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TURKISH-ARMENIAN RELATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2)
by Ali Yurttagul*
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Feb 29 2008
The reason that Armenia does not have too many problems with its
contradictory "policies of balance" is partially because of its current
"cease-fire" with Azerbaijan and because of the embargo that Turkey
has placed on Armenia.
Even if it is not possible for Turkey to have good relations with
Armenia for as long as that nation continues to occupy Azerbaijani
land, it is also not very constructive for Turkey to entirely base its
Armenia policies on Azerbaijan. Within this framework, just as Turkey
would emerge as the most advantageous nation in any improvement of
relations between Ankara, Yerevan and Baku, it is also in the best
position in terms of finding a solution. In addition, Turkey is also
in the position of being the nation which would be most affected
by any new Armenian-Azerbaijani armed clashes. No matter what the
result of any new armed clashes, they would be to the disadvantage
of Turkey. Namely, the presence and effect of both Iran and Russia
in this region are hidden in the perpetuation of this crisis and
the struggle between Azerbaijan and Armenia. For this reason, Turkey
needs to make it known that it will not allow any new armed clashes,
and it should take an active role in pushing these two nations to
come to a solution. One-quarter of Azerbaijan is under occupation,
while more than 1 million people have been forced from their homes,
waiting in miserable conditions to be able to return.
Azerbaijanis are in the meantime becoming more heavily armed, which
is why the risk of a new war continues to rise. And while Armenia's
economic position may be improving, it is still the poorest nation
in the region. Its relations with both Russia and Iran continue to
deepen. While the European Union does have economic influence in the
region, in terms of politics, its presence is not really felt.
Turkey, conversely, is in a position to affect the regional balance.
Just as Turkey could bring about the Armenian pullout from Azerbaijani
territory, it could also help speed up the period needed to find a
solution for the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. The dependence of both
Armenia and Azerbaijan on Turkey is much deeper than that of Turkey
on these two nations.
Reviewing policies
If Turkey wants to implement new policies on Armenia, it needs to
review its embargo-boycott policies towards this nation. Even though
relations between Turkey and Armenia might not immediately normalize,
the startup of dialogue and diplomatic relations and the opening up of
the border between Turkey and Armenia would at least not only bring
about the possibility of closer ties between Yerevan and Ankara, but
would also pull the current north-south indexed "policies of balance"
currently pursued by Armenia to a more east-west trajectory. In this
situation, Armenia would no longer be able to use Turkey's embargo as
an excuse for its "policies of balance" while at the same time its
dependence on Turkey would increase with each passing day. This is,
of course, not to say that numerous other problems would not continue,
though.
Looking at other problems that are preventing closer relations between
Turkey and Armenia, two topics in particular move to the forefront:
the recognition of borders and the genocide matter. Let us look
briefly at the question of the recognition of borders. Turkey must
be careful not to fall into the absurd position Greece fell into in
its policies toward Macedonia.
The allegations that Armenia is demanding land from Turkey must
not be taken seriously. In fact, the still-relevant Kars accord of
1921 is enough to confirm this and allow relations to not be marred
by these allegations. There is no need to allow statements made by
a few radical Armenian nationalists to destroy what should be more
levelheaded relations between Turkey and Armenia. Just as Greek claims
that a "Macedonia with its population of 2 million is threatening us"
put that nation into an absurd position, Ankara's claims that Yerevan
is threatening it do not look particularly believable. Leaving Armenia
to deal with EU institutions regarding any problems it may have with
borders would be a much smarter method for Ankara to pursue.
As for the genocide question, this matter is a more difficult one
in terms of Turkish-Armenian relations. It is a problem which will
take much more time, which is much more multi-dimensional and which
is an important and large-scale problem. Just as the genocide matter
makes Turkey's own international relations more difficult, we also
see that, as in the case of Hrant Dink, it also plays a large role
in Turkish national politics. It is no question that the genocide
question presents an important barrier to Turkish relations with
Armenia. Thus we would like to touch on three significant dimensions
of this matter with regard to Turkish relations with both Armenia and
the EU. Let us examine these three dimensions of the "genocide theory"
from both their historical perspective and their human perspective.
The events of 1915 have been scrutinized not only by Turkey, but
globally. Armenians say "genocide," while the official Turkish view
is that no "genocide" took place and that instead what happened was
"forced migration." In talking about these painful events, sources from
the Turkish Historical Society (TTK) say 300,000 were killed while
objective researchers say between 600,000 and 800,000 were killed
and Armenian sources say 1.5 million people were killed. We do not
wish to enter into a debate here about who is telling the truth or
whether it was a "genocide" or "forced migration." To this end, we do
not believe that this subject has actually even been debated enough,
especially in Turkey. For this reason, just as this subject must not
be accepted as a pre-requisite for a start-up of relations between
Turkey and Armenia, it must also not be accepted as a pre-condition
for anything else. From this perspective, Turkey's efforts to put
the subject firmly into the hands of historians have been right
on the mark. And if Turkey wants to be consistent on this front,
it should not place any pre-conditions on this subject, which needs
a great deal of research. It should work to lift factors preventing
necessary research into this subject as well as end impediments to
freedom of thought and expression such as the controversial Article
301 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK).
As for the historical dimension to the debates over genocide, just
as this subject is one which needs time, it is also one in which
historians cannot come up with political solutions.
What historians can do is illuminate and bring about a healthy and
scientific basis to continue debates. It would be naive to expect
that historians would be able to create a "theory" or "history" that
both Turkey and Armenia would be able to accept. Just as historical
knowledge is not a science that is objective -- though many may
think so -- it is also true that historians are people. From this
perspective, a joint historical commission formed by Germany and
the Czech Republic to research the forced deportations of German
populations following the end of World War II is a good example. Just
as German and Czech researchers were unable to produce a shared
statement following more than 10 years of research, the members of this
joint historical research commission were not even able to come to
an agreement on the foreword to the two separate texts they prepared
for publication. The fact that these two EU nations were unable to
come to agreement on a "shared analysis" of events -- which could not
even be compared to those of 1915 in terms of their seriousness --
shows us how intertwined the science of history really is with modern
times. In essence, it would be realistic to expect that any shared
commissions formed by Turkey and Armenia on this subject would be
met with problems similar to those the German-Czech commission dealt
with. In order to record a shared and objective history, both sides in
this case need to be willing to dispense with various taboos. The late
Dink was a journalist who pointed freely at these taboos, which were
constantly provoked and fueled in both Armenia and Turkey. He was also
a journalist who was faced with a lot of trouble stemming from these
taboos. There can be little doubt that it will be very difficult for
both Turkey and Armenia to dispense with their taboos on this subject.
These difficulties, however, are not ones which should prevent Turkey
from flexibility when it comes to the human dimension of the "genocide"
question. While the events may be labeled by Ankara as "forced
migrations" and while perhaps not 1.5 million people but instead
300,000 people were killed and deported from their homes, the fact
remains that the Armenians experienced much pain. We are thus forced
to take the pain of these events -- events which separated fathers
from their sons, mothers from their daughters, events which turned the
daily lives of many Armenians into a nightmare -- seriously. We need
to seriously consider the pain which Dink expressed as a melancholy,
but which we hear from many Armenians in the diaspora expressed as
hatred and enmity. In terms of dealing with this problem, which could
potentially last for hundreds of years, we need to try and understand
this pain which derived from events that took place on our soil. Thus
the human element here is critical. For the generations that came after
those who were killed or forced from their homes during the events of
1915, this is vital. And for us, it is vital in term of the load on our
conscience. Displaying sensitivity on this matter will relieve us as
people and will relieve Turkey in terms of its international relations.
Looking at the EU
Now let's take a moment to examine the EU aspect of this matter. Just
as Armenia now perceives that the US is not going to force Turkey to
enter good relations with Armenia, it has placed all of its own hopes
in terms of achieving results on Turkey's quest for EU accession. We
could say that Armenia, which is becoming closer to the EU within
the framework of the EU's "European Neighborly Policy" is the most
successful "partner" of the Caucasus. This tightening of ties between
the EU and Armenia, which overlaps with the sympathy that the EU
already feels for Armenia, causes some to think that Turkey will be
influenced by these changing balances. Also, there is some thought
that Yerevan could put the squeeze on Ankara not through the "genocide"
matter, as the diaspora does, but through the "embargo matter" and the
"good neighbor relations" conditions of the Copenhagen criteria. It
would be incorrect to dismiss these speculations as baseless. Though
this topic has not fully come to the table in Turkish-EU relations,
the same way Cyprus already has, it does not mean that it will not
tomorrow or the day after. And though the subject receives only nominal
attention in EU reports these days, it may take up a more generous
amount of space in relations between Ankara and Brussels in the future.
It will not be easy for Turkey to explain its embargo policy towards
Armenia and to pass it off as "constructive" from the perspective of
the EU's "good neighbor relations." Turkey needs first to win over
its own regional politics before entering the EU, which already has
good relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is to say that
the EU is already working towards peace and stability in the Caucuses
and, even though it may not be particularly effective on a political
level, it holds important instruments when it comes to economics in
the region.
What's more, Turkey's interests in the region overlap from every
perspective with those of the EU. If Turkey wants to be economically
influential in the Caucasus region, if it wants to see Russia pull
out militarily from the region and if it wants to see Russia abandon
its view of the Caucuses as its own front yard, it needs to use its
advantages from the region within the EU to help bring about peace.
There are many one-sided actions Turkey could take to bring this
about. Let us touch upon two of them.
By fulfilling certain responsibilities that it has toward ethnic
Armenian citizens who live in the Republic of Turkey, Turkey could be
taking an important step in the right direction. It needs to review
history books and see that the word "Armenian" is not used in place
of "enemy" and see to it that history is re-written accordingly. In
addition, schools offering education in the Armenian language should
be opened up to the children of Armenians who have moved to Turkey in
recent years. Likewise, a proper immigrant status must be conferred on
these people, who currently enjoy nothing in the way of social rights.
Just as many other minorities in Turkey have, the Armenians also
have plenty of complaints regarding the Foundations Law and its
implementation.
In overcoming these problems, Turkey would be showing its flexibility
in these matters, and not only would Armenian citizens win out,
but a positive message would be sent to both the EU and Armenia.
Turkey needs to enter into a new era of relations with Armenia. A
policy which supported a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem,
a healing of the armed clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, an
installation of peace in the Caucasus, an opening up of the region
to the world and to the West would be in every sense to Turkey's own
advantage, which is why Turkey needs to start diplomatic relations
with Armenia, open up the borders between the two countries and begin
playing a constructive and influential role in the Caucasus. Just as a
Turkey pursuing dialogue would weaken radical nationalist factions,
it would also switch Armenia's own "policies of balance" into a
Western-oriented, rather than Russia- and Iran-oriented, trajectory.
Just as Turkey could use all of the possibilities lent to it by its
relations with the EU in dealing with Armenia, a new approach to
Armenia would also weaken the European right, which wants to use the
Armenia matter to block Turkey on its path towards the EU. In the end,
just as policies in search of solutions have strengthened Turkey's
hand when it comes to Cyprus, they could also strengthen Turkey on
its relations with Armenia front. What's more, the risks present in
the Cyprus matter for Turkey are not even present in its potential
relations with Armenia.
Photo: Turkish President Abdullah Gul ( R ) with Patriarch Mesrob II,
the spiritual leader of Turkey's Armenian Orthodox community, met at
the Cankaya Palace in October of 2007 in an effort to build bridges
between the two countries.
* Ali Yurttagul is a political advisor for the Greens in the European
Parliament.
http://www.todayszaman.com/t z-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=135132
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
by Ali Yurttagul*
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Feb 29 2008
The reason that Armenia does not have too many problems with its
contradictory "policies of balance" is partially because of its current
"cease-fire" with Azerbaijan and because of the embargo that Turkey
has placed on Armenia.
Even if it is not possible for Turkey to have good relations with
Armenia for as long as that nation continues to occupy Azerbaijani
land, it is also not very constructive for Turkey to entirely base its
Armenia policies on Azerbaijan. Within this framework, just as Turkey
would emerge as the most advantageous nation in any improvement of
relations between Ankara, Yerevan and Baku, it is also in the best
position in terms of finding a solution. In addition, Turkey is also
in the position of being the nation which would be most affected
by any new Armenian-Azerbaijani armed clashes. No matter what the
result of any new armed clashes, they would be to the disadvantage
of Turkey. Namely, the presence and effect of both Iran and Russia
in this region are hidden in the perpetuation of this crisis and
the struggle between Azerbaijan and Armenia. For this reason, Turkey
needs to make it known that it will not allow any new armed clashes,
and it should take an active role in pushing these two nations to
come to a solution. One-quarter of Azerbaijan is under occupation,
while more than 1 million people have been forced from their homes,
waiting in miserable conditions to be able to return.
Azerbaijanis are in the meantime becoming more heavily armed, which
is why the risk of a new war continues to rise. And while Armenia's
economic position may be improving, it is still the poorest nation
in the region. Its relations with both Russia and Iran continue to
deepen. While the European Union does have economic influence in the
region, in terms of politics, its presence is not really felt.
Turkey, conversely, is in a position to affect the regional balance.
Just as Turkey could bring about the Armenian pullout from Azerbaijani
territory, it could also help speed up the period needed to find a
solution for the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. The dependence of both
Armenia and Azerbaijan on Turkey is much deeper than that of Turkey
on these two nations.
Reviewing policies
If Turkey wants to implement new policies on Armenia, it needs to
review its embargo-boycott policies towards this nation. Even though
relations between Turkey and Armenia might not immediately normalize,
the startup of dialogue and diplomatic relations and the opening up of
the border between Turkey and Armenia would at least not only bring
about the possibility of closer ties between Yerevan and Ankara, but
would also pull the current north-south indexed "policies of balance"
currently pursued by Armenia to a more east-west trajectory. In this
situation, Armenia would no longer be able to use Turkey's embargo as
an excuse for its "policies of balance" while at the same time its
dependence on Turkey would increase with each passing day. This is,
of course, not to say that numerous other problems would not continue,
though.
Looking at other problems that are preventing closer relations between
Turkey and Armenia, two topics in particular move to the forefront:
the recognition of borders and the genocide matter. Let us look
briefly at the question of the recognition of borders. Turkey must
be careful not to fall into the absurd position Greece fell into in
its policies toward Macedonia.
The allegations that Armenia is demanding land from Turkey must
not be taken seriously. In fact, the still-relevant Kars accord of
1921 is enough to confirm this and allow relations to not be marred
by these allegations. There is no need to allow statements made by
a few radical Armenian nationalists to destroy what should be more
levelheaded relations between Turkey and Armenia. Just as Greek claims
that a "Macedonia with its population of 2 million is threatening us"
put that nation into an absurd position, Ankara's claims that Yerevan
is threatening it do not look particularly believable. Leaving Armenia
to deal with EU institutions regarding any problems it may have with
borders would be a much smarter method for Ankara to pursue.
As for the genocide question, this matter is a more difficult one
in terms of Turkish-Armenian relations. It is a problem which will
take much more time, which is much more multi-dimensional and which
is an important and large-scale problem. Just as the genocide matter
makes Turkey's own international relations more difficult, we also
see that, as in the case of Hrant Dink, it also plays a large role
in Turkish national politics. It is no question that the genocide
question presents an important barrier to Turkish relations with
Armenia. Thus we would like to touch on three significant dimensions
of this matter with regard to Turkish relations with both Armenia and
the EU. Let us examine these three dimensions of the "genocide theory"
from both their historical perspective and their human perspective.
The events of 1915 have been scrutinized not only by Turkey, but
globally. Armenians say "genocide," while the official Turkish view
is that no "genocide" took place and that instead what happened was
"forced migration." In talking about these painful events, sources from
the Turkish Historical Society (TTK) say 300,000 were killed while
objective researchers say between 600,000 and 800,000 were killed
and Armenian sources say 1.5 million people were killed. We do not
wish to enter into a debate here about who is telling the truth or
whether it was a "genocide" or "forced migration." To this end, we do
not believe that this subject has actually even been debated enough,
especially in Turkey. For this reason, just as this subject must not
be accepted as a pre-requisite for a start-up of relations between
Turkey and Armenia, it must also not be accepted as a pre-condition
for anything else. From this perspective, Turkey's efforts to put
the subject firmly into the hands of historians have been right
on the mark. And if Turkey wants to be consistent on this front,
it should not place any pre-conditions on this subject, which needs
a great deal of research. It should work to lift factors preventing
necessary research into this subject as well as end impediments to
freedom of thought and expression such as the controversial Article
301 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK).
As for the historical dimension to the debates over genocide, just
as this subject is one which needs time, it is also one in which
historians cannot come up with political solutions.
What historians can do is illuminate and bring about a healthy and
scientific basis to continue debates. It would be naive to expect
that historians would be able to create a "theory" or "history" that
both Turkey and Armenia would be able to accept. Just as historical
knowledge is not a science that is objective -- though many may
think so -- it is also true that historians are people. From this
perspective, a joint historical commission formed by Germany and
the Czech Republic to research the forced deportations of German
populations following the end of World War II is a good example. Just
as German and Czech researchers were unable to produce a shared
statement following more than 10 years of research, the members of this
joint historical research commission were not even able to come to
an agreement on the foreword to the two separate texts they prepared
for publication. The fact that these two EU nations were unable to
come to agreement on a "shared analysis" of events -- which could not
even be compared to those of 1915 in terms of their seriousness --
shows us how intertwined the science of history really is with modern
times. In essence, it would be realistic to expect that any shared
commissions formed by Turkey and Armenia on this subject would be
met with problems similar to those the German-Czech commission dealt
with. In order to record a shared and objective history, both sides in
this case need to be willing to dispense with various taboos. The late
Dink was a journalist who pointed freely at these taboos, which were
constantly provoked and fueled in both Armenia and Turkey. He was also
a journalist who was faced with a lot of trouble stemming from these
taboos. There can be little doubt that it will be very difficult for
both Turkey and Armenia to dispense with their taboos on this subject.
These difficulties, however, are not ones which should prevent Turkey
from flexibility when it comes to the human dimension of the "genocide"
question. While the events may be labeled by Ankara as "forced
migrations" and while perhaps not 1.5 million people but instead
300,000 people were killed and deported from their homes, the fact
remains that the Armenians experienced much pain. We are thus forced
to take the pain of these events -- events which separated fathers
from their sons, mothers from their daughters, events which turned the
daily lives of many Armenians into a nightmare -- seriously. We need
to seriously consider the pain which Dink expressed as a melancholy,
but which we hear from many Armenians in the diaspora expressed as
hatred and enmity. In terms of dealing with this problem, which could
potentially last for hundreds of years, we need to try and understand
this pain which derived from events that took place on our soil. Thus
the human element here is critical. For the generations that came after
those who were killed or forced from their homes during the events of
1915, this is vital. And for us, it is vital in term of the load on our
conscience. Displaying sensitivity on this matter will relieve us as
people and will relieve Turkey in terms of its international relations.
Looking at the EU
Now let's take a moment to examine the EU aspect of this matter. Just
as Armenia now perceives that the US is not going to force Turkey to
enter good relations with Armenia, it has placed all of its own hopes
in terms of achieving results on Turkey's quest for EU accession. We
could say that Armenia, which is becoming closer to the EU within
the framework of the EU's "European Neighborly Policy" is the most
successful "partner" of the Caucasus. This tightening of ties between
the EU and Armenia, which overlaps with the sympathy that the EU
already feels for Armenia, causes some to think that Turkey will be
influenced by these changing balances. Also, there is some thought
that Yerevan could put the squeeze on Ankara not through the "genocide"
matter, as the diaspora does, but through the "embargo matter" and the
"good neighbor relations" conditions of the Copenhagen criteria. It
would be incorrect to dismiss these speculations as baseless. Though
this topic has not fully come to the table in Turkish-EU relations,
the same way Cyprus already has, it does not mean that it will not
tomorrow or the day after. And though the subject receives only nominal
attention in EU reports these days, it may take up a more generous
amount of space in relations between Ankara and Brussels in the future.
It will not be easy for Turkey to explain its embargo policy towards
Armenia and to pass it off as "constructive" from the perspective of
the EU's "good neighbor relations." Turkey needs first to win over
its own regional politics before entering the EU, which already has
good relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is to say that
the EU is already working towards peace and stability in the Caucuses
and, even though it may not be particularly effective on a political
level, it holds important instruments when it comes to economics in
the region.
What's more, Turkey's interests in the region overlap from every
perspective with those of the EU. If Turkey wants to be economically
influential in the Caucasus region, if it wants to see Russia pull
out militarily from the region and if it wants to see Russia abandon
its view of the Caucuses as its own front yard, it needs to use its
advantages from the region within the EU to help bring about peace.
There are many one-sided actions Turkey could take to bring this
about. Let us touch upon two of them.
By fulfilling certain responsibilities that it has toward ethnic
Armenian citizens who live in the Republic of Turkey, Turkey could be
taking an important step in the right direction. It needs to review
history books and see that the word "Armenian" is not used in place
of "enemy" and see to it that history is re-written accordingly. In
addition, schools offering education in the Armenian language should
be opened up to the children of Armenians who have moved to Turkey in
recent years. Likewise, a proper immigrant status must be conferred on
these people, who currently enjoy nothing in the way of social rights.
Just as many other minorities in Turkey have, the Armenians also
have plenty of complaints regarding the Foundations Law and its
implementation.
In overcoming these problems, Turkey would be showing its flexibility
in these matters, and not only would Armenian citizens win out,
but a positive message would be sent to both the EU and Armenia.
Turkey needs to enter into a new era of relations with Armenia. A
policy which supported a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem,
a healing of the armed clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, an
installation of peace in the Caucasus, an opening up of the region
to the world and to the West would be in every sense to Turkey's own
advantage, which is why Turkey needs to start diplomatic relations
with Armenia, open up the borders between the two countries and begin
playing a constructive and influential role in the Caucasus. Just as a
Turkey pursuing dialogue would weaken radical nationalist factions,
it would also switch Armenia's own "policies of balance" into a
Western-oriented, rather than Russia- and Iran-oriented, trajectory.
Just as Turkey could use all of the possibilities lent to it by its
relations with the EU in dealing with Armenia, a new approach to
Armenia would also weaken the European right, which wants to use the
Armenia matter to block Turkey on its path towards the EU. In the end,
just as policies in search of solutions have strengthened Turkey's
hand when it comes to Cyprus, they could also strengthen Turkey on
its relations with Armenia front. What's more, the risks present in
the Cyprus matter for Turkey are not even present in its potential
relations with Armenia.
Photo: Turkish President Abdullah Gul ( R ) with Patriarch Mesrob II,
the spiritual leader of Turkey's Armenian Orthodox community, met at
the Cankaya Palace in October of 2007 in an effort to build bridges
between the two countries.
* Ali Yurttagul is a political advisor for the Greens in the European
Parliament.
http://www.todayszaman.com/t z-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=135132
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress