COLD WAR CARICATURES DON'T TELL THE GEORGIAN STORY: THE WAR IN THE CAUCASUS IS ANYTHING BUT A TIDY, BLACK-AND-WHITE STORY
By Dan Gardner
The Gazette (Montreal)
August 29, 2008 Friday
Final Edition
As Russian tanks rumbled through Georgia, leaving a swathe of
destruction, the western media hurriedly dug up background information
for a public that - let's be honest - was not entirely aware that
Georgia is something other than the home of the Atlanta Braves.
One historical tidbit appeared repeatedly: Georgia had been forced
into the Russian empire in the 19th century but in 1918, with
Russia embroiled in civil war, Georgians bravely threw off their
shackles. Independence lasted until 1921, when a Bolshevik army invaded
and dragged this proud people back into a Russian-dominated empire.
In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia once more
tasted freedom. But now, the Russians were yet again on the march.
History seldom offers such neat parallels. Or such tidy morality
plays. It was hard to avoid the conclusion that Russia is incorrigible.
But neat parallels and tidy morality tales are almost invariably neat
and tidy because messy details have been left out. And so it was with
the story of Georgia's first, tragic bid for freedom.
Following the declaration of independence in 1918, the first shots
Georgians fired weren't at Russians. They were at Armenians, in a
squalid little war fought over obscure scraps of land.
The Caucasus - a mountainous region not much bigger than England and
Wales - is home to some 40 languages. The ethnic mix is bewilderingly
complex.
And borders? For 2,000 years, they have twisted and curled like
currents in a river mouth as the people of the region migrated,
fought themselves, and were pushed about by foreign invaders from
the Romans to the Russians.
Any attempt by a people to break from the status quo and form its own
state with its own territory is fraught. Any attempt in the Caucasus
is explosive.
Georgia's war with Armenia was followed by struggles with the Ossetians
and the Abkhaz, ethnic minorities who saw themselves as distinct from
Georgians as Georgians are from Russians.
But the Georgians wouldn't let them go. The vicious fighting that
followed weakened the new Georgian state, contributing to the victory
of the Bolshevik army that invaded in 1921.
Not so neat and tidy, is it? And the complexity only deepened during
the Soviet years.
Abkhazia, which had been an "autonomous province" within the newly
independent Georgia, was made its own Soviet Socialist Republic within
the Soviet Union. That lasted until 1931, when Abkhazia became an
"autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic" within the Georgian Soviet
Socialist Republic. South Ossetia had a similar status.
This fiddling with borders was the work of Josef Stalin. Himself a
Georgian, Stalin had a keen understanding of national passions and
he drew borders and moved populations in ways calculated to create
ethnic conflict and thereby strengthen Moscow's control.
As that control finally faded in 1989, Georgia declared its
independence from the Soviet Union. But neither Abkhazia nor South
Ossetia wanted to go - both resented Georgian dominance and feared
they would lose autonomy within an independent Georgia - and so they
sought to become Soviet republics.
Fierce fighting broke out. Thousands died. Tens of thousands were
ethnically cleansed.
Georgia failed to take control of either Abkhazia or South Ossetia
but the international community decided the Soviet borders set by
Stalin in the 1930s would stand. And so two "frozen conflicts" were
created: Georgian sovereignty over Abkhazia and South Ossetia was
internationally recognized but effective control was held by the
Abkhaz, South Ossetians and their Russian allies.
The war this month was sparked by a Georgian attempt to resume control
of South Ossetia. The massive Russian response and subsequent ceasefire
essentially ensured everything will go back into limbo.
It all makes the head spin. And bear in mind that this is a greatly
simplified version of the conflict. Add all the relevant details and
it begins to resemble Jarndyce and Jarndyce, the interminable legal
battle in Dickens's Bleak House.
Unfortunately, the mess in Georgia is far from unique. Similar
conflicts pepper the valleys of the Caucasus. And not only
there. Moldova. Somalia. Nigeria. It's only on maps that the earth
is neatly divided into clear, uncontested states.
In settling these disputes, the international community is guided by
two powerful principles.
One is the inviolability of borders. Order is a precarious
thing. Recognize one breakaway and others will seek the same status,
nations rightly fear. The status quo must be respected.
But then there's the right of a people to "self-determination." Now
enshrined in international law and the United Nations charter, the
first modern declaration of this right was found in the "Fourteen
Points" that U.S. president Woodrow Wilson laid out as the basis
for a post-First World War peace settlement. Wilson's words inspired
countless minorities to assert themselves - minorities that included
Georgians, Abkhaz, and Ossetians.
Obviously, these two international principles push in very different
directions, but they're not necessarily irreconcilable.
And yet we heard almost nothing about the law, research, and precedents
from politicians, commentators and the media. Faced with bewildering
complexity and their own ignorance - honestly, how many of us had
even heard of South Ossetia in July?- they turned to the comfortingly
familiar tropes of the Cold War.
The Russian government insisted NATO's support of Kosovo and Kosovo's
recent declaration of independence from Serbia were precedents for
its actions. But few gave the point any serious examination. Why
complicate such a satisfying morality play?
Please note: I am not taking sides. I am not denying the machinations
of Vladimir Putin. I am not denying the brutality of the Russian
invasion.
What I object to are Cold War caricatures and anti-Russian sentiment
so crude it verges on bigotry.
Reality anywhere is complicated. And reality in the Caucasus? Only
deluded foreigners would see anything neat and tidy about it.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Dan Gardner
The Gazette (Montreal)
August 29, 2008 Friday
Final Edition
As Russian tanks rumbled through Georgia, leaving a swathe of
destruction, the western media hurriedly dug up background information
for a public that - let's be honest - was not entirely aware that
Georgia is something other than the home of the Atlanta Braves.
One historical tidbit appeared repeatedly: Georgia had been forced
into the Russian empire in the 19th century but in 1918, with
Russia embroiled in civil war, Georgians bravely threw off their
shackles. Independence lasted until 1921, when a Bolshevik army invaded
and dragged this proud people back into a Russian-dominated empire.
In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia once more
tasted freedom. But now, the Russians were yet again on the march.
History seldom offers such neat parallels. Or such tidy morality
plays. It was hard to avoid the conclusion that Russia is incorrigible.
But neat parallels and tidy morality tales are almost invariably neat
and tidy because messy details have been left out. And so it was with
the story of Georgia's first, tragic bid for freedom.
Following the declaration of independence in 1918, the first shots
Georgians fired weren't at Russians. They were at Armenians, in a
squalid little war fought over obscure scraps of land.
The Caucasus - a mountainous region not much bigger than England and
Wales - is home to some 40 languages. The ethnic mix is bewilderingly
complex.
And borders? For 2,000 years, they have twisted and curled like
currents in a river mouth as the people of the region migrated,
fought themselves, and were pushed about by foreign invaders from
the Romans to the Russians.
Any attempt by a people to break from the status quo and form its own
state with its own territory is fraught. Any attempt in the Caucasus
is explosive.
Georgia's war with Armenia was followed by struggles with the Ossetians
and the Abkhaz, ethnic minorities who saw themselves as distinct from
Georgians as Georgians are from Russians.
But the Georgians wouldn't let them go. The vicious fighting that
followed weakened the new Georgian state, contributing to the victory
of the Bolshevik army that invaded in 1921.
Not so neat and tidy, is it? And the complexity only deepened during
the Soviet years.
Abkhazia, which had been an "autonomous province" within the newly
independent Georgia, was made its own Soviet Socialist Republic within
the Soviet Union. That lasted until 1931, when Abkhazia became an
"autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic" within the Georgian Soviet
Socialist Republic. South Ossetia had a similar status.
This fiddling with borders was the work of Josef Stalin. Himself a
Georgian, Stalin had a keen understanding of national passions and
he drew borders and moved populations in ways calculated to create
ethnic conflict and thereby strengthen Moscow's control.
As that control finally faded in 1989, Georgia declared its
independence from the Soviet Union. But neither Abkhazia nor South
Ossetia wanted to go - both resented Georgian dominance and feared
they would lose autonomy within an independent Georgia - and so they
sought to become Soviet republics.
Fierce fighting broke out. Thousands died. Tens of thousands were
ethnically cleansed.
Georgia failed to take control of either Abkhazia or South Ossetia
but the international community decided the Soviet borders set by
Stalin in the 1930s would stand. And so two "frozen conflicts" were
created: Georgian sovereignty over Abkhazia and South Ossetia was
internationally recognized but effective control was held by the
Abkhaz, South Ossetians and their Russian allies.
The war this month was sparked by a Georgian attempt to resume control
of South Ossetia. The massive Russian response and subsequent ceasefire
essentially ensured everything will go back into limbo.
It all makes the head spin. And bear in mind that this is a greatly
simplified version of the conflict. Add all the relevant details and
it begins to resemble Jarndyce and Jarndyce, the interminable legal
battle in Dickens's Bleak House.
Unfortunately, the mess in Georgia is far from unique. Similar
conflicts pepper the valleys of the Caucasus. And not only
there. Moldova. Somalia. Nigeria. It's only on maps that the earth
is neatly divided into clear, uncontested states.
In settling these disputes, the international community is guided by
two powerful principles.
One is the inviolability of borders. Order is a precarious
thing. Recognize one breakaway and others will seek the same status,
nations rightly fear. The status quo must be respected.
But then there's the right of a people to "self-determination." Now
enshrined in international law and the United Nations charter, the
first modern declaration of this right was found in the "Fourteen
Points" that U.S. president Woodrow Wilson laid out as the basis
for a post-First World War peace settlement. Wilson's words inspired
countless minorities to assert themselves - minorities that included
Georgians, Abkhaz, and Ossetians.
Obviously, these two international principles push in very different
directions, but they're not necessarily irreconcilable.
And yet we heard almost nothing about the law, research, and precedents
from politicians, commentators and the media. Faced with bewildering
complexity and their own ignorance - honestly, how many of us had
even heard of South Ossetia in July?- they turned to the comfortingly
familiar tropes of the Cold War.
The Russian government insisted NATO's support of Kosovo and Kosovo's
recent declaration of independence from Serbia were precedents for
its actions. But few gave the point any serious examination. Why
complicate such a satisfying morality play?
Please note: I am not taking sides. I am not denying the machinations
of Vladimir Putin. I am not denying the brutality of the Russian
invasion.
What I object to are Cold War caricatures and anti-Russian sentiment
so crude it verges on bigotry.
Reality anywhere is complicated. And reality in the Caucasus? Only
deluded foreigners would see anything neat and tidy about it.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress