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DEMOCRACY TAKES ROOT
Sergei Markedonov
Russia Profile
Feb 28 2008
Russia
The year 2008 can be called an ~SElection Year~T for Southern Caucasus
states. On Jan. 5, there was a presidential election in Georgia
(with a parliamentary election campaign coming up in May). It was
Armenia~Rs turn on February 19. A few days ago, this republic not
only elected its president, it practically completed an election
cycle. In May 2007, Armenia elected its national parliament. That
was when Serge Sarkisyan, the winning party~Rs frontrunner and Prime
Minister of Armenia, became the official successor of Robert Kocharyan.
After processing voting records from all 1923 polling stations,
the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Armenia announced the results.
According to its data, Sarkisyan received 53 percent. The second place
was taken by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the first president of Armenia
(1991-1998). Ter-Petrosyan received 21.5 percent, followed by the
Armenian parliament~Rs ex-speaker Arthur Bagdarasyan at 17 percent,
the representative of Armenia~Rs oldest party Dashnaktsutiun and
vice-speaker of the republic~Rs current parliament Vaan Ovannisyan
with 6 percent, and former prime minister of Armenia~Rs government in
the early 1990~Rs Vazgen Manukyan with 2 percent. Turnout was high,
at nearly 70 percent.
However, election results in Armenia cannot be measured purely with
electoral arithmetic. Up until now, the Southern Caucasus region had
no experience in transferring power from one leader to another through
electoral procedures, and Armenia did not have an established tradition
of succession of power. Levon Ter-Petrosyan won the election in 1996,
but his victory was questioned not only via mass demonstrations,
but also by a declaration of the state of emergency following the
election. In 1998 he resigned as a result of a ~Svelvet coup.~T During
the 2003 parliamentary and presidential elections, there were new
protests and questions of the regime~Rs legitimacy.
Some of these elements are present today as well, as followers of the
defeated candidate likewise go out into the street to protest. But
there are also new aspects. Having served two terms in office,
Robert Kocharyan leaves without violating the Fundamental Law. Serge
Sarkisyan won in a competitive election. He certainly is the successor
to Kocharyan~Rs political course, but his victory is derived from an
election procedure, rather than a coup or a series of behind-the-scenes
negotiations. Thus, a new precedent is being set for a politically
unstable region.
The results of Armenian elections were not known beforehand, and the
intrigue persevered through election day. In September 2007, Levon
Ter-Petrosyan returned to politics after nine years of silence and
absence from any public activities.
This bright politician, who once led Armenia to independence,
won two election campaigns and lost his third one. He didn~Rt fail
completely, as his opponents and propagandists will make it sound
both in Yerevan and in Moscow. Armenia~Rs former president has
great electoral potential, unlike his main opponent, Ter-Petrosyan
who had no administrative resources and no party structures at his
disposal. He did not have his own faction in the parliament, although
he did have sympathizers among its members. But he did face pressure
and informational warfare. He was accused of everything short of
intentionally starving his own people. Less than six months later
and in the conditions described above, the ex-president won almost
one-fourth of all votes.
As is usually the case in post-Soviet states, the announcement of
election campaign results is interpreted in many different ways,
sometimes spilling out into the capital~Rs streets. Here is how
David Petrosyan, a well-known Yerevan journalist and political
analyst describes the new 2008 trend of street protests: ~SMeetings,
processions and other protest actions attract dozens of thousands of
people. The regime does everything in its power to not allow followers
of L. Ter-Petrosyan to flow into the capital from the provinces. So far
Ter-Petrosyan~Rs followers have demonstrated composure, self-control
and good organization. Despite the fact that they do not accept the
results of the election and call the current events a ~Scriminal
coup.~T So far the opposition is practicing peaceful, non-violent
legal and political methods. And this is probably the course this
struggle will continue to take.~T
It is hard to argue with Petrosyan~Rs words. However, the opposition~Rs
adherence to purely ~Speaceful methods of struggle~T can also be
ascribed to their understanding of the other resources the regime
possesses besides coercion. It has its own popularity resource, which
can be relied upon to use administrative pressure and informational
~Spumping.~T
If the current regime had no authority among the population,
the opposition would probably have acted in a more forceful and
less peaceful way. But the ghost of Orange Revolutions, which some
excessively zealous propagandists scared the Russian public with,
has yet to take root in Armenia. As Azerbaijan~Rs militarist rhetoric
increases, any internal destabilization in Armenia could potentially
threaten the country~Rs security.
The Armenian opposition as a whole, just like the Georgian one,
has not been able to become fully consolidated or to produce a clear
program and platform. The Armenian opposition was unable to increase
its electoral support by enlisting uncertain voters. The slogans of
stability and predictability have yet again turned out to be more
important for the majority of the population.
But based on election results (not only on the vote count, but
also on the facts of intra-political dynamics as a whole), it can
be concluded that, first of all, these elections were a competitive
struggle. There was no ~SOperation Successor~T that would have gone
smoothly and predictably.
Secondly, the competition will most likely continue, judged by the
situation inside the Central Election Commission. In particular,
two of the eight CEC members refused to sign the election report, and
one member appended his signature but expressed a ~Sspecial opinion.~T
Now, much will depend on Ter-Petrosyan~Rs plans. Will he become a
magnet for all discontented Armenians, a patriarch of the opposition?
The next parliamentary election is a long three years away. Unlike
their Georgian colleagues, the Armenian opposition has to develop a
long-term strategy. In these three years, they will have to accrue
political weight. That is, they must not attempt to get rid of each
other, and should not criticize authorities just for being in power.
This task is much more complicated than simply holding protests
and rallies.
As for the ~SWest-Russia~T dilemma, no matter what his policy is,
the president of Armenia will solve it along the following lines:
both the West and Russia. In Yerevan this course is called a policy
of complimentarism.
The Armenian elite will cooperate with Moscow as well as with
Washington and with Brussels, for rather pragmatic reasons. There
are abundant Armenian diasporas in Western countries (especially in
the United States and France), which are involved in both business
activities and in the administrative and political decision-making
process in these countries. Also, Armenia is trying to influence Turkey
(Ankara wants to join the EU, and therefore must adjust to ~SEuropean
standards~T), as well as to overcome its far from brilliant isolation
with Western help. All this means that no matter who wins in Yerevan,
these ~Swinners~T will be guided not by pretty toasts, but by real
politics, advantages and pragmatism.
Russia likewise needs to be pragmatic in developing its strategy
in the Caucasus. Our country should switch from references to the
~Sglorious past~T to pragmatic advantages. Armenia is ready and
willing to cooperate with Russia in the military sphere, as well as
in the field of security (unlike Georgia).
This opportunity should be taken advantage of, along with other
opportunities. Not many people know that the gasification in Armenia
is developing much faster than inside Russia itself.
Russian business is also very active in the field of
telecommunications, having invested more in this field in one year than
Greek business has in the past ten. These are the interests that should
become grounds for full-value bilateral cooperation between Armenia and
Russia, and not fear of the Western threat and ~Scolored revolutions.~T
Sergey Markedonov, PhD, is the Head of the Interethnic Relations
Department at Moscow~Rs Institute of Political and Military Analysis.
Sergei Markedonov
Russia Profile
Feb 28 2008
Russia
The year 2008 can be called an ~SElection Year~T for Southern Caucasus
states. On Jan. 5, there was a presidential election in Georgia
(with a parliamentary election campaign coming up in May). It was
Armenia~Rs turn on February 19. A few days ago, this republic not
only elected its president, it practically completed an election
cycle. In May 2007, Armenia elected its national parliament. That
was when Serge Sarkisyan, the winning party~Rs frontrunner and Prime
Minister of Armenia, became the official successor of Robert Kocharyan.
After processing voting records from all 1923 polling stations,
the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Armenia announced the results.
According to its data, Sarkisyan received 53 percent. The second place
was taken by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the first president of Armenia
(1991-1998). Ter-Petrosyan received 21.5 percent, followed by the
Armenian parliament~Rs ex-speaker Arthur Bagdarasyan at 17 percent,
the representative of Armenia~Rs oldest party Dashnaktsutiun and
vice-speaker of the republic~Rs current parliament Vaan Ovannisyan
with 6 percent, and former prime minister of Armenia~Rs government in
the early 1990~Rs Vazgen Manukyan with 2 percent. Turnout was high,
at nearly 70 percent.
However, election results in Armenia cannot be measured purely with
electoral arithmetic. Up until now, the Southern Caucasus region had
no experience in transferring power from one leader to another through
electoral procedures, and Armenia did not have an established tradition
of succession of power. Levon Ter-Petrosyan won the election in 1996,
but his victory was questioned not only via mass demonstrations,
but also by a declaration of the state of emergency following the
election. In 1998 he resigned as a result of a ~Svelvet coup.~T During
the 2003 parliamentary and presidential elections, there were new
protests and questions of the regime~Rs legitimacy.
Some of these elements are present today as well, as followers of the
defeated candidate likewise go out into the street to protest. But
there are also new aspects. Having served two terms in office,
Robert Kocharyan leaves without violating the Fundamental Law. Serge
Sarkisyan won in a competitive election. He certainly is the successor
to Kocharyan~Rs political course, but his victory is derived from an
election procedure, rather than a coup or a series of behind-the-scenes
negotiations. Thus, a new precedent is being set for a politically
unstable region.
The results of Armenian elections were not known beforehand, and the
intrigue persevered through election day. In September 2007, Levon
Ter-Petrosyan returned to politics after nine years of silence and
absence from any public activities.
This bright politician, who once led Armenia to independence,
won two election campaigns and lost his third one. He didn~Rt fail
completely, as his opponents and propagandists will make it sound
both in Yerevan and in Moscow. Armenia~Rs former president has
great electoral potential, unlike his main opponent, Ter-Petrosyan
who had no administrative resources and no party structures at his
disposal. He did not have his own faction in the parliament, although
he did have sympathizers among its members. But he did face pressure
and informational warfare. He was accused of everything short of
intentionally starving his own people. Less than six months later
and in the conditions described above, the ex-president won almost
one-fourth of all votes.
As is usually the case in post-Soviet states, the announcement of
election campaign results is interpreted in many different ways,
sometimes spilling out into the capital~Rs streets. Here is how
David Petrosyan, a well-known Yerevan journalist and political
analyst describes the new 2008 trend of street protests: ~SMeetings,
processions and other protest actions attract dozens of thousands of
people. The regime does everything in its power to not allow followers
of L. Ter-Petrosyan to flow into the capital from the provinces. So far
Ter-Petrosyan~Rs followers have demonstrated composure, self-control
and good organization. Despite the fact that they do not accept the
results of the election and call the current events a ~Scriminal
coup.~T So far the opposition is practicing peaceful, non-violent
legal and political methods. And this is probably the course this
struggle will continue to take.~T
It is hard to argue with Petrosyan~Rs words. However, the opposition~Rs
adherence to purely ~Speaceful methods of struggle~T can also be
ascribed to their understanding of the other resources the regime
possesses besides coercion. It has its own popularity resource, which
can be relied upon to use administrative pressure and informational
~Spumping.~T
If the current regime had no authority among the population,
the opposition would probably have acted in a more forceful and
less peaceful way. But the ghost of Orange Revolutions, which some
excessively zealous propagandists scared the Russian public with,
has yet to take root in Armenia. As Azerbaijan~Rs militarist rhetoric
increases, any internal destabilization in Armenia could potentially
threaten the country~Rs security.
The Armenian opposition as a whole, just like the Georgian one,
has not been able to become fully consolidated or to produce a clear
program and platform. The Armenian opposition was unable to increase
its electoral support by enlisting uncertain voters. The slogans of
stability and predictability have yet again turned out to be more
important for the majority of the population.
But based on election results (not only on the vote count, but
also on the facts of intra-political dynamics as a whole), it can
be concluded that, first of all, these elections were a competitive
struggle. There was no ~SOperation Successor~T that would have gone
smoothly and predictably.
Secondly, the competition will most likely continue, judged by the
situation inside the Central Election Commission. In particular,
two of the eight CEC members refused to sign the election report, and
one member appended his signature but expressed a ~Sspecial opinion.~T
Now, much will depend on Ter-Petrosyan~Rs plans. Will he become a
magnet for all discontented Armenians, a patriarch of the opposition?
The next parliamentary election is a long three years away. Unlike
their Georgian colleagues, the Armenian opposition has to develop a
long-term strategy. In these three years, they will have to accrue
political weight. That is, they must not attempt to get rid of each
other, and should not criticize authorities just for being in power.
This task is much more complicated than simply holding protests
and rallies.
As for the ~SWest-Russia~T dilemma, no matter what his policy is,
the president of Armenia will solve it along the following lines:
both the West and Russia. In Yerevan this course is called a policy
of complimentarism.
The Armenian elite will cooperate with Moscow as well as with
Washington and with Brussels, for rather pragmatic reasons. There
are abundant Armenian diasporas in Western countries (especially in
the United States and France), which are involved in both business
activities and in the administrative and political decision-making
process in these countries. Also, Armenia is trying to influence Turkey
(Ankara wants to join the EU, and therefore must adjust to ~SEuropean
standards~T), as well as to overcome its far from brilliant isolation
with Western help. All this means that no matter who wins in Yerevan,
these ~Swinners~T will be guided not by pretty toasts, but by real
politics, advantages and pragmatism.
Russia likewise needs to be pragmatic in developing its strategy
in the Caucasus. Our country should switch from references to the
~Sglorious past~T to pragmatic advantages. Armenia is ready and
willing to cooperate with Russia in the military sphere, as well as
in the field of security (unlike Georgia).
This opportunity should be taken advantage of, along with other
opportunities. Not many people know that the gasification in Armenia
is developing much faster than inside Russia itself.
Russian business is also very active in the field of
telecommunications, having invested more in this field in one year than
Greek business has in the past ten. These are the interests that should
become grounds for full-value bilateral cooperation between Armenia and
Russia, and not fear of the Western threat and ~Scolored revolutions.~T
Sergey Markedonov, PhD, is the Head of the Interethnic Relations
Department at Moscow~Rs Institute of Political and Military Analysis.