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Middle East Times, Egypt
Aug 23 2008
The Real World: Georgia War Lessons for the Middle East
By ARIEL COHEN (Middle East Times)Published: August 22, 2008
Syrian President Bashar Assad joined Muammar Gadhafi of Libya in
backing Russia's lightning military action against Georgia, making
Syria one of the few countries in the world to publicly back the
Kremlin.
"We understand the essence of the Russian position and its military
response," Assad told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at the start
of their meeting in Moscow. "We believe Russia was responding to the
Georgian provocation."
At the start of the war, almost no country in the world came out in
support of Russian action. Cuba and Libya were in the vanguard of the
old Soviet coterie speaking out in support. Venezuela and Hamas chimed
in, but even "brotherly" Belarus and historic ally Armenia, two
countries over which Russia has the most sway, remained noticeably
silent.
Good old days of the Cold War and U.S.-Russian competition may be
returning to the Middle East. Damascus, supported by Iranian cash,
wants bigger and better toys. The Baath regime signals that it is not
serious about the still-born negotiations with Israel it conducted in
Istanbul.
Assad has been seeking state-of-the-art SA-10s anti-aircraft missile
system for close to a decade, and the sale has been blocked numerous
times in the past, by pressure from the United States and
Israel. Damascus also is interested in the long range S-300
anti-aircraft/anti-ballistic missile system Russia has sold to Tehran.
Assad said he hopes to offer Moscow the opportunity to deploy that
type of missile in Syrian territory, as a counterweight to
U.S. missiles in Poland, but it is clearly aimed at Israel. Syria also
is asking short-range surface to surface ballistic missiles SS-21
SCARAB (9K79 Tochka) single-stage, short-range, tactical-ballistic
missile and SS-26 Iskander short-range missile.
The SS-26 comes in two modifications: a longer range (greater than 400
km) variant for the Russian forces, and a shorter range (less than 300
km) version for export. If Syria gets either, it will be able to hit
the Tel Aviv area with greater accuracy than with the current
SCUDs. If Russia satisfies Syria's demands, it will mean that it is
seeking a confrontation with the United States not just in the Soviet
periphery, but in the old battleground of the Middle East.
Lessons from the Georgia war are going to be studied in the Middle
Eastern military academies for years to come. The early assessment
signals the return of conventional military operations, 20th century
style -- with some elements of intensive information warfare and cyber
attacks thrown in for a good measure.
The Russian General Staff planning provided a speed and complexity in
implementing combined operations that were well prepared and
reasonably executed. More important, the Russian offensive achieved a
strategic surprise. Essentially, after regaining control of
Tskhinvali, the Russian army conducted a two-pronged offensive against
Georgia from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This is purely within the
tradition of the classical Russian operational art, of conducting more
than one offensive operation to prevent the defender's concentration
of forces and overwhelm his defensive strategy.
The Russian military occupied the strategically vital highway and
railway line which crosses central Georgia and links Tbilisi with the
coastline, severing access to its main port, and essentially
paralyzing and dividing the country in several parts.
Overwhelming Force
The Russian main ground forces involved in the invasion of Georgia
belong to the 58th Army, which took part in the invasion and
occupation of Chechnya since 1999. Other Russian units that are taking
part in the campaign are the 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division
based in Chechnya, the Guards "Pskov" 76th Guards Airborne Division,
the 98th Guards Airborne Division based in Ivanovo, and the 45th
Independent Strategic Reconnaissance Regiment, which is under the Main
Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (Spetsnaz GRU).
The Russian airborne troops operated from South Ossetia and Abkhazia
in the invasion of Georgia, providing security to the Roki Tunnel;
occupying Poti; destroying oil infrastructures there; and possibly
participating in the capture of the strategic Inguri hydro power
station without a shot fired. Ingrui station provides two-thirds of
Georgia's electricity.
Lessons Learned
A few preliminary lessons can be distilled after only 13 days since
the beginning of hostilities. These include:
- Watch out for the Bear! Russian continental power is on the
rise. Central European countries should watch their rhetoric, while
staunchly defending their own national security interests. Small
states need to treat nuclear armed great powers with
respect. Provoking a militarily strong adversary is worthwhile only if
you are confident of victory, and even then there may be bitter
surprises, just as Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili found out.
- Combine NATO and U.S. Guarantees with Military Self-Reliance.
European NATO members have much higher level of security guarantees
than Georgia, including NATO's Article Five. Yet, during the Cold War
years, countries which had contingencies and training for popular
resistance against the USSR -- Albania, Romania, and Switzerland --
had a higher level of security than those which only relied solely on
U.S. troops or nukes. Revisiting civil defense and organized popular
resistance may be in order.
- Airpower alone is not sufficient. Russia used air, armor, the Black
Sea Fleet, special forces and allied militias. Clausewitzian lessons
still apply: the use of combined operations with overwhelming force in
the war's center of gravity does work.
- Surprise and speed of operations still matter -- as they have for
4,000 years of recorded history of warfare. To be successful, wars
have to have limited and achievable goals. Russia achieved most of its
goals between Friday and Monday, while the world, including
U.S. President George W. Bush, was busy watching the Olympics and
parliaments were on vacation.
- Do not cringe -- within reason -- from taking military casualties
and inflicting overwhelming military and civilian causalities at a
level unacceptable to the enemy. Georgia lost between 100-200
soldiers, and was routed. A tougher enemy, like Japan or Germany in
World War II, or even a non-state actor like the Taliban or Hezbollah,
could suffer a proportionally much higher rate of casualties and keep
on fighting.
- Information and psychological warfare is paramount. So is
cyber-security. It looks like the Russians conducted repeated denial
of service attacks against Georgia (and in 2007, against Estonia),
shutting down key Web sites. Russia was ready with accusation and
footage of alleged Georgian atrocities in South Ossetia, attempting to
shift the information operations playing fields from
"aggressor-victim" to "saving Ossetian civilians from barbaric
Georgians." These operations also matter domestically, to shore
support and boost morale at home.
Avoiding the New Cold War
It is still early to digest all the lessons of this conflict, but this
geopolitical earthquake symbolizes that the tectonic plates of Eastern
Europe and Western Eurasia are shifting. And this is just the
beginning: the future of southern Caucasus, Ukraine and other
countries of the former Soviet Empire is at play.
Most important, this war is not about Georgia, but about what kind of
international actor Russia will be in the 21st century. If Russia
expands its confrontation, grave implications for the Middle East will
follow.
After an almost-20 year hiatus, the United States and NATO allies may
once again prioritize Russia as a potential threat to their vital
interests in Europe and beyond.
The question is whether NATO will send a strong signal to Moscow that
its aggression will not stand. This should be done through tough
diplomacy, in international organizations, and through inventive
economic measures. The United States, its allies and Europe must do
everything possible to reverse Russian aggression against Georgia --
and to prevent further hostile action against its allies.
--
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is senior research fellow at the Heritage
Foundation and the author of 500 articles and three books on Russia
and Eurasia, including Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis,
and Kazakhstan: The Road to Independence (fall 2008, forthcoming).
http://www.metimes.com/Politics/20 08/08/23/the_real_world_georgia_war_lessons_for_th e_middle_east/9569/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Aug 23 2008
The Real World: Georgia War Lessons for the Middle East
By ARIEL COHEN (Middle East Times)Published: August 22, 2008
Syrian President Bashar Assad joined Muammar Gadhafi of Libya in
backing Russia's lightning military action against Georgia, making
Syria one of the few countries in the world to publicly back the
Kremlin.
"We understand the essence of the Russian position and its military
response," Assad told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at the start
of their meeting in Moscow. "We believe Russia was responding to the
Georgian provocation."
At the start of the war, almost no country in the world came out in
support of Russian action. Cuba and Libya were in the vanguard of the
old Soviet coterie speaking out in support. Venezuela and Hamas chimed
in, but even "brotherly" Belarus and historic ally Armenia, two
countries over which Russia has the most sway, remained noticeably
silent.
Good old days of the Cold War and U.S.-Russian competition may be
returning to the Middle East. Damascus, supported by Iranian cash,
wants bigger and better toys. The Baath regime signals that it is not
serious about the still-born negotiations with Israel it conducted in
Istanbul.
Assad has been seeking state-of-the-art SA-10s anti-aircraft missile
system for close to a decade, and the sale has been blocked numerous
times in the past, by pressure from the United States and
Israel. Damascus also is interested in the long range S-300
anti-aircraft/anti-ballistic missile system Russia has sold to Tehran.
Assad said he hopes to offer Moscow the opportunity to deploy that
type of missile in Syrian territory, as a counterweight to
U.S. missiles in Poland, but it is clearly aimed at Israel. Syria also
is asking short-range surface to surface ballistic missiles SS-21
SCARAB (9K79 Tochka) single-stage, short-range, tactical-ballistic
missile and SS-26 Iskander short-range missile.
The SS-26 comes in two modifications: a longer range (greater than 400
km) variant for the Russian forces, and a shorter range (less than 300
km) version for export. If Syria gets either, it will be able to hit
the Tel Aviv area with greater accuracy than with the current
SCUDs. If Russia satisfies Syria's demands, it will mean that it is
seeking a confrontation with the United States not just in the Soviet
periphery, but in the old battleground of the Middle East.
Lessons from the Georgia war are going to be studied in the Middle
Eastern military academies for years to come. The early assessment
signals the return of conventional military operations, 20th century
style -- with some elements of intensive information warfare and cyber
attacks thrown in for a good measure.
The Russian General Staff planning provided a speed and complexity in
implementing combined operations that were well prepared and
reasonably executed. More important, the Russian offensive achieved a
strategic surprise. Essentially, after regaining control of
Tskhinvali, the Russian army conducted a two-pronged offensive against
Georgia from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This is purely within the
tradition of the classical Russian operational art, of conducting more
than one offensive operation to prevent the defender's concentration
of forces and overwhelm his defensive strategy.
The Russian military occupied the strategically vital highway and
railway line which crosses central Georgia and links Tbilisi with the
coastline, severing access to its main port, and essentially
paralyzing and dividing the country in several parts.
Overwhelming Force
The Russian main ground forces involved in the invasion of Georgia
belong to the 58th Army, which took part in the invasion and
occupation of Chechnya since 1999. Other Russian units that are taking
part in the campaign are the 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division
based in Chechnya, the Guards "Pskov" 76th Guards Airborne Division,
the 98th Guards Airborne Division based in Ivanovo, and the 45th
Independent Strategic Reconnaissance Regiment, which is under the Main
Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (Spetsnaz GRU).
The Russian airborne troops operated from South Ossetia and Abkhazia
in the invasion of Georgia, providing security to the Roki Tunnel;
occupying Poti; destroying oil infrastructures there; and possibly
participating in the capture of the strategic Inguri hydro power
station without a shot fired. Ingrui station provides two-thirds of
Georgia's electricity.
Lessons Learned
A few preliminary lessons can be distilled after only 13 days since
the beginning of hostilities. These include:
- Watch out for the Bear! Russian continental power is on the
rise. Central European countries should watch their rhetoric, while
staunchly defending their own national security interests. Small
states need to treat nuclear armed great powers with
respect. Provoking a militarily strong adversary is worthwhile only if
you are confident of victory, and even then there may be bitter
surprises, just as Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili found out.
- Combine NATO and U.S. Guarantees with Military Self-Reliance.
European NATO members have much higher level of security guarantees
than Georgia, including NATO's Article Five. Yet, during the Cold War
years, countries which had contingencies and training for popular
resistance against the USSR -- Albania, Romania, and Switzerland --
had a higher level of security than those which only relied solely on
U.S. troops or nukes. Revisiting civil defense and organized popular
resistance may be in order.
- Airpower alone is not sufficient. Russia used air, armor, the Black
Sea Fleet, special forces and allied militias. Clausewitzian lessons
still apply: the use of combined operations with overwhelming force in
the war's center of gravity does work.
- Surprise and speed of operations still matter -- as they have for
4,000 years of recorded history of warfare. To be successful, wars
have to have limited and achievable goals. Russia achieved most of its
goals between Friday and Monday, while the world, including
U.S. President George W. Bush, was busy watching the Olympics and
parliaments were on vacation.
- Do not cringe -- within reason -- from taking military casualties
and inflicting overwhelming military and civilian causalities at a
level unacceptable to the enemy. Georgia lost between 100-200
soldiers, and was routed. A tougher enemy, like Japan or Germany in
World War II, or even a non-state actor like the Taliban or Hezbollah,
could suffer a proportionally much higher rate of casualties and keep
on fighting.
- Information and psychological warfare is paramount. So is
cyber-security. It looks like the Russians conducted repeated denial
of service attacks against Georgia (and in 2007, against Estonia),
shutting down key Web sites. Russia was ready with accusation and
footage of alleged Georgian atrocities in South Ossetia, attempting to
shift the information operations playing fields from
"aggressor-victim" to "saving Ossetian civilians from barbaric
Georgians." These operations also matter domestically, to shore
support and boost morale at home.
Avoiding the New Cold War
It is still early to digest all the lessons of this conflict, but this
geopolitical earthquake symbolizes that the tectonic plates of Eastern
Europe and Western Eurasia are shifting. And this is just the
beginning: the future of southern Caucasus, Ukraine and other
countries of the former Soviet Empire is at play.
Most important, this war is not about Georgia, but about what kind of
international actor Russia will be in the 21st century. If Russia
expands its confrontation, grave implications for the Middle East will
follow.
After an almost-20 year hiatus, the United States and NATO allies may
once again prioritize Russia as a potential threat to their vital
interests in Europe and beyond.
The question is whether NATO will send a strong signal to Moscow that
its aggression will not stand. This should be done through tough
diplomacy, in international organizations, and through inventive
economic measures. The United States, its allies and Europe must do
everything possible to reverse Russian aggression against Georgia --
and to prevent further hostile action against its allies.
--
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is senior research fellow at the Heritage
Foundation and the author of 500 articles and three books on Russia
and Eurasia, including Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis,
and Kazakhstan: The Road to Independence (fall 2008, forthcoming).
http://www.metimes.com/Politics/20 08/08/23/the_real_world_georgia_war_lessons_for_th e_middle_east/9569/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress