeepers there, although Saakashvili, since his inauguration, has
strongly opposed these peacekeeping missions, arguing that the
majority of the personnel are Russian citizens, which makes the
missions partisan.
There are a number of reasons why these two areas would like to break
away from Georgia. First is the lack of dialogue with Tbilisi. In
order to discourage the separatists, Saakashvili has embarked on a
mission to isolate the two areas from the rest of the world. He
stopped the supply of fresh water and electricity to the areas, thus
forcing the separatist governments to seek help from neighbouring
Russia and international aid agencies.
Furthermore, Saakashvili deliberately continues to obstruct UN aid
efforts and, more specifically, the efforts of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees. Since 2007, Saakashvili's government has
not allowed a single UN truck with aid and construction materials to
reach refugee camps in the two areas. The second reason is the ongoing
militarisation of the Georgian Armed Forces by Nato countries and the
military build-up around their borders. The Georgian army consists of
37 000 soldiers, which is double the usual number for a Nato country
of its size. In 2007, the Georgian government agreed to increase the
defence spending to about $989 million (about R7.7 billion), which is
a 50% boost in the last five years.
More recently, the Georgian army has purchased, from the US and
Turkey, armoured personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery,
helicopters and tanks. Moreover, the Georgian army is five times
stronger than the Abkhaz and Ossetian armies put together. Therefore,
were it not for the peacekeepers stationed in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, Saakashvili would have overthrown the local governments with
ease. The third reason is Saakashvili himself.
In 2007, the president stated in a public appearance that anyone who
does not feel Georgian should leave the country. Perhaps, one should
remind Saakashvili that Georgia is a multi-ethnic country with a large
minority population (Azeris, Armenians, Russians, Ossetians and
Turks). His comments wage a cruel war on the ethnically diverse
population, something that even the EU should step up and criticise.
The latest developments in South Ossetia have had only one objective:
to show off Georgia's new sophisticated military technology. President
Saakashvili's military (assault) in South Ossetia aimed to speed up
Georgia's impending Nato membership and to induce Nato statesmen to
rethink their decision. However, Saakashvili's impulsive and
provocative leadership could gradually plunge his state into chaos.
Yes, Nato membership will certainly bring political and economic
incentives for Saakashvili, but the million dollar question remains
whether Georgia will ever be at peace having Russian and Nato soldiers
standing on its soil simultaneously. Furthermore, Saakashvili should
not dismiss the Kosovo factor. Since the declaration of independence
of the Serbian breakaway province, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have
demanded international recognition from the world.
Even though there was no response to their calls, except from Moscow
which tried to unfreeze this issue at the UN Security Council but
failed to secure US and British backing, South Ossetia and Abkhazia
managed to receive, after 16 years, international media coverage. As
outlined above, those two territories have been left with no other
choice but to seek self-determination.
With the latest military assault on South Ossetia; the 30 000 refugees
who fled to North Ossetia - which is half of the South Ossetian
population - and the innocent killings of nearly 3 000 civilians in
the capital Tskhinvali, I doubt that any Ossetians would ever want to
stay in Georgia. Moreover, this assault could easily qualify as
genocide at The Hague, but most likely Saakashvili will escape with a
fright and final warning from his Western counterparts.
In concluding this overview of Saakashvili, there is an interesting
analogy from the Cold War that could be used to highlight
Saakashvili's governance.
In the 1960s, the Romanian Prime Minister, Ion Maurer, visited the
Greek prime minister. The Greek statesman asked Maurer what was the
secret of Romanian survival and Maurer responded: "Corruption and
cowardice".
Julian Kitipov is an assistant lecturer in the Department of
Political Sciences, University of Pretoria. The views expressed in
this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Centre for International Political Studies (CiPS) or the
University of Pretoria