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Georgiandaily, NY
Dec 20 2008
RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC CHALLENGES IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: AZERBAIJAN MOVES
CENTER STAGE
December 20, 2008
By Roger N. McDermott
Russia has emerged from the war with Georgia in August 2008 with
considerable long term strategic challenges, both within the South
Caucasus and in its dealings with the United States.
Whilst Moscow indulges in self congratulation over the failure of
Georgia and Ukraine to secure a timetable for NATO membership,
believing it has gained a victory over a divided and weakened Alliance
and President Dmitry Medvedev expresses his hope that the new Obama
administration in Washington will presage compromise over missile
defence, Russia will face growing problems in reconciling its
self-generated image of resurgence with economic downturn and lack of
support from close allies in the CIS.
BACKGROUND:
Moscow's wider diplomatic efforts in the South Caucasus have yielded
mixed results. The declaration on the Nagorno-Karabakh resolution
which was signed by the Azerbaijani, Armenian and Russian presidents
on November 2 urges a political solution to the conflict. In Moscow,
this was portrayed as a diplomatic triumph partly connected with its
victory in August and its newfound penchant to promote peaceful
conflict resolution. Amongst its neighbours in the South Caucasus,
these views are less credible. Azerbaijani President Aliyev, for
instance, according to Azad Azarbaycan TV believes the document showed
that the conflicting parties are Armenia and Azerbaijan: an important
concession, since Yerevan has maintained that it is an issue between
Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.
Moreover, interviewed on Italy's Rai International TV channel on
November 27, Aliyev said that despite the Moscow agreement, Azerbaijan
reserves the right to resolve the dispute by force, if necessary. `No
one can find in that (Azerbaijani-Armenian-Russian) declaration a
commitment by Azerbaijan to refrain from a military option (of
resolving the conflict). The fact that it says that we think a
political settlement must be in place does not mean that we refuse our
fundamental rights,' Aliyev explained. In fact, he used the
opportunity to highlight the fragility of peace in the South Caucasus,
which had been underscored as a result of the war in Georgia last
August, though he expressed his preference to see a political
solution, questioning the international community's intentions or
interest in this. `Armenia has been violating the Azerbaijani people's
fundamental rights for over two decades and nothing is happening. We
hope that attention to the issue will increase, especially after the
latest developments in the Caucasus which showed how fragile peace
is,' Aliyev said. Despite Russian protestations otherwise, the South
Caucasus is no less volatile after the Georgia conflict.
The transit of military cargoes to Armenia, which has used Georgian
territory to do this since 1994, has been made more complex in the
aftermath of the August conflict. This not only has implications for
the transit of Russian military hardware and supplies for Russia's
base in Armenia, since Georgia will not permit this to occur using its
territory, it also affects Yerevan's procurement options. For example,
should Armenia purchase tanks from Ukraine, these would now be subject
to Armenia-Georgia bilateral cooperation, as the tanks would be
shipped to the Georgian port of Poti and then by rail to Armenia. In
this sense, Russia has inadvertently boosted the strategic importance
of Georgia within the region. The alternative supply route is through
Azerbaijan, but this is subject to longer term fluctuations, and of
course Baku can monitor the exact nature of all Russian military
cargoes to the base in Armenia. This will remain problematic for
Russia's MoD.
IMPLICATIONS:
In late November, Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry raised serious
reservations over a recent bilateral defence cooperation agreement
reached between Armenia and Georgia. The terms of that agreement
appear to give Armenia transit rights through Georgia's territory for
non-Russian military cargo. Additionally, the agreement foresees
Armenia sending its tanks for maintenance to the Tbilisi tank repair
facility, something Baku considers could be a potential security
concern for Azerbaijan. While this situation remained unresolved,
Tbilisi, buoyed by the reaffirmation of NATOs support for its eventual
membership of the Alliance in the aftermath of the NATO foreign
ministers' meeting in Brussels 2-3 December 2008, carried out a
government reshuffle designed to bring more experienced politicians
into the Georgian government. Baku has also stressed its strategic
partnership with Tbilisi as a way of ensuring a favourable resolution
of concerns over the Armenia-Georgia defence cooperation
agreement. Tbilisi, on the other hand, has positioned itself well to
raise its own objections about Azerbaijani territory being used as a
transit route for Russian military cargo at a time when Russia is an
occupying power on Georgian territory. Moscow has limited leverage in
these issues.
Similarly, NATO's role may be changing in the South Caucasus, but it
has hardly relinquished its interests as the Kremlin would like to see
happen. Turkey's embassy in Baku organized meetings at NATO
headquarters on November 17-18 2008, attended by delegations from
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Although a wide range of issues were
discussed, the central focus was how to improve the delivery of NATOs
Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP). This presaged the mooting
of the idea at the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in December to
develop annual action plans, rather than concentrating on the more
controversial Membership Action Plans (MAP), which were denied to
Georgia and Ukraine. Moscow, contrary to the statements made by its
political leadership on the issue of NATO `backing down' on the MAP
issue for Georgia and Ukraine, is in reality powerless to prevent the
Alliance from developing more targeted and systemic assistance for its
partners in the South Caucasus.
Azerbaijan's first phase of IPAP, endorsed in April 2005, was
completed in January 2008. Since April 2008, talks have centered on
moving the second phase IPAP beyond its current draft stage. NATO
would like to have the new IPAP agreement with Baku published in full
in order to promote transparency and defuse unnecessary speculation on
Alliance assistance to Azerbaijan's armed forces. NATO wants to
further support the transformation of the Azerbaijani military
education system and strengthen the professionalism of sergeants
amongst other tasks in order to help promote bringing military
training and standards into line with NATO standards.
NATO has pressed for the formation of a joint headquarters in
Azerbaijan's military structures, which Baku has agreed to implement
by late 2009 or early 2010. These advances combined with an undoubted
interest in further modifying IPAP to suit its needs, suggest that
Baku is open to closer cooperation with the Alliance. Baku needs
assistance in strengthening these aspects of its armed forces, which
NATO members are able to provide. NATO is encountering an appetite for
`graduated relations' with the Alliance amongst its partners in the
South Caucasus.
CONCLUSIONS:
Russia is subject to the impact of the global financial crisis,
shoring up the ruble, flight of foreign capital since the war in
August, and faces the prospect of a continued slide of world oil
prices. It has committed to building new military bases in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia which will be expensive and an additional security
and financial drain on the Russian state. Equally, its recognition of
the `independence' of the two breakaway regions in Georgia has not
elicited any support from its CIS neighbors. NATO's cooperation with
Azerbaijan and Georgia ` far from being minimized ` is likely to
witness deeper assistance individually tailored to the host country
needs and promoting defense and security sector reform, while
stimulating further Euro-Atlantic integration. Russian power, after
the war in Georgia, may be more illusory than real.
AUTHORS' BIO: Roger N McDermott is a an Honorary Senior Research
Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University
of Kent at Canterbury (UK) and Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military
Studies, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC. He specializes in the
militaries and security issues in Russia, Central Asia and the South
Caucasus.
URL: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5002
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_con tent&task=view&id`04&Itemid=132
Dec 20 2008
RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC CHALLENGES IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: AZERBAIJAN MOVES
CENTER STAGE
December 20, 2008
By Roger N. McDermott
Russia has emerged from the war with Georgia in August 2008 with
considerable long term strategic challenges, both within the South
Caucasus and in its dealings with the United States.
Whilst Moscow indulges in self congratulation over the failure of
Georgia and Ukraine to secure a timetable for NATO membership,
believing it has gained a victory over a divided and weakened Alliance
and President Dmitry Medvedev expresses his hope that the new Obama
administration in Washington will presage compromise over missile
defence, Russia will face growing problems in reconciling its
self-generated image of resurgence with economic downturn and lack of
support from close allies in the CIS.
BACKGROUND:
Moscow's wider diplomatic efforts in the South Caucasus have yielded
mixed results. The declaration on the Nagorno-Karabakh resolution
which was signed by the Azerbaijani, Armenian and Russian presidents
on November 2 urges a political solution to the conflict. In Moscow,
this was portrayed as a diplomatic triumph partly connected with its
victory in August and its newfound penchant to promote peaceful
conflict resolution. Amongst its neighbours in the South Caucasus,
these views are less credible. Azerbaijani President Aliyev, for
instance, according to Azad Azarbaycan TV believes the document showed
that the conflicting parties are Armenia and Azerbaijan: an important
concession, since Yerevan has maintained that it is an issue between
Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.
Moreover, interviewed on Italy's Rai International TV channel on
November 27, Aliyev said that despite the Moscow agreement, Azerbaijan
reserves the right to resolve the dispute by force, if necessary. `No
one can find in that (Azerbaijani-Armenian-Russian) declaration a
commitment by Azerbaijan to refrain from a military option (of
resolving the conflict). The fact that it says that we think a
political settlement must be in place does not mean that we refuse our
fundamental rights,' Aliyev explained. In fact, he used the
opportunity to highlight the fragility of peace in the South Caucasus,
which had been underscored as a result of the war in Georgia last
August, though he expressed his preference to see a political
solution, questioning the international community's intentions or
interest in this. `Armenia has been violating the Azerbaijani people's
fundamental rights for over two decades and nothing is happening. We
hope that attention to the issue will increase, especially after the
latest developments in the Caucasus which showed how fragile peace
is,' Aliyev said. Despite Russian protestations otherwise, the South
Caucasus is no less volatile after the Georgia conflict.
The transit of military cargoes to Armenia, which has used Georgian
territory to do this since 1994, has been made more complex in the
aftermath of the August conflict. This not only has implications for
the transit of Russian military hardware and supplies for Russia's
base in Armenia, since Georgia will not permit this to occur using its
territory, it also affects Yerevan's procurement options. For example,
should Armenia purchase tanks from Ukraine, these would now be subject
to Armenia-Georgia bilateral cooperation, as the tanks would be
shipped to the Georgian port of Poti and then by rail to Armenia. In
this sense, Russia has inadvertently boosted the strategic importance
of Georgia within the region. The alternative supply route is through
Azerbaijan, but this is subject to longer term fluctuations, and of
course Baku can monitor the exact nature of all Russian military
cargoes to the base in Armenia. This will remain problematic for
Russia's MoD.
IMPLICATIONS:
In late November, Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry raised serious
reservations over a recent bilateral defence cooperation agreement
reached between Armenia and Georgia. The terms of that agreement
appear to give Armenia transit rights through Georgia's territory for
non-Russian military cargo. Additionally, the agreement foresees
Armenia sending its tanks for maintenance to the Tbilisi tank repair
facility, something Baku considers could be a potential security
concern for Azerbaijan. While this situation remained unresolved,
Tbilisi, buoyed by the reaffirmation of NATOs support for its eventual
membership of the Alliance in the aftermath of the NATO foreign
ministers' meeting in Brussels 2-3 December 2008, carried out a
government reshuffle designed to bring more experienced politicians
into the Georgian government. Baku has also stressed its strategic
partnership with Tbilisi as a way of ensuring a favourable resolution
of concerns over the Armenia-Georgia defence cooperation
agreement. Tbilisi, on the other hand, has positioned itself well to
raise its own objections about Azerbaijani territory being used as a
transit route for Russian military cargo at a time when Russia is an
occupying power on Georgian territory. Moscow has limited leverage in
these issues.
Similarly, NATO's role may be changing in the South Caucasus, but it
has hardly relinquished its interests as the Kremlin would like to see
happen. Turkey's embassy in Baku organized meetings at NATO
headquarters on November 17-18 2008, attended by delegations from
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Although a wide range of issues were
discussed, the central focus was how to improve the delivery of NATOs
Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP). This presaged the mooting
of the idea at the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in December to
develop annual action plans, rather than concentrating on the more
controversial Membership Action Plans (MAP), which were denied to
Georgia and Ukraine. Moscow, contrary to the statements made by its
political leadership on the issue of NATO `backing down' on the MAP
issue for Georgia and Ukraine, is in reality powerless to prevent the
Alliance from developing more targeted and systemic assistance for its
partners in the South Caucasus.
Azerbaijan's first phase of IPAP, endorsed in April 2005, was
completed in January 2008. Since April 2008, talks have centered on
moving the second phase IPAP beyond its current draft stage. NATO
would like to have the new IPAP agreement with Baku published in full
in order to promote transparency and defuse unnecessary speculation on
Alliance assistance to Azerbaijan's armed forces. NATO wants to
further support the transformation of the Azerbaijani military
education system and strengthen the professionalism of sergeants
amongst other tasks in order to help promote bringing military
training and standards into line with NATO standards.
NATO has pressed for the formation of a joint headquarters in
Azerbaijan's military structures, which Baku has agreed to implement
by late 2009 or early 2010. These advances combined with an undoubted
interest in further modifying IPAP to suit its needs, suggest that
Baku is open to closer cooperation with the Alliance. Baku needs
assistance in strengthening these aspects of its armed forces, which
NATO members are able to provide. NATO is encountering an appetite for
`graduated relations' with the Alliance amongst its partners in the
South Caucasus.
CONCLUSIONS:
Russia is subject to the impact of the global financial crisis,
shoring up the ruble, flight of foreign capital since the war in
August, and faces the prospect of a continued slide of world oil
prices. It has committed to building new military bases in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia which will be expensive and an additional security
and financial drain on the Russian state. Equally, its recognition of
the `independence' of the two breakaway regions in Georgia has not
elicited any support from its CIS neighbors. NATO's cooperation with
Azerbaijan and Georgia ` far from being minimized ` is likely to
witness deeper assistance individually tailored to the host country
needs and promoting defense and security sector reform, while
stimulating further Euro-Atlantic integration. Russian power, after
the war in Georgia, may be more illusory than real.
AUTHORS' BIO: Roger N McDermott is a an Honorary Senior Research
Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University
of Kent at Canterbury (UK) and Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military
Studies, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC. He specializes in the
militaries and security issues in Russia, Central Asia and the South
Caucasus.
URL: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5002
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_con tent&task=view&id`04&Itemid=132