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20.08.08
`RUSSIA SAVED THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH OSSETIA FROM GENOCIDE'
Mr. President, it seems that the latest war between Russia and Georgia
was not seriously evaluated by the Armenian authorities, political
parties, and experts even though that war has directly affected our
vital interests.
I cannot disagree with your observation but I would like to make one
clarification. The war was initially Georgian-Ossetian, and only later
it became Georgian-Russian.
Do you mean to say that Georgia was the initiator and Russia was drawn
into the conflict reluctantly?
I do not mean to say anything. I am only stating the facts. Nobody can
dispute the fact that it was Georgia that unleashed the war, aiming to
do away with the South Ossetian Republic by force. Nobody can dispute
also that Russia with its decisive intervention saved the people of
South Ossetia from Genocide. If the Russian intervention was delayed by
six hours, there would be no South Ossetia today.
Many have criticized the Russian intervention on the grounds that it was
disproportionate even if they have not disputed its necessity.
I do not know a single case in history when great powers have responded
proportionately after their interests have been infringed upon. As I
said, the important thing is that Russia, regardless of the
proportionality of its response, saved the people of South Ossetia from
an imminent Genocide.
What do you think about the claims that Sahakashvili could not have
started the war without the approval of the United States?
I consider such claims baseless and less than credible, because I think
it is impossible for a serious country like the Unites States to prod
anybody toward such recklessness. President Sahakashvili may have simply
misjudged or misinterpreted certain friendly gestures from the west.
In that case what was Sahakashvili's calculus based on? Is it possible
that he had not foreseen the consequences of his actions and
particularly the Russian reaction?
I think the Georgian government's calculus was first and foremost
predicated upon the element of surprise, and secondly, the unjustified
expectation of receiving support from the international community by
presenting countries friendly to Georgia with a fait accompli. Thus we
are dealing with a typical, as well as an instructive, case of wishful
thinking.
If, as you mentioned, Georgia had bet on the surprise factor, why did
they not try to send paratroopers to block the Roki tunnel in order to
thwart the advance of Russian troops?
The Georgian intention was not the physical extermination of the South
Ossetian people, but its deportation, which could have become impossible
if the tunnel was not kept open. Sahakashvili could not have failed to
realize that an extermination campaign would not have been forgiven by
the international community, whereas deportation could have been somehow
tolerated, as it was in the case of Krajina's Serbs in 1995.
Could you briefly summarize the consequences of this war?
The war unleashed by Georgia has inflicted heavy losses on the people of
South Ossetia and on Russian peacekeepers, but the main victim of this
war is Georgia, which, in addition to the loss of thousands of lives,
lost the Georgian-populated enclaves and now has tens of thousands of
new refuges. I have no doubt that none other than the Georgian people
will demand an account from its government for all of that. I feel
personally pained for the national catastrophe that has befallen the
Georgian people, and I wish them a speedy recovery of its dignity and
self confidence. That wish is as sincere humanly as it is unequivocal
politically, since the stability, strength, and prosperity of Georgia is
in Armenia's best interest.
How would you evaluate the mediation mission of president Sarkozi aimed
at settling the Russian-Georgian conflict?
It was a very timely and effective mission which, of course, was
facilitated by the Russian side's flexibility and the Georgian side's
absence of alternatives. Sarkozi's role was made more important by the
fact that he was representing not only the position of France but also
that of the European Union.
And how would you comment on the unequivocal support the leaders of
Poland, Baltic republics, as well as Ukraine lent to Georgia in that
context?
The demonstration of solidarity that took place in Tbilisi was, of
course, a moving scene, but its meaning was moral rather than political.
What consequences can the Russian `Georgian armed confrontation have
from the prospective of global politics?
In spite the wide international resonance generated by the
Russian-Georgian war, it is obvious that it is going to have an only
local or regional importance, and is not going to affect the relations
of the superpowers in matters of strategic importance. The tough
anti-Russian rhetoric in the Unites States should be seen in the context
of the presidential campaign, therefore there are no grounds to see this
as a long-term development. South Ossetia is not the kind of focal point
that could trigger the resumption of a new cold war.
Could the Georgian-Ossetian war affect in any way the other unsolved
ethnic conflicts?
Undoubtedly. Unfortunately though not in the direction of facilitating
their resolution, but rather in the direction of complicating and
prolonging them. The war once again has brought to the surface the
internally inconsistent positions the superpowers have adopted toward
the two fundamental principles of international law ` the principle of
territorial integrity and the principle of national self-determination.
Unless the world rejects the practice of applying double standards in
this question and unless the world finds the key to harmonizing these
principles, it is impossible to imagine a speedy resolution to
ethno-national conflicts.
What kind of effect has the war had on Armenia?
The war demonstrated in all clarity how fragile and vulnerable Armenia's
economy is. The war in the neighboring state that lasted only a few days
immediately disrupted the regularity of shipments to Armenia and created
a certain level of panic in our internal market, particularly in the
area of natural gas and gasoline supply. Even a temporary disruption of
the operation of the port of Poti and the destruction of one of the
bridges of the Transcaucasian railway are likely to make the situation
more complicated still. This should force the Armenian authorities to
think very carefully about this bitter reality and draw appropriate
conclusions.
How do you think the Armenian government should have reacted to the war
and what steps should it have taken under the circumstances?
If you are talking about the official or diplomatic reaction, then
positive neutrality was probably the maximally reasonable position the
Armenian government could have adopted toward the armed conflict between
two friendly states. In this regard, there are few reasons to complain
about the position of the Armenian authorities. In practice, the
Armenian government must take, and it has partially taken, certain steps
with regard to the prevision of humanitarian assistance to both Ossetian
and Georgian sides, organization of the shipment of goods with truck
convoys, participation in the work of repairing the port of Poti and the
Caspi railway bridge, etc. But this is not all I mean by `appropriate
conclusions.' I mean something much more substantial, more specifically,
the lessons we should learn from this war.
What lessons do you have in mind?
First, the Armenian authorities must realize what a disaster Armenia's
blockade and its unilateral dependence on only one neighbor are. That
realization should force them to take real steps toward the resolution
of the Karabagh conflict and the normalization of Armenian `Turkish
relations. Second, imprudence Is particularly dangerous for small states
because its consequence for them is usually national catastrophe. Small
states cannot afford such mistakes. Only the powerful can afford such
luxury, because their mistakes are costly not for themselves, but again
for the small states. And third, small states should once and for all
reject the policy of relying on third parties and should try instead to
solve their problems relying on their own means and capabilities,
remaining committed to the accepted norms of international law and the
norm of peaceful coexistence of nations.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
http://www.a1plus.am
20.08.08
`RUSSIA SAVED THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH OSSETIA FROM GENOCIDE'
Mr. President, it seems that the latest war between Russia and Georgia
was not seriously evaluated by the Armenian authorities, political
parties, and experts even though that war has directly affected our
vital interests.
I cannot disagree with your observation but I would like to make one
clarification. The war was initially Georgian-Ossetian, and only later
it became Georgian-Russian.
Do you mean to say that Georgia was the initiator and Russia was drawn
into the conflict reluctantly?
I do not mean to say anything. I am only stating the facts. Nobody can
dispute the fact that it was Georgia that unleashed the war, aiming to
do away with the South Ossetian Republic by force. Nobody can dispute
also that Russia with its decisive intervention saved the people of
South Ossetia from Genocide. If the Russian intervention was delayed by
six hours, there would be no South Ossetia today.
Many have criticized the Russian intervention on the grounds that it was
disproportionate even if they have not disputed its necessity.
I do not know a single case in history when great powers have responded
proportionately after their interests have been infringed upon. As I
said, the important thing is that Russia, regardless of the
proportionality of its response, saved the people of South Ossetia from
an imminent Genocide.
What do you think about the claims that Sahakashvili could not have
started the war without the approval of the United States?
I consider such claims baseless and less than credible, because I think
it is impossible for a serious country like the Unites States to prod
anybody toward such recklessness. President Sahakashvili may have simply
misjudged or misinterpreted certain friendly gestures from the west.
In that case what was Sahakashvili's calculus based on? Is it possible
that he had not foreseen the consequences of his actions and
particularly the Russian reaction?
I think the Georgian government's calculus was first and foremost
predicated upon the element of surprise, and secondly, the unjustified
expectation of receiving support from the international community by
presenting countries friendly to Georgia with a fait accompli. Thus we
are dealing with a typical, as well as an instructive, case of wishful
thinking.
If, as you mentioned, Georgia had bet on the surprise factor, why did
they not try to send paratroopers to block the Roki tunnel in order to
thwart the advance of Russian troops?
The Georgian intention was not the physical extermination of the South
Ossetian people, but its deportation, which could have become impossible
if the tunnel was not kept open. Sahakashvili could not have failed to
realize that an extermination campaign would not have been forgiven by
the international community, whereas deportation could have been somehow
tolerated, as it was in the case of Krajina's Serbs in 1995.
Could you briefly summarize the consequences of this war?
The war unleashed by Georgia has inflicted heavy losses on the people of
South Ossetia and on Russian peacekeepers, but the main victim of this
war is Georgia, which, in addition to the loss of thousands of lives,
lost the Georgian-populated enclaves and now has tens of thousands of
new refuges. I have no doubt that none other than the Georgian people
will demand an account from its government for all of that. I feel
personally pained for the national catastrophe that has befallen the
Georgian people, and I wish them a speedy recovery of its dignity and
self confidence. That wish is as sincere humanly as it is unequivocal
politically, since the stability, strength, and prosperity of Georgia is
in Armenia's best interest.
How would you evaluate the mediation mission of president Sarkozi aimed
at settling the Russian-Georgian conflict?
It was a very timely and effective mission which, of course, was
facilitated by the Russian side's flexibility and the Georgian side's
absence of alternatives. Sarkozi's role was made more important by the
fact that he was representing not only the position of France but also
that of the European Union.
And how would you comment on the unequivocal support the leaders of
Poland, Baltic republics, as well as Ukraine lent to Georgia in that
context?
The demonstration of solidarity that took place in Tbilisi was, of
course, a moving scene, but its meaning was moral rather than political.
What consequences can the Russian `Georgian armed confrontation have
from the prospective of global politics?
In spite the wide international resonance generated by the
Russian-Georgian war, it is obvious that it is going to have an only
local or regional importance, and is not going to affect the relations
of the superpowers in matters of strategic importance. The tough
anti-Russian rhetoric in the Unites States should be seen in the context
of the presidential campaign, therefore there are no grounds to see this
as a long-term development. South Ossetia is not the kind of focal point
that could trigger the resumption of a new cold war.
Could the Georgian-Ossetian war affect in any way the other unsolved
ethnic conflicts?
Undoubtedly. Unfortunately though not in the direction of facilitating
their resolution, but rather in the direction of complicating and
prolonging them. The war once again has brought to the surface the
internally inconsistent positions the superpowers have adopted toward
the two fundamental principles of international law ` the principle of
territorial integrity and the principle of national self-determination.
Unless the world rejects the practice of applying double standards in
this question and unless the world finds the key to harmonizing these
principles, it is impossible to imagine a speedy resolution to
ethno-national conflicts.
What kind of effect has the war had on Armenia?
The war demonstrated in all clarity how fragile and vulnerable Armenia's
economy is. The war in the neighboring state that lasted only a few days
immediately disrupted the regularity of shipments to Armenia and created
a certain level of panic in our internal market, particularly in the
area of natural gas and gasoline supply. Even a temporary disruption of
the operation of the port of Poti and the destruction of one of the
bridges of the Transcaucasian railway are likely to make the situation
more complicated still. This should force the Armenian authorities to
think very carefully about this bitter reality and draw appropriate
conclusions.
How do you think the Armenian government should have reacted to the war
and what steps should it have taken under the circumstances?
If you are talking about the official or diplomatic reaction, then
positive neutrality was probably the maximally reasonable position the
Armenian government could have adopted toward the armed conflict between
two friendly states. In this regard, there are few reasons to complain
about the position of the Armenian authorities. In practice, the
Armenian government must take, and it has partially taken, certain steps
with regard to the prevision of humanitarian assistance to both Ossetian
and Georgian sides, organization of the shipment of goods with truck
convoys, participation in the work of repairing the port of Poti and the
Caspi railway bridge, etc. But this is not all I mean by `appropriate
conclusions.' I mean something much more substantial, more specifically,
the lessons we should learn from this war.
What lessons do you have in mind?
First, the Armenian authorities must realize what a disaster Armenia's
blockade and its unilateral dependence on only one neighbor are. That
realization should force them to take real steps toward the resolution
of the Karabagh conflict and the normalization of Armenian `Turkish
relations. Second, imprudence Is particularly dangerous for small states
because its consequence for them is usually national catastrophe. Small
states cannot afford such mistakes. Only the powerful can afford such
luxury, because their mistakes are costly not for themselves, but again
for the small states. And third, small states should once and for all
reject the policy of relying on third parties and should try instead to
solve their problems relying on their own means and capabilities,
remaining committed to the accepted norms of international law and the
norm of peaceful coexistence of nations.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress