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WPS Agency, Russia
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
December 12, 2008 Friday
PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE AND DOUBLE MEANING;
Who is prepared to ruin peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem?
by Vladimir Kazimirov
BAKU RESORTED TO THREATS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF KARABAKH BY SHEER
STRENGTH OF ARMS; Azerbaijan does not appear to be too hot on finally
finding a solution to the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Addressing the parties involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at
the conference of OSCE foreign ministers that ended in Helsinki on
December 5, chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group (Russia, United States,
France) urged them to reiterate allegiance to a peaceful solution.
What was that? The heads of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia had signed
the Moscow Declaration on November 2. Why would the OSCE Minsk Group
repeat the call?
August events in the Caucasus generated second thoughts in the
capitals that had often threatened to solve the problem of Karabakh by
sheer strength of arms. Signature on the Moscow Declaration stifled
aggressive rhetorics from Baku but not for long. President Ilham
Aliyev told Italian television in late November that the Moscow
Declaration did not detract from "Baku's right to settle the conflict
by military means." "There is nothing about the Moscow Declaration
that might be interpreted as commitment to refrain from the military
solution," Aliyev said.
Great interpretation of an international document and one's own
signature on it! In other words, one is free to declare anything and
do something altogether different all the same. How can peaceful
settlement of a conflict fail to rule out a military solution? How can
an "explanation" such as this and appropriate course of action be
expected to promote improvement of the situation, security and
stability, not to mention measures of trust?
Moreover, a lot of Baku's arguments are anything but unarguable. That
Nagorno-Karabakh has been the focal point of the whole conflict is
beyond doubt. It is difficult if possible at all to chalk everything
off to "Armenian aggression" in the late 20th century because there is
considerably more to the conflict that this. It is quite
understandable that Baku refuses to put up with occupation of seven
Azerbaijani districts but some of the blame for it rests with the
Azerbaijanis themselves. Had Azerbaijan been less persistent in its
efforts to avoid a cease-fire and truce in 1992-1994, it would have
been safe and whole now.
It is wrong to interpret the right to self-defense in so cavalier a
manner. It is Baku's threats and its unwillingness to facilitate
security of Nagorno-Karabakh that enable the Armenians to put off
withdrawal from the seized territories. The Azerbaijanis and Armenians
should cast aside the age-old confrontation and enmity. Another
bloodshed is the last thing they need. The Moscow Declaration offered
a solution but requires sincerity from the warring sides. The document
is about there being no alternatives to a political settlement of the
conflict.
Source: Vremya Novostei, December 9, 2008, p. 5
Translated by Aleksei Ignatkin
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
December 12, 2008 Friday
PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE AND DOUBLE MEANING;
Who is prepared to ruin peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem?
by Vladimir Kazimirov
BAKU RESORTED TO THREATS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF KARABAKH BY SHEER
STRENGTH OF ARMS; Azerbaijan does not appear to be too hot on finally
finding a solution to the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Addressing the parties involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at
the conference of OSCE foreign ministers that ended in Helsinki on
December 5, chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group (Russia, United States,
France) urged them to reiterate allegiance to a peaceful solution.
What was that? The heads of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia had signed
the Moscow Declaration on November 2. Why would the OSCE Minsk Group
repeat the call?
August events in the Caucasus generated second thoughts in the
capitals that had often threatened to solve the problem of Karabakh by
sheer strength of arms. Signature on the Moscow Declaration stifled
aggressive rhetorics from Baku but not for long. President Ilham
Aliyev told Italian television in late November that the Moscow
Declaration did not detract from "Baku's right to settle the conflict
by military means." "There is nothing about the Moscow Declaration
that might be interpreted as commitment to refrain from the military
solution," Aliyev said.
Great interpretation of an international document and one's own
signature on it! In other words, one is free to declare anything and
do something altogether different all the same. How can peaceful
settlement of a conflict fail to rule out a military solution? How can
an "explanation" such as this and appropriate course of action be
expected to promote improvement of the situation, security and
stability, not to mention measures of trust?
Moreover, a lot of Baku's arguments are anything but unarguable. That
Nagorno-Karabakh has been the focal point of the whole conflict is
beyond doubt. It is difficult if possible at all to chalk everything
off to "Armenian aggression" in the late 20th century because there is
considerably more to the conflict that this. It is quite
understandable that Baku refuses to put up with occupation of seven
Azerbaijani districts but some of the blame for it rests with the
Azerbaijanis themselves. Had Azerbaijan been less persistent in its
efforts to avoid a cease-fire and truce in 1992-1994, it would have
been safe and whole now.
It is wrong to interpret the right to self-defense in so cavalier a
manner. It is Baku's threats and its unwillingness to facilitate
security of Nagorno-Karabakh that enable the Armenians to put off
withdrawal from the seized territories. The Azerbaijanis and Armenians
should cast aside the age-old confrontation and enmity. Another
bloodshed is the last thing they need. The Moscow Declaration offered
a solution but requires sincerity from the warring sides. The document
is about there being no alternatives to a political settlement of the
conflict.
Source: Vremya Novostei, December 9, 2008, p. 5
Translated by Aleksei Ignatkin