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  • Consequences Of Foreseeable Conflict

    CONSEQUENCES OF FORESEEABLE CONFLICT

    Shekulli
    Aug 15 2008
    Albania

    A brief, unforeseen, and brutal war ended negatively for Georgia,
    with thousands of dead, the de facto - and also perhaps de jure -
    loss of southern Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the prospective weakening
    of the grip on power of its charismatic president Saakashvili. The
    Western media were quick to blame the latter for his emotional moves
    and his failing to make a realistic assessment of the situation as he
    decided to respond to the provocations of the [Ossetian] separatists by
    means of an offensive which was beaten off by the Russian intervention.

    The same for the passive stand taken by the European Union, whose major
    leaders, like German Chancellor Merkel, had never looked with a kind
    eye on the venturesome moves of a young president who soon disappointed
    his Western allies with his uncontained - if not altogether childish -
    behaviour towards Russia.

    Still, going from general considerations to the conclusions that may
    be drawn from the sudden and dramatic development of a situation which
    was precipitated within a few days, we may perhaps begin by saying
    that these breakaway regions have often been likened to Kosova. This
    is especially true in the Kremlin's official statements, which were all
    too ready to draw destabilizing parallels between a precedent allegedly
    created in international law by the way the Kosova issue was solved.

    Without waiting for the proclamation of the independence of Kosova,
    Moscow warned that it would entail changes in the situation in the
    Caucasus.

    On the other hand, in other similar situations which, apart from
    Ossetia and Abkhazia, are worth mentioning - like the region of
    Nagorni-Karabakh, which has for years been contested between Armenia
    and Azerbaijan, or the breakaway region of Transdniester in Moldova -
    the Russians are more interested in the preservation of the status
    quo, that is, the frozen conflicts which are intended to maintain
    Russia's influence in the region and its control of its strategic
    ways of communication.

    Russian policy aims at achieving the same goal over Kosova too,
    by trying to impede its international recognition and any manner of
    cooperation between the two state entities there - the Albanians and
    the Serbs. This strengthens Russia's international position and gives
    it a chance to exercise its geostrategic influence on this part of
    Europe, which in return increases Serbia's dependence on Russia and
    adds to its hostility to the Western world. "Frozen" conflicts increase
    the negotiating power of the Russians who also wield other cards in
    their hands, such as their wealth of natural resources, their control
    of the means of communication with Russia's neighbouring countries,
    the continuous increase of the value of the petrodollar, and the
    increase of internal cohesion and the absence of an opposition -
    all factors that enable Russia to play a unique political role in
    bilateral and multilateral relations.

    However, returning to the recent conflict in Ossetia, it is worth
    stressing some of the benefits and costs for each side to see how
    they may have an influence on the future diplomatic configuration of
    these countries.

    To begin with Georgia, it appears that it suffered a net loss in the
    recent conflict, paying dearly for its desire for real independence
    from the Kremlin. The loss of Southern Ossetia, which was an autonomous
    region to a certain extent, brought about the establishment of a
    "bastard" government and a tax and monetary management totally
    independent of Tbilisi, and made both Ossetia's course as a breakaway
    region and Abkhazia's ethnic cleansing (of the Georgian population)
    much easier. Besides, with the calming down of the situation, the first
    head to roll is expected to be that of Saakashvili's, who failed both
    in his calculations and in ensuring effective international support
    for his country; that is, he lost his diplomatic gamble. An isolated
    Georgia, in which all roads lead to Moscow, cannot allow itself the
    luxury of keeping for long a president whom Moscow considers its
    "black sheep."

    Another great loser may be George W. Bush who had made Georgia's and
    Ukraine's NATO membership a personal point, which was rejected by his
    sceptical French and German partners. The Georgian army suffered a
    disastrous defeat, although it was 18,000-strong and was considered
    the best US-trained army in the former Soviet republics. It must also
    be borne in mind that Saakashvili enjoys the reputation of the most
    pro-US and the most independent leader from Moscow among the other
    leaders of the former Soviet republics. The failure of US diplomacy
    in preventing and, later on, sanctioning Russia's aggressive policy
    is no minor setback for a president in the last year of his term,
    a president who is also known for his tough foreign policy.

    Another consequence of the Georgian-Russian conflict is that the
    revolutions Washington has been trying to export to the former Soviet
    republics will no longer make headway, although at a point it was
    supposed that there would be a general drift towards democracy in
    these countries. About a year ago, Uzbekistan, which was known as
    the United States' staunchest ally in Central Asia relinquished its
    partnership with the United States and turned towards Moscow. But
    this country's leader Karimov was not alone. Kazakhstan President
    Nazarbayev also rejected an oil pipeline project that was supposed to
    go around Russia and, instead, signed some important agreements on oil
    and gas pipelines that will link his country not only with Russia but
    also with China. His example was followed by Turkmenistan's president,
    who sold to the Russians the right of exploitation of the natural gas
    of a country that is considered the world's richest in this field,
    thereby dashing the hopes of the Americans who were expecting that
    he would change his course. For its part, Belarus is under the total
    domination of its Russian neighbour, even going to such lengths as
    expelling US diplomats, as it did only a little time ago. Ukraine,
    Washington's last hope, is divided between the eastern part that
    identifies itself with Russia and the western part that supports the
    pro-Western Yushchenko-Timoshenko bloc, which is also reflected in
    its parliament.

    Russia's victory, however, is a relative one. Although it consolidated
    its international position and put an end to speculation about the
    real dominant power in Eurasia, blocked NATO's expansion towards the
    east, and changed the world geopolitical and geostrategic balance to
    its advantage, it cannot be said that it won everything. Russia's
    affirmation and especially the reconfirmation of its influence
    on the Caucasus and beyond, arouses the fear of an uncontrolled
    Russian economic and military hegemony. But there is another - and
    more important - problem for Russia. It cannot play simultaneously
    and equally on several fronts - in the Caucasus, Iran, and Kosova
    [Kosovo] - or in opposing US defensive missile systems in Azerbaijan
    and, perhaps, at a later time, in Serbia too. The Americans' turning a
    blind eye to what is happening in the Caucasus - where they could not
    lend limitless support to an anathematized and improvident president -
    along with an eventual easing of tension with Iran and the, at least on
    the face of it, rehabilitation of North Korea, leaves all paths open
    to what they [the Americans] insist is a major goal of the foreign
    policy of [President] Bush's Administration and, in a way, the "pearl"
    of his presidency: stepping up the international recognition of the
    new state of Kosova and making Russia give up its intransigence on
    this issue. This can by no means be considered a presidential whim
    of Bush's. It serves US strategic interests in this important part
    of Europe, in which the United States has not too many friends, as
    well as the crowning of the diplomatic work that has long overcome
    partisan differences over this issue.

    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
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