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RESPONDING TO GEORGIA CRISIS, TURKEY SEEKS NEW CAUCASUS SECURITY INITIATIVE
By Alman Mir - Ismail
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Aug 22 2008
DC
The Georgian-Russian military conflict has created new security
dilemmas in the South Caucasus. Not only has the fragile
stability established since the chaos of 1990s been ruined, but
the East-West energy and transportation corridor has also been made
vulnerable. Turkey, as one of the largest donors of the South Caucasus
region and an active player in regional politics, surprisingly stayed
out of the conflict, neither defending its regional ally Georgia nor
making official statements at the governmental level. For many in
the region, this was perceived as a sign of Turkish weakness, lack
of interest in the South Caucasus region from the ruling AKP party,
and growing dependence on Russia in terms of trade and regional
alliance. Others simply called it a "sell-out of Caucasus." Indeed,
Turkey benefits from the regional energy pipelines and such a reaction
can only raise surprise among regional countries.
Partly because of the desire to refute these rumors and partly to
achieve Turkey's long-awaited goals in the Caucasus, Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan came up with the "Platform for security
and cooperation in the South Caucasus" initiative. The initiative,
which Erdogan plans to discuss with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov, is intended to create a regional security framework. It
intends to accomplish this by encouraging greater integration between
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia and empowering Russia and Turkey to
play the leads roles of regional security guarantors. Erdogan's vision
is to solve the frozen conflicts in the region on a sustainable and
long-lasting basis and to satisfy the national interests of Russia,
which regards the West's influence in the region as a "zero-sum
game." Under this initiative, NATO would be limited to an outside role
in providing security for the region -- a clear effort to minimize
Russian distrust and anger.
With this idea, Erdogan visited Baku on August 21 to talk with
President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and unveil this plan. Azerbaijani
public and politicians generally have greeted this proposal with
a great degree of skepticism. Political analyst Rasim Musabeyov was
quoted by ANS TV on August 21 saying, "Turkey wants to push Azerbaijan
towards compromise and also make sure Armenia plays more pragmatic
role. This is the vision behind the Caucasus Platform idea of Erdogan."
Opposition newspaper Yeni Musavat believes that under the pretext
of the Common Caucasus Platform, Erdogan wants to open borders with
Armenia. Indeed, since its arrival in power in 2002, the AKP party
has been favoring the idea of restoring economic and trade ties
with Yerevan in order to improve the economic situation in Turkey's
Eastern regions, such as Kars and Erzurum, which suffer greatly from
the closed borders with Armenia. Azerbaijani officials have protested
against these ideas, saying that opening borders prior to Armenia's
liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani territories would not only
damage Turkish-Azerbaijani solidarity and alliance in the region, but
also symbolically forgive the ethnic cleansing by Armenia. Previous
Turkish governments have preconditioned the opening of the borders
with Armenia to the end of the Karabakh conflict. For Azerbaijan,
closed borders between Turkey and Armenia are another tool of pressure
on the officials in Yerevan.
Nevertheless, after the presidential elections in Armenia in early
2008, Turkish-Armenian relations seem to be entering a new stage. Newly
elected President of Armenia Serj Sarkisian has invited his Turkish
counterpart Abdulla Gul to Yerevan to watch a soccer game between the
two countries. This sport event began a series of diplomatic events,
culminating with the revelation by senior Turkish officials that
high ranking diplomats of the two nations are engaged in negotiations
in Geneva. And on August 22, Yeni Musavat even reported that Turkey
opened flights into Armenia.
Officials in Baku seem less nervous this time about the possibility
of the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations than back in
2003-2004. It appears that even in the circles of the Azerbaijani
political leadership, there is an understanding that the economic
pressures on Armenia do not work and simply reinforce Armenian
dependence on Russia. Perhaps the normalization of Turkish-Armenian
relations will entice a breakthrough on the negotiation process in
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. More trust between these two nations might
prompt Armenia to extend certain concessions, should Yerevan feel
itself more secure.
However, some analysts believe that this Erdogan's initiative is
doomed to failure. Nationalism, realpolitik, and irrational behavior
still dominate politics in the Caucasus, and it would be unrealistic
to expect Armenia to be less nationalistic or Russia to behave more
pragmatically. "If the West manages to push Russia out of Caucasus,
then the idea of the common Caucasus home might be possible. If
Russia stays in the region, then not," says Ilgar Mammadov, political
scientist (ANS TV, August 21). His colleague Zardusht Alizadeh echoes
pessimism: "The initiative of Erdigan will be unsuccessful" (Day.az,
August 20).
Similar proposals for the common Caucasus House, like the common EU,
were made in the early 1990s but eventually failed due to a lack of
desire from the competing powers both inside and outside of the region.
By Alman Mir - Ismail
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Aug 22 2008
DC
The Georgian-Russian military conflict has created new security
dilemmas in the South Caucasus. Not only has the fragile
stability established since the chaos of 1990s been ruined, but
the East-West energy and transportation corridor has also been made
vulnerable. Turkey, as one of the largest donors of the South Caucasus
region and an active player in regional politics, surprisingly stayed
out of the conflict, neither defending its regional ally Georgia nor
making official statements at the governmental level. For many in
the region, this was perceived as a sign of Turkish weakness, lack
of interest in the South Caucasus region from the ruling AKP party,
and growing dependence on Russia in terms of trade and regional
alliance. Others simply called it a "sell-out of Caucasus." Indeed,
Turkey benefits from the regional energy pipelines and such a reaction
can only raise surprise among regional countries.
Partly because of the desire to refute these rumors and partly to
achieve Turkey's long-awaited goals in the Caucasus, Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan came up with the "Platform for security
and cooperation in the South Caucasus" initiative. The initiative,
which Erdogan plans to discuss with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov, is intended to create a regional security framework. It
intends to accomplish this by encouraging greater integration between
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia and empowering Russia and Turkey to
play the leads roles of regional security guarantors. Erdogan's vision
is to solve the frozen conflicts in the region on a sustainable and
long-lasting basis and to satisfy the national interests of Russia,
which regards the West's influence in the region as a "zero-sum
game." Under this initiative, NATO would be limited to an outside role
in providing security for the region -- a clear effort to minimize
Russian distrust and anger.
With this idea, Erdogan visited Baku on August 21 to talk with
President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and unveil this plan. Azerbaijani
public and politicians generally have greeted this proposal with
a great degree of skepticism. Political analyst Rasim Musabeyov was
quoted by ANS TV on August 21 saying, "Turkey wants to push Azerbaijan
towards compromise and also make sure Armenia plays more pragmatic
role. This is the vision behind the Caucasus Platform idea of Erdogan."
Opposition newspaper Yeni Musavat believes that under the pretext
of the Common Caucasus Platform, Erdogan wants to open borders with
Armenia. Indeed, since its arrival in power in 2002, the AKP party
has been favoring the idea of restoring economic and trade ties
with Yerevan in order to improve the economic situation in Turkey's
Eastern regions, such as Kars and Erzurum, which suffer greatly from
the closed borders with Armenia. Azerbaijani officials have protested
against these ideas, saying that opening borders prior to Armenia's
liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani territories would not only
damage Turkish-Azerbaijani solidarity and alliance in the region, but
also symbolically forgive the ethnic cleansing by Armenia. Previous
Turkish governments have preconditioned the opening of the borders
with Armenia to the end of the Karabakh conflict. For Azerbaijan,
closed borders between Turkey and Armenia are another tool of pressure
on the officials in Yerevan.
Nevertheless, after the presidential elections in Armenia in early
2008, Turkish-Armenian relations seem to be entering a new stage. Newly
elected President of Armenia Serj Sarkisian has invited his Turkish
counterpart Abdulla Gul to Yerevan to watch a soccer game between the
two countries. This sport event began a series of diplomatic events,
culminating with the revelation by senior Turkish officials that
high ranking diplomats of the two nations are engaged in negotiations
in Geneva. And on August 22, Yeni Musavat even reported that Turkey
opened flights into Armenia.
Officials in Baku seem less nervous this time about the possibility
of the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations than back in
2003-2004. It appears that even in the circles of the Azerbaijani
political leadership, there is an understanding that the economic
pressures on Armenia do not work and simply reinforce Armenian
dependence on Russia. Perhaps the normalization of Turkish-Armenian
relations will entice a breakthrough on the negotiation process in
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. More trust between these two nations might
prompt Armenia to extend certain concessions, should Yerevan feel
itself more secure.
However, some analysts believe that this Erdogan's initiative is
doomed to failure. Nationalism, realpolitik, and irrational behavior
still dominate politics in the Caucasus, and it would be unrealistic
to expect Armenia to be less nationalistic or Russia to behave more
pragmatically. "If the West manages to push Russia out of Caucasus,
then the idea of the common Caucasus home might be possible. If
Russia stays in the region, then not," says Ilgar Mammadov, political
scientist (ANS TV, August 21). His colleague Zardusht Alizadeh echoes
pessimism: "The initiative of Erdigan will be unsuccessful" (Day.az,
August 20).
Similar proposals for the common Caucasus House, like the common EU,
were made in the early 1990s but eventually failed due to a lack of
desire from the competing powers both inside and outside of the region.