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THE CASE FOR CLARITY
Economist.com
Feb 21st 2008
Why does the EU support independence for Kosovo?
WHY is the West giving Kosovo independence when it refuses to recognise
Transdniestria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia? These three places are
nominally independent--at least in their own eyes--and have been so
for many years.
At first sight it seems a clear case of Western double
standards. Kosovar Albanians don't want to be under Serbian rule
any more than the Abkhaz feel Georgian or the Transdniestrians like
Moldova. They have established their status by force of arms, and
entrenched it over ten years of quasi-independence. Is not the real
story just an American power-play in Europe, punishing Serbia and
rewarding the only pro-American Muslims in the world?
Nobody would deny that such political calculations have influenced
decision-making. But the real difference is another one. Kosovo wants
to join the European Union. That much is at least clear, however
badly run Kosovo may be at the moment, and however much gangsterism
and ethno-nationalism have flourished there under the haphazard
stewardship of the so-called international community. Kosovo does
not want to join, say, Turkey in a new "Ottoman Caliphate". Nor is
it even interested in forming a "Greater Albania".
That makes a big difference. Transdniestria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia
do not subscribe to the Euroatlantic vision of multilateral security
and law-governed political freedom. The main priority of the ruling
elites there is self-enrichment, followed by at least a rhetorical
commitment to closer integration with Russia (a goal that the Kremlin
endorses in theory but seems remarkably cautious about in practice).
The West is reluctant to say so bluntly, but that makes a
difference. The EU is sending thousands of lawyers, prosecutors and
police officers to Kosovo, in what might be termed the continent's
most ambitious colonial adventure for decades. That "soft imperialism"
creates at least a chance of success for Kosovo's independence.
All this may yet be derailed. Bosnia is falling apart again; Macedonia
still looks fragile; and Russia could not ask for more fertile soil for
mischief, with Europe divided and indecisive. But it is worth a try.
Contrast that with Transdniestria or Abkhazia. Imagine that Russia and
a bunch of other countries--Belarus, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Venezuela,
say--decided to go ahead and recognise these breakaway statelets. It is
almost laughable to imagine what such outside supporters could offer
to promote the rule of law and good government. Would Hugo Chávez
of Venezuela offer policemen? Would Russia provide prosecutors,
or Uzbekistan start teaching Abkhaz civil servants about e-government?
This is the weakness at the heart of all the Kremlin's foreign-policy
efforts in the countries of the former Soviet Union. It offers a
great deal for elites. Some enjoy lavish hospitality and lucrative
directorships.
Others get intelligence co-operation and sales of advanced weaponry.
But Russia has much less to offer from the public's point of
view. True, it offers passports, and a Russian passport is not
worthless.
But the survival of the Soviet-era propiska system means that this
does not confer the prized right to live and work in Moscow. Even
the Kremlin's most loyal allies can't offer that to their citizens
as a quid pro quo.
(Admittedly, Schengen and American visas can still be shamefully hard
to come by, even for citizens of ex-captive nations that are loyally
Euroatlantic in outlook).
What the EU will not say, but thinks privately, is this: We are
supporting Kosovo's independence because of the chance that it
will become more like us, and hence a better neighbour. We oppose
independence for Transdniestria et al because it would make them more
like Russia, and therefore worse for Europe.
--Boundary_(ID_UMU81y15lBMniDYPzf4bMw)--
Economist.com
Feb 21st 2008
Why does the EU support independence for Kosovo?
WHY is the West giving Kosovo independence when it refuses to recognise
Transdniestria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia? These three places are
nominally independent--at least in their own eyes--and have been so
for many years.
At first sight it seems a clear case of Western double
standards. Kosovar Albanians don't want to be under Serbian rule
any more than the Abkhaz feel Georgian or the Transdniestrians like
Moldova. They have established their status by force of arms, and
entrenched it over ten years of quasi-independence. Is not the real
story just an American power-play in Europe, punishing Serbia and
rewarding the only pro-American Muslims in the world?
Nobody would deny that such political calculations have influenced
decision-making. But the real difference is another one. Kosovo wants
to join the European Union. That much is at least clear, however
badly run Kosovo may be at the moment, and however much gangsterism
and ethno-nationalism have flourished there under the haphazard
stewardship of the so-called international community. Kosovo does
not want to join, say, Turkey in a new "Ottoman Caliphate". Nor is
it even interested in forming a "Greater Albania".
That makes a big difference. Transdniestria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia
do not subscribe to the Euroatlantic vision of multilateral security
and law-governed political freedom. The main priority of the ruling
elites there is self-enrichment, followed by at least a rhetorical
commitment to closer integration with Russia (a goal that the Kremlin
endorses in theory but seems remarkably cautious about in practice).
The West is reluctant to say so bluntly, but that makes a
difference. The EU is sending thousands of lawyers, prosecutors and
police officers to Kosovo, in what might be termed the continent's
most ambitious colonial adventure for decades. That "soft imperialism"
creates at least a chance of success for Kosovo's independence.
All this may yet be derailed. Bosnia is falling apart again; Macedonia
still looks fragile; and Russia could not ask for more fertile soil for
mischief, with Europe divided and indecisive. But it is worth a try.
Contrast that with Transdniestria or Abkhazia. Imagine that Russia and
a bunch of other countries--Belarus, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Venezuela,
say--decided to go ahead and recognise these breakaway statelets. It is
almost laughable to imagine what such outside supporters could offer
to promote the rule of law and good government. Would Hugo Chávez
of Venezuela offer policemen? Would Russia provide prosecutors,
or Uzbekistan start teaching Abkhaz civil servants about e-government?
This is the weakness at the heart of all the Kremlin's foreign-policy
efforts in the countries of the former Soviet Union. It offers a
great deal for elites. Some enjoy lavish hospitality and lucrative
directorships.
Others get intelligence co-operation and sales of advanced weaponry.
But Russia has much less to offer from the public's point of
view. True, it offers passports, and a Russian passport is not
worthless.
But the survival of the Soviet-era propiska system means that this
does not confer the prized right to live and work in Moscow. Even
the Kremlin's most loyal allies can't offer that to their citizens
as a quid pro quo.
(Admittedly, Schengen and American visas can still be shamefully hard
to come by, even for citizens of ex-captive nations that are loyally
Euroatlantic in outlook).
What the EU will not say, but thinks privately, is this: We are
supporting Kosovo's independence because of the chance that it
will become more like us, and hence a better neighbour. We oppose
independence for Transdniestria et al because it would make them more
like Russia, and therefore worse for Europe.
--Boundary_(ID_UMU81y15lBMniDYPzf4bMw)--