Tweet
CONFRONTATIONAL RUSSIA
Economist
http://www.economist.com/world/e urope/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11998649
Aug 27 2008
UK
Russia's diplomatic recognition of two breakaway bits of Georgia is
more bad news
TO GEORGIAN fury, Western consternation and strong support at home,
Russia's government recognised two breakaway regions of Georgia as
independent countries on Tuesday August 26th. The map of Europe is
different, and darker, as a result.
The planned dispatch of Russian diplomats to open embassies in
Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, the main cities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
respectively, marks the formal dismemberment of Georgia: until very
recently, Russia had at least in theory accepted its neighbour's
territorial integrity.
As long as Russia kept up its recognition of Georgian territorial
integrity, it could claim that its soldiers in both places were
peacekeepers operating under international mandates. Cynics, such
as Georgia's president, Mikheil Saakashvili, had long joked that the
Russian forces should be called "piece-keepers", whose real role was
to maintain the Kremlin's influence in the former empire. Russia
says that its forces are protecting the Abkhaz and Ossetians from
Georgian attack.
Diplomatic historians may find that the two new countries will not
make for enduring study. The next act in the drama may well be that
both new countries ask to become part of the Russian Federation. That
underlines Russia's dramatic military victory against Georgia in this
month's war, giving it a permanent presence south of the Caucasus
mountains, close to the vital oil and gas pipelines that bring energy
from the Caspian region and Central Asia to Turkey and beyond.
Russia likes to draw parallels with Kosovo--a state carved out
of Serbia as a result of Western military intervention. But the
parallel is superficial. Few embassies will open in South Ossetia
(which, following the ethnic cleansing of its Georgian population,
has a population little bigger than that of Liechtenstein). Close
Russian allies such as Belarus and Tajikistan will be keen to put on
a show of support. Others may be more chary of recognising Russian
puppet states as independent countries. Moldova and Azerbaijan, for
example, have headaches with similar entities, Transdniestria and
Nagorno-Karabakh. Like South Ossetia and Abkhazia, they are the result
of ethnic flare-ups in the dying days of the Soviet Union. Russian
allies farther afield, such as Venezuela and Cuba, may be tempted to
join in the humiliation of the West.
Hard words are flying. Britain and America have condemned
the move. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, called it
"unacceptable". She is on a hastily arranged visit to the Baltic
states, which are now shivering in anticipation of what Russia's
foreign policy may hold in store for them. France, which holds the
presidency of the European Union, had already called an emergency
summit for September 1st to review ties with Russia. It was the French
president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who brokered a ceasefire on August 12th. He
is furious with what he sees as Russian double-dealing.
Some of the strongest words came from Carl Bildt, the Swedish foreign
minister: "That the Russian government leadership now has chosen this
route means they have chosen a policy of confrontation, not only
with the rest of Europe, but also with the international community
in general," he said.
All that may be true. But for now, criticism of the Kremlin's actions
in Georgia seems to be fuelling the Russian leadership's determination
to do more of the same. Public opinion seems strongly behind the
muscular new foreign policy, seeing it as a sign that Russia has
recovered from the weakness of the 1990s. Russia seems not to care
that Western countries are now threatening to block its membership
of the World Trade Organisation.
Indeed, Russia feels it can easily withstand Western
displeasure. Soaring oil and gas prices have put nearly $600 billion
in its hard-currency reserves. Many Russians reckon that in the end
the big European countries that matter will decide that they care
more about trade ties and reliable energy supplies than they do about
Georgia. On the evidence so far, that assessment may be correct.
Economist
http://www.economist.com/world/e urope/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11998649
Aug 27 2008
UK
Russia's diplomatic recognition of two breakaway bits of Georgia is
more bad news
TO GEORGIAN fury, Western consternation and strong support at home,
Russia's government recognised two breakaway regions of Georgia as
independent countries on Tuesday August 26th. The map of Europe is
different, and darker, as a result.
The planned dispatch of Russian diplomats to open embassies in
Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, the main cities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
respectively, marks the formal dismemberment of Georgia: until very
recently, Russia had at least in theory accepted its neighbour's
territorial integrity.
As long as Russia kept up its recognition of Georgian territorial
integrity, it could claim that its soldiers in both places were
peacekeepers operating under international mandates. Cynics, such
as Georgia's president, Mikheil Saakashvili, had long joked that the
Russian forces should be called "piece-keepers", whose real role was
to maintain the Kremlin's influence in the former empire. Russia
says that its forces are protecting the Abkhaz and Ossetians from
Georgian attack.
Diplomatic historians may find that the two new countries will not
make for enduring study. The next act in the drama may well be that
both new countries ask to become part of the Russian Federation. That
underlines Russia's dramatic military victory against Georgia in this
month's war, giving it a permanent presence south of the Caucasus
mountains, close to the vital oil and gas pipelines that bring energy
from the Caspian region and Central Asia to Turkey and beyond.
Russia likes to draw parallels with Kosovo--a state carved out
of Serbia as a result of Western military intervention. But the
parallel is superficial. Few embassies will open in South Ossetia
(which, following the ethnic cleansing of its Georgian population,
has a population little bigger than that of Liechtenstein). Close
Russian allies such as Belarus and Tajikistan will be keen to put on
a show of support. Others may be more chary of recognising Russian
puppet states as independent countries. Moldova and Azerbaijan, for
example, have headaches with similar entities, Transdniestria and
Nagorno-Karabakh. Like South Ossetia and Abkhazia, they are the result
of ethnic flare-ups in the dying days of the Soviet Union. Russian
allies farther afield, such as Venezuela and Cuba, may be tempted to
join in the humiliation of the West.
Hard words are flying. Britain and America have condemned
the move. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, called it
"unacceptable". She is on a hastily arranged visit to the Baltic
states, which are now shivering in anticipation of what Russia's
foreign policy may hold in store for them. France, which holds the
presidency of the European Union, had already called an emergency
summit for September 1st to review ties with Russia. It was the French
president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who brokered a ceasefire on August 12th. He
is furious with what he sees as Russian double-dealing.
Some of the strongest words came from Carl Bildt, the Swedish foreign
minister: "That the Russian government leadership now has chosen this
route means they have chosen a policy of confrontation, not only
with the rest of Europe, but also with the international community
in general," he said.
All that may be true. But for now, criticism of the Kremlin's actions
in Georgia seems to be fuelling the Russian leadership's determination
to do more of the same. Public opinion seems strongly behind the
muscular new foreign policy, seeing it as a sign that Russia has
recovered from the weakness of the 1990s. Russia seems not to care
that Western countries are now threatening to block its membership
of the World Trade Organisation.
Indeed, Russia feels it can easily withstand Western
displeasure. Soaring oil and gas prices have put nearly $600 billion
in its hard-currency reserves. Many Russians reckon that in the end
the big European countries that matter will decide that they care
more about trade ties and reliable energy supplies than they do about
Georgia. On the evidence so far, that assessment may be correct.