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  • Turkey's offensive comes at a price

    Asia Times Online, Hong Kong
    Feb. 25, 2008



    Turkey's offensive comes at a price

    By M K Bhadrakumar

    The high Qandil mountains and deep gorges on the northern Iraqi
    border region with Iran must be one of the world's most ideal
    terrains for guerrilla war. That is where the fighters of the
    separatist Turkish Kurdish movement the Kurdistan Workers' Party
    (PKK) have set up its headquarters. The PKK is close enough to the
    Turkish border to stage its guerrilla attacks and can easily
    frustrate "hot pursuits" by the Turkish army.

    There is a popular saying that Kurds have no friends but the
    mountains. The region offers one of the world's spectacular natural
    fortresses, virtually impossible to penetrate. Especially so in the
    winter with heavy snowfall, frequent treacherous avalanches and
    howling icy winds mercilessly ransacking anything out in the
    open.

    Without doubt, the seasoned military commanders in Ankara know that
    the Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq, which began last
    Thursday just after sunset, can settle nothing. The Pashas are highly
    professional men and are hard realists who act with deliberation.
    They would know that it will not be easy to find the Kurdish
    guerrillas who know every inch of their mountain strongholds and
    evaded for decades even a skilful predator like Saddam Hussein.

    More so, since the current Turkish operation lacks the all-important
    element of surprise. It has been in the making for months - visibly
    and meticulously. It has been on the drawing board at the military,
    political and diplomatic level. Besides, the world knows it is not in
    the Turkish character to back off, looking weak, when provoked. The
    first stage of the Turkish incursion into northern Iraq began last
    December when the Turkish air force started attacking PKK camps and
    insisted this was a prelude to a ground offensive to follow.

    Turkey's General Staff said that 33 PKK rebels, including a leader,
    and eight soldiers died in heavy fighting in poor weather conditions
    on Sunday. It said at least 112 rebels and 15 soldiers had died since
    the operations began.

    Turkish domestic reaction

    The Kurdish guerrillas knew they had provoked Turkey too far this
    past year and retribution wouldn't be long in coming. They could have
    gone into hiding. Therefore, the Turkish incursion on Thursday is to
    be evaluated not for its military results but for its political and
    strategic implications. A few hundred Turkish troops on
    search-and-destroy missions in the Iraqi mountains cannot solve the
    Kurdish problem. They may render a blow to PKK morale, but when the
    snow melts and the passes open, it is a wide open question whether
    the PKK cadres will resume their bloody business.

    Meanwhile, the switch to the military track may scotch prospects of
    any serious national reconciliation with Turkey's Kurdish population
    that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Prime
    Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been seeking. Indeed, Erdogan
    realizes that Turkey has a Kurdish problem which needs to be
    politically addressed. Enlightened sections of Turkish opinion share
    his view.

    They realize, as one of Turkey's senior editors, Ilnur Cevik, wrote,
    "There are millions of Kurds living in Turkey and a sizeable majority
    has integrated into our society. But there are also those who do not
    feel a part of us and demand to be treated as first class citizens of
    the Turkish republic. They feel discriminated, persecuted and
    underprivileged. They believe the reason for this is their ethnic
    background." The cross-border operations into northern Iraq might end
    up hardening grievances. But then that is looking ahead.

    In immediate terms, the Turkish nation has rallied in patriotic
    fervor as powerful images come flooding home of brave lads in smart
    military fatigues heading for the battlefront, of tanks and heavy
    armor menacingly advancing towards the border and of F-16 aircraft
    pounding the staggering Kurdish mountains. Even grumpy sections of
    Turkey's corporate media have fallen in line, including some whom
    Erdogan lately antagonized by not accommodating their business
    interests. "Ten thousands heroes in northern Iraq," hailed the mass
    circulation Hurriyet newspaper belonging to the Dogan group.

    The secular "Kemalists", who were appalled by Erdogan's latest
    constitutional reform lifting the ban on Turkish women wearing
    headscarves at universities, have shifted their attention to national
    security. The dark rumors of a military coup against the Islamist
    government have scattered. The staunchly secular-minded Turkish
    judiciary may now hesitate to uphold appeals against Erdogan's reform
    over headscarves.

    All in all, the acute political polarization in Turkey in recent
    weeks between the Islamist and secular camps takes a back seat. True,
    the mounting economic difficulties arising out of slowing economic
    growth, falling investment rates, mounting unemployment, inflation
    and widening income disparities will not easily go away. But
    historically, the working class too becomes susceptible to
    nationalism.

    Shifting alignments in Iraq
    However, the timing of the incursion has a far wider significance. It
    is obvious that the timing has much to do with political alignments
    within Iraq. For the first time since 2003, Iraqi Kurds are
    politically isolated. The Kurdish parties have come under pressure
    >From Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government, as it pushes through
    a US$45 billion budget that substantially reduces the share of income
    of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) from 17% to 14.5%. Baghdad
    also refuses to pay the salary of the 80,000-strong Kurdish militia
    (Peshmerga) or to allow the provincial legislature to remove
    federally appointed provincial governors. Equally, Baghdad is firm on
    the federal government's prerogative to be the sole authority to
    award contracts to foreign oil companies.

    Sunni parties, the Shi'ite Sadrist movement, the Turkomen party
    (supported by Ankara) and possibly the Iraqi List headed by former
    prime minister Iyad Allawi (who has links with the West) are arrayed
    as a majority grouping within the Iraqi Parliament, which seeks
    strengthening of Baghdad's central authority over the Kurdish
    provinces. The US remains supportive of Maliki.

    Iraqi Kurdish ambitions no longer match US interests. A devastating
    recent essay by Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute
    titled "Is Iraqi Kurdistan a Good Ally?" analyzed the shifting
    alignments. Rubin thoroughly questioned the assumptions regarding the
    Iraqi Kurds' "pro-Americanism". He underscored that Iraqi Kurdish
    leader Massoud Barzani would turn out to be like former Palestinian
    leader Yasser Arafat as a thorn in Washington's side. Rubin alleged
    double-dealings by the Iraqi Kurds with Iran. He suggested the
    rampantly corrupt and decadent leadership in Kurdistan could only
    lead to a strengthening of the forces of religious conservatism and
    the growth of Islamist parties.

    Rubin concluded, "As Turkish warplanes bomb terrorist bases in Iraqi
    Kurdistan, it is time for both Washington and Irbil [capital of the
    KRG] to reassess their policies. Washington has many cards to play.
    Sympathy to Kurdistan is understandable, but is increasingly based on
    myth. US goodwill should never be an entitlement. Barzani may remain
    an ally, but he has disqualified himself from any substantive
    partnership. It is time to take a tough-love approach to Iraqi
    Kurdistan. There should be no aid and no diplomatic legitimacy so
    long as Iraqi Kurdistan remains a PKK safe haven, sells US security
    to the highest bidder, and leaves democratic reform stagnant."

    Nothing like this has ever been said by a leading American analyst
    about the Iraqi Kurds, who were the darling of US policymakers
    through the past 17-year period since Saddam's catastrophic Gulf War
    in 1991. Rubin sent out a deadly message - Washington has no more
    critical need of Iraqi Kurds.

    He was spot on. The US military in Iraq has concluded that the best
    means of countering the Sunni insurgency is by bribing the militants.
    The success of the policy has sharply reduced US dependence on the
    Kurdish Peshmerga. As the US military works on a similar deal with
    the Shi'ite Sadrist militias as well, the use of Peshmerga as foot
    soldiers of counterinsurgency operations further diminishes.

    The US's Iraq strategy
    The shift in US thinking is already manifesting. The referendum on
    the status of the Kirkuk area, which was due last December, stands
    postponed until June - perhaps, indefinitely. Washington may listen
    to Ankara's plea that Kirkuk must be given a special status under a
    United Nations mandate, as the Turks do not want to see it
    incorporated into Iraqi Kurdistan.

    Washington has abandoned any plans of setting up a permanent military
    base in northern Iraq. William Arkin, a prominent US security
    analyst, wrote in his Washington Post blog last week that President
    George W Bush is pressing ahead with a period of "consolidation and
    reorganization" and "the likelihood of any significant change in Iraq
    is slim".

    Arkin substantiates that Bush is "quietly putting in place the pieces
    that will indeed tie the next president's hands". The emphasis is on
    contracting US combat forces in Iraq to a fewer number of combat
    forces and special operations forces and to fight the war in Iraq
    >From other locations.

    Thus, in Kuwait, the US is completing finishing touches on a
    permanent ground forces command for Iraq and the region, which is
    capable of being a platform for "full spectrum operations" in 27
    countries around southwest Asia and the Middle East. In Bahrain, the
    United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman, the US Air Force and navy have
    set up additional permanent bases.

    According to Arkin, "tens of billions have been ploughed into the
    American infrastructure", and "permanently deployed with the new
    regional headquarters in Kuwait will be a theater-level logistical
    command, a communications command, a military intelligence brigade, a
    'civil affairs' group and a medical command".

    But, interestingly, the Bush strategy virtually leaves Iraq's
    northern side without any significant American military presence.
    Such a security vacuum is unsustainable. Clearly, Washington expects
    Turkey to play a major role as the guardian of the stability of
    northern Iraq. This is logical thinking. Turkey is perfectly capable
    of keeping at bay the two other prowling powers in northern Iraq's
    neighborhood - Iran and Syria. It suits American - and Israeli -
    interests if Ankara doesn't advance its entente cordiale any further
    with Tehran and Damascus.

    Ankara also welcomes the role of being a pivotal power in US regional
    policies. To quote Gungor Uras of the liberal Milliyet newspaper,
    "The US is now reshaping the Middle East. While this is happening,
    Turkey has the choice of either sitting on one side and watching
    developments, or taking an active role. US support has great
    importance for ending terrorism in Turkey, resolving the Kurdish and
    Armenian issues, our relations with our neighbors, and keeping the
    military strong ... Do not forget that the US carried us to the
    waiting room of the European Union ... Foreign capital and loans come
    through New York. Washington's green light is important to prevent
    jams on the road to New York."

    Moreover, the transportation routes of the oil and gas resources of
    northern Iraq pass through Turkey. Ankara has a genuine interest in
    keeping the area stable. Several inter-linkages have already appeared
    around energy security. The growing regional energy interdependence
    places Turkey at an advantage. Turkey has always prided itself as
    Europe's energy hub. Washington will encourage a key role for Turkey
    in proposed trans-Caspian energy pipeline projects, which will also
    put the brakes on swiftly expanding Russia-Turkey cooperation. The
    Arab Gas Pipeline connects Turkey with Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon
    and Egypt. Turkey is working on an energy linkup with Israel.

    Again, it is the oil and gas supplies from Iraq that will help
    realize the viability of the 3,300-kilometer Nabucco pipeline
    (running from the Caspian Sea via Turkey and the Balkan states to
    Austria), without which Russia's tightening grip over the European
    energy market cannot be loosened, which, in turn, holds profound
    implications for Russia's relations with Europe and for the US's
    trans-Atlantic leadership.

    US policy review on Turkey
    Thus, all in all, Washington has estimated the urgent need to
    accommodate Turkey's aspirations as a regional power. The Bush
    administration seems to have undertaken a major policy review toward
    Turkey in the October-November period last year around the same time
    it considered the follow-up on the troop "surge" in Iraq. It
    concluded that for a variety of reasons, abandoning Iraqi Kurds to
    their fate is a small price to pay for reviving Turkey's friendship.

    The turning point came during the visit of Erdogan to the US in
    November. Almost overnight, the body language of US-Turkey relations
    began to change. The chilly rhetoric abruptly changed to warm
    backslapping. The emphasis was on the commonality of interests in the
    struggle against terrorism. There was an unmistakable impatience in
    the US calls on the Iraqi Kurdish leadership to restrain the PKK
    through concrete steps.

    Immediately after Erdogan's visit, deputy chief of the Turkish

    General Staff, General Ergin Saygun, received his American
    counterpart, General James Cartwright, and the US's top commander in
    Iraq, General David Petraeus, in Ankara for follow-up discussions.
    They established a mechanism for intelligence-sharing. And the US
    began supplying Turkey with real-time intelligence regarding PKK
    activities in northern Iraq.

    By the time US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in Ankara
    a week later in early December, she could already acknowledge that
    Turkey had a "comprehensive plan" to fight the PKK. The tacit
    understanding with the US enabled Turkey to launch the air strikes
    inside northern Iraq from December 16 onward. Washington - and
    European countries - openly accepted



    the legitimacy of Turkey's attacks on the PKK bases. It was a major
    diplomatic and military victory for Ankara.

    Turkish columnist Cuneyt Ulsever wrote in Hurriyet, "My greatest
    pleasure in this operation is that Turkey was able to show the entire
    world that it is the greatest power in the Middle East. This should
    be a warning not only to the PKK, but to all nations about Turkey's
    superiority in terms of both technology and the human capital
    employing it."

    The US-Turkish bonding rapidly thickened as it happens when old
    friends get together. At a speech at the Woodrow Wilson International
    Center for Scholars during his visit to the US in January, Turkish
    President Abdullah Gul said, "Turkey and United States are partners
    in Iraq. Needless to say, we both have [a] great stake in Iraq's
    security and stability and welfare."

    Even the left-wing Kemalist Cumhuriyet newspaper acknowledged, "A new
    era is upon us [in US-Turkey relations]." With a sense of deja vu,
    Iraqi Kurd leaders began realizing that Bush has done a Kissingerian
    trick on them and the ground has shifted beneath their feet. Since
    November, they have been resigned to the inevitability of Turkish
    military operations inside northern Iraq. More important, they have
    assessed that with the u-turn in US policy, the odds are heavily
    stacked against them. The Kurds know from long experience it is
    futile to be defiant of a superpower, especially when it bonds with a
    strong regional power - at least for the time being.

    Both Barzani and Kurdish leader and President Jalal Talabani have
    accepted that as long as the Turkish operations are in the nature of
    "limited military incursions to remote, isolated, uninhabited
    regions" of northern Iraq - to quote Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar
    Zebary, who is also Barzani's nephew - they won't make a fuss about
    the Turkish violation of Iraqi sovereignty. When the Turkish jets and
    helicopter gunships first appeared over the northern Iraqi skies in
    mid-December, it was apparent that Barzani had abandoned the PKK and
    henceforth the latter would be on its own. Barzani expects Ankara to
    appreciate his attitude as a serious concession and an act of
    goodwill.

    The three-way equation throws light on an obscure aspect of Ankara's
    ties with Barzani. Turkey and Barzani are equally interested to see
    that the transportation of oil from northern Iraq proceeds without
    disruption. In the future, as increased volumes of oil (and gas)
    begin to flow, this convergence of interests will only get
    reinforced.

    Muted international reaction
    Ankara can derive satisfaction that there has been no outright
    condemnation of its military incursion by the international
    community. Turkish diplomats claim that the Iraqi authorities had
    "close knowledge" of the incursion in advance.

    Zebary told the BBC that "all this has been done unilaterally", but
    he would only point out that the Turkish action had the "potential to
    escalate" and, therefore, should end "as soon as possible", and he
    couldn't "contemplate" any protracted stay by the Turkish army on
    Iraqi soil.

    Indeed, Europe, which is grappling with the Kosovo issue, is hardly
    in a position to prescribe the cannons of international law to
    Turkey. Predictably, United Nations secretary general Ban Ki-moon
    sounded defensive. The Arab League essentially called for restraint
    by Turkey.

    Ankara has little to worry about. US Secretary of Defense Robert
    Gates sees no reason to postpone his scheduled visit to Turkey on
    Tuesday. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak visited Ankara on
    February 13. His main agenda was to canvass for Israel's highly
    lucrative arms sales to Turkey, but in his meeting with the Turkish
    chief of general staff, General Yasar Buyukanit, Barak said Israel
    supported Turkey's fight against the PKK. (This was despite Gul's
    criticism of Israeli attacks on Gaza when Barak called on him.)

    General James Cartwright, deputy head of the US Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, also arrived in Ankara on February 13 for discussions with his
    Turkish counterpart, General Ergin Saygun, on the operations against
    the PKK. The two generals are the point persons designated by
    Washington and Ankara as responsible for coordinating US-Turkey
    military cooperation in countering the PKK.

    Evidently, Turkey is acting in concert with the US and Israel. The US
    and Israel endorse Turkey's pre-eminent role in northern Iraq. With
    the Balkans in focus and with defeat staring in the face of the North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)in Afghanistan, Turkey's
    importance as a key US ally is rising. Turkey commands the KFOR
    (Kosovo Force) in southern Kosovo. Turkey has historical influence in
    the Balkans.

    The fact is, the Kosovo model is both good and bad for Turkey. As
    Russian President Vladimir Putin caustically suggested last week, the
    West should also now recognize Northern Cyprus as Turkish. On the
    other hand, Kosovo sets a bad example for separatist elements in
    Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Iraq. Ankara's prompt decision to
    recognize the "independent" Kosovo was indeed a diplomatic signal to
    Washington that it is willing to harmonize its foreign policy
    decisions with US geostrategy.

    Turkish role in Afghanistan
    However, for Washington, it is not Ottoman Turkey's legacy in the
    Balkans, which is all very well as misty history, but what Ankara can
    tangibly do for it in Afghanistan that becomes the number one
    priority. Frank Hyland, a former US intelligence official (who served
    in the Central Intelligence Agency's Counter-Terrorist Center, the
    National Security Agency and the National Counter-Terrorism Center)
    wrote recently that Washington has requested Turkey to step up its
    troop deployment in Afghanistan and, more importantly, to deploy the
    troops in active combat missions against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
    (The 1,000-strong Turkish contingent is presently deployed in
    non-combat duties in and around Kabul.)

    Turkish media criticized that the US was seeking a quid pro quo from
    Turkey for its cooperation in the fight against the PKK. This is a
    correct reading of Bush's intentions. During his two-day mission to
    Turkey on Tuesday, Gates will reiterate the US expectations. Hyland
    says, "Washington is well aware of the strong hand it brings to
    negotiations with Turkey, considering the latter's need to locate and
    track PKK guerrillas in support of Turkish military operations."

    Certainly, when someone takes its help, Washington usually expects
    the friend to return the favor. Ankara can't be an exception. But,
    will the AKP reciprocate? It will be a tough call. The Islamist AKP
    government will seriously ponder over the irony of ordering troops to
    get cracking on militant Islamists as part of a NATO force, which a
    growing number of alienated Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan view
    as an occupation army. Turkey would consult its close friend,
    Pakistan.

    But Bush is running out of time. He will expect Erdogan and Gul to
    stand up and be counted as true friends by the time NATO gathers for
    its summit in Romania in early April. Hyland sums up, "Given the
    stakes for the United States, the tough negotiations over the
    NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan have just begun with other NATO
    allies as well as with Turkey. After making a general appeal for
    additional troops across the entire NATO community, the United States
    appears to have chosen Turkey as the 'best-chance' ally to focus on
    for immediate results.

    "Turkey's success against the PKK since real-time intelligence made
    it possible to hit targets in Iraq with pinpoint precision, is a
    considerable inducement in the ongoing discussions, especially as
    spring approaches - the traditional season for the commencement of
    another PKK campaign."

    The buck of course stops with the Turkish Pashas. They are wise men,
    who are not given to hyperbole. They will coolly evaluate the
    challenge of fulfilling Bush's great expectations of Turkey as a
    regional power - not only in the snow-clad, windy Qandil mountains,
    but also in the inhospitable Hindu Kush notorious for its unwelcome
    ways.

    M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
    Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador
    to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).

    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JB26Ak0 1.html
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