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KOSOVAR INDEPENDENCE RECOGNIZED, RUSSIA'S BLUFF CALLED IN ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA
by Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor -- The Jamestown Foundation
February 19, 2008 -- Volume 5, Issue 31
On February 17 Kosova declared officially its independence from
Serbia. On February 18 the United States and several major European
countries recognized Kosova as an independent state. More than 20
(out of 27) European Union member countries are prepared to extend
recognition.
Russia anticipated this outcome some weeks, if not months, ahead of
its occurrence. By the end of 2007 Moscow had started backtracking on
its retaliatory threats to recognize the "independence" of post-Soviet
secessionist territories. It had to backtrack, lest its warnings be
exposed as the bluff they were.
Moscow's threat to use Kosova's secession as a "precedent" or "model"
for resolving post-Soviet conflicts was never a credible threat, unless
the Kremlin was bent on incurring severe damage and no gain to its
policies on a wide range of interests: Relations with the West, with
CIS countries (far beyond those immediately affected by secessions)
and with international organizations, as well as Russia's own security
situation in the North Caucasus would have been severely jeopardized.
Those anxious about Russian exploitation of a Kosova "precedent"
overlooked the fact that Moscow remains more than content to exploit
the existing, "frozen" situation in the unresolved conflicts. This
it can continue doing effectively and at low cost to itself, as long
as the West does not prioritize the resolution of the post-Soviet
conflicts.
Indications are now multiplying that Moscow has blinked on its most
specific threat: that to "recognize the independence" of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Russia had singled out these two Georgian territories as
prime candidates for "recognition." This line of attack contradicted
Moscow's own claim that resolution of all secessionist conflicts
in Europe and the world must follow a "common model" or "single
standard." In practice, its blatant selectivity about Abkhazia and
South Ossetia reflected Moscow's special enmity toward Georgia, the
immediate territorial proximity (whereas Karabakh and Transnistria
are not contiguous to Russia), and the Russian policy of allowing
Armenia de facto a free hand in Karabakh, while Moscow claims de
facto a free hand in the two Georgian territories.
Largely for those reasons, Moscow had conferred Russian citizenship
en masse in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, so as to claim a right of
intrusive protection there, including military presence. At the
same time it left the issues of citizenship and security protection
in Karabakh up to Armenia. And it has been negotiating with Moldova
since 2006 regarding a settlement that would leave Transnistria within
Moldova, in return for a certain measure of Russian political and
military oversight over a Moldovan state "reunified" in that way.
These highly differentiated, expediency-based approaches nullified
from the outset Russia's argument about a "Kosovo precedent" with
general applicability. Had it applied such a "precedent" unilaterally
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Kremlin would have been exposed
as singularizing Georgia and targeting it for a wanton act of
aggression. With Russian troops and Russian-appointed local leaders
already deployed in those two enclaves, any Russian "recognition"
would have been seen worldwide as open military occupation and
annexation. Moscow did not need to risk such a scenario, since the
existing unresolved situation suits Russian purposes too well.
As Kosova's declaration of independence and Western recognition drew
near, Moscow must have concluded that its threats against Georgia
were unusable threats. Consequently, Moscow seems to be seeking a
face-saving exit from a political impasse into which it has driven
itself. Suddenly the Kremlin is downplaying its all-to-recent,
dire warnings.
In his annual news conference (the final one of his presidency)
on February 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin denounced Western
intentions to recognize Kosova as "unlawful," and the argument
about Kosova's uniqueness as (Western) "lies." But Putin went on to
declare that Russia would not let itself be provoked into similar
"unlawful" actions: "What will we do if they start recognizing
Kosovo's independence unilaterally? We are not going to play the
fool. If someone takes a bad decision it does not mean that we should
act in the same way. I repeat, we will not play the fool by doing
the same thing, acting as if this [Russian recognition of post-Soviet
secessions] is a necessary consequence" (Interfax, February 14).
On February 15, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov received
the Abkhaz and South Ossetian de facto leaders, Sergei Bagapsh and
Eduard Kokoiti, in Moscow. The Russian communiqués referred to them
as "presidents," by the usage adopted several years ago. Lavrov,
as well as accompanying statements by the Russian MFA, merely said
that Russia, in light of Kosova, would "reconsider" (peresmotrit)
its policy regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Further on the vague
tone, Russia would "undoubtedly take [Kosova] into account in Russia's
relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia" (Interfax, February 15,
16). Thus Putin's, Lavrov's, and other Russian MFA statements were
worded so as to stop short of repeating previous warnings about
recognizing those two secessions.
On February 18, Russia's Duma and Federation Council released a joint
statement condemning the Western recognition of Kosova, but stopping
short of warnings about "recognition" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The Russian parliament had in recent years adopted a series of
resolutions that contained such warnings. Sukhumi and Tskhinvali
hoped for more of the same, more than ever now; but they were
disappointed. Moreover, the joint statement was adopted quietly by
the two chambers' Councils (leaderships), not the plenums, and without
any of the customary fanfare.
At the moment, Moscow wants the Kosova issue returned to the UN
Security Council, ostensibly in order to reverse Kosova's independence
and halt its recognition (Interfax, February 15, 16).
Such resort to the UNSC also signifies the beginning of a face-saving
retreat from the previous show of intransigence. Referring this
issue to the UNSC at this point is tantamount to burying it in that
veto-bound forum, without openly acknowledging defeat. With this move,
Moscow plays to Greater Serbian nationalism, but has no hope to change
the situation on the ground.
The CIS summit, scheduled for February 21 in Moscow, should further
restrain Russian rhetoric about Abkhazia and South Ossetia. No CIS
country ever associated itself with Russian threats to recognize the
secession of those two Georgian territories. Should Putin revert to
such threats, he might at best find himself in the company of Belarus
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka (though even this does not seem very
likely). Even Armenia would not risk its relations with Georgia by
endorsing such Russian threats against Armenia's neighbor country and
lifeline to the world. Azerbaijan and Moldova, which face secessions
and military occupations of their territories, would condemn any
Russian "recognition" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It would also
be condemned by Ukraine and Kazakhstan, both of which reckon with
possible Russian exploitation of ethnic issues on their territories.
Moscow's two-year old bluff has been called in Kosova. While Russian
policy remains unpredictable (particularly during the presidential
transition in the Kremlin), any Russian leverage through the threat
of recognizing the post-Soviet secessions seems to have run out.
--Vladimir Socor
--Boundary_(ID_YNdg/IWVU0jvN5GrBGbnWQ)--
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
by Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor -- The Jamestown Foundation
February 19, 2008 -- Volume 5, Issue 31
On February 17 Kosova declared officially its independence from
Serbia. On February 18 the United States and several major European
countries recognized Kosova as an independent state. More than 20
(out of 27) European Union member countries are prepared to extend
recognition.
Russia anticipated this outcome some weeks, if not months, ahead of
its occurrence. By the end of 2007 Moscow had started backtracking on
its retaliatory threats to recognize the "independence" of post-Soviet
secessionist territories. It had to backtrack, lest its warnings be
exposed as the bluff they were.
Moscow's threat to use Kosova's secession as a "precedent" or "model"
for resolving post-Soviet conflicts was never a credible threat, unless
the Kremlin was bent on incurring severe damage and no gain to its
policies on a wide range of interests: Relations with the West, with
CIS countries (far beyond those immediately affected by secessions)
and with international organizations, as well as Russia's own security
situation in the North Caucasus would have been severely jeopardized.
Those anxious about Russian exploitation of a Kosova "precedent"
overlooked the fact that Moscow remains more than content to exploit
the existing, "frozen" situation in the unresolved conflicts. This
it can continue doing effectively and at low cost to itself, as long
as the West does not prioritize the resolution of the post-Soviet
conflicts.
Indications are now multiplying that Moscow has blinked on its most
specific threat: that to "recognize the independence" of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Russia had singled out these two Georgian territories as
prime candidates for "recognition." This line of attack contradicted
Moscow's own claim that resolution of all secessionist conflicts
in Europe and the world must follow a "common model" or "single
standard." In practice, its blatant selectivity about Abkhazia and
South Ossetia reflected Moscow's special enmity toward Georgia, the
immediate territorial proximity (whereas Karabakh and Transnistria
are not contiguous to Russia), and the Russian policy of allowing
Armenia de facto a free hand in Karabakh, while Moscow claims de
facto a free hand in the two Georgian territories.
Largely for those reasons, Moscow had conferred Russian citizenship
en masse in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, so as to claim a right of
intrusive protection there, including military presence. At the
same time it left the issues of citizenship and security protection
in Karabakh up to Armenia. And it has been negotiating with Moldova
since 2006 regarding a settlement that would leave Transnistria within
Moldova, in return for a certain measure of Russian political and
military oversight over a Moldovan state "reunified" in that way.
These highly differentiated, expediency-based approaches nullified
from the outset Russia's argument about a "Kosovo precedent" with
general applicability. Had it applied such a "precedent" unilaterally
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Kremlin would have been exposed
as singularizing Georgia and targeting it for a wanton act of
aggression. With Russian troops and Russian-appointed local leaders
already deployed in those two enclaves, any Russian "recognition"
would have been seen worldwide as open military occupation and
annexation. Moscow did not need to risk such a scenario, since the
existing unresolved situation suits Russian purposes too well.
As Kosova's declaration of independence and Western recognition drew
near, Moscow must have concluded that its threats against Georgia
were unusable threats. Consequently, Moscow seems to be seeking a
face-saving exit from a political impasse into which it has driven
itself. Suddenly the Kremlin is downplaying its all-to-recent,
dire warnings.
In his annual news conference (the final one of his presidency)
on February 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin denounced Western
intentions to recognize Kosova as "unlawful," and the argument
about Kosova's uniqueness as (Western) "lies." But Putin went on to
declare that Russia would not let itself be provoked into similar
"unlawful" actions: "What will we do if they start recognizing
Kosovo's independence unilaterally? We are not going to play the
fool. If someone takes a bad decision it does not mean that we should
act in the same way. I repeat, we will not play the fool by doing
the same thing, acting as if this [Russian recognition of post-Soviet
secessions] is a necessary consequence" (Interfax, February 14).
On February 15, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov received
the Abkhaz and South Ossetian de facto leaders, Sergei Bagapsh and
Eduard Kokoiti, in Moscow. The Russian communiqués referred to them
as "presidents," by the usage adopted several years ago. Lavrov,
as well as accompanying statements by the Russian MFA, merely said
that Russia, in light of Kosova, would "reconsider" (peresmotrit)
its policy regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Further on the vague
tone, Russia would "undoubtedly take [Kosova] into account in Russia's
relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia" (Interfax, February 15,
16). Thus Putin's, Lavrov's, and other Russian MFA statements were
worded so as to stop short of repeating previous warnings about
recognizing those two secessions.
On February 18, Russia's Duma and Federation Council released a joint
statement condemning the Western recognition of Kosova, but stopping
short of warnings about "recognition" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The Russian parliament had in recent years adopted a series of
resolutions that contained such warnings. Sukhumi and Tskhinvali
hoped for more of the same, more than ever now; but they were
disappointed. Moreover, the joint statement was adopted quietly by
the two chambers' Councils (leaderships), not the plenums, and without
any of the customary fanfare.
At the moment, Moscow wants the Kosova issue returned to the UN
Security Council, ostensibly in order to reverse Kosova's independence
and halt its recognition (Interfax, February 15, 16).
Such resort to the UNSC also signifies the beginning of a face-saving
retreat from the previous show of intransigence. Referring this
issue to the UNSC at this point is tantamount to burying it in that
veto-bound forum, without openly acknowledging defeat. With this move,
Moscow plays to Greater Serbian nationalism, but has no hope to change
the situation on the ground.
The CIS summit, scheduled for February 21 in Moscow, should further
restrain Russian rhetoric about Abkhazia and South Ossetia. No CIS
country ever associated itself with Russian threats to recognize the
secession of those two Georgian territories. Should Putin revert to
such threats, he might at best find himself in the company of Belarus
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka (though even this does not seem very
likely). Even Armenia would not risk its relations with Georgia by
endorsing such Russian threats against Armenia's neighbor country and
lifeline to the world. Azerbaijan and Moldova, which face secessions
and military occupations of their territories, would condemn any
Russian "recognition" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It would also
be condemned by Ukraine and Kazakhstan, both of which reckon with
possible Russian exploitation of ethnic issues on their territories.
Moscow's two-year old bluff has been called in Kosova. While Russian
policy remains unpredictable (particularly during the presidential
transition in the Kremlin), any Russian leverage through the threat
of recognizing the post-Soviet secessions seems to have run out.
--Vladimir Socor
--Boundary_(ID_YNdg/IWVU0jvN5GrBGbnWQ)--
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress