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BalkanInsight.com, Serbia
Feb 18 2008
Kosovo Recognition Tests Putin's Resolve
18 February 2008
As Western states recognise the breakaway Balkan province, Russia
faces hard choices in the Caucasus.
By Thomas de Waal in London
Until recently, the assumption was that Russia would be the main
diplomatic winner from events in Kosovo. Now that independence has
actually been proclaimed, this prediction will be tested, as Moscow
has to decide how confrontational it wants to be towards Kosovo's
friends.
Russia's intransigence over Kosovo's independence has already exposed
splits in the European Union and forced some Western countries to
move towards recognition of the new state without UN backing.
President Vladimir Putin has also proved more far-sighted than his
Western counterparts in predicting that Kosovo's independence
declaration would have repercussions for other separatist disputes
while politicians in Washington or Brussels were insisting in a
legalistic fashion that `Kosovo does not set a precedent'.
Recognition of Kosovo's independence does change the situation
elsewhere, whether Westerners like it or not. Consider the
calculations that Sergei Bagapsh, de facto leader of Abkhazia, or
Bako Sahakian, his counterpart in Nagorny Karabakh, will now make.
Even if they were considering this option seriously - and they are
not - it will now be harder for them to tell their respective publics
that they were even considering a deal with the governments of
Georgia or Azerbaijan on the re-integration of their territories into
those two states. The natural response from the public will be: `Look
what the Kosovars got. We won't settle for less.'
In his final press conference as Russia's President on February 14,
Putin pressed home this point. `We are told all the time: Kosovo is a
special case,' Putin said. `It is all lies. There is no special case
and everybody understands it perfectly well.'
Putin then mentioned several other separatist disputes concerning
Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria, laying
down a marker that the latter three - all fiercely pro-Moscow -
should not expect Russian recognition of their unilaterally declared
independence.
`We have to work out a common policy to settle these questions,'
Putin added. `We are not pushing the situation into deadlock. We are
proposing that our partners elaborate common rules of conduct. Why do
we have to incite separatism?'
Abkhazia, the largest of these territories, with a population of
about a quarter of a million, it is still missing the vast majority
of ethnic Georgians who fled or were expelled in the 1992-3 war. It
formally declared independence in 1999 and possesses fairly viable
institutions, including a presidency, parliament, media and NGOs. It
is closely integrated with Russia though its current leader, Bagapsh,
has clashed with Moscow in the past.
But recognition of Abkhazia, or of South Ossetia, would pit Russia
into an all-out confrontation with Georgia, which has powerful
friends in the West. It would also mean taking charge of the full
security of the two tiny Caucasian regions indefinitely.
Until now, the threat to recognize has been a more effective card for
Russia than recognition itself. But the longer that Russia declines
to play the card, the more it will alienate opinion in Abkhazia.
Russia will, therefore, offer the territories other forms of support.
But in Abkhazia in particular the impression is growing that Russia
is playing with them like pawns.
Notably, in his press conference, Putin also failed to mention two
other separatist territories in the Caucasus. One is Nagorny
Karabakh, the Armenian territory that broke away from Azerbaijan in
the early Nineties. The Russian president's silence on that conflict
reflects the fact that Russia is supposed to be a neutral mediator in
this dispute and values good relations with Azerbaijan.
The other is Chechnya, which has twice declared independence from
Moscow and where Putin himself crushed the separatist movement at the
cost of tens of thousands of lives.
Chechnya has seemingly been pacified, though at the cost of giving
the nationalist pro-Moscow Chechen government a free writ to do as it
likes. Chechens are war-weary and separatism is probably now the last
thing on their minds. But the issue is not buried forever and
pro-independence Chechens will be watching Moscow's behaviour towards
Abkhazia or South Ossetia.
On the wider front, Russia's diplomatic options over Kosovo are
limited. As Russia has a UN Security Council veto, Western countries
have avoided making UN endorsement a pre-requisite for recognising
Kosovo. Putin has already taken a very tough line with the West on
issues ranging from anti-missile defence to the British Council, so
it is hard to see Moscow further escalating matters.
The Russians already have a close relationship with Belgrade and have
negotiated to make Serbia a client of Russian gas, so there are no
new friends to be made there.
The other constraining factor is that Russia is in the middle of a
handover. On March 2, Dmitry Medvedev, Putin's hand-picked successor,
is due to be elected President. Medvedev is unlikely to pick major
foreign-policy fights in the early days of his presidency, when his
first priority will be asserting his authority at home.
`Medvedev nowadays is a hostage of Putin's aggressive style,' said
Sergei Markedonov, a Moscow political analyst. `Putin doesn't need to
demonstrate his will and ability to defend Russian interests.
Medvedev, especially after the presidential elections, will have to
prove that he's strong, too ... which is why it's possible he will
display anti-Western sentiments. But this does not constitute a
strategy.'
Markedonov predicted that Medevev would probably try to avoid open
confrontation over the Balkans or the Caucasus and continue Putin's
current policy. In other words, while Russia will claim the moral
high ground over Kosovo, it is also likely to be content to assert
its superiority with words rather than actions.
Thomas de Waal is Caucasus Editor at IWPR, the Institute for War and
Peace Reporting. Balkan Insight is BIRN's online publication.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Feb 18 2008
Kosovo Recognition Tests Putin's Resolve
18 February 2008
As Western states recognise the breakaway Balkan province, Russia
faces hard choices in the Caucasus.
By Thomas de Waal in London
Until recently, the assumption was that Russia would be the main
diplomatic winner from events in Kosovo. Now that independence has
actually been proclaimed, this prediction will be tested, as Moscow
has to decide how confrontational it wants to be towards Kosovo's
friends.
Russia's intransigence over Kosovo's independence has already exposed
splits in the European Union and forced some Western countries to
move towards recognition of the new state without UN backing.
President Vladimir Putin has also proved more far-sighted than his
Western counterparts in predicting that Kosovo's independence
declaration would have repercussions for other separatist disputes
while politicians in Washington or Brussels were insisting in a
legalistic fashion that `Kosovo does not set a precedent'.
Recognition of Kosovo's independence does change the situation
elsewhere, whether Westerners like it or not. Consider the
calculations that Sergei Bagapsh, de facto leader of Abkhazia, or
Bako Sahakian, his counterpart in Nagorny Karabakh, will now make.
Even if they were considering this option seriously - and they are
not - it will now be harder for them to tell their respective publics
that they were even considering a deal with the governments of
Georgia or Azerbaijan on the re-integration of their territories into
those two states. The natural response from the public will be: `Look
what the Kosovars got. We won't settle for less.'
In his final press conference as Russia's President on February 14,
Putin pressed home this point. `We are told all the time: Kosovo is a
special case,' Putin said. `It is all lies. There is no special case
and everybody understands it perfectly well.'
Putin then mentioned several other separatist disputes concerning
Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria, laying
down a marker that the latter three - all fiercely pro-Moscow -
should not expect Russian recognition of their unilaterally declared
independence.
`We have to work out a common policy to settle these questions,'
Putin added. `We are not pushing the situation into deadlock. We are
proposing that our partners elaborate common rules of conduct. Why do
we have to incite separatism?'
Abkhazia, the largest of these territories, with a population of
about a quarter of a million, it is still missing the vast majority
of ethnic Georgians who fled or were expelled in the 1992-3 war. It
formally declared independence in 1999 and possesses fairly viable
institutions, including a presidency, parliament, media and NGOs. It
is closely integrated with Russia though its current leader, Bagapsh,
has clashed with Moscow in the past.
But recognition of Abkhazia, or of South Ossetia, would pit Russia
into an all-out confrontation with Georgia, which has powerful
friends in the West. It would also mean taking charge of the full
security of the two tiny Caucasian regions indefinitely.
Until now, the threat to recognize has been a more effective card for
Russia than recognition itself. But the longer that Russia declines
to play the card, the more it will alienate opinion in Abkhazia.
Russia will, therefore, offer the territories other forms of support.
But in Abkhazia in particular the impression is growing that Russia
is playing with them like pawns.
Notably, in his press conference, Putin also failed to mention two
other separatist territories in the Caucasus. One is Nagorny
Karabakh, the Armenian territory that broke away from Azerbaijan in
the early Nineties. The Russian president's silence on that conflict
reflects the fact that Russia is supposed to be a neutral mediator in
this dispute and values good relations with Azerbaijan.
The other is Chechnya, which has twice declared independence from
Moscow and where Putin himself crushed the separatist movement at the
cost of tens of thousands of lives.
Chechnya has seemingly been pacified, though at the cost of giving
the nationalist pro-Moscow Chechen government a free writ to do as it
likes. Chechens are war-weary and separatism is probably now the last
thing on their minds. But the issue is not buried forever and
pro-independence Chechens will be watching Moscow's behaviour towards
Abkhazia or South Ossetia.
On the wider front, Russia's diplomatic options over Kosovo are
limited. As Russia has a UN Security Council veto, Western countries
have avoided making UN endorsement a pre-requisite for recognising
Kosovo. Putin has already taken a very tough line with the West on
issues ranging from anti-missile defence to the British Council, so
it is hard to see Moscow further escalating matters.
The Russians already have a close relationship with Belgrade and have
negotiated to make Serbia a client of Russian gas, so there are no
new friends to be made there.
The other constraining factor is that Russia is in the middle of a
handover. On March 2, Dmitry Medvedev, Putin's hand-picked successor,
is due to be elected President. Medvedev is unlikely to pick major
foreign-policy fights in the early days of his presidency, when his
first priority will be asserting his authority at home.
`Medvedev nowadays is a hostage of Putin's aggressive style,' said
Sergei Markedonov, a Moscow political analyst. `Putin doesn't need to
demonstrate his will and ability to defend Russian interests.
Medvedev, especially after the presidential elections, will have to
prove that he's strong, too ... which is why it's possible he will
display anti-Western sentiments. But this does not constitute a
strategy.'
Markedonov predicted that Medevev would probably try to avoid open
confrontation over the Balkans or the Caucasus and continue Putin's
current policy. In other words, while Russia will claim the moral
high ground over Kosovo, it is also likely to be content to assert
its superiority with words rather than actions.
Thomas de Waal is Caucasus Editor at IWPR, the Institute for War and
Peace Reporting. Balkan Insight is BIRN's online publication.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress