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INSIDE THE ERGENEKON CASE
By Ece Temelkuran
A CounterPunch
December 4, 2008
Turkey's Sinister Blend of Watergate and the Dreyfus Affair
Turkey is facing a new round in her relationship with
democracy. Opponents of the Islamic governing party, known as the AK
for the initials of its Turkish name, are being accused being members
of a secret state gang called Ergenekon. The trials in this case,
which are expected to last for years, began last month. The sinister
undertow portends the likelihood that Turkey is about to experience
its own version of a 'colored revolution'.
A few weeks ago in Diyarbak?r, in the Kurdish region of Turkey,
a prominent Kurdish intellectual said: 'Maybe I should appear as a
commentator on the Ergenekon case'. Putting on a sour, hesitant face
she carried on: 'Since my husband's assassin is still unknown I can
be counted as a victim of deep state like many other Kurdish and
Turkish leftists.' The group of well-known intellectuals from both
ethnicities gathered round the table were silent; nobody knew how
to respond. Those who had for years been vocal about any political
issue were now, like many of their peers, speechless.
That is why one should be warned about the Ergenekon case. Since the
Ergenekon case represents the advanced level of classical Turkish
chaos, this is not a good time to start learning about Turkey unless
yo u are experienced in this 'lonely and beloved country'. Of course,
it makes the story easier if you are promoting a certain political
engagement such as Kemalism or political Islam, but if you want to
maintain a leftist stance on the Ergenekon case, there starts the
hesitation, silence and confusion. And unfortunately this messy,
pervasive state of mind has arisen at one of the most important
cross-roads of not only Turkish political history but also the
Middle East.
Ergenekon is the name of a legendary valley in Turkish
mythology. According to the legend, the valley in Central Asia was
home to the ancient Turks, until a grey wolf led them out onto the
road to the eventual nationhood.
Since last January this piece of mythology has become extremely vital
for Turkey. Ergenekon is now the name of an alleged ultra-nationalist,
ultra-Kemalist gang, which has been operating since 1999 as a part
of the 'deep state'. Their alleged aim is to organize coups against
the AKP government. Like coups, the term 'deep state' has been and
still is a very popular term in Turkish, used to describe renegade
members of the security and military forces said to act outside the
law in what they judge to be Turkey's best interests. The term has
a very long history, which goes back to the Ottoman period, but the
contemporary version generally begins with the Cold War era. Under the
name of 'counter-guerrilla', it was formed to combat the rising leftist
movement and later on the Kurdish uprising in South Eastern Turkey. The
secret entity represents illegal state violence, but also drug dealing
and all kinds of smuggling, first in the Kurdish region then in whole
country. The growing illegal, invisible and untouchable body has been
the source of state terror against Kurdish and Turkish politicians,
intellectuals, trade unions, leftist student organizations.
Although the whole country became aware of the concept, especially
during the coup years in the 1980s, the deep state was revealed
beyond any doubt in 1996 when a car accident happened in Susurluk,
a town in the Marmara region.
In the car were a senior police chief, a prominent right-wing
politician and a wanted assassin who was especially famous for killing
or ordering the killings of Kurdish leaders and intellectuals. Although
the accident revealed the relations between government and assassins,
the case opened against the 'Susurluk gang' was obscured and blocked
by the concept of 'state secrets'. Soon after the interrogations
began, Mehmet Aar, then minister of the interior, was linked to
the case because of his alleged relations with mafia bosses and
ultra-nationalist organizations. His defense was built on the
concept of 'state secret', which was powerful enough to legitimize
any illegal act. The accusations were paralyse d with the help of
the term and the case never progressed. But the Turkish left, that
has been politically dispersed since 1980, for the first time came
together en masse to protest. The name of the civilian action was
'Darkness for 1 minute'. We switched our lights on and off for 1
minute at 9 o'clock every night. It was an easy and legally costless
action, so as a result the mass got bigger and even included those
who live in the apartments of the National Intelligence Service. For
a couple of months people blew whistles, called the residents of their
districts for action and chanted 'One minute darkness for daylight!',
a reference to the idea of bringing the criminals into daylight. It
never happened. The case followed a spiral-like route and every time
the prosecutions ended up with either the sacred term of 'state secret'
or the immunity of the MPs. The only positive outcome of the case was
that society was mobilized more than it ever had been since the coup.
Among the sulking faces were the Islamists. The Felicity Party
did not admire the mobilization at all. The leader of the party,
Necmettin Erbakan, created a sarcastic metaphor for the activists and
the action. He said 'They are doing glu glu dance' which practically
meant nothing but he was referring to the African tribes and their
native dance. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then Mayor of Istanbul, w as one of
the leading figures in the Felicity Party. As far as the Turkish media
knows he was silent about the deep state and the Susurluk gang. There
was another silent name, Mumtazer Turköne. He was the consultant
of Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, during the Susurluk case. His fame
comes from making her say 'The one who shoots or is shot by a bullet
for this country is a hero' about the Susurluk case. This motto was
created not only to defend the Susurluk gang members and eventually the
counter-guerrilla but also to exacerbate the racist, ultra-nationalist
attack on Kurdish society. This name and this little story does not
mean anything to you at the moment but just keep him in mind for a
couple of paragraphs. At some point this name and the political route
that it followed will show how the political compass of Turkey broke
down during recent years. This name also will function as a beacon
to find our way through the mess of the Ergenekon case.
Turkey couldn't judge the Susurluk gang but public opinion was
convinced there were links between the mafia, ultra-nationalist
organizations and the state. Radikal, then a very new, leftist
newspaper made its debut publishing striking stories about
Susurluk. They now and then gave two-page spreads to maps showing the
links between illegal organizations and political figures dating back
to the coup years. But even this committed newsp aper lost track when
things got so complicated that no map was sufficient to show all the
links. The complexity of the issue created a pollution of information,
and gradually those following the case gave up. The Susurluk case left
behind '1 Minute darkness' activists who eventually became a loose
civil action group which, among many other oppositional actions,
organized the anti-war campaign that stopped Turkey joining the
invasion of Iraq.
The 'oppressed' becomes the 'oppressor'
To cut a long story short, in 2001 after the Virtue Party, descendant
of the Felicity Party, was closed down because of its anti-secular
actions, the young, dynamic politicians in the party started a
new movement and soon they established a new party, the AKP. Their
leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan was held as a political prisoner for
reading a poem which runs: 'Minarets are our spears, mosques are our
helmets'. He was a young, fledgling leader when he was imprisoned
but when he stepped out his prime ministry was almost guaranteed
along with his image of being an 'oppressed political leader', an
image still in use even in his second term in office. He was the
handsome face of moderate Islam, an oppressed soul and, as an owner
of fast-growing companies, a capitalist. These virtues made him the
tailor-made leader for new neo-liberal party with conservative topping.
On coming to p ower the AKP began one of the most important eras
of Turkish political history. Their civil discourse was pleasing to
liberal intellectual circles.
The party fitted in with the Greater Middle East Project long
envisioned by the White House. The big corporate fat cats were
quite happy with this business-oriented government. The supposedly
long-oppressed conservative Islamists were looking to the future
with hope. Fetullah Gulen's community, the widest religion-based
economic and political network in Turkey, constituted just after
the coup in 1980, supported the new government. Seeing the support
of liberal intellectuals and up to a certain degree leftists, the
European Union was reassured about the party. Since the party was
talking about pluralism and the 'Kurdish question' openly, Kurdish
politicians were fine with the AKP as well. For a while, an absolute
and uniformly annoying 'stanno tutti bene' situation was in place.
>From the beginning of their first term the AKP, starting from their
leader to the lowest-ranking party member, created and shared a
mythology of being oppressed. The history of 'oppressed Muslims' goes
back to the establishment of the republic. In the common description,
the Kemalist elite, centering power in a secular, unitary state,
oppressed the Muslim community. Sociologists defined the AKP government
as 'the margins' taking over the 'centre' or the trium ph of the
'tradition' against the 'modernist state'. Since the intellectual
staff of the political movement wasn't capable of theorizing and to
a certain degree polishing the reign of the AKP, the party gathered
an intellectual support group consisting of former leftists who have
converted to neo-liberalism. The group legitimized the Islamist AKP
basically by saying that the long wait of the oppressed people of
Turkey is over, as they are now taking the country from the old guard
of the Kemalist elite. The AKP leaders, members and supporters were
represented as the 'light bulbs' of freedom and 'real democracy'. The
same liberal intellectual circles also all but became the guarantors
of democracy and the regime, especially for the European Union.
On the other hand, for ordinary people these complicated democracy
theory lessons were not suitable. Another strategy was used for that
level. A variety of rumours was spread around. 'Before Ataturk we read
and understood the Quran but his legacy made us less Muslim', 'Before
the AKP nobody thought of poverty, but now its civil extensions,
the charities, are pouring money on the poor', 'Our girls will go to
universities with their headscarves'. . . And there were more.
Anatolians never thought about the meaning of the Quran, the AKP has
been charged by German courts with committing fraud over i nternational
Islamic charity organizations, and the girls never made it to the
universities. But the rumours fulfilled their duty and among the
public the moral triumph belonged to the AKP.
Each and every time the party was going through a crisis of
public trust, there came an incident of 'oppression of Islam and
democracy'. While these two concepts stuck to each other in a very
dangerous way, the tension between the party and the army was the
issue causing the most agitation. A mythology was created: the grass
roots of the AKP were resisting the military, civil bureaucracy
and the elite that together have long been exploiting the religious
beliefs of the country. The masses who are intimidated by the AKP's
rise and the possibility of the second man of the party, Abdullah Gul,
becoming president went onto the streets for 'flag demonstrations'. The
demonstrations were against anti-secularism first, but soon turned
into ultra-nationalist meetings.
Shortly after these famous meetings came the elections, and the AKP
won a second term after getting 47 per cent of the votes. The Prime
Minister said in his victory speech that 'the ones who didn't vote
for them are the colours of this country'. It was obvious that for the
prime minister the ones who didn't support him were only the garnish
of the country, and the AKP would be served as the only main course.
=0 D In its second term the AKP was even more reckless. Not only the
personal political style of the prime minister became more ruthless,
but also financially the party became more fearless. The alleged
corruptions of the AKP mayors and the cabinet were growing. But
then came the great rescuer of the AKP -- the case for the party's
closure. It was vital PR for the party and it did its job. Since it
is anti-democratic to close down a party, even the most committed
critics of the party wrote and spoke out against the closure. Plus,
in the political and intellectual arena it was now an ideological
sin to criticize the AKP. An atmosphere was created in which every
criticism of the AKP made you seem like those who are trying to block
the democratic process by means of the closure case. The AKP was once
again the 'great oppressed' in spite of its long list of human rights
violations, fierce neo-liberal policies and anti-secular moves at
every administrative level. It was now once again a sin to 'oppress'
the oppressor.
A political tool or the end of deep state: Ergenekon
It all started in last January when a large cache of hand grenades
was found in a district on the margins of Istanbul. Soon these
hand grenades were linked with the attack against Cumhuriyet, the
secularist, Kemalist newspaper and gradually to the attack against
the Council of State. These attacks were=2 0carried out by a group of
people who described themselves as 'very religious'. The reason for
their attacks was that the newspaper was against the headscarf and the
State of Council delivered a verdict against the lifting of the ban
on headscarves in government buildings. The grenades were also linked
to retired generals who became committed defenders of secularism and
Kemalism in their civilian life by founding associations.
These associations became even more famous through their involvement
in the flag demonstrations. So the main idea was that there was a gang
making provocations against the symbols of Kemalist state, actually
in order to agitate people against the government. A 2,500-page
indictment was handed to the court on July 14, 2008. 86 people,
editors of newspapers, retired generals, political party leaders,
directors of TV channels were accused during the Susurluk Case. Most
of these people were known as 'nationalists' who still religiously
believed in the secular nation-state and saw the AKP as a major danger
to a unitary, secular Turkey.
Some of them were famous paramilitary figures who have long been
wanted for questioning.
The name of the case, Ergenekon, came from a document found in a
former TV host's home. TV host Tuncay Guney once made programs for an
Islamic TV channel and at the moment he is a rabbi in Canada. Now and
then we see him saying obscure things live on air from Canada. The
alleged gang's name was written on a piece of paper at his place,
according to the indictment.
The timing of Ergenekon overlapped with the case for closing down
the AKP. A considerable number of people came up with the argument
that this case was a political tool against the nationalist-Kemalist
camp--an eye-for-an-eye kind of move. The way the suspects were
prosecuted exacerbated this argument. Although his latest works were
calling ultra-nationalists to action, the well-known leading columnist
of Cumhuriyet Ilhan Selcuk was for years a highly praised and respected
leftist columnist. Selcuk, 84, was taken from his home at 4 o'clock
in the morning as the alleged leader of the gang. Mustafa Balbay, the
representative of the same newspaper in Ankara, was also taken into
custody as though he was a fugitive. The arrests were like a 'lesson'
to those who take an oppositional stand against the government. On
the other hand, among the names there were suspects of political
assassinations. So it was not easy to categorize the case purely as an
attack on opponents of the government. Once you talked about the case
negatively it was guaranteed that your name would appear in pro-AKP
newspapers as an 'Ergenekon-lover', 'coup-wanter', 'military-toy-boy'.
The newspaper, which was confiscated by the State and then sold
extremely cheaply to=2 0a group whose CEO is the prime minister's
son-in-law, has been and still is the most enthusiastic celebrator
of the case. Among many TV channels, radio stations and newspapers
Yeniafak, shamelessly close to the government, and Zaman which is
a trademark of Fetullah followers, represented the case as an iron
fist against those who want a coup in Turkey. The new newspaper,
Taraf ,was the most vocal one about the case. Its columnists were
former leftists who have now become liberals. One of its editors is
famous for articles supporting the attack on Afghanistan and the
Iraq invasion. She was shown as the 'voice of the White House in
Turkey'. The financial sources of the paper are still being discussed.
Among many arguments the most interesting one is that followers of
Fetullah Gulen finance the paper.
With the zeal of converts, all the 'retired leftist' columnists
baptised the AKP as the most courageous government of all, and the
Ergenekon case as the end to all our problems of democracy. Through the
media the case became a witch-hunt. Anything that hinders the AKP's
program was probably linked to Ergenekon gang. I remember the fierce
oppression that the unions went through on Mayday in Istanbul. One day
prior to the demonstrations the prime minister was sharp in his words,
saying that there would be no holds barred against those who wanted to
demonstrate in Taksim, the centre of Istanbul. 'It would be a disaster
if the feet became the head', he said. It was a symbolic act for the
workers to show that they don't recognize the limits of the 1980 coup
that banned them from the city centre on Maydays. But what happened
was that the police even dropped a bomb in the emergency department
of a hospital, where demonstrators were trying to hide from the tear
gas spreading almost across the whole European side of the city. The
following day, press releases and pro-AKP intellectuals were commenting
on probable links between trade unions and the Ergenekon gang.
Yet another interesting detail was that in those mainstream American
newspapers which are more than eager to put Turkey on their front
page when it comes to lifting of the headscarf ban or any other
moderate Islam issue, there was not even one sentence about the
Mayday violence which turned Istanbul into an invaded city. Instead,
national and international media quoted the prime minister saying that
'I am the prosecutor of Ergenekon case'. This exciting tone made some
of the analysts think that the case was not intended to do away with
the deep state, but to take it over from the established forces. Long
before this, it had been reported that the police forces had gradually
started to become Fetullah followers. But now it was time for a final
move to take over the deep state from secular, nation-state de fenders.
Another argument was that the army and the AKP made a secret agreement
just before the Ergenekon case when the prime minister and the chief
general met in Dolmabahce Palace in Istanbul, and never revealed
what they talked about. According to some sources, it is a 'cleaning
operation' for the army and the deep state or a 'recreation project'
for both the AKP and the deep state.
'A piece of paper': Questions are forbidden!
As the prosecutions for the case carried on, even the best analysts
became mute. First of all the 2,500-page indictment was full of
recordings of personal telephone calls that have nothing to do with
the case. All these recordings were leaked to the press long before
the case officially opened.
For instance, among these recordings were Ilhan Selcuk's conversations
about Fashion TV or gossip about his colleagues. It was as if the aim
was to degrade the dignity of symbolic figures in the Kemalist camp,
rather than prosecuting them. Those taken by the police were freed
within a couple of days, but the news about their personal telephone
conversations kept appearing in pro-AKP newspapers and web-sites--to
the extent that erotic exchanges between a woman columnist and a party
leader, or their comments on an episode of 'Sex and The City', were
read widely. The telephone recordings have become the most important
issue on co untry's agenda. Recordings of prominent figures in the
Kemalist elite were put on YouTube or other web-sites. Each and
every time we heard recordings of a Republican Party (CHP) member,
a Supreme Court judge or a university dean criticizing the AKP or
making a joke about the prophet.
Prominent figures in society one by one told the press that they
are oppressed by recording-phobia. Their main concern was that these
recordings were done by the secret police in support of the AKP. When
the press asked questions about the issue the Minister of Transport
commented: 'If you don't commit any crimes, why should you worry
about anyone listening to your telephone calls!' And somehow this
whole issue became a joke thanks to Turkey's very special habit and
talent of normalizing anything. Soon we all were joking about the
ticky tacky sounds we hear during our telephone calls. This outrageous
revelation was overshadowed by the celebrities taken into custody as
part of the Ergenekon case.
Even though there was a serious part of the Ergenekon indictment,
the not-so-serious, red-carpet part was much more visible for
sure. A gay singer famous for his 'snake-dance', a very respected
middle aged actor and a list of celebrities are counted as alleged
torturers or gang members of the Ergenekon gang. Their names were on
a piece of paper in one of the retired generals' home like many other
e vidences that the indictment stands on. But you should be careful
when saying such things. Since there was a witch-hunt, including the
trustworthiness of the evidence nothing could be questioned about
the Ergenekon case. During this ongoing witch-hunt, it is not enough
to stop criticizing the AKP in fear of being counted as Ergenekon
defender. You should not ask questions about the Ergenekon case
either. Questions such as:
If this case is intended to question the deep state or at least a
part of this illegal entity, how come the indictment has no relation
to the Kurdish issue? Since the deep state committed its recent crimes
against Kurdish politicians, businessmen and intellectuals, there must
have been something about them in the indictment. So, where are they?
If this case is against the deep state that organizes coups and if
the government is so eager to judge coup attempts, why don't they
start with the visible one done in 1980 rather than running after
invisible ones?
If the government is so against anti-democratic interventions and
eager to judge the generals who have such intentions, why didn't they
change the 15th amendment of the constitution that gives judicial
immunity to the 1980s coup generals?
These are just a couple of examples of possible sinful questions
about the indictment.
The indictment was initially supposed to shed light on every political
assassination committed in Turke y starting from Musa Anter, a
larger-than-life Kurdish writer; Ugur Mumcu, a journalist who was
killed with a car-bomb for finding alleged links between the deep
state and the Kurdish separatist movement; Hrant Dink, the Armenian
journalist who wrote and spoke in favour of recognition of the Armenian
community in Turkey, and was killed by an ultra-nationalist teenager
linked to the police forces. This promising indictment gradually became
more and more circus-like with the addition of new prosecutions. This
circus-like trend overlapped with the Supreme Court's decision about
the case against the AKP, which was in favor of the party. Some argued
that after the party guaranteed that it wasn't going to be closed,
the Ergenekon case lost its importance for the government.
One of the latest prosecutions is against a famous transvestite,
Sisi, who happened to be doing a documentary called 'The Women of the
Republic', probably a Kemalist product representing the role models of
Kemalism in country's early period. The other prosecution is against
the well-known actress Nurseli Idiz, whose latest work involved
her disguising herself as Kemal Ataturk. The media follow-up of the
prosecutions was even more awkward then the people themselves. The
liberal columnists who are over-rating the case, especially the
female ones, made fun of these two, commenting on how they looked,
what they wore, how they loved to be ta ken by the police etc. The
following week, Sisi was a guest on the TV show of the most famous pop
star in Turkey, and Idiz was seen on a daytime women's show. Both of
them talked about the psychological torture that they went through,
and the only democratic support they got was the 'Oh my god's that
they received from the TV audience. While Sisi was talking about
psychological torture, she said it was up to European standards--and
she was not being ironic at all.
Most of the people taken into police custody were not accused of
anything, and were only made to wait for at least three days at
the police office to be questioned about the alleged gang. But you
cannot ask if it was necessary to take people into custody to ask
a couple of questions. The reason is not only the witch-hunt that
might then catch up with you; there are also serious names among the
accused. For instance, the police chief who started the operation
against the alleged Ergenekon gang in the first place. The reason
for his prosecution was that they found a piece of paper in his home
showing links between Ergenekon members. His defence was that it was
normal and that he was the one working on the case. Such contradictory,
almost silly details of the indictment make it very difficult to
believe that it is as serious as the deep state itself. And one might
think that as a threatened writer in Turkey, since I am one of the
potential targets of such a gang, I have every right to question the
seriousness of such a case. But no, you cannot.
Little boxes of mind games!
Now it is time to remember that name: Mumtazer Turköne. Normally he
would be a normal character in the story of a Third World country where
a man makes his inadequate young wife an MP in the governing party and
himself a columnist in the pro-government media. But no, the story of
this name tells a lot about the recent history of my country. In the
70s Turköne was a young academic, known as the up-and-coming ideologue
of the ultra-nationalist Grey Wolves. The Grey Wolves were used by
the paramilitary forces against leftist students and often armed
to kill them. In 80s he was accused of extremist ultra-nationalist
actions and demands were made for him to be sentenced to 15 years'
imprisonment. During the 1990s he was the right hand of Prime Minister
Tansu Ciller, who exacerbated the ultra-nationalist wave created by the
civil war between Kurdish separatists and the Turkish army. Turköne
is famous for making Tansu Ciller say: 'The one who shoots a bullet
or is shot by a bullet for this country is a hero.'
This motto was created just after the Susurluk accident and was used to
legitimize the deep state and members of gangs applying illegal state
violence. During the 90s, at some point, this man for all seasons
must have seen the trend and understood that it was time to change
trains. At the moment he is a columnist for Zaman, the newspaper
founded and directed by Fetullah followers. His former student, now
wife, Ozlem Turköne, is the youngest AKP MP in the parliament. As one
of the most hardworking and devoted ideologues of the AKP and moderate
Islam, Turköne now never mentions his old days when he was very, very
close to the deep state. Now he is one the 'democrat intellectuals'
with other neo-liberal writers, most of them converted from Maoism or
other sects of the former left. As right-wing intellectuals they are
hoisting the standard of being democrats, and as Islamic conservatives
they are defending the Ergenekon case against people like me.
Me?
A friend from the socialist left stopped me on the street the other
day. His voice was anxious: "You know what, maybe you should not
write about Ergenekon for a while". He paused and sulked: "I think the
way you do on this issue but you know... They made two little boxes:
a Kemalist box and a liberal one. Even if you don't fit to either of
the boxes they break your arms or legs and make you fit one of them
at the end. They don't open a third box for you. This is a dangerous
political climate and we are all going to be wasted in the end".
He is right. If you ask questions about the indictment, or even if you
express your concern about the seriousness of the case, there you go
into the Kemalist box. If you clap your hands whenever you hear the
name of the Ergenekon case, then you can be considered a democrat and
can inhabit the same box as those I mentioned above. In that box the
concept of democracy is reduced to freedom of faith, and its links
to social justice or equality have been cut mercilessly. That is why
in Turkey at the moment, if you are coming from the left, in order
to be recognized as 'not a fascist' you are obliged to bow your head
before right-wing perceptions of democracy.
Even though it was the left that has been the ultimate victim of the
deep state, they are for the time being the ones accused of being
the deep state itself. This discourse or political climate has such a
strong character that even the most intelligent and experienced spin
doctors on the left have been stammering since last January about
the Ergenekon case. Meanwhile the right-wing democrats, the liberals,
are making noise saying that this time the gang was caught before it
managed to carry out the coup. Thank god, the AKP government at the
last minute busted them in the very act!
This reduction of politics to barren dualities didn't actually start
with the Ergenekon case; on the contrary, it had already been creating
an in tellectual industry with interesting products since the political
polarization deepened with the start of the AKP's second term. On
almost every news channel there are talk-shows featuring a pro-AKP
liberal democrat and an anti-AKP democrat. Since their controversies
are the product on sale, these programs are visually exaggerated as
well. In one of them, before the show begins they show two tigers
attacking each other and in another program one, side has a black, the
other a white background. The AKP, beyond its other achievements, gave
Turkey this amazing present: intellectual and political discussions
are now made in little boxes between black-and-white tigers!
The unwanted intervener: the Left!
This barren intellectual climate is dominated by those figures who very
much resemble their peers in Georgia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia. Like
those colour revolutions, stamped with the words 'made in USA', the
chosen political leader is praised by the New World Order's Wizard
of Oz, Richard Holbrooke. Like Saakashvili of Georgia, Prime Minister
Erdogan is a good friend of Holbrooke, and like the Orange Revolution
of Ukraine, the ideological transformation of the intelligentsia
towards liberalism is directed by US-approved, freedom-fighter
NGOs. Those who don't want to be ridden by this wave are classed
as counter-revolutionaries or just Kemalists, which basically means
fascist. Even if you have proven your ideological trustwor thiness
before history, for instance by being tortured or executed by the coup,
you still might not be saved from being counted as a coup-lover.
Taraf, the very young newspaper set up just before the Ergenekon case,
and which became a committed supporter of the case, made its debut by
branding three very young revolutionaries--Deniz Gezmis, Yusuf Aslan
and Huseyin Inan, executed in 1972 by an earlier coup--as xenophobic
and Kemalist.
The last words of these 20-something people were 'Long live the
brotherhood of Kurdish and Turkish peoples!', but it was passé to
defend victims of the former coups. Now it was this new coup that
we were supposed to concentrate on! The newspaper not only attacked
respected and beloved figures of the left, but also tried to make
the whole leftist tradition worthless in a blink of an eye.
>From what I have read about colour-coded revolutions, this is what
you go through when they decide to make one in your country. Lots of
ideological confusion is spread, the concept of democracy is reduced
to oranges or tulips, and when you try to defend some basic values
like equality or secularism, you become a scapegoat if not a fascist
guardian of the old regime. The difference is that this time the
so-called revolution is taking place not in Europe but in the Middle
East, and for the Middle East. When the revolution is completed
probably the old guards of the Kemalist regime and the Cold War
generals left over from the Cold War will be gone, but Turkey will
also be a Middle Eastern country more than ever before. When that
time arrives, the liberal intellectuals probably won't apologize for
their 'misunderstandings' like their colour revolutionary buddies in
other countries.
These are the reasons why the left has felt hesitant to intervene in
the case as the natural victim of the deep state. Finally Ufuk Uras,
an independent MP of the socialist left, demanded in parliament
the establishment of a research commission on the coups and coup
attempts. His demand is supported by the DTP, a Kurdish party. 'Let
the coups be judged and the attempted coups be revealed initiative',
of which I am part, began in the third week of September.
For the sake of legitimacy, they invited a couple of liberal
intellectuals and even AKP supporters for the initiative's opening
press conference.
And Uras made a declaration, saying that although he sought support
among AKP members, none of them signed the demand for research
commission. The left is trying to appear as an intervener in the
Ergenekon case--albeit with hesitant baby steps. Although they are
the ones who must be the most vocal, because of the long story told
above, they just murmur at the moment.
Because they know, like my friend in Diyarbak?r, that their sacrifices
are not enough to secure an intervening position in this case. To be
right, you must be a liberal.
Me? I am just reading more and more about colour revolutions, which
make me feel less lonely.
Ece Temelkuran is the most-read female political columnist in Turkey,
writing regularly for Milliyet, with a well deserved reputation for
fearlessness and verve. She also hosts a widely view political show in
Turkish tv. Her latest book, The Deep Mountain, based on interviews
with Armenians in Armenia, France and the U.S. and published in
Istanbul in May 2008, is currently being translated into English. She
has published widely and won numerous awards for her work, including
the Pen for Peace Award, and Turkish Journalist of the Year. She
is the author of several books, including, "What Is There For Me To
Say!" on the hunger strikes by political prisoners in Turkey, and "We
are Making A Revolution Here Senorita!" on the politics and every-day
life in Chavez's Venezuela. She can be reached at [email protected]
--Boundary_(ID_RtZ3VVUMSA6M/8S xLaCg9w)--
By Ece Temelkuran
A CounterPunch
December 4, 2008
Turkey's Sinister Blend of Watergate and the Dreyfus Affair
Turkey is facing a new round in her relationship with
democracy. Opponents of the Islamic governing party, known as the AK
for the initials of its Turkish name, are being accused being members
of a secret state gang called Ergenekon. The trials in this case,
which are expected to last for years, began last month. The sinister
undertow portends the likelihood that Turkey is about to experience
its own version of a 'colored revolution'.
A few weeks ago in Diyarbak?r, in the Kurdish region of Turkey,
a prominent Kurdish intellectual said: 'Maybe I should appear as a
commentator on the Ergenekon case'. Putting on a sour, hesitant face
she carried on: 'Since my husband's assassin is still unknown I can
be counted as a victim of deep state like many other Kurdish and
Turkish leftists.' The group of well-known intellectuals from both
ethnicities gathered round the table were silent; nobody knew how
to respond. Those who had for years been vocal about any political
issue were now, like many of their peers, speechless.
That is why one should be warned about the Ergenekon case. Since the
Ergenekon case represents the advanced level of classical Turkish
chaos, this is not a good time to start learning about Turkey unless
yo u are experienced in this 'lonely and beloved country'. Of course,
it makes the story easier if you are promoting a certain political
engagement such as Kemalism or political Islam, but if you want to
maintain a leftist stance on the Ergenekon case, there starts the
hesitation, silence and confusion. And unfortunately this messy,
pervasive state of mind has arisen at one of the most important
cross-roads of not only Turkish political history but also the
Middle East.
Ergenekon is the name of a legendary valley in Turkish
mythology. According to the legend, the valley in Central Asia was
home to the ancient Turks, until a grey wolf led them out onto the
road to the eventual nationhood.
Since last January this piece of mythology has become extremely vital
for Turkey. Ergenekon is now the name of an alleged ultra-nationalist,
ultra-Kemalist gang, which has been operating since 1999 as a part
of the 'deep state'. Their alleged aim is to organize coups against
the AKP government. Like coups, the term 'deep state' has been and
still is a very popular term in Turkish, used to describe renegade
members of the security and military forces said to act outside the
law in what they judge to be Turkey's best interests. The term has
a very long history, which goes back to the Ottoman period, but the
contemporary version generally begins with the Cold War era. Under the
name of 'counter-guerrilla', it was formed to combat the rising leftist
movement and later on the Kurdish uprising in South Eastern Turkey. The
secret entity represents illegal state violence, but also drug dealing
and all kinds of smuggling, first in the Kurdish region then in whole
country. The growing illegal, invisible and untouchable body has been
the source of state terror against Kurdish and Turkish politicians,
intellectuals, trade unions, leftist student organizations.
Although the whole country became aware of the concept, especially
during the coup years in the 1980s, the deep state was revealed
beyond any doubt in 1996 when a car accident happened in Susurluk,
a town in the Marmara region.
In the car were a senior police chief, a prominent right-wing
politician and a wanted assassin who was especially famous for killing
or ordering the killings of Kurdish leaders and intellectuals. Although
the accident revealed the relations between government and assassins,
the case opened against the 'Susurluk gang' was obscured and blocked
by the concept of 'state secrets'. Soon after the interrogations
began, Mehmet Aar, then minister of the interior, was linked to
the case because of his alleged relations with mafia bosses and
ultra-nationalist organizations. His defense was built on the
concept of 'state secret', which was powerful enough to legitimize
any illegal act. The accusations were paralyse d with the help of
the term and the case never progressed. But the Turkish left, that
has been politically dispersed since 1980, for the first time came
together en masse to protest. The name of the civilian action was
'Darkness for 1 minute'. We switched our lights on and off for 1
minute at 9 o'clock every night. It was an easy and legally costless
action, so as a result the mass got bigger and even included those
who live in the apartments of the National Intelligence Service. For
a couple of months people blew whistles, called the residents of their
districts for action and chanted 'One minute darkness for daylight!',
a reference to the idea of bringing the criminals into daylight. It
never happened. The case followed a spiral-like route and every time
the prosecutions ended up with either the sacred term of 'state secret'
or the immunity of the MPs. The only positive outcome of the case was
that society was mobilized more than it ever had been since the coup.
Among the sulking faces were the Islamists. The Felicity Party
did not admire the mobilization at all. The leader of the party,
Necmettin Erbakan, created a sarcastic metaphor for the activists and
the action. He said 'They are doing glu glu dance' which practically
meant nothing but he was referring to the African tribes and their
native dance. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then Mayor of Istanbul, w as one of
the leading figures in the Felicity Party. As far as the Turkish media
knows he was silent about the deep state and the Susurluk gang. There
was another silent name, Mumtazer Turköne. He was the consultant
of Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, during the Susurluk case. His fame
comes from making her say 'The one who shoots or is shot by a bullet
for this country is a hero' about the Susurluk case. This motto was
created not only to defend the Susurluk gang members and eventually the
counter-guerrilla but also to exacerbate the racist, ultra-nationalist
attack on Kurdish society. This name and this little story does not
mean anything to you at the moment but just keep him in mind for a
couple of paragraphs. At some point this name and the political route
that it followed will show how the political compass of Turkey broke
down during recent years. This name also will function as a beacon
to find our way through the mess of the Ergenekon case.
Turkey couldn't judge the Susurluk gang but public opinion was
convinced there were links between the mafia, ultra-nationalist
organizations and the state. Radikal, then a very new, leftist
newspaper made its debut publishing striking stories about
Susurluk. They now and then gave two-page spreads to maps showing the
links between illegal organizations and political figures dating back
to the coup years. But even this committed newsp aper lost track when
things got so complicated that no map was sufficient to show all the
links. The complexity of the issue created a pollution of information,
and gradually those following the case gave up. The Susurluk case left
behind '1 Minute darkness' activists who eventually became a loose
civil action group which, among many other oppositional actions,
organized the anti-war campaign that stopped Turkey joining the
invasion of Iraq.
The 'oppressed' becomes the 'oppressor'
To cut a long story short, in 2001 after the Virtue Party, descendant
of the Felicity Party, was closed down because of its anti-secular
actions, the young, dynamic politicians in the party started a
new movement and soon they established a new party, the AKP. Their
leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan was held as a political prisoner for
reading a poem which runs: 'Minarets are our spears, mosques are our
helmets'. He was a young, fledgling leader when he was imprisoned
but when he stepped out his prime ministry was almost guaranteed
along with his image of being an 'oppressed political leader', an
image still in use even in his second term in office. He was the
handsome face of moderate Islam, an oppressed soul and, as an owner
of fast-growing companies, a capitalist. These virtues made him the
tailor-made leader for new neo-liberal party with conservative topping.
On coming to p ower the AKP began one of the most important eras
of Turkish political history. Their civil discourse was pleasing to
liberal intellectual circles.
The party fitted in with the Greater Middle East Project long
envisioned by the White House. The big corporate fat cats were
quite happy with this business-oriented government. The supposedly
long-oppressed conservative Islamists were looking to the future
with hope. Fetullah Gulen's community, the widest religion-based
economic and political network in Turkey, constituted just after
the coup in 1980, supported the new government. Seeing the support
of liberal intellectuals and up to a certain degree leftists, the
European Union was reassured about the party. Since the party was
talking about pluralism and the 'Kurdish question' openly, Kurdish
politicians were fine with the AKP as well. For a while, an absolute
and uniformly annoying 'stanno tutti bene' situation was in place.
>From the beginning of their first term the AKP, starting from their
leader to the lowest-ranking party member, created and shared a
mythology of being oppressed. The history of 'oppressed Muslims' goes
back to the establishment of the republic. In the common description,
the Kemalist elite, centering power in a secular, unitary state,
oppressed the Muslim community. Sociologists defined the AKP government
as 'the margins' taking over the 'centre' or the trium ph of the
'tradition' against the 'modernist state'. Since the intellectual
staff of the political movement wasn't capable of theorizing and to
a certain degree polishing the reign of the AKP, the party gathered
an intellectual support group consisting of former leftists who have
converted to neo-liberalism. The group legitimized the Islamist AKP
basically by saying that the long wait of the oppressed people of
Turkey is over, as they are now taking the country from the old guard
of the Kemalist elite. The AKP leaders, members and supporters were
represented as the 'light bulbs' of freedom and 'real democracy'. The
same liberal intellectual circles also all but became the guarantors
of democracy and the regime, especially for the European Union.
On the other hand, for ordinary people these complicated democracy
theory lessons were not suitable. Another strategy was used for that
level. A variety of rumours was spread around. 'Before Ataturk we read
and understood the Quran but his legacy made us less Muslim', 'Before
the AKP nobody thought of poverty, but now its civil extensions,
the charities, are pouring money on the poor', 'Our girls will go to
universities with their headscarves'. . . And there were more.
Anatolians never thought about the meaning of the Quran, the AKP has
been charged by German courts with committing fraud over i nternational
Islamic charity organizations, and the girls never made it to the
universities. But the rumours fulfilled their duty and among the
public the moral triumph belonged to the AKP.
Each and every time the party was going through a crisis of
public trust, there came an incident of 'oppression of Islam and
democracy'. While these two concepts stuck to each other in a very
dangerous way, the tension between the party and the army was the
issue causing the most agitation. A mythology was created: the grass
roots of the AKP were resisting the military, civil bureaucracy
and the elite that together have long been exploiting the religious
beliefs of the country. The masses who are intimidated by the AKP's
rise and the possibility of the second man of the party, Abdullah Gul,
becoming president went onto the streets for 'flag demonstrations'. The
demonstrations were against anti-secularism first, but soon turned
into ultra-nationalist meetings.
Shortly after these famous meetings came the elections, and the AKP
won a second term after getting 47 per cent of the votes. The Prime
Minister said in his victory speech that 'the ones who didn't vote
for them are the colours of this country'. It was obvious that for the
prime minister the ones who didn't support him were only the garnish
of the country, and the AKP would be served as the only main course.
=0 D In its second term the AKP was even more reckless. Not only the
personal political style of the prime minister became more ruthless,
but also financially the party became more fearless. The alleged
corruptions of the AKP mayors and the cabinet were growing. But
then came the great rescuer of the AKP -- the case for the party's
closure. It was vital PR for the party and it did its job. Since it
is anti-democratic to close down a party, even the most committed
critics of the party wrote and spoke out against the closure. Plus,
in the political and intellectual arena it was now an ideological
sin to criticize the AKP. An atmosphere was created in which every
criticism of the AKP made you seem like those who are trying to block
the democratic process by means of the closure case. The AKP was once
again the 'great oppressed' in spite of its long list of human rights
violations, fierce neo-liberal policies and anti-secular moves at
every administrative level. It was now once again a sin to 'oppress'
the oppressor.
A political tool or the end of deep state: Ergenekon
It all started in last January when a large cache of hand grenades
was found in a district on the margins of Istanbul. Soon these
hand grenades were linked with the attack against Cumhuriyet, the
secularist, Kemalist newspaper and gradually to the attack against
the Council of State. These attacks were=2 0carried out by a group of
people who described themselves as 'very religious'. The reason for
their attacks was that the newspaper was against the headscarf and the
State of Council delivered a verdict against the lifting of the ban
on headscarves in government buildings. The grenades were also linked
to retired generals who became committed defenders of secularism and
Kemalism in their civilian life by founding associations.
These associations became even more famous through their involvement
in the flag demonstrations. So the main idea was that there was a gang
making provocations against the symbols of Kemalist state, actually
in order to agitate people against the government. A 2,500-page
indictment was handed to the court on July 14, 2008. 86 people,
editors of newspapers, retired generals, political party leaders,
directors of TV channels were accused during the Susurluk Case. Most
of these people were known as 'nationalists' who still religiously
believed in the secular nation-state and saw the AKP as a major danger
to a unitary, secular Turkey.
Some of them were famous paramilitary figures who have long been
wanted for questioning.
The name of the case, Ergenekon, came from a document found in a
former TV host's home. TV host Tuncay Guney once made programs for an
Islamic TV channel and at the moment he is a rabbi in Canada. Now and
then we see him saying obscure things live on air from Canada. The
alleged gang's name was written on a piece of paper at his place,
according to the indictment.
The timing of Ergenekon overlapped with the case for closing down
the AKP. A considerable number of people came up with the argument
that this case was a political tool against the nationalist-Kemalist
camp--an eye-for-an-eye kind of move. The way the suspects were
prosecuted exacerbated this argument. Although his latest works were
calling ultra-nationalists to action, the well-known leading columnist
of Cumhuriyet Ilhan Selcuk was for years a highly praised and respected
leftist columnist. Selcuk, 84, was taken from his home at 4 o'clock
in the morning as the alleged leader of the gang. Mustafa Balbay, the
representative of the same newspaper in Ankara, was also taken into
custody as though he was a fugitive. The arrests were like a 'lesson'
to those who take an oppositional stand against the government. On
the other hand, among the names there were suspects of political
assassinations. So it was not easy to categorize the case purely as an
attack on opponents of the government. Once you talked about the case
negatively it was guaranteed that your name would appear in pro-AKP
newspapers as an 'Ergenekon-lover', 'coup-wanter', 'military-toy-boy'.
The newspaper, which was confiscated by the State and then sold
extremely cheaply to=2 0a group whose CEO is the prime minister's
son-in-law, has been and still is the most enthusiastic celebrator
of the case. Among many TV channels, radio stations and newspapers
Yeniafak, shamelessly close to the government, and Zaman which is
a trademark of Fetullah followers, represented the case as an iron
fist against those who want a coup in Turkey. The new newspaper,
Taraf ,was the most vocal one about the case. Its columnists were
former leftists who have now become liberals. One of its editors is
famous for articles supporting the attack on Afghanistan and the
Iraq invasion. She was shown as the 'voice of the White House in
Turkey'. The financial sources of the paper are still being discussed.
Among many arguments the most interesting one is that followers of
Fetullah Gulen finance the paper.
With the zeal of converts, all the 'retired leftist' columnists
baptised the AKP as the most courageous government of all, and the
Ergenekon case as the end to all our problems of democracy. Through the
media the case became a witch-hunt. Anything that hinders the AKP's
program was probably linked to Ergenekon gang. I remember the fierce
oppression that the unions went through on Mayday in Istanbul. One day
prior to the demonstrations the prime minister was sharp in his words,
saying that there would be no holds barred against those who wanted to
demonstrate in Taksim, the centre of Istanbul. 'It would be a disaster
if the feet became the head', he said. It was a symbolic act for the
workers to show that they don't recognize the limits of the 1980 coup
that banned them from the city centre on Maydays. But what happened
was that the police even dropped a bomb in the emergency department
of a hospital, where demonstrators were trying to hide from the tear
gas spreading almost across the whole European side of the city. The
following day, press releases and pro-AKP intellectuals were commenting
on probable links between trade unions and the Ergenekon gang.
Yet another interesting detail was that in those mainstream American
newspapers which are more than eager to put Turkey on their front
page when it comes to lifting of the headscarf ban or any other
moderate Islam issue, there was not even one sentence about the
Mayday violence which turned Istanbul into an invaded city. Instead,
national and international media quoted the prime minister saying that
'I am the prosecutor of Ergenekon case'. This exciting tone made some
of the analysts think that the case was not intended to do away with
the deep state, but to take it over from the established forces. Long
before this, it had been reported that the police forces had gradually
started to become Fetullah followers. But now it was time for a final
move to take over the deep state from secular, nation-state de fenders.
Another argument was that the army and the AKP made a secret agreement
just before the Ergenekon case when the prime minister and the chief
general met in Dolmabahce Palace in Istanbul, and never revealed
what they talked about. According to some sources, it is a 'cleaning
operation' for the army and the deep state or a 'recreation project'
for both the AKP and the deep state.
'A piece of paper': Questions are forbidden!
As the prosecutions for the case carried on, even the best analysts
became mute. First of all the 2,500-page indictment was full of
recordings of personal telephone calls that have nothing to do with
the case. All these recordings were leaked to the press long before
the case officially opened.
For instance, among these recordings were Ilhan Selcuk's conversations
about Fashion TV or gossip about his colleagues. It was as if the aim
was to degrade the dignity of symbolic figures in the Kemalist camp,
rather than prosecuting them. Those taken by the police were freed
within a couple of days, but the news about their personal telephone
conversations kept appearing in pro-AKP newspapers and web-sites--to
the extent that erotic exchanges between a woman columnist and a party
leader, or their comments on an episode of 'Sex and The City', were
read widely. The telephone recordings have become the most important
issue on co untry's agenda. Recordings of prominent figures in the
Kemalist elite were put on YouTube or other web-sites. Each and
every time we heard recordings of a Republican Party (CHP) member,
a Supreme Court judge or a university dean criticizing the AKP or
making a joke about the prophet.
Prominent figures in society one by one told the press that they
are oppressed by recording-phobia. Their main concern was that these
recordings were done by the secret police in support of the AKP. When
the press asked questions about the issue the Minister of Transport
commented: 'If you don't commit any crimes, why should you worry
about anyone listening to your telephone calls!' And somehow this
whole issue became a joke thanks to Turkey's very special habit and
talent of normalizing anything. Soon we all were joking about the
ticky tacky sounds we hear during our telephone calls. This outrageous
revelation was overshadowed by the celebrities taken into custody as
part of the Ergenekon case.
Even though there was a serious part of the Ergenekon indictment,
the not-so-serious, red-carpet part was much more visible for
sure. A gay singer famous for his 'snake-dance', a very respected
middle aged actor and a list of celebrities are counted as alleged
torturers or gang members of the Ergenekon gang. Their names were on
a piece of paper in one of the retired generals' home like many other
e vidences that the indictment stands on. But you should be careful
when saying such things. Since there was a witch-hunt, including the
trustworthiness of the evidence nothing could be questioned about
the Ergenekon case. During this ongoing witch-hunt, it is not enough
to stop criticizing the AKP in fear of being counted as Ergenekon
defender. You should not ask questions about the Ergenekon case
either. Questions such as:
If this case is intended to question the deep state or at least a
part of this illegal entity, how come the indictment has no relation
to the Kurdish issue? Since the deep state committed its recent crimes
against Kurdish politicians, businessmen and intellectuals, there must
have been something about them in the indictment. So, where are they?
If this case is against the deep state that organizes coups and if
the government is so eager to judge coup attempts, why don't they
start with the visible one done in 1980 rather than running after
invisible ones?
If the government is so against anti-democratic interventions and
eager to judge the generals who have such intentions, why didn't they
change the 15th amendment of the constitution that gives judicial
immunity to the 1980s coup generals?
These are just a couple of examples of possible sinful questions
about the indictment.
The indictment was initially supposed to shed light on every political
assassination committed in Turke y starting from Musa Anter, a
larger-than-life Kurdish writer; Ugur Mumcu, a journalist who was
killed with a car-bomb for finding alleged links between the deep
state and the Kurdish separatist movement; Hrant Dink, the Armenian
journalist who wrote and spoke in favour of recognition of the Armenian
community in Turkey, and was killed by an ultra-nationalist teenager
linked to the police forces. This promising indictment gradually became
more and more circus-like with the addition of new prosecutions. This
circus-like trend overlapped with the Supreme Court's decision about
the case against the AKP, which was in favor of the party. Some argued
that after the party guaranteed that it wasn't going to be closed,
the Ergenekon case lost its importance for the government.
One of the latest prosecutions is against a famous transvestite,
Sisi, who happened to be doing a documentary called 'The Women of the
Republic', probably a Kemalist product representing the role models of
Kemalism in country's early period. The other prosecution is against
the well-known actress Nurseli Idiz, whose latest work involved
her disguising herself as Kemal Ataturk. The media follow-up of the
prosecutions was even more awkward then the people themselves. The
liberal columnists who are over-rating the case, especially the
female ones, made fun of these two, commenting on how they looked,
what they wore, how they loved to be ta ken by the police etc. The
following week, Sisi was a guest on the TV show of the most famous pop
star in Turkey, and Idiz was seen on a daytime women's show. Both of
them talked about the psychological torture that they went through,
and the only democratic support they got was the 'Oh my god's that
they received from the TV audience. While Sisi was talking about
psychological torture, she said it was up to European standards--and
she was not being ironic at all.
Most of the people taken into police custody were not accused of
anything, and were only made to wait for at least three days at
the police office to be questioned about the alleged gang. But you
cannot ask if it was necessary to take people into custody to ask
a couple of questions. The reason is not only the witch-hunt that
might then catch up with you; there are also serious names among the
accused. For instance, the police chief who started the operation
against the alleged Ergenekon gang in the first place. The reason
for his prosecution was that they found a piece of paper in his home
showing links between Ergenekon members. His defence was that it was
normal and that he was the one working on the case. Such contradictory,
almost silly details of the indictment make it very difficult to
believe that it is as serious as the deep state itself. And one might
think that as a threatened writer in Turkey, since I am one of the
potential targets of such a gang, I have every right to question the
seriousness of such a case. But no, you cannot.
Little boxes of mind games!
Now it is time to remember that name: Mumtazer Turköne. Normally he
would be a normal character in the story of a Third World country where
a man makes his inadequate young wife an MP in the governing party and
himself a columnist in the pro-government media. But no, the story of
this name tells a lot about the recent history of my country. In the
70s Turköne was a young academic, known as the up-and-coming ideologue
of the ultra-nationalist Grey Wolves. The Grey Wolves were used by
the paramilitary forces against leftist students and often armed
to kill them. In 80s he was accused of extremist ultra-nationalist
actions and demands were made for him to be sentenced to 15 years'
imprisonment. During the 1990s he was the right hand of Prime Minister
Tansu Ciller, who exacerbated the ultra-nationalist wave created by the
civil war between Kurdish separatists and the Turkish army. Turköne
is famous for making Tansu Ciller say: 'The one who shoots a bullet
or is shot by a bullet for this country is a hero.'
This motto was created just after the Susurluk accident and was used to
legitimize the deep state and members of gangs applying illegal state
violence. During the 90s, at some point, this man for all seasons
must have seen the trend and understood that it was time to change
trains. At the moment he is a columnist for Zaman, the newspaper
founded and directed by Fetullah followers. His former student, now
wife, Ozlem Turköne, is the youngest AKP MP in the parliament. As one
of the most hardworking and devoted ideologues of the AKP and moderate
Islam, Turköne now never mentions his old days when he was very, very
close to the deep state. Now he is one the 'democrat intellectuals'
with other neo-liberal writers, most of them converted from Maoism or
other sects of the former left. As right-wing intellectuals they are
hoisting the standard of being democrats, and as Islamic conservatives
they are defending the Ergenekon case against people like me.
Me?
A friend from the socialist left stopped me on the street the other
day. His voice was anxious: "You know what, maybe you should not
write about Ergenekon for a while". He paused and sulked: "I think the
way you do on this issue but you know... They made two little boxes:
a Kemalist box and a liberal one. Even if you don't fit to either of
the boxes they break your arms or legs and make you fit one of them
at the end. They don't open a third box for you. This is a dangerous
political climate and we are all going to be wasted in the end".
He is right. If you ask questions about the indictment, or even if you
express your concern about the seriousness of the case, there you go
into the Kemalist box. If you clap your hands whenever you hear the
name of the Ergenekon case, then you can be considered a democrat and
can inhabit the same box as those I mentioned above. In that box the
concept of democracy is reduced to freedom of faith, and its links
to social justice or equality have been cut mercilessly. That is why
in Turkey at the moment, if you are coming from the left, in order
to be recognized as 'not a fascist' you are obliged to bow your head
before right-wing perceptions of democracy.
Even though it was the left that has been the ultimate victim of the
deep state, they are for the time being the ones accused of being
the deep state itself. This discourse or political climate has such a
strong character that even the most intelligent and experienced spin
doctors on the left have been stammering since last January about
the Ergenekon case. Meanwhile the right-wing democrats, the liberals,
are making noise saying that this time the gang was caught before it
managed to carry out the coup. Thank god, the AKP government at the
last minute busted them in the very act!
This reduction of politics to barren dualities didn't actually start
with the Ergenekon case; on the contrary, it had already been creating
an in tellectual industry with interesting products since the political
polarization deepened with the start of the AKP's second term. On
almost every news channel there are talk-shows featuring a pro-AKP
liberal democrat and an anti-AKP democrat. Since their controversies
are the product on sale, these programs are visually exaggerated as
well. In one of them, before the show begins they show two tigers
attacking each other and in another program one, side has a black, the
other a white background. The AKP, beyond its other achievements, gave
Turkey this amazing present: intellectual and political discussions
are now made in little boxes between black-and-white tigers!
The unwanted intervener: the Left!
This barren intellectual climate is dominated by those figures who very
much resemble their peers in Georgia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia. Like
those colour revolutions, stamped with the words 'made in USA', the
chosen political leader is praised by the New World Order's Wizard
of Oz, Richard Holbrooke. Like Saakashvili of Georgia, Prime Minister
Erdogan is a good friend of Holbrooke, and like the Orange Revolution
of Ukraine, the ideological transformation of the intelligentsia
towards liberalism is directed by US-approved, freedom-fighter
NGOs. Those who don't want to be ridden by this wave are classed
as counter-revolutionaries or just Kemalists, which basically means
fascist. Even if you have proven your ideological trustwor thiness
before history, for instance by being tortured or executed by the coup,
you still might not be saved from being counted as a coup-lover.
Taraf, the very young newspaper set up just before the Ergenekon case,
and which became a committed supporter of the case, made its debut by
branding three very young revolutionaries--Deniz Gezmis, Yusuf Aslan
and Huseyin Inan, executed in 1972 by an earlier coup--as xenophobic
and Kemalist.
The last words of these 20-something people were 'Long live the
brotherhood of Kurdish and Turkish peoples!', but it was passé to
defend victims of the former coups. Now it was this new coup that
we were supposed to concentrate on! The newspaper not only attacked
respected and beloved figures of the left, but also tried to make
the whole leftist tradition worthless in a blink of an eye.
>From what I have read about colour-coded revolutions, this is what
you go through when they decide to make one in your country. Lots of
ideological confusion is spread, the concept of democracy is reduced
to oranges or tulips, and when you try to defend some basic values
like equality or secularism, you become a scapegoat if not a fascist
guardian of the old regime. The difference is that this time the
so-called revolution is taking place not in Europe but in the Middle
East, and for the Middle East. When the revolution is completed
probably the old guards of the Kemalist regime and the Cold War
generals left over from the Cold War will be gone, but Turkey will
also be a Middle Eastern country more than ever before. When that
time arrives, the liberal intellectuals probably won't apologize for
their 'misunderstandings' like their colour revolutionary buddies in
other countries.
These are the reasons why the left has felt hesitant to intervene in
the case as the natural victim of the deep state. Finally Ufuk Uras,
an independent MP of the socialist left, demanded in parliament
the establishment of a research commission on the coups and coup
attempts. His demand is supported by the DTP, a Kurdish party. 'Let
the coups be judged and the attempted coups be revealed initiative',
of which I am part, began in the third week of September.
For the sake of legitimacy, they invited a couple of liberal
intellectuals and even AKP supporters for the initiative's opening
press conference.
And Uras made a declaration, saying that although he sought support
among AKP members, none of them signed the demand for research
commission. The left is trying to appear as an intervener in the
Ergenekon case--albeit with hesitant baby steps. Although they are
the ones who must be the most vocal, because of the long story told
above, they just murmur at the moment.
Because they know, like my friend in Diyarbak?r, that their sacrifices
are not enough to secure an intervening position in this case. To be
right, you must be a liberal.
Me? I am just reading more and more about colour revolutions, which
make me feel less lonely.
Ece Temelkuran is the most-read female political columnist in Turkey,
writing regularly for Milliyet, with a well deserved reputation for
fearlessness and verve. She also hosts a widely view political show in
Turkish tv. Her latest book, The Deep Mountain, based on interviews
with Armenians in Armenia, France and the U.S. and published in
Istanbul in May 2008, is currently being translated into English. She
has published widely and won numerous awards for her work, including
the Pen for Peace Award, and Turkish Journalist of the Year. She
is the author of several books, including, "What Is There For Me To
Say!" on the hunger strikes by political prisoners in Turkey, and "We
are Making A Revolution Here Senorita!" on the politics and every-day
life in Chavez's Venezuela. She can be reached at [email protected]
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