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RUSSIA IN THE CAUCASUS; RUSSIA'S OIL
IHT
August 28, 2008
Russia in the Caucasus
The Russians and the Georgians have long had a testy relationship. The
Russians absorbed Georgia, along with Armenia and Azerbaijan, into the
trans-Caucasus region of the old Russian Empire in the first decades
of the 19th century. The Bolsheviks invaded in 1921 and annexed
the independent statelet into the Soviet Union for the next several
decades. So, sadly, Russian suppression of Georgia is nothing new.
The Soviets were more interested in forging a buffer for their
Communist state while also creating like-minded Socialist governments
along their borders. Lenin and Stalin struck against neighbors in
order to give the Russian Communist regime space and time to evolve.
In terms of geopolitics, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin thinks like
Lenin and Stalin. He foresees the recreation of a Russian Empire
with client states that allow Russia to pump oil and gas and control
the region.
In Georgia, Putin appears to have won in the short-term. But he should
remember what happened to comrades Lenin and Trotsky when they invaded
Poland, which struck back and knocked the Red Army out of the country.
Russia's actions in Georgia might stoke resistance and separatist
sentiment within Russia itself.
Independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia would not resolve
very much. The bulk of Abkhaz and South Ossetian grievances
stem from the fact that they have been in political and economic
isolation despite being functional de facto governments since the
early 1990s. Unrepresented internationally and with no diplomatic
relations, the Abkhaz and South Ossetian governments have turned to
Russia for support.
The solution to the conflict may be simpler than it seems. The
diplomatic dilemma here is not between independence and territorial
integrity. Rather, it is in the gray area between statehood and
isolation. The international community, in this conflict and in others,
must find a way to engage nonstate actors and de facto governments in
international human rights forums, diplomatic negotiations, at the UN,
and in international law.
The violence in the Caucasus is a reflection of the sorry state of
affairs for millions of unrepresented groups in the world. It is
only when states learn to engage nonstate actors diplomatically,
without being alarmed by calls for separatism and independence,
that there can be a lasting solution here.
Judy Fu, The Hague Secretariat, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples
Organization
Russia's oil
The article "Let oil flow to Czechs, Putin says" (July 22) is
inaccurate in suggesting that Gunvor trades oil through the Druzhba
pipeline. Currently, Gunvor has no contract for supply on the Druzhba
pipeline and has not traded any volumes through the pipeline in
question for at least two years.
Dirk Jonker, Amsterdam Managing director, Gunvor International
IHT
August 28, 2008
Russia in the Caucasus
The Russians and the Georgians have long had a testy relationship. The
Russians absorbed Georgia, along with Armenia and Azerbaijan, into the
trans-Caucasus region of the old Russian Empire in the first decades
of the 19th century. The Bolsheviks invaded in 1921 and annexed
the independent statelet into the Soviet Union for the next several
decades. So, sadly, Russian suppression of Georgia is nothing new.
The Soviets were more interested in forging a buffer for their
Communist state while also creating like-minded Socialist governments
along their borders. Lenin and Stalin struck against neighbors in
order to give the Russian Communist regime space and time to evolve.
In terms of geopolitics, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin thinks like
Lenin and Stalin. He foresees the recreation of a Russian Empire
with client states that allow Russia to pump oil and gas and control
the region.
In Georgia, Putin appears to have won in the short-term. But he should
remember what happened to comrades Lenin and Trotsky when they invaded
Poland, which struck back and knocked the Red Army out of the country.
Russia's actions in Georgia might stoke resistance and separatist
sentiment within Russia itself.
Independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia would not resolve
very much. The bulk of Abkhaz and South Ossetian grievances
stem from the fact that they have been in political and economic
isolation despite being functional de facto governments since the
early 1990s. Unrepresented internationally and with no diplomatic
relations, the Abkhaz and South Ossetian governments have turned to
Russia for support.
The solution to the conflict may be simpler than it seems. The
diplomatic dilemma here is not between independence and territorial
integrity. Rather, it is in the gray area between statehood and
isolation. The international community, in this conflict and in others,
must find a way to engage nonstate actors and de facto governments in
international human rights forums, diplomatic negotiations, at the UN,
and in international law.
The violence in the Caucasus is a reflection of the sorry state of
affairs for millions of unrepresented groups in the world. It is
only when states learn to engage nonstate actors diplomatically,
without being alarmed by calls for separatism and independence,
that there can be a lasting solution here.
Judy Fu, The Hague Secretariat, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples
Organization
Russia's oil
The article "Let oil flow to Czechs, Putin says" (July 22) is
inaccurate in suggesting that Gunvor trades oil through the Druzhba
pipeline. Currently, Gunvor has no contract for supply on the Druzhba
pipeline and has not traded any volumes through the pipeline in
question for at least two years.
Dirk Jonker, Amsterdam Managing director, Gunvor International