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TURKISH-ARMENIAN RELATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
by Ali Yurttagul*
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Feb 28 2008
The results of the Armenian elections last Tuesday were unfortunately
not as hopeful as those experienced recently in Cyprus.
The former prime minister and new president Sarkisian is from the
"Karabakh family," which holds power in Armenia in its hands like a
caliphate. Sarkisian is, like Kocharian, a politician who supports
the independence of Karabakh. His political star began to shine
during his time in the Soviet Union Communist Party, and he held an
important position during the occupation of Azeri lands. He has also
held important positions such as defense minister during his career
in Armenia. Observers in Europe believe that Sarkisian will continue
Russia-indexed policies while in power in Armenia, and that he will
not start up any solution-seeking efforts on the Karabakh issue. In
Armenia, where corruption levels are high, close ties with the EU
are seen not only as a path toward economic development, but also
as a vehicle to put pressure on Turkey. While it is expected that
Kocharian will move into the role of prime minister during Sarkisian's
presidency, a move by Turkey into a period of pro-active policies
toward Armenia is seen by many as the only factor that could alter
balances in Armenia in the post-election period there. These kind of
pro-active policies, which we examine closely below, would turn the EU
factor into an element of pressure against Armenia rather than Turkey,
and could change political balances noticeably.
In terms of the difficult and multi-dimensional problems that relations
with Armenia present for Turkey, it is difficult to say that Turkey
has used the "time" factor very well, or has developed, as in the
case with Cyprus, any easy-to-read policies aimed at solution. Before
entering into the question of what trajectory any "solution policies"
for relations with Armenia could take for Turkey, we would like to
touch on the current situation in Armenia, the genocide matter, the
problems concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as international and
EU relations.
>From a geographical perspective, Armenia is a small, enclosed nation
with Georgia to its north, a small border with Iran to the south, and
Turkey and Azerbaijan to its west and east, respectively. Armenia
achieved its independence following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, but has been struggling now for years with both economic
and political problems because of the Karabakh problem and its war
with Azerbaijan. Armenia, whose economic and defense policies are
completely indexed on Russia, is supported by Iran on the question of
its tensions with Azerbaijan, and is particularly dependent on Iran
on the matter of trade. With these Russia and Iran-based policies
on one end, Armenia also carries off warm relations with the EU and
the US due to its strong diasporas in the latter two, as well as
the sympathy held by the West for Armenia's history. Even though
if these "policies of balance" look possible now due to the post
Cold War moderate political climate that began with Gorbachev and
have continued since, this is certainly not a permanent strategy for
Armenia. The moment that clashes between the Iran-Russia duo and the
West deepen in the energy base that is the Caucasus, this "policy of
balance" held by Armenia will be subject to collapse.
When we closely examine Armenia's dependence and "policies of balance"
when it comes to Russia and Iran, we see that Armenia is, like Cyprus,
a difficult nation where extreme nationalism is high, and violence
plays a considerable role in politics most of the time.
It is doubtful, for example, that there are many nations in the
world where a prime minister and eight of his cabinet ministers,
in other words almost the entire government cabinet of ministers,
have been killed during a parliamentary session, as was the case in
Armenia. As for the dependence on Russia, it is of a character which
completes the extreme nationalism in Armenia, where politicians from
the Karabakh region play an important role. Though the price paid by
Armenian society for this may be high, the fact is that in the wake
of these most recent elections, it now looks extremely unlikely that
there will be efforts to index Armenia's politics more heavily on the
West, open up to Turkey, or find a permanent solution to the Karabakh
problem. It would nothing but a waste of time, after all, to expect
such an effort that was supported by neither Russia nor Iran. For
this reason, Turkey needs to develop an Armenia policy which will
alter today's situation, making it more difficult for Armenia carry
on its "balance policies," and preventing Armenia from continuing
its conflicting, contradictory relations with the West and the EU.
by Ali Yurttagul*
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Feb 28 2008
The results of the Armenian elections last Tuesday were unfortunately
not as hopeful as those experienced recently in Cyprus.
The former prime minister and new president Sarkisian is from the
"Karabakh family," which holds power in Armenia in its hands like a
caliphate. Sarkisian is, like Kocharian, a politician who supports
the independence of Karabakh. His political star began to shine
during his time in the Soviet Union Communist Party, and he held an
important position during the occupation of Azeri lands. He has also
held important positions such as defense minister during his career
in Armenia. Observers in Europe believe that Sarkisian will continue
Russia-indexed policies while in power in Armenia, and that he will
not start up any solution-seeking efforts on the Karabakh issue. In
Armenia, where corruption levels are high, close ties with the EU
are seen not only as a path toward economic development, but also
as a vehicle to put pressure on Turkey. While it is expected that
Kocharian will move into the role of prime minister during Sarkisian's
presidency, a move by Turkey into a period of pro-active policies
toward Armenia is seen by many as the only factor that could alter
balances in Armenia in the post-election period there. These kind of
pro-active policies, which we examine closely below, would turn the EU
factor into an element of pressure against Armenia rather than Turkey,
and could change political balances noticeably.
In terms of the difficult and multi-dimensional problems that relations
with Armenia present for Turkey, it is difficult to say that Turkey
has used the "time" factor very well, or has developed, as in the
case with Cyprus, any easy-to-read policies aimed at solution. Before
entering into the question of what trajectory any "solution policies"
for relations with Armenia could take for Turkey, we would like to
touch on the current situation in Armenia, the genocide matter, the
problems concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as international and
EU relations.
>From a geographical perspective, Armenia is a small, enclosed nation
with Georgia to its north, a small border with Iran to the south, and
Turkey and Azerbaijan to its west and east, respectively. Armenia
achieved its independence following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, but has been struggling now for years with both economic
and political problems because of the Karabakh problem and its war
with Azerbaijan. Armenia, whose economic and defense policies are
completely indexed on Russia, is supported by Iran on the question of
its tensions with Azerbaijan, and is particularly dependent on Iran
on the matter of trade. With these Russia and Iran-based policies
on one end, Armenia also carries off warm relations with the EU and
the US due to its strong diasporas in the latter two, as well as
the sympathy held by the West for Armenia's history. Even though
if these "policies of balance" look possible now due to the post
Cold War moderate political climate that began with Gorbachev and
have continued since, this is certainly not a permanent strategy for
Armenia. The moment that clashes between the Iran-Russia duo and the
West deepen in the energy base that is the Caucasus, this "policy of
balance" held by Armenia will be subject to collapse.
When we closely examine Armenia's dependence and "policies of balance"
when it comes to Russia and Iran, we see that Armenia is, like Cyprus,
a difficult nation where extreme nationalism is high, and violence
plays a considerable role in politics most of the time.
It is doubtful, for example, that there are many nations in the
world where a prime minister and eight of his cabinet ministers,
in other words almost the entire government cabinet of ministers,
have been killed during a parliamentary session, as was the case in
Armenia. As for the dependence on Russia, it is of a character which
completes the extreme nationalism in Armenia, where politicians from
the Karabakh region play an important role. Though the price paid by
Armenian society for this may be high, the fact is that in the wake
of these most recent elections, it now looks extremely unlikely that
there will be efforts to index Armenia's politics more heavily on the
West, open up to Turkey, or find a permanent solution to the Karabakh
problem. It would nothing but a waste of time, after all, to expect
such an effort that was supported by neither Russia nor Iran. For
this reason, Turkey needs to develop an Armenia policy which will
alter today's situation, making it more difficult for Armenia carry
on its "balance policies," and preventing Armenia from continuing
its conflicting, contradictory relations with the West and the EU.