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THE KOSOVA CONUNDRUM FOR TURKEY AND EURASIA
By John C. K. Daly
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Feb 27 2008
DC
Since Kosova unilaterally declared independence on February 17, its
action has caused a fissure in international reactions. Thirty states
have now recognized Kosova's independence, including the United States,
Great Britain, France, and Germany. However, Russia, China, Spain,
Georgia, and Greece, among others, oppose the move.
Turkey supported the declaration on the basis that it could help bring
peace to the Balkans. Following a reception for Albanian Foreign
Minister Lulzim Basha, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan said,
"Prosperity of the regional people must be enhanced to ensure a
lasting peace in the Balkans... The Balkans had to suffer for many
years. Turkey respects the will of the people of Kosova. Turkey also
expends full support to the NATO membership of Albania, Macedonia,
and Croatia" (New Anatolian, February 26).
To show its support for Belgrade - and opposition to Kosovar
independence, Russia has decided to play the energy card. On February
25 Serbian President Boris Tadic received Russian First Deputy Prime
Minister Dmitry Medvedev in Belgrade and signed an agreement allowing
Russia's South Stream pipeline to transit Serbia, a distinct blow to
EU alternative pipeline routes (RBC, February 26).
For Turkey, the implications of having South Stream transit Serbia
are enormous, as the pipeline's route directly undercuts the Nabucco
pipeline favored by Turkey, the United States, and the EU, which
would deliver Central Asian gas to Europe via Turkey - and bypass
Russia. Whether Moscow will play further pipeline politics with Ankara
to indicate its displeasure over Turkey's position is unclear, but the
South Stream decision will definitely hit Ankara in the pocketbook,
costing it hundreds of millions of dollars annually in natural gas
transit fees. Adding to Russia's distrust is Turkey's support of
Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia entering NATO, a process that the
Kremlin feels has already gone too far.
Interestingly, the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has
also recognized Kosova, while Cyprus has not.
Among the fifteen former Soviet republics, Latvia and Estonia
have already recognized Kosova, while Lithuania's parliament is
considering a similar action. At the other end of the spectrum,
Belarus and Moldova have lined up behind the Kremlin's position. The
Belarusian Parliamentary Commission on International Affairs reported,
"Events in Kosova not only destabilize the situation in the Balkans,
but also directly affect international stability. Kosova necessarily
sets a precedent of similar crises in other countries" (Telegraf,
February 21).
On February 18 the Moldovan government issued an official statement
noting, "With all the uniqueness of the Kosova problem, this form of
'decision' is not only an arbitrary violation of the integrity of the
Republic of Serbia, but also a major factor in the destabilization
of Europe, a dangerous incentive for the revitalization of separatist
sentiment in all conflict zones" (Nezavisimaya Moldova, February 19).
In Transnistria Moldova has a restive Russian minority toying with
the idea of separatism. Ukraine supports the idea of further talks.
The governments in the Caucasus have taken attitudes sharply divergent
from the Baltics. Both Georgia and Armenia have explicitly declared
that they will not recognize Serbia's breakaway province Georgia is
worried that similar sentiments might prevail in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, while two days before the declaration Armenian Foreign
Minister Vartan Oskanian complained of an international double
standard, saying, "Granting independence to Kosova, the international
community violated the legal norms but forgot Karabakh" (PanARMENIAN
Network, February 16).
Ankara's close ally, Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan, no doubt fearing
that Karabakh might follow Kosova's precedent, has labeled Pristina's
declaration of sovereignty and independence "illegal" and, according
to Aydin Mirzazade, a member of the Standing Parliamentary Commission
for Security and Defense, is considering withdrawing its 34-man
peacekeeping contingent from the newly independent state (Trend,
February 26).
In Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have all
stated that they are against the declaration of independence, while
Uzbekistan is reserving judgment.
Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Erzhan Ashikbaev commented
during a weekly news briefing, "The position of Kazakhstan on the
Kosova situation is based on the fundamental principles of the
United Nations about the retention of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of states within their internationally acknowledged
boundaries, the search for peaceful means to debate questions on
the basis of fulfilling of the positions, which are contained in the
documents on regulating the crisis, first of all the resolution of
the UN Security Council No. 1244 about a peaceful plan for Kosova"
(http://ru.government.kz/site/news/20 08/02/57).
It seems ironic that Turkey, successor to an Ottoman Empire that ruled
the Balkans for centuries, should support Kosova's independence in the
name of stability. Meanwhile, the states that emerged from the wreckage
of the USSR largely either oppose independence or support further
talks, concerned that Kosova's action at the very least violates
the spirit of the UN mandate assumed in 1999. It seems unlikely that
opposition to the move, centered around Moscow, is unlikely to abate
any time soon, but what is obvious is that, of the former republics
of the USSR, which stretched from the Polish border to the Pacific,
two-thirds of its successor states are opposed to the move, based on
international law and the UN overstepping its mandate.
Whether Kosova's action will lead to greater stability in the Balkans
or set off a flurry of micro-nationalist declarations around the
world remains to be seen. Equally unclear is the eventual response
of Russia, Eurasia's dominant energy producer, and whether it will
choose to exercise that power to indicate its profound displeasure.
For Turkey, which earlier this year suffered from shortages of Russian
natural gas, it is a question well worth pondering.
By John C. K. Daly
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Feb 27 2008
DC
Since Kosova unilaterally declared independence on February 17, its
action has caused a fissure in international reactions. Thirty states
have now recognized Kosova's independence, including the United States,
Great Britain, France, and Germany. However, Russia, China, Spain,
Georgia, and Greece, among others, oppose the move.
Turkey supported the declaration on the basis that it could help bring
peace to the Balkans. Following a reception for Albanian Foreign
Minister Lulzim Basha, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan said,
"Prosperity of the regional people must be enhanced to ensure a
lasting peace in the Balkans... The Balkans had to suffer for many
years. Turkey respects the will of the people of Kosova. Turkey also
expends full support to the NATO membership of Albania, Macedonia,
and Croatia" (New Anatolian, February 26).
To show its support for Belgrade - and opposition to Kosovar
independence, Russia has decided to play the energy card. On February
25 Serbian President Boris Tadic received Russian First Deputy Prime
Minister Dmitry Medvedev in Belgrade and signed an agreement allowing
Russia's South Stream pipeline to transit Serbia, a distinct blow to
EU alternative pipeline routes (RBC, February 26).
For Turkey, the implications of having South Stream transit Serbia
are enormous, as the pipeline's route directly undercuts the Nabucco
pipeline favored by Turkey, the United States, and the EU, which
would deliver Central Asian gas to Europe via Turkey - and bypass
Russia. Whether Moscow will play further pipeline politics with Ankara
to indicate its displeasure over Turkey's position is unclear, but the
South Stream decision will definitely hit Ankara in the pocketbook,
costing it hundreds of millions of dollars annually in natural gas
transit fees. Adding to Russia's distrust is Turkey's support of
Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia entering NATO, a process that the
Kremlin feels has already gone too far.
Interestingly, the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has
also recognized Kosova, while Cyprus has not.
Among the fifteen former Soviet republics, Latvia and Estonia
have already recognized Kosova, while Lithuania's parliament is
considering a similar action. At the other end of the spectrum,
Belarus and Moldova have lined up behind the Kremlin's position. The
Belarusian Parliamentary Commission on International Affairs reported,
"Events in Kosova not only destabilize the situation in the Balkans,
but also directly affect international stability. Kosova necessarily
sets a precedent of similar crises in other countries" (Telegraf,
February 21).
On February 18 the Moldovan government issued an official statement
noting, "With all the uniqueness of the Kosova problem, this form of
'decision' is not only an arbitrary violation of the integrity of the
Republic of Serbia, but also a major factor in the destabilization
of Europe, a dangerous incentive for the revitalization of separatist
sentiment in all conflict zones" (Nezavisimaya Moldova, February 19).
In Transnistria Moldova has a restive Russian minority toying with
the idea of separatism. Ukraine supports the idea of further talks.
The governments in the Caucasus have taken attitudes sharply divergent
from the Baltics. Both Georgia and Armenia have explicitly declared
that they will not recognize Serbia's breakaway province Georgia is
worried that similar sentiments might prevail in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, while two days before the declaration Armenian Foreign
Minister Vartan Oskanian complained of an international double
standard, saying, "Granting independence to Kosova, the international
community violated the legal norms but forgot Karabakh" (PanARMENIAN
Network, February 16).
Ankara's close ally, Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan, no doubt fearing
that Karabakh might follow Kosova's precedent, has labeled Pristina's
declaration of sovereignty and independence "illegal" and, according
to Aydin Mirzazade, a member of the Standing Parliamentary Commission
for Security and Defense, is considering withdrawing its 34-man
peacekeeping contingent from the newly independent state (Trend,
February 26).
In Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have all
stated that they are against the declaration of independence, while
Uzbekistan is reserving judgment.
Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Erzhan Ashikbaev commented
during a weekly news briefing, "The position of Kazakhstan on the
Kosova situation is based on the fundamental principles of the
United Nations about the retention of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of states within their internationally acknowledged
boundaries, the search for peaceful means to debate questions on
the basis of fulfilling of the positions, which are contained in the
documents on regulating the crisis, first of all the resolution of
the UN Security Council No. 1244 about a peaceful plan for Kosova"
(http://ru.government.kz/site/news/20 08/02/57).
It seems ironic that Turkey, successor to an Ottoman Empire that ruled
the Balkans for centuries, should support Kosova's independence in the
name of stability. Meanwhile, the states that emerged from the wreckage
of the USSR largely either oppose independence or support further
talks, concerned that Kosova's action at the very least violates
the spirit of the UN mandate assumed in 1999. It seems unlikely that
opposition to the move, centered around Moscow, is unlikely to abate
any time soon, but what is obvious is that, of the former republics
of the USSR, which stretched from the Polish border to the Pacific,
two-thirds of its successor states are opposed to the move, based on
international law and the UN overstepping its mandate.
Whether Kosova's action will lead to greater stability in the Balkans
or set off a flurry of micro-nationalist declarations around the
world remains to be seen. Equally unclear is the eventual response
of Russia, Eurasia's dominant energy producer, and whether it will
choose to exercise that power to indicate its profound displeasure.
For Turkey, which earlier this year suffered from shortages of Russian
natural gas, it is a question well worth pondering.