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Washington Post
Aug 24 2008
Georgian Democracy A Complex Evolution
By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, August 24, 2008; Page A17
During the current conflict between Russia and Georgia, U.S. officials
have frequently referred to the former Soviet republic as a democracy,
a nation President Bush once called "a beacon of liberty." Speaking
before the Veterans of Foreign Wars last week, the president declared,
"Georgia has stood for freedom around the world -- now the world must
stand for freedom in Georgia."
But the story of Georgia's democracy is more complex than the
administration's rhetoric suggests, and some experts say U.S. policies
have undermined the country's democratic trends.
After the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia brought the government of
President Mikheil Saakashvili to power, the Bush administration scaled
back funding for voluntary civil and social organizations in order to
devote resources to building up the central government -- precisely as
such organizations were being weakened by a drain of top officials
joining the new government. Separate aid efforts to create a
professional civil service have also been thwarted by objections by
the Georgia government.
As a result, experts and aid specialists said, Georgia's central
government has become more powerful, while other governmental and
nongovernmental institutions have become weaker since the 2003
overthrow of leader Eduard Shevardnadze, resulting in few outlets for
popular discontent. Last November, the government used excessive force
to disperse largely peaceful demonstrations in Tbilisi, Georgia's
capital, according to Human Rights Watch, and Saakashvili briefly
imposed emergency rule.
Last month, the Georgian government further tried to limit aid to
nongovernmental groups, bluntly informing foreign donors that future
technical assistance "would be provided in direct response to
government requests." According to a copy of the government's July 7
briefing, provided by a person who attended it, future projects must
focus on infrastructure, such as roads and sanitation. The Georgia
government "did not appreciate" and was opposed to projects "which
eventually attain policy dynamics of their own and become a burden on
the government and/or confuse the policy-making process," the briefing
document said.
"Georgia is a semi-democracy. We have traded one kind of
semi-democratic system for another. There is a real need to understand
that what happened is another one-party government emerged," said
Lincoln Mitchell, who worked for the National Democratic Institute in
Georgia from 2002 to 2004 and is author of the forthcoming book
"Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia's Rose
Revolution."
Under Shevardnadze, there was freedom of assembly and the press, and
the government was too weak to crack down on dissent, Mitchell
said. But the state was rife with corruption, and elections were
poorly run. Under Saakashvili, the central government is stronger and
official corruption has been reduced, but the media have far fewer
freedoms and there are fewer civil organizations. Elections still
don't function well. Mitchell added that Parliament has been weakened
through constitutional changes mandated by Saakashvili, making it
difficult for the legislative branch to restrain executive power.
"We undermine Georgia's cause when we overstate their democracy," said
Mitchell, now an assistant professor at Columbia University. "If we
declare victory prematurely, as I think the Bush administration has
done, it is not good for democracy generally and not good for Georgia
in particular."
Tom Malinowski, Washington advocacy director for Human Rights Watch,
agreed that "relative to its self-image and the way it is portrayed in
the United States, Georgia is not a pristine democracy." But, he said,
compared with such neighbors as Armenia, Azerbaijan and other former
Soviet republics in the region, "it is a much better place."
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, pressed by foreign
reporters last week on the nature of Georgia's democracy, acknowledged
that Tbilisi "has not even come close to finishing its democratic
evolution. It still has a long way to go on many fronts. . . . And we
are committed to helping Georgia move even deeper in its democratic
evolution."
Still, aid specialists said working in Georgia is often a frustrating
experience, with initiatives blocked by a rotating cast of ministers
or officials who are frequently replaced by Saakashvili. While the
president wins praise for his crackdown on corruption and his ability
to attract investment, former and current aid workers said it is often
difficult to make real improvements.
"I was excited to go to Georgia. I thought it had real prospects,"
said Jamie Factor, who has spent 15 years working on international
donor programs to advance democratic reforms in transitional countries
and served in Georgia in 2006 and 2007. "But I couldn't have been more
disappointed in terms of being able to accomplish anything."
Out of a total of $67 million the Bush administration has requested in
aid for Georgia for fiscal 2009, more is devoted to military
assistance ($15.2 million) than democracy programs ($14.8
million). Before the conflict with Russia erupted early this month,
Georgia's armed forces made up the third-largest foreign force in the
U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.
"Georgia has made enormous strides in governmental reform but must
improve the effectiveness of key institutions, strengthen political
pluralism and increase public participation to truly consolidate its
democratic gains," the State Department said in its budget
justification to Congress.
Officials at the U.S. Agency for International Development say that
the Georgian government did not pressure the United States to reduce
funding to civil society groups but that the agency "rebalanced"
funding after the Rose Revolution because it could begin to work
directly with the Georgian government. An official, speaking on the
condition of anonymity to answer questions about particular programs,
said that efforts to create a professional civil service have suffered
a setback. "USAID can only engage in this type of wholesale reform if
the host country wants it and is behind the initiative," the official
said.
Aug 24 2008
Georgian Democracy A Complex Evolution
By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, August 24, 2008; Page A17
During the current conflict between Russia and Georgia, U.S. officials
have frequently referred to the former Soviet republic as a democracy,
a nation President Bush once called "a beacon of liberty." Speaking
before the Veterans of Foreign Wars last week, the president declared,
"Georgia has stood for freedom around the world -- now the world must
stand for freedom in Georgia."
But the story of Georgia's democracy is more complex than the
administration's rhetoric suggests, and some experts say U.S. policies
have undermined the country's democratic trends.
After the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia brought the government of
President Mikheil Saakashvili to power, the Bush administration scaled
back funding for voluntary civil and social organizations in order to
devote resources to building up the central government -- precisely as
such organizations were being weakened by a drain of top officials
joining the new government. Separate aid efforts to create a
professional civil service have also been thwarted by objections by
the Georgia government.
As a result, experts and aid specialists said, Georgia's central
government has become more powerful, while other governmental and
nongovernmental institutions have become weaker since the 2003
overthrow of leader Eduard Shevardnadze, resulting in few outlets for
popular discontent. Last November, the government used excessive force
to disperse largely peaceful demonstrations in Tbilisi, Georgia's
capital, according to Human Rights Watch, and Saakashvili briefly
imposed emergency rule.
Last month, the Georgian government further tried to limit aid to
nongovernmental groups, bluntly informing foreign donors that future
technical assistance "would be provided in direct response to
government requests." According to a copy of the government's July 7
briefing, provided by a person who attended it, future projects must
focus on infrastructure, such as roads and sanitation. The Georgia
government "did not appreciate" and was opposed to projects "which
eventually attain policy dynamics of their own and become a burden on
the government and/or confuse the policy-making process," the briefing
document said.
"Georgia is a semi-democracy. We have traded one kind of
semi-democratic system for another. There is a real need to understand
that what happened is another one-party government emerged," said
Lincoln Mitchell, who worked for the National Democratic Institute in
Georgia from 2002 to 2004 and is author of the forthcoming book
"Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia's Rose
Revolution."
Under Shevardnadze, there was freedom of assembly and the press, and
the government was too weak to crack down on dissent, Mitchell
said. But the state was rife with corruption, and elections were
poorly run. Under Saakashvili, the central government is stronger and
official corruption has been reduced, but the media have far fewer
freedoms and there are fewer civil organizations. Elections still
don't function well. Mitchell added that Parliament has been weakened
through constitutional changes mandated by Saakashvili, making it
difficult for the legislative branch to restrain executive power.
"We undermine Georgia's cause when we overstate their democracy," said
Mitchell, now an assistant professor at Columbia University. "If we
declare victory prematurely, as I think the Bush administration has
done, it is not good for democracy generally and not good for Georgia
in particular."
Tom Malinowski, Washington advocacy director for Human Rights Watch,
agreed that "relative to its self-image and the way it is portrayed in
the United States, Georgia is not a pristine democracy." But, he said,
compared with such neighbors as Armenia, Azerbaijan and other former
Soviet republics in the region, "it is a much better place."
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, pressed by foreign
reporters last week on the nature of Georgia's democracy, acknowledged
that Tbilisi "has not even come close to finishing its democratic
evolution. It still has a long way to go on many fronts. . . . And we
are committed to helping Georgia move even deeper in its democratic
evolution."
Still, aid specialists said working in Georgia is often a frustrating
experience, with initiatives blocked by a rotating cast of ministers
or officials who are frequently replaced by Saakashvili. While the
president wins praise for his crackdown on corruption and his ability
to attract investment, former and current aid workers said it is often
difficult to make real improvements.
"I was excited to go to Georgia. I thought it had real prospects,"
said Jamie Factor, who has spent 15 years working on international
donor programs to advance democratic reforms in transitional countries
and served in Georgia in 2006 and 2007. "But I couldn't have been more
disappointed in terms of being able to accomplish anything."
Out of a total of $67 million the Bush administration has requested in
aid for Georgia for fiscal 2009, more is devoted to military
assistance ($15.2 million) than democracy programs ($14.8
million). Before the conflict with Russia erupted early this month,
Georgia's armed forces made up the third-largest foreign force in the
U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.
"Georgia has made enormous strides in governmental reform but must
improve the effectiveness of key institutions, strengthen political
pluralism and increase public participation to truly consolidate its
democratic gains," the State Department said in its budget
justification to Congress.
Officials at the U.S. Agency for International Development say that
the Georgian government did not pressure the United States to reduce
funding to civil society groups but that the agency "rebalanced"
funding after the Rose Revolution because it could begin to work
directly with the Georgian government. An official, speaking on the
condition of anonymity to answer questions about particular programs,
said that efforts to create a professional civil service have suffered
a setback. "USAID can only engage in this type of wholesale reform if
the host country wants it and is behind the initiative," the official
said.