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RUSSIA MAY TIGHTEN ITS POLICY TOWARDS THE CIS COUNTRIES
WPS Agency
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
August 18, 2008 Monday
Russia
Parrying the aggression of Georgia against South Ossetia has
demonstrated this
This is understandable because Saakashvili and Yushchenko being
supporters of Washington have become allies in the anti-Russian
attitude a long time ago. But why have Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia
and other closest allies of Russia kept silent? Attempts to answer
this question enable us to say that Russia is to blame for such a
stance because of many reasons. Moscow makes too many concessions
and courtesies towards its allies.
But what we are to do?
First, with regard to some unfriendly opponents of Russia, we need to
continue a harsh policy. Taking into account the explosive situation
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and a possibility of unleashing of a
new large-scale war there, we think that it is necessary to tighten
sanctions of Russia against Georgia. Russia has the right to demand
this from its CSTO allies (exactly, to demand this!). This is not
an arbitrary action but an element of harsh policy. Russia has a
right to, having obtained support of the UN, to undertake a course at
demilitarization of Georgia. For example, it can organize its maritime
and aerial blockade and to implement examination of ships arriving
to its ports via the Black Sea from the standpoint of transportation
of armament and ammunition.
Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, who had been the director of the
main department of international military cooperation in the Defense
Ministry for a long time, announced that Russia stopped combat
operations against Georgia too early and agreed with a dialogue with
intermediaries from the European Union.
Ivashov said, "the victory over Georgia was given to Sarkozy who
already changed the paragraphs of the conflict regulation, which
would definitely have the most negative impact on the geopolitical
interests of Russia in Georgia and in entire South Caucasus in the
future." According to Ivashov, having characterized Georgia as an
aggressor country that allowed genocide of Ossetians and Russians the
Russian authorities had not to enforce peace on Georgia but to achieve
its capitulation as had happened to fascist Germany in the past.
Ivashov says, "for the purpose of prevention of new aggression,
it would be possible to broaden the security zone of South Ossetia
by 30-40 kilometers to the south of the country having reached
Gori. In Western Georgia it would be possible to take the strategic
paths leading to the Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi under
control. However, we have not even managed to impose a paragraph on
the complete demilitarization of Georgia on the European Union. This
means that we are not protected from new aggressive actions on the
part of Georgia."
Second, we need aggressiveness not only on the military and diplomatic
level but also on the economic one. Russia has economic leverage to
pressure Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. It is necessary to reinforce
them. Russia is catastrophically losing many markets on the territory
of the CIS but invests petrodollars in the economy of the US and other
Western countries. Why cannot we invest them in the economies of the
aforementioned countries thus connecting them to our country not only
in business but also in policy? Probably then they will become more
loyal towards Moscow?
Third, it is necessary to give up the tactic of "sick and carrot"
towards the allies of Russia in the post-Soviet space (first of all,
in the field of military technological cooperation). It is necessary
to tell the CSTO allies: security in exchange for economic concessions
in business.
Fourth, it is really high time for Moscow to manifest its will and to
fulfill what is written in the foreign policy concept (FPC) with regard
to the role of the collective security system in the post-Soviet
space. For example, the FPC says that Russia views the CSTO as
"a key tool in maintenance of stability and provision of security
in the CIS emphasizing adaptation of the CSTO as a multifunctional
integration structure to the changing situation and transformation
of the organization into the main institution of security provision
in the zone of its responsibility." Unfortunately, this has been
said at least for ten years. However, the CSTO was passive when
the "tulip" revolution happened in Kyrgyzstan. There is also no
participation of the CSTO in the peacekeeping activities in the
post-Soviet space. Probably that is why NATO ignores contacts with
this organization. However, Moscow wants to change the situation in
this aspect and this is inspiring.
Henceforth, the plans for improvement of efficiency of the CSTO are
formulated in an official Russian document. It is necessary only to
make the CSTO such key tool in provision of security on the territory
of the CIS like this is written in the FPC.
Fifth, Russia needs to determine its opponents in the CIS in the
conceptual aspect. For example, the FPC says that the attitude
of Russia to sub-regional formations and other structures without
Russian participation in the CIS space is determined "proceeding from
evaluation of their real contribution to provision of good neighborly
relations and stability, their readiness to really take into account
the legal Russian interests and to respect the already existing
mechanisms of cooperation like the CIS, CSTO, Eurasian Economic
Union and Shanghai Cooperation Organization." It seems that this
is written correctly but the aforementioned mechanisms themselves
require improvement. This means that in its activities Russia needs
to write principles of interaction with these organizations in a
more. It seems that this is written correctly but the aforementioned
mechanisms themselves require improvement. This means that in its
activities Russia needs to outline the principles of interaction
with these organizations in a more detailed manner and clearer. We
should not be afraid of harshness. If Russia has real allies they
will understand this harshness. This means that we need to build a
new system of relations and contacts with them.
It is also possible to mention other necessary measures in foreign
policy of Russia towards the CIS countries. These measures will be
justified if they lead to growth of authority of Russia as the leading
country in the CIS.
Source: . The events connected with the conduction of the operation
of peace enforcement in the zones of the Georgian-Ossetian and
Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts by Russia have demonstrated not only the
increased combat readiness of the Armed Forces of Russia but also the
will of our country to defend its geopolitical interests in the South
Caucasian region. The main principles of resolving of the conflict
situation between Russia and Georgia were determined with mediation of
France. It would seem that having used military force Russia achieved
what it wanted: the aggressor was ousted from the territory of South
Ossetia and measures of humanitarian and political nature for provision
of assistance to the suffered population were taken. Meanwhile, if
we analyze lessons of these events, we encounter a very sad fact: the
allies of Russia in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
and in other organizations did not support Russia in a difficult time.
When the Russian troops were parrying the attack of the Georgian
aggressor at South Ossetia tete-a-tete, assistance was coming
only from the regions of Russia and CIS countries had either
incomprehensible silence or ardent zealous condemnation of Moscow,
which was demonstrated by the regime of Victor Yushchenko.
WPS Agency
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
August 18, 2008 Monday
Russia
Parrying the aggression of Georgia against South Ossetia has
demonstrated this
This is understandable because Saakashvili and Yushchenko being
supporters of Washington have become allies in the anti-Russian
attitude a long time ago. But why have Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia
and other closest allies of Russia kept silent? Attempts to answer
this question enable us to say that Russia is to blame for such a
stance because of many reasons. Moscow makes too many concessions
and courtesies towards its allies.
But what we are to do?
First, with regard to some unfriendly opponents of Russia, we need to
continue a harsh policy. Taking into account the explosive situation
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and a possibility of unleashing of a
new large-scale war there, we think that it is necessary to tighten
sanctions of Russia against Georgia. Russia has the right to demand
this from its CSTO allies (exactly, to demand this!). This is not
an arbitrary action but an element of harsh policy. Russia has a
right to, having obtained support of the UN, to undertake a course at
demilitarization of Georgia. For example, it can organize its maritime
and aerial blockade and to implement examination of ships arriving
to its ports via the Black Sea from the standpoint of transportation
of armament and ammunition.
Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, who had been the director of the
main department of international military cooperation in the Defense
Ministry for a long time, announced that Russia stopped combat
operations against Georgia too early and agreed with a dialogue with
intermediaries from the European Union.
Ivashov said, "the victory over Georgia was given to Sarkozy who
already changed the paragraphs of the conflict regulation, which
would definitely have the most negative impact on the geopolitical
interests of Russia in Georgia and in entire South Caucasus in the
future." According to Ivashov, having characterized Georgia as an
aggressor country that allowed genocide of Ossetians and Russians the
Russian authorities had not to enforce peace on Georgia but to achieve
its capitulation as had happened to fascist Germany in the past.
Ivashov says, "for the purpose of prevention of new aggression,
it would be possible to broaden the security zone of South Ossetia
by 30-40 kilometers to the south of the country having reached
Gori. In Western Georgia it would be possible to take the strategic
paths leading to the Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi under
control. However, we have not even managed to impose a paragraph on
the complete demilitarization of Georgia on the European Union. This
means that we are not protected from new aggressive actions on the
part of Georgia."
Second, we need aggressiveness not only on the military and diplomatic
level but also on the economic one. Russia has economic leverage to
pressure Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. It is necessary to reinforce
them. Russia is catastrophically losing many markets on the territory
of the CIS but invests petrodollars in the economy of the US and other
Western countries. Why cannot we invest them in the economies of the
aforementioned countries thus connecting them to our country not only
in business but also in policy? Probably then they will become more
loyal towards Moscow?
Third, it is necessary to give up the tactic of "sick and carrot"
towards the allies of Russia in the post-Soviet space (first of all,
in the field of military technological cooperation). It is necessary
to tell the CSTO allies: security in exchange for economic concessions
in business.
Fourth, it is really high time for Moscow to manifest its will and to
fulfill what is written in the foreign policy concept (FPC) with regard
to the role of the collective security system in the post-Soviet
space. For example, the FPC says that Russia views the CSTO as
"a key tool in maintenance of stability and provision of security
in the CIS emphasizing adaptation of the CSTO as a multifunctional
integration structure to the changing situation and transformation
of the organization into the main institution of security provision
in the zone of its responsibility." Unfortunately, this has been
said at least for ten years. However, the CSTO was passive when
the "tulip" revolution happened in Kyrgyzstan. There is also no
participation of the CSTO in the peacekeeping activities in the
post-Soviet space. Probably that is why NATO ignores contacts with
this organization. However, Moscow wants to change the situation in
this aspect and this is inspiring.
Henceforth, the plans for improvement of efficiency of the CSTO are
formulated in an official Russian document. It is necessary only to
make the CSTO such key tool in provision of security on the territory
of the CIS like this is written in the FPC.
Fifth, Russia needs to determine its opponents in the CIS in the
conceptual aspect. For example, the FPC says that the attitude
of Russia to sub-regional formations and other structures without
Russian participation in the CIS space is determined "proceeding from
evaluation of their real contribution to provision of good neighborly
relations and stability, their readiness to really take into account
the legal Russian interests and to respect the already existing
mechanisms of cooperation like the CIS, CSTO, Eurasian Economic
Union and Shanghai Cooperation Organization." It seems that this
is written correctly but the aforementioned mechanisms themselves
require improvement. This means that in its activities Russia needs
to write principles of interaction with these organizations in a
more. It seems that this is written correctly but the aforementioned
mechanisms themselves require improvement. This means that in its
activities Russia needs to outline the principles of interaction
with these organizations in a more detailed manner and clearer. We
should not be afraid of harshness. If Russia has real allies they
will understand this harshness. This means that we need to build a
new system of relations and contacts with them.
It is also possible to mention other necessary measures in foreign
policy of Russia towards the CIS countries. These measures will be
justified if they lead to growth of authority of Russia as the leading
country in the CIS.
Source: . The events connected with the conduction of the operation
of peace enforcement in the zones of the Georgian-Ossetian and
Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts by Russia have demonstrated not only the
increased combat readiness of the Armed Forces of Russia but also the
will of our country to defend its geopolitical interests in the South
Caucasian region. The main principles of resolving of the conflict
situation between Russia and Georgia were determined with mediation of
France. It would seem that having used military force Russia achieved
what it wanted: the aggressor was ousted from the territory of South
Ossetia and measures of humanitarian and political nature for provision
of assistance to the suffered population were taken. Meanwhile, if
we analyze lessons of these events, we encounter a very sad fact: the
allies of Russia in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
and in other organizations did not support Russia in a difficult time.
When the Russian troops were parrying the attack of the Georgian
aggressor at South Ossetia tete-a-tete, assistance was coming
only from the regions of Russia and CIS countries had either
incomprehensible silence or ardent zealous condemnation of Moscow,
which was demonstrated by the regime of Victor Yushchenko.