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CAUCASUS: IF RUSSIA ACTED DIFFERENTLY AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
Michael Averko
American Chronicle
http://www.americanchronicle.com/article s/71911
Aug 21 2008
CA
A series of destabilizing responses were likely if Russia did not
counterattack against the August 7 Georgian government strike into
South Ossetia. Russia would have probably faced a significantly
greater refugee crisis from what occurred. Georgian president Mikheil
Saakashvili might have had greater inclination to attack Abkhazia. Many
Russians would be pressing the issue of why their government did not
take action to deter the hypothetically stated situation.
These points relate to why Russia acted in the way it did. In doing
so, the Kremlin no doubt considered the rhetorical backlash it would
receive.
The Russian government was in a kind of "damned if you do, damned
if you don't" scenario. They knew that a reasonably based (as far
as major powers conducting armed action) counterattack against the
Georgian government was not going to be met with open arms from Western
neo-liberals and neo-conservatives. On the other hand, a Russian
non-military response would probably not result in significant benefits
for Russia. On the contrary, some in the West would gloat about how
their guy Saakashvili had his way with "Russian surrogates" and Russia.
Russian foreign policy takes into account the Western post-Soviet
global advocacy that favors certain humanitarian issues over
others. Western laxness to the 1995 ethnic cleansing of 150,000 Krajina
Sebs and willingness to downplay Kosovo Liberation Army transgressions
lead Moscow to believe that the West would not be so scornful of a
"disproportionate" Georgian government attempt which victoriously
retook South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
In 1992, Russia assumed the role of peacekeeper in the disputed
South Ossetian and Abkhaz territories of the former Georgian Soviet
Socialist Republic (SSR). As the strongest force in the Caucasus,
the Russians were on better terms with the involved adversaries than
he belligerents were with themselves.
Comparative references are made to the Russian counterattack on Georgia
and the 2003 American led attack on Iraq. Of course, Saakashvili is
nowhere near the threat that Saddam Hussein posed. At the same time,
the territory of the former Georgian SSR borders Russia, whereas
Iraq is not even in the same hemisphere as the United States. In
1991, there was an international consensus for turning back Saddam's
invasion of Kuwait. This included Syria and Turkey; two countries not
known for seeing eye to eye. In 2003, Syria, Turkey and other nations
expressed apprehension to the American led attack which overthrew
Saddam. For now, it appears that the suffering caused by the Russian
military action in Georgia will be considerably lower than what Iraq
has experienced since 2003.
Georgia's best chance at successfully achieving a mutually agreed to
jurisdiction in South Ossetia and Abkhazia involve factors that some
will not find appealing. The least provocative factor grants the two
regions great autonomy. The other facet concerns Georgia and Russia
redeveloping closer ties. South Ossetia and Georgia are not currently
motivated to be a part of Georgia. Russia presently sees little reason
to please Georgian desires in the two disputed territories.
Attention has been given to Abkhazia's ethnic makeup prior to the
Soviet breakup (17.8% Abkhaz and 45.7% Georgian, as per the 1989
Soviet census). The roughly 35% non-ethnic Abkhaz/Georgian population
took different positions on the Abkhaz-Georgian dispute. Many
fled post-Soviet war torn Abkhazia, with a good number remaining
(according to a 2003 census of Abkhazia, 43.8% of the population is
Abkhaz and 21.3% Georgian). The Abkhaz note that they were said to be
a majority in their region going back to about the mid-19th century
(based on not always accurate census taking). During the Stalin era,
the Abkhaz felt discriminated against when compared to the Georgians.
Abkhazia's situation reveals how disputed territories have different
circumstances. Among the comparative specifics being history and human
rights, in conjunction with the overall will of the people from the
respective disputed territory. The disputed former Communist bloc
territories are Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh
and Trans-Dniester.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Michael Averko
American Chronicle
http://www.americanchronicle.com/article s/71911
Aug 21 2008
CA
A series of destabilizing responses were likely if Russia did not
counterattack against the August 7 Georgian government strike into
South Ossetia. Russia would have probably faced a significantly
greater refugee crisis from what occurred. Georgian president Mikheil
Saakashvili might have had greater inclination to attack Abkhazia. Many
Russians would be pressing the issue of why their government did not
take action to deter the hypothetically stated situation.
These points relate to why Russia acted in the way it did. In doing
so, the Kremlin no doubt considered the rhetorical backlash it would
receive.
The Russian government was in a kind of "damned if you do, damned
if you don't" scenario. They knew that a reasonably based (as far
as major powers conducting armed action) counterattack against the
Georgian government was not going to be met with open arms from Western
neo-liberals and neo-conservatives. On the other hand, a Russian
non-military response would probably not result in significant benefits
for Russia. On the contrary, some in the West would gloat about how
their guy Saakashvili had his way with "Russian surrogates" and Russia.
Russian foreign policy takes into account the Western post-Soviet
global advocacy that favors certain humanitarian issues over
others. Western laxness to the 1995 ethnic cleansing of 150,000 Krajina
Sebs and willingness to downplay Kosovo Liberation Army transgressions
lead Moscow to believe that the West would not be so scornful of a
"disproportionate" Georgian government attempt which victoriously
retook South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
In 1992, Russia assumed the role of peacekeeper in the disputed
South Ossetian and Abkhaz territories of the former Georgian Soviet
Socialist Republic (SSR). As the strongest force in the Caucasus,
the Russians were on better terms with the involved adversaries than
he belligerents were with themselves.
Comparative references are made to the Russian counterattack on Georgia
and the 2003 American led attack on Iraq. Of course, Saakashvili is
nowhere near the threat that Saddam Hussein posed. At the same time,
the territory of the former Georgian SSR borders Russia, whereas
Iraq is not even in the same hemisphere as the United States. In
1991, there was an international consensus for turning back Saddam's
invasion of Kuwait. This included Syria and Turkey; two countries not
known for seeing eye to eye. In 2003, Syria, Turkey and other nations
expressed apprehension to the American led attack which overthrew
Saddam. For now, it appears that the suffering caused by the Russian
military action in Georgia will be considerably lower than what Iraq
has experienced since 2003.
Georgia's best chance at successfully achieving a mutually agreed to
jurisdiction in South Ossetia and Abkhazia involve factors that some
will not find appealing. The least provocative factor grants the two
regions great autonomy. The other facet concerns Georgia and Russia
redeveloping closer ties. South Ossetia and Georgia are not currently
motivated to be a part of Georgia. Russia presently sees little reason
to please Georgian desires in the two disputed territories.
Attention has been given to Abkhazia's ethnic makeup prior to the
Soviet breakup (17.8% Abkhaz and 45.7% Georgian, as per the 1989
Soviet census). The roughly 35% non-ethnic Abkhaz/Georgian population
took different positions on the Abkhaz-Georgian dispute. Many
fled post-Soviet war torn Abkhazia, with a good number remaining
(according to a 2003 census of Abkhazia, 43.8% of the population is
Abkhaz and 21.3% Georgian). The Abkhaz note that they were said to be
a majority in their region going back to about the mid-19th century
(based on not always accurate census taking). During the Stalin era,
the Abkhaz felt discriminated against when compared to the Georgians.
Abkhazia's situation reveals how disputed territories have different
circumstances. Among the comparative specifics being history and human
rights, in conjunction with the overall will of the people from the
respective disputed territory. The disputed former Communist bloc
territories are Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh
and Trans-Dniester.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress