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GONE TO BASE
by Ruslan Gorevoi
WPS Agency
What the Papers Say (Russia)
August 26, 2008 Tuesday
Russia
RUSSIA IS REESTABLISHING MILITARY BASES ON THE BORDERS OF THE ERSTWHILE
SOVIET UNION; An update on Moscow's response to the efforts of the
West to build a sanitary cordon around Russia.
Keeping an eye on geopolitical parity is one duty Moscow never shirks
nowadays. Of course, it could adopt a different pattern of behavior and
succumb to Washington's every demand the way Yugoslavia once did. What
this compliance cost Yugoslavia is common knowledge. First, all
republics were encouraged to cede and leave Serbia all alone. Second,
the West left Serbia without its own ancestral lands of Kosovo and
Metochia.
Even that is not all, or so it seems. With President Boris Tadic
studiously looking the other way, all of Serbia may be restricted to
Belgrade city limits soon. The Serbian way of non-resistance to the
bullying West is not for Russia. It follows that something has to be
done. Response to appearance of the American ABM defense system in the
Czech Republic and Poland should take the form of an increased military
presence of Russia in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan and also
in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. As well as in Syria, Cuba,
and Venezuela. (With Belarus, everything is clear since we will form
a union with this country one fine day.) Military experts say that
these measures will neutralize the American ABM defense system in
Poland whose efficiency is going to be marginal in any event. This
system kills one missile out of five on its lucky day and never even
sees guided missiles with nuclear warheads.
President of Moldova Vladimir Voronin was demanding Russian
peacekeepers' withdrawal from the Trans-Dniester region and their
replacement with an international contingent barely a year ago. It took
Deputy Premier Sergei Ivanov a great deal of patience and persuasion
to convince Voronin to learn to live up with the idea that Russia
would retain its presence in the region as long as assets of the
14th Army remained there. As a matter of fact, Russia was supposed to
withdraw all of that from the region seven years ago, in keeping with
the Istanbul Accords (1999). On the other hand, withdrawal from the
Trans-Dniester region would have meant leaving the self-proclaimed
republic on its own and depriving itself of a chance to establish a
military base there one fine day.
Now that Ukrainian President Victor Yuschenko reached an agreement with
his Romanian counterpart Traian Basescu to settle the Trans-Dniester
conflict without Moldova, Voronin has a chance (and the time)
to authorize an increase of the numerical strength of the Russian
peacekeeping contingent in the region and permit establishment of
Russian military bases just about anywhere in Moldova.
Russian peacekeepers in the Trans-Dniester region number almost 1,000
men these days (two motorized infantry battalions, battalion of guards,
helicopter unit, and several auxiliary companies). The contingent is to
be increased to brigade's size soon. Also importantly, the reinforced
contingent will help Moldova itself with its national security.
Restoration of Russia's military presence in Central Asia began in
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Return to these post-Soviet
republics was anything but easy and unproblematic, thanks to
NATO. Return to Uzbekistan was particularly difficult. President
Islam Karimov was one of the initiators of the anti-Russian
GUUAM (an alliance of Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan,
and Moldova). Moreover, one of the first US military bases in
the post-Soviet zone was established precisely in Uzbekistan (in
Khanabad). Karimov even did his best to keep the Russian military out
of Kyrgyzstan, so that a major conflict between Moscow and Tashkent
was barely averted in 2001.
In any event, Karimov and Voronin reconsidered their options. Islamic
gunmen provoked several border incidents several years ago. The Uzbeks
turned to the United States for help but Washington chose to remain
deaf to all requests. Uzbek secret services in the meanwhile came by
the documents proving that the gunmen had aimed to seize Samarkand
and Bukhara and - which was particularly piquant - that they had
elicited promises of non-involvement from the Americans. Karimov did
not forgive the Americans. He ousted them from Uzbekistan in 2005 and
invited the Russians to the former US AF base a year later. Official
Tashkent severed ties with the Americans and withdrew from GUUAM.
More or less analogous metamorphoses occurred in Kyrgyzstan
too. Reassuring Moscow of his goodwill and readiness to advance
relations with it, President Askar Akayev did what he could to prevent
transfer of the airfield in Kant to the Russians. At the same time,
he did not exactly object to the American expansion into Central Asia
so that the US AF established its airbase in Manas right near the
capital city of Bishkek in 2002. Once the AF base was established,
Islamic fanatics launched their attacks - just the way it had been
in Uzbekistan nearby.
Moreover, Akayev was hard pressed by existence of unsolved territorial
disputes with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, ones he couldn't hope to
settle on his own. Claiming to want "parity" in the country, Akayev
authorized establishment of a Russian military base. It was established
in 2003 (Russia has SU-25 ground-strafers based there). As for Akayev,
he told the Americans to vacate the premises in spring 2005 - the
way Karimov had done before him.
When Kurmanbek Bakiyev was elected the president of Kyrgyzstan, the
Russian military solidified its positions in this country. Russia
has several other military objects in Kyrgyzstan these days - torpedo
testing center, long-range communications center, and seismic station
working for the Russian Strategic Missile Forces.
It is necessary to add that Russian military presence meets long-term
interests of Central Asian republics.
The Tajik Pamir are Kyrgyz-populated. Samarkand and Bukhara in
the southern part of Uzbekistan are Tajik-populated. There are
four Uzbek enclaves on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. State borders
actually exist on paper because Central Asian states cannot maintain
their integrity. Skirmishes between border guards are not exactly
unheard-of (one involving Uzbek and Tajik border guards was reported
only recently).
There is Afghanistan nearby, a major pain in the neck. Islamic
fundamentalists cross the borders without hindrance, ferrying into
Central Asia weapons, drugs, and ideology.
All hopes are pinned on the Russian military, particularly in
Tajikistan. President Emomali Rakhmonov kept stalling for time in the
matter of permitting a Russian military base in Tajikistan when his
country's national security was maintained by Russian border guards'
presence. All of that ended in December 2004 when Russia withdrew
its border guards and left Tajikistan facing the task of securing
its own borders. It did not take official Dushanbe long to realize
the scope of problems it was facing with Russian border guards gone
and nobody to turn to for assistance.
Russia ended up owner of the Nurek electronic center in less than a
month. Its 201st Motorized Infantry Division posted in Tajikistan was
developed into a fully-fledged military base. These days, three Russian
regiments are quartered in Dushanbe, Kulyab, and Kurgan-Tyube. By
way of military presence in Tajikistan, Russia also has a battery of
Grad multiple rocket launchers, AF group (five SU-25s), helicopter
wing, antiaircraft missile regiment, regiment of self-propelled
artillery pieces, and a regiment of jammers. Nearly 8,000 men strong,
the Russian military contingent includes 100 tanks and 300 infantry
fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. Also importantly,
Tajikistan does not even demand a rent for the military base.
Georgia's reckless foray into South Ossetia offered Moscow additional
opportunities even in this region that seemed lost to its influence
forever. President of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity has already
authorized establishment of a major military base, and his Abkhazian
counterpart Sergei Bagapsh is expected to follow suit in the immediate
future. Political situation being what it is, Russian military presence
in the region will ensure its security in the Caucasus and serve as
a counterweight to American presence.
The situation in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the meanwhile may repeat
itself again in Azerbaijan. President Ilham Aliyev will probably
be re-elected but the Americans seem to be backing the Azerbaijani
opposition rather than their protege. There are no guarantees at
all that Aliyev will tolerate it. In fact, he is likely to do what
his Uzbek and Kyrgyz colleagues did. In the meantime, there is an
obstacle to the Russian-Azerbaijani rapprochement, one by name of
Yerevan. Two years ago, Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Abiyev
declared his country ready "to take every conceivable measure to
restore territorial integrity and control over Nagorno-Karabakh",
and relations between Moscow and Baku plummeted.
Russian then Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov proclaimed Moscow
ready to dispatch its military to Stepanakert (the capital of
Nagorno-Karabakh). In fact, Ivanov repeated the offer to Stepanakert a
year later. Official Baku was understandably upset then. It is probably
different, these days. Aliyev may put up with deployment of the Russian
military in Stepanakert and with other, even more resolute, steps
now. In any event, Russian military analysts anticipate establishment
of a Russian military base in Azerbaijan in a foreseeable future -
on Aliyev's request.
In other words, the Russian military returned to the borders of the
erstwhile USSR and established a security belt along the Russian
perimeter. Leaders of Venezuela, Cuba, and Syria offer territories
of their countries for Russian military bases too. It is going to put
Russia in a position where it will be able to make a lot of problems
for the United States in the Middle East and Latin America. Sure,
it is not going to endear Russia to Europe or America, but it will
allow for at least a semblance of military parity. Also importantly,
this expansion promises Russia both foreign political dividends
and purely economic ones. Control is frequently more rewarding than
actual possession.
by Ruslan Gorevoi
WPS Agency
What the Papers Say (Russia)
August 26, 2008 Tuesday
Russia
RUSSIA IS REESTABLISHING MILITARY BASES ON THE BORDERS OF THE ERSTWHILE
SOVIET UNION; An update on Moscow's response to the efforts of the
West to build a sanitary cordon around Russia.
Keeping an eye on geopolitical parity is one duty Moscow never shirks
nowadays. Of course, it could adopt a different pattern of behavior and
succumb to Washington's every demand the way Yugoslavia once did. What
this compliance cost Yugoslavia is common knowledge. First, all
republics were encouraged to cede and leave Serbia all alone. Second,
the West left Serbia without its own ancestral lands of Kosovo and
Metochia.
Even that is not all, or so it seems. With President Boris Tadic
studiously looking the other way, all of Serbia may be restricted to
Belgrade city limits soon. The Serbian way of non-resistance to the
bullying West is not for Russia. It follows that something has to be
done. Response to appearance of the American ABM defense system in the
Czech Republic and Poland should take the form of an increased military
presence of Russia in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan and also
in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. As well as in Syria, Cuba,
and Venezuela. (With Belarus, everything is clear since we will form
a union with this country one fine day.) Military experts say that
these measures will neutralize the American ABM defense system in
Poland whose efficiency is going to be marginal in any event. This
system kills one missile out of five on its lucky day and never even
sees guided missiles with nuclear warheads.
President of Moldova Vladimir Voronin was demanding Russian
peacekeepers' withdrawal from the Trans-Dniester region and their
replacement with an international contingent barely a year ago. It took
Deputy Premier Sergei Ivanov a great deal of patience and persuasion
to convince Voronin to learn to live up with the idea that Russia
would retain its presence in the region as long as assets of the
14th Army remained there. As a matter of fact, Russia was supposed to
withdraw all of that from the region seven years ago, in keeping with
the Istanbul Accords (1999). On the other hand, withdrawal from the
Trans-Dniester region would have meant leaving the self-proclaimed
republic on its own and depriving itself of a chance to establish a
military base there one fine day.
Now that Ukrainian President Victor Yuschenko reached an agreement with
his Romanian counterpart Traian Basescu to settle the Trans-Dniester
conflict without Moldova, Voronin has a chance (and the time)
to authorize an increase of the numerical strength of the Russian
peacekeeping contingent in the region and permit establishment of
Russian military bases just about anywhere in Moldova.
Russian peacekeepers in the Trans-Dniester region number almost 1,000
men these days (two motorized infantry battalions, battalion of guards,
helicopter unit, and several auxiliary companies). The contingent is to
be increased to brigade's size soon. Also importantly, the reinforced
contingent will help Moldova itself with its national security.
Restoration of Russia's military presence in Central Asia began in
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Return to these post-Soviet
republics was anything but easy and unproblematic, thanks to
NATO. Return to Uzbekistan was particularly difficult. President
Islam Karimov was one of the initiators of the anti-Russian
GUUAM (an alliance of Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan,
and Moldova). Moreover, one of the first US military bases in
the post-Soviet zone was established precisely in Uzbekistan (in
Khanabad). Karimov even did his best to keep the Russian military out
of Kyrgyzstan, so that a major conflict between Moscow and Tashkent
was barely averted in 2001.
In any event, Karimov and Voronin reconsidered their options. Islamic
gunmen provoked several border incidents several years ago. The Uzbeks
turned to the United States for help but Washington chose to remain
deaf to all requests. Uzbek secret services in the meanwhile came by
the documents proving that the gunmen had aimed to seize Samarkand
and Bukhara and - which was particularly piquant - that they had
elicited promises of non-involvement from the Americans. Karimov did
not forgive the Americans. He ousted them from Uzbekistan in 2005 and
invited the Russians to the former US AF base a year later. Official
Tashkent severed ties with the Americans and withdrew from GUUAM.
More or less analogous metamorphoses occurred in Kyrgyzstan
too. Reassuring Moscow of his goodwill and readiness to advance
relations with it, President Askar Akayev did what he could to prevent
transfer of the airfield in Kant to the Russians. At the same time,
he did not exactly object to the American expansion into Central Asia
so that the US AF established its airbase in Manas right near the
capital city of Bishkek in 2002. Once the AF base was established,
Islamic fanatics launched their attacks - just the way it had been
in Uzbekistan nearby.
Moreover, Akayev was hard pressed by existence of unsolved territorial
disputes with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, ones he couldn't hope to
settle on his own. Claiming to want "parity" in the country, Akayev
authorized establishment of a Russian military base. It was established
in 2003 (Russia has SU-25 ground-strafers based there). As for Akayev,
he told the Americans to vacate the premises in spring 2005 - the
way Karimov had done before him.
When Kurmanbek Bakiyev was elected the president of Kyrgyzstan, the
Russian military solidified its positions in this country. Russia
has several other military objects in Kyrgyzstan these days - torpedo
testing center, long-range communications center, and seismic station
working for the Russian Strategic Missile Forces.
It is necessary to add that Russian military presence meets long-term
interests of Central Asian republics.
The Tajik Pamir are Kyrgyz-populated. Samarkand and Bukhara in
the southern part of Uzbekistan are Tajik-populated. There are
four Uzbek enclaves on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. State borders
actually exist on paper because Central Asian states cannot maintain
their integrity. Skirmishes between border guards are not exactly
unheard-of (one involving Uzbek and Tajik border guards was reported
only recently).
There is Afghanistan nearby, a major pain in the neck. Islamic
fundamentalists cross the borders without hindrance, ferrying into
Central Asia weapons, drugs, and ideology.
All hopes are pinned on the Russian military, particularly in
Tajikistan. President Emomali Rakhmonov kept stalling for time in the
matter of permitting a Russian military base in Tajikistan when his
country's national security was maintained by Russian border guards'
presence. All of that ended in December 2004 when Russia withdrew
its border guards and left Tajikistan facing the task of securing
its own borders. It did not take official Dushanbe long to realize
the scope of problems it was facing with Russian border guards gone
and nobody to turn to for assistance.
Russia ended up owner of the Nurek electronic center in less than a
month. Its 201st Motorized Infantry Division posted in Tajikistan was
developed into a fully-fledged military base. These days, three Russian
regiments are quartered in Dushanbe, Kulyab, and Kurgan-Tyube. By
way of military presence in Tajikistan, Russia also has a battery of
Grad multiple rocket launchers, AF group (five SU-25s), helicopter
wing, antiaircraft missile regiment, regiment of self-propelled
artillery pieces, and a regiment of jammers. Nearly 8,000 men strong,
the Russian military contingent includes 100 tanks and 300 infantry
fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. Also importantly,
Tajikistan does not even demand a rent for the military base.
Georgia's reckless foray into South Ossetia offered Moscow additional
opportunities even in this region that seemed lost to its influence
forever. President of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity has already
authorized establishment of a major military base, and his Abkhazian
counterpart Sergei Bagapsh is expected to follow suit in the immediate
future. Political situation being what it is, Russian military presence
in the region will ensure its security in the Caucasus and serve as
a counterweight to American presence.
The situation in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the meanwhile may repeat
itself again in Azerbaijan. President Ilham Aliyev will probably
be re-elected but the Americans seem to be backing the Azerbaijani
opposition rather than their protege. There are no guarantees at
all that Aliyev will tolerate it. In fact, he is likely to do what
his Uzbek and Kyrgyz colleagues did. In the meantime, there is an
obstacle to the Russian-Azerbaijani rapprochement, one by name of
Yerevan. Two years ago, Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Abiyev
declared his country ready "to take every conceivable measure to
restore territorial integrity and control over Nagorno-Karabakh",
and relations between Moscow and Baku plummeted.
Russian then Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov proclaimed Moscow
ready to dispatch its military to Stepanakert (the capital of
Nagorno-Karabakh). In fact, Ivanov repeated the offer to Stepanakert a
year later. Official Baku was understandably upset then. It is probably
different, these days. Aliyev may put up with deployment of the Russian
military in Stepanakert and with other, even more resolute, steps
now. In any event, Russian military analysts anticipate establishment
of a Russian military base in Azerbaijan in a foreseeable future -
on Aliyev's request.
In other words, the Russian military returned to the borders of the
erstwhile USSR and established a security belt along the Russian
perimeter. Leaders of Venezuela, Cuba, and Syria offer territories
of their countries for Russian military bases too. It is going to put
Russia in a position where it will be able to make a lot of problems
for the United States in the Middle East and Latin America. Sure,
it is not going to endear Russia to Europe or America, but it will
allow for at least a semblance of military parity. Also importantly,
this expansion promises Russia both foreign political dividends
and purely economic ones. Control is frequently more rewarding than
actual possession.