GEORGIA AND THE RENEWED US-RUSSIAN RIVALRY
Business Line
August 21, 2008 Thursday
One of the major premises of American foreign policy has been that,
with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a policy of "containment"
of a weakened, impoverished and dispirited Russia could succeed, by
an aggressive expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) alliance to Russia's borders, accompanied by domination
of the oil and gas resources not only of Russia, but also of the
former Soviet Republics in Central Asia and the Caucasian regions,
by American and western oil companies. The aim was to integrate the
Caucasian Republics - Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan - into NATO
and construct pipelines bypassing Russia, to carry oil and gas from
countries such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to ports like Ceyhan in
Turkey, for onward shipment to America's NATO partners in Europe.
Strategic objectives The American strategy for access to Caucasian
energy resources was spelt out by Ariel Cohen, a leading analyst of the
Washington-based neo-conservative think-tank, the Heritage Foundation
in 1999. Cohen then proclaimed: "US interests in the Caucasus boil
down to providing guarantees of greater independence to Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan; controlling Iran; ensuring access to energy
resources and precluding the possible revival of Russian imperial
ambitions in the region".
To achieve these objectives, Cohen urged more political support for
an oil pipeline project bypassing the Russian pipeline networks, from
Azerbaijan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. He argued that if this was
not done, Russia and Iran would control access to and investment in a
major part of the Caucasian energy resources, making the West dependent
on Russia and Iran. As the pipeline was to be constructed through
Georgia, Cohen urged the promotion of "security collaboration with
Georgia" and expanding ties with Azerbaijan and Armenia as a "signal"
to Moscow that its support for separatism in South Caucasus would
lead to an end of US economic assistance. Worse still, Cohen urged
that for the US to achieve its strategic objectives, it should open
talks with leaders of North Caucasian ethnic groups - a euphemism for
promoting Muslim separatism in Russia's Chechen and Dagestan Regions.
Russia's power potential What Cohen and US policymakers failed to
anticipate was that under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia
would stage a remarkable economic recovery. In less than a decade,
Russia emerged as a global player, shrewdly using its position as
holding the world's largest resources of natural gas, the second
largest resources of coal and as the world's second biggest producer
of oil, to effectively make America's European allies look to it with
respect and realism. Under Putin's leadership, Russia's economy has
grown at over 7 per cent annually since the year 2000.
Russia has wielded diplomatic clout as a Permanent Member of the UN
Security Council and its participation in groupings like the G-8,
The Middle East Quartet, the Six Power initiative on North Korea's
nuclear programme, APEC, OSCE and in the Russia-NATO Council. Russia
has also expanded its power potential in crucial areas such as its
Defence and space industries. Moreover, with significant Russian
minorities in former Soviet Republics such as Kazakhstan and Ukraine,
Moscow has signalled that it will not remain unconcerned about how
ethnic Russians are treated in these countries.
Unmindful of these changes in power equations, the Americans have
attempted to virtually encircle Russia by proposing missile defences
in former Warsaw Pact members and by encouraging Russia's neighbours
such as Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO. On the eve of the last
NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, President Bush commended
the "bold decision" of the Ukrainian President, Viktor Yuschenko,
to apply for NATO membership and dispatching Ukrainian troops to Iraq
and Afghanistan. Bush added: "In Bucharest this week I will continue
to make our position clear about our support for MAP (NATO membership)
for Ukraine and Georgia".
Recognition of Georgia The Kremlin strongly opposed NATO expansion and
warned that it could lead to Moscow's recognition of the breakaway
regions of Abhkazia and South Ossetia in Georgia which had asserted
their independence and were protected by Russian peacekeepers. While
the US and the European Union were opposed to independence for these
regions, Russia's Parliament proclaimed that if the western powers
could recognise the independence of Kosovo after military intervention,
there was no reason Russia could not do likewise in Georgia.
Georgia's immature US educated President, Mikhail Sakashvili, gave
the Russians the opening they seized when, bolstered by arms supplies
from Ukraine and expectations of full-scale American support, he
mounted a military operation to establish control over South Ossetia
on August 8. Within days, the Georgians were humiliatingly defeated
by the Russians and forced to accept EU mediation by French President,
Nicholas Sarkozy. The proposals agreed to between Sarkozy and Russian
President, Dmitri Medvedev, include a provision for "international
talks on the future status of Abhkazia and South Ossetia and ways to
provide for their security".
Russia views this as EU acceptance of the impossibility of return
to the pre-war status quo. With Chancellor Merkel of Germany and
the French Prime Minister, Francois Fallon, having opposed NATO
membership for Ukraine and Georgia, the US now finds that apart from
support from the ever-loyal British, its other major partners in NATO
such as Germany, France and Italy, which are increasingly dependent
on Russian oil and natural gas, have no desire to embark on another
Cold war against Russia.
Global implications These developments are going to have profound
implications on global politics in coming years. The Americans are
not going to give up their attempts to encircle Russia. The Russians,
in turn, could make American diplomacy on issues like the nuclear
programmes of North Korea and Iran very difficult, should the Americans
become confrontational.
Former Soviet Republics like Kazakhstan, which have huge energy
resources, will now become more cautious in their dealings with
the US out of fear of Russian reaction. In the face of such rivalry
from Russia, the Americans will now seek closer ties with Beijing -
a development of some importance for India and the balance of power in
Asia. Like in the Nixon and Clinton years, China will seek to prove
that it is a useful partner to the US and endeavour to isolate India
diplomatically, skilfully using our Communist Parties to undermine
India-US relations, as they have done in recent times.
India has traditionally had close relations with Russia. Even today,
Russian supply of enriched uranium keeps the Tarapur Nuclear Power
Plant functioning in the face of an American embargo, and crucial
areas of Defence requirements like the acquisition of cruise missiles
and futuristic fifth generation fighter aircraft are based on joint
collaboration and development with the Russians. New Delhi would be
well advised to ensure that on energy-related issues such as the
proposed pipelines with Iran and Turkmenistan and developments in
Central Asia, it pays greater attention to Russian policies. Moreover,
Indian diplomacy should seek to promote a dialogue between the US,
on the one hand, and Russia and Iran, on the other, on issues like
the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, where US policy has
been to exclude these countries, as far as possible. Even though the
Americans were inclined to show accommodation of Chechen separatism
earlier, they now have a better understanding of Russian imperatives,
after the terrorist strikes of 9/11.
Business Line
August 21, 2008 Thursday
One of the major premises of American foreign policy has been that,
with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a policy of "containment"
of a weakened, impoverished and dispirited Russia could succeed, by
an aggressive expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) alliance to Russia's borders, accompanied by domination
of the oil and gas resources not only of Russia, but also of the
former Soviet Republics in Central Asia and the Caucasian regions,
by American and western oil companies. The aim was to integrate the
Caucasian Republics - Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan - into NATO
and construct pipelines bypassing Russia, to carry oil and gas from
countries such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to ports like Ceyhan in
Turkey, for onward shipment to America's NATO partners in Europe.
Strategic objectives The American strategy for access to Caucasian
energy resources was spelt out by Ariel Cohen, a leading analyst of the
Washington-based neo-conservative think-tank, the Heritage Foundation
in 1999. Cohen then proclaimed: "US interests in the Caucasus boil
down to providing guarantees of greater independence to Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan; controlling Iran; ensuring access to energy
resources and precluding the possible revival of Russian imperial
ambitions in the region".
To achieve these objectives, Cohen urged more political support for
an oil pipeline project bypassing the Russian pipeline networks, from
Azerbaijan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. He argued that if this was
not done, Russia and Iran would control access to and investment in a
major part of the Caucasian energy resources, making the West dependent
on Russia and Iran. As the pipeline was to be constructed through
Georgia, Cohen urged the promotion of "security collaboration with
Georgia" and expanding ties with Azerbaijan and Armenia as a "signal"
to Moscow that its support for separatism in South Caucasus would
lead to an end of US economic assistance. Worse still, Cohen urged
that for the US to achieve its strategic objectives, it should open
talks with leaders of North Caucasian ethnic groups - a euphemism for
promoting Muslim separatism in Russia's Chechen and Dagestan Regions.
Russia's power potential What Cohen and US policymakers failed to
anticipate was that under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia
would stage a remarkable economic recovery. In less than a decade,
Russia emerged as a global player, shrewdly using its position as
holding the world's largest resources of natural gas, the second
largest resources of coal and as the world's second biggest producer
of oil, to effectively make America's European allies look to it with
respect and realism. Under Putin's leadership, Russia's economy has
grown at over 7 per cent annually since the year 2000.
Russia has wielded diplomatic clout as a Permanent Member of the UN
Security Council and its participation in groupings like the G-8,
The Middle East Quartet, the Six Power initiative on North Korea's
nuclear programme, APEC, OSCE and in the Russia-NATO Council. Russia
has also expanded its power potential in crucial areas such as its
Defence and space industries. Moreover, with significant Russian
minorities in former Soviet Republics such as Kazakhstan and Ukraine,
Moscow has signalled that it will not remain unconcerned about how
ethnic Russians are treated in these countries.
Unmindful of these changes in power equations, the Americans have
attempted to virtually encircle Russia by proposing missile defences
in former Warsaw Pact members and by encouraging Russia's neighbours
such as Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO. On the eve of the last
NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, President Bush commended
the "bold decision" of the Ukrainian President, Viktor Yuschenko,
to apply for NATO membership and dispatching Ukrainian troops to Iraq
and Afghanistan. Bush added: "In Bucharest this week I will continue
to make our position clear about our support for MAP (NATO membership)
for Ukraine and Georgia".
Recognition of Georgia The Kremlin strongly opposed NATO expansion and
warned that it could lead to Moscow's recognition of the breakaway
regions of Abhkazia and South Ossetia in Georgia which had asserted
their independence and were protected by Russian peacekeepers. While
the US and the European Union were opposed to independence for these
regions, Russia's Parliament proclaimed that if the western powers
could recognise the independence of Kosovo after military intervention,
there was no reason Russia could not do likewise in Georgia.
Georgia's immature US educated President, Mikhail Sakashvili, gave
the Russians the opening they seized when, bolstered by arms supplies
from Ukraine and expectations of full-scale American support, he
mounted a military operation to establish control over South Ossetia
on August 8. Within days, the Georgians were humiliatingly defeated
by the Russians and forced to accept EU mediation by French President,
Nicholas Sarkozy. The proposals agreed to between Sarkozy and Russian
President, Dmitri Medvedev, include a provision for "international
talks on the future status of Abhkazia and South Ossetia and ways to
provide for their security".
Russia views this as EU acceptance of the impossibility of return
to the pre-war status quo. With Chancellor Merkel of Germany and
the French Prime Minister, Francois Fallon, having opposed NATO
membership for Ukraine and Georgia, the US now finds that apart from
support from the ever-loyal British, its other major partners in NATO
such as Germany, France and Italy, which are increasingly dependent
on Russian oil and natural gas, have no desire to embark on another
Cold war against Russia.
Global implications These developments are going to have profound
implications on global politics in coming years. The Americans are
not going to give up their attempts to encircle Russia. The Russians,
in turn, could make American diplomacy on issues like the nuclear
programmes of North Korea and Iran very difficult, should the Americans
become confrontational.
Former Soviet Republics like Kazakhstan, which have huge energy
resources, will now become more cautious in their dealings with
the US out of fear of Russian reaction. In the face of such rivalry
from Russia, the Americans will now seek closer ties with Beijing -
a development of some importance for India and the balance of power in
Asia. Like in the Nixon and Clinton years, China will seek to prove
that it is a useful partner to the US and endeavour to isolate India
diplomatically, skilfully using our Communist Parties to undermine
India-US relations, as they have done in recent times.
India has traditionally had close relations with Russia. Even today,
Russian supply of enriched uranium keeps the Tarapur Nuclear Power
Plant functioning in the face of an American embargo, and crucial
areas of Defence requirements like the acquisition of cruise missiles
and futuristic fifth generation fighter aircraft are based on joint
collaboration and development with the Russians. New Delhi would be
well advised to ensure that on energy-related issues such as the
proposed pipelines with Iran and Turkmenistan and developments in
Central Asia, it pays greater attention to Russian policies. Moreover,
Indian diplomacy should seek to promote a dialogue between the US,
on the one hand, and Russia and Iran, on the other, on issues like
the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, where US policy has
been to exclude these countries, as far as possible. Even though the
Americans were inclined to show accommodation of Chechen separatism
earlier, they now have a better understanding of Russian imperatives,
after the terrorist strikes of 9/11.