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UKRAINE, RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN STABILITY
David Miliband
guardian.co.uk
Friday August 29 2008
It is not an act of hostility towards Russia for Europe to support
Ukraine, but a positive move towards lasting peace
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has seemed that new rules
were being established for the conduct of international relations
in central and eastern Europe and central Asia. The watchwords
were independence and interdependence; sovereignty and mutual
responsibility; cooperation and common interests. They are good words
that need to be defended.
The Georgia crisis provided a rude awakening. The sight of Russian
tanks in a neighbouring country on the 40th anniversary of the crushing
of the Prague Spring has shown that the temptations of power politics
remain. The old sores and divisions fester. Russia remains unreconciled
to the new map of Europe.
Yesterday's unilateral attempt to redraw the map marks not just the
end of the post-cold war period, but is also the moment when countries
are required to set out where they stand on the significant issues
of nationhood and international law.
The Russian president says he is not afraid of a new cold war. We
don't want one. He has a big responsibility not to start one.
Ukraine is a leading example of the benefits that accrue when a
country takes charge of its own destiny, and seeks alliances with
other countries.
Its choices should=2 0not be seen as a threat to Russia or an act of
hostility. Equally its independence does demand a new relationship
with Russia - a partnership of equals, not the relationship of master
and servant.
Russia must not learn the wrong lessons from the Georgia crisis:
there can be no going back on fundamental principles of territorial
integrity, democratic governance and international law. It has shown
in the last two weeks what anyone could have foretold: that it can
defeat Georgia's army.
But today Russia is more isolated, less trusted and less respected
than two weeks ago. It has made military gains in the short term. But
over time it will feel the economic and political losses. If Russia
truly wants respect and influence, and the benefits that flow from it,
Russia needs to change course.
Prime Minister Putin has described the collapse of the Soviet Union as
"the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th century. I don't
see it that way. Most people of the former Soviet bloc or Warsaw Pact
don't see it that way. It will be a tragedy for Russia if it spends
the next 20 years believing it to be the case.
Indeed, since 1991 there has been no "stab in the back" of Russia. In
fact, we have offered Russia extensive cooperation with the EU
and Nato; membership of the council of Europe and the G8. Summits,
mechanisms and meetings have been developed by the EU and Nato not to
humiliate or threaten Russia, but to engage with it. The EU and the
United States provided critical support for the Russian economy when it
was needed, and western companies have invested heavily. And Russia has
made substantial gains from its reintegration into the global economy.
These are actions that seek to promote prosperity and respect for
Russia.
But they have recently been met with scorn. Indeed, the record from
suspension of Russian participation in the conventional armed forces
to harassment of business people and cyber attacks on neighbours is
not a good one. Now we have Georgia.
People often talk and ask about unity in Europe. Russian action
has produced unity in Europe. Unity in demanding the withdrawal of
Russian troops to their August 7 positions; unity in rejecting the
use of force as the basis for redrawing the map of the Caucasus;
unity in support of the democratically elected government of Georgia.
Of course Russia can and should have interests in its neighbours,
but like everyone else, it must earn that influence. Indeed, they
do not make up the "post-Soviet space" to which Prime Minister Putin
often refers. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a new reality -
sovereign, independent countries with minds of their own and rights
to defend.
Russia also needs to clarify its attitude to the use of force to solve
disputes. Some argue that Russia has done nothing not previously
done by Nat o in Kosovo in 1999. But this comparison does not bear
serious examination.
Leave to one side that Russia spends a lot of time arguing in the
UN and elsewhere against "interference" in internal affairs, whether
in Zimbabwe or Burma. Nato's actions in Kosovo followed dramatic and
systematic abuse of human rights, culminating in ethnic cleansing on a
scale not seen in Europe since the second world war. Nato acted over
Kosovo only after intensive negotiations in the UN security council
and determined efforts at peace talks. Special envoys were sent to
warn Milosevic in person of the consequences of his actions. None of
this can be said for Russia's use of force in Georgia.
The decision to recognise Kosovo's independence came only after
Russia made clear it would veto the deal proposed by the UN secretary
general's special envoy, former Finnish President Ahtisaari. Even then
we agreed to a further four months of negotiations by an EU-US-Russia
troika in order to ensure that no stone was left unturned in the
search for a mutually acceptable compromise.
Over Georgia, Russia moved from support for territorial integrity to
breaking up the country in three weeks and relied entirely on military
force to do so.
Russia must now ask itself about the relationship between short-term
military victories and long-term economic prosperity. At the time
of the Soviet Union's invasion of Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia
in 196 8, no one asked what impact its actions had on the Russian
stock market.
There was no Russian stock market.
Now, the conflict in Georgia has been associated with a sharp decline
in investor confidence. Russia's foreign exchange reserves fell in
one week by $16bn. In one day the value of Gazprom fell by the same
amount. Risk premia in Russia have sky-rocketed.
Isolation of Russia is not feasible. It would be counter-productive
because Russia's economic integration is the best discipline on its
politics. It would only strengthen the sense of victimhood that fuels
intolerant nationalism. And it would compromise the world's interests
in tackling nuclear proliferation, addressing climate change or
stabilising Afghanistan.
But the international community is not impotent. Europeans need Russian
gas, but Gazprom needs European consumers and investment. The reality
of interdependence is that both sides have leverage; both sides can
change the terms of trade.
Our approach must be hard-headed-engagement. That means bolstering
allies, rebalancing the energy relationship with Russia, defending the
rules of international institutions, and renewing efforts to tackle
"unresolved conflicts".
Here, Ukraine is key. It has strong links to Russia and this is
firmly in both countries' interests. But Ukraine is also a European
country. Ukrainian leaders have spoken of their aspiration to see their
country become a member of the EU. Article 49 of the EU treaty gives
all European countries the right to apply. The prospect and reality of
EU membership has been a force for stability, prosperity and democracy
across eastern Europe and it should remain so beyond. Once Ukraine
fulfils EU criteria, it should be accepted as a full member.
As for Ukraine's relationship with Nato, it does not pose a threat to
Russia. It is about strengthening Ukraine's democratic institutions
and independence - things that will benefit Russia in the long term.
Europe also must re-balance the energy relationship with Russia. Europe
needs to invest in storing gas to deal with interruptions. More
interconnections between countries and properly functioning internal
markets will increase resilience. It needs diverse, secure and
resilient gas supplies.
Europe needs to act as one when dealing with third parties like
Russia. And we will be reducing our dependence on gas altogether:
increasing energy efficiency, investing in carbon capture and storage
technology for coal, and in renewables and nuclear power.
In all international institutions, we will need to review our relations
with Russia. I do not apologise for rejecting kneejerk calls for
Russia to be expelled from the G8, or for EU-Russia or Nato-Russia
relations to be broken. But we do need to examine the nature, depth
and breadth of relations with Russia.
In Nato, we will stand by our commitments to existing members, and
there w ill be renewed determination that there should be no Russian
veto on the future direction of Nato.
Fourth, the unresolved conflicts that mark the end of empire should
not be ignored. The world's attention is currently on South Ossetia
and Abkhazia.
But the conflicts in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh must not
be overlooked. Each has its roots in longstanding ethnic tensions,
exacerbated by economic and political underdevelopment.
The choice today is clear. Not to sponsor a new cold war, but to be
clear about the foundations of lasting peace.
David Miliband
guardian.co.uk
Friday August 29 2008
It is not an act of hostility towards Russia for Europe to support
Ukraine, but a positive move towards lasting peace
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has seemed that new rules
were being established for the conduct of international relations
in central and eastern Europe and central Asia. The watchwords
were independence and interdependence; sovereignty and mutual
responsibility; cooperation and common interests. They are good words
that need to be defended.
The Georgia crisis provided a rude awakening. The sight of Russian
tanks in a neighbouring country on the 40th anniversary of the crushing
of the Prague Spring has shown that the temptations of power politics
remain. The old sores and divisions fester. Russia remains unreconciled
to the new map of Europe.
Yesterday's unilateral attempt to redraw the map marks not just the
end of the post-cold war period, but is also the moment when countries
are required to set out where they stand on the significant issues
of nationhood and international law.
The Russian president says he is not afraid of a new cold war. We
don't want one. He has a big responsibility not to start one.
Ukraine is a leading example of the benefits that accrue when a
country takes charge of its own destiny, and seeks alliances with
other countries.
Its choices should=2 0not be seen as a threat to Russia or an act of
hostility. Equally its independence does demand a new relationship
with Russia - a partnership of equals, not the relationship of master
and servant.
Russia must not learn the wrong lessons from the Georgia crisis:
there can be no going back on fundamental principles of territorial
integrity, democratic governance and international law. It has shown
in the last two weeks what anyone could have foretold: that it can
defeat Georgia's army.
But today Russia is more isolated, less trusted and less respected
than two weeks ago. It has made military gains in the short term. But
over time it will feel the economic and political losses. If Russia
truly wants respect and influence, and the benefits that flow from it,
Russia needs to change course.
Prime Minister Putin has described the collapse of the Soviet Union as
"the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th century. I don't
see it that way. Most people of the former Soviet bloc or Warsaw Pact
don't see it that way. It will be a tragedy for Russia if it spends
the next 20 years believing it to be the case.
Indeed, since 1991 there has been no "stab in the back" of Russia. In
fact, we have offered Russia extensive cooperation with the EU
and Nato; membership of the council of Europe and the G8. Summits,
mechanisms and meetings have been developed by the EU and Nato not to
humiliate or threaten Russia, but to engage with it. The EU and the
United States provided critical support for the Russian economy when it
was needed, and western companies have invested heavily. And Russia has
made substantial gains from its reintegration into the global economy.
These are actions that seek to promote prosperity and respect for
Russia.
But they have recently been met with scorn. Indeed, the record from
suspension of Russian participation in the conventional armed forces
to harassment of business people and cyber attacks on neighbours is
not a good one. Now we have Georgia.
People often talk and ask about unity in Europe. Russian action
has produced unity in Europe. Unity in demanding the withdrawal of
Russian troops to their August 7 positions; unity in rejecting the
use of force as the basis for redrawing the map of the Caucasus;
unity in support of the democratically elected government of Georgia.
Of course Russia can and should have interests in its neighbours,
but like everyone else, it must earn that influence. Indeed, they
do not make up the "post-Soviet space" to which Prime Minister Putin
often refers. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a new reality -
sovereign, independent countries with minds of their own and rights
to defend.
Russia also needs to clarify its attitude to the use of force to solve
disputes. Some argue that Russia has done nothing not previously
done by Nat o in Kosovo in 1999. But this comparison does not bear
serious examination.
Leave to one side that Russia spends a lot of time arguing in the
UN and elsewhere against "interference" in internal affairs, whether
in Zimbabwe or Burma. Nato's actions in Kosovo followed dramatic and
systematic abuse of human rights, culminating in ethnic cleansing on a
scale not seen in Europe since the second world war. Nato acted over
Kosovo only after intensive negotiations in the UN security council
and determined efforts at peace talks. Special envoys were sent to
warn Milosevic in person of the consequences of his actions. None of
this can be said for Russia's use of force in Georgia.
The decision to recognise Kosovo's independence came only after
Russia made clear it would veto the deal proposed by the UN secretary
general's special envoy, former Finnish President Ahtisaari. Even then
we agreed to a further four months of negotiations by an EU-US-Russia
troika in order to ensure that no stone was left unturned in the
search for a mutually acceptable compromise.
Over Georgia, Russia moved from support for territorial integrity to
breaking up the country in three weeks and relied entirely on military
force to do so.
Russia must now ask itself about the relationship between short-term
military victories and long-term economic prosperity. At the time
of the Soviet Union's invasion of Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia
in 196 8, no one asked what impact its actions had on the Russian
stock market.
There was no Russian stock market.
Now, the conflict in Georgia has been associated with a sharp decline
in investor confidence. Russia's foreign exchange reserves fell in
one week by $16bn. In one day the value of Gazprom fell by the same
amount. Risk premia in Russia have sky-rocketed.
Isolation of Russia is not feasible. It would be counter-productive
because Russia's economic integration is the best discipline on its
politics. It would only strengthen the sense of victimhood that fuels
intolerant nationalism. And it would compromise the world's interests
in tackling nuclear proliferation, addressing climate change or
stabilising Afghanistan.
But the international community is not impotent. Europeans need Russian
gas, but Gazprom needs European consumers and investment. The reality
of interdependence is that both sides have leverage; both sides can
change the terms of trade.
Our approach must be hard-headed-engagement. That means bolstering
allies, rebalancing the energy relationship with Russia, defending the
rules of international institutions, and renewing efforts to tackle
"unresolved conflicts".
Here, Ukraine is key. It has strong links to Russia and this is
firmly in both countries' interests. But Ukraine is also a European
country. Ukrainian leaders have spoken of their aspiration to see their
country become a member of the EU. Article 49 of the EU treaty gives
all European countries the right to apply. The prospect and reality of
EU membership has been a force for stability, prosperity and democracy
across eastern Europe and it should remain so beyond. Once Ukraine
fulfils EU criteria, it should be accepted as a full member.
As for Ukraine's relationship with Nato, it does not pose a threat to
Russia. It is about strengthening Ukraine's democratic institutions
and independence - things that will benefit Russia in the long term.
Europe also must re-balance the energy relationship with Russia. Europe
needs to invest in storing gas to deal with interruptions. More
interconnections between countries and properly functioning internal
markets will increase resilience. It needs diverse, secure and
resilient gas supplies.
Europe needs to act as one when dealing with third parties like
Russia. And we will be reducing our dependence on gas altogether:
increasing energy efficiency, investing in carbon capture and storage
technology for coal, and in renewables and nuclear power.
In all international institutions, we will need to review our relations
with Russia. I do not apologise for rejecting kneejerk calls for
Russia to be expelled from the G8, or for EU-Russia or Nato-Russia
relations to be broken. But we do need to examine the nature, depth
and breadth of relations with Russia.
In Nato, we will stand by our commitments to existing members, and
there w ill be renewed determination that there should be no Russian
veto on the future direction of Nato.
Fourth, the unresolved conflicts that mark the end of empire should
not be ignored. The world's attention is currently on South Ossetia
and Abkhazia.
But the conflicts in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh must not
be overlooked. Each has its roots in longstanding ethnic tensions,
exacerbated by economic and political underdevelopment.
The choice today is clear. Not to sponsor a new cold war, but to be
clear about the foundations of lasting peace.