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Dennis Summut: `The conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny
Karabakh hang like the `sword of Damocles'
14 January 2008 [15:55] - Today.Az
A speech of Mr. Dennis Sammut (Executive Director, LINKS) made on
`Wider Black Sea: Perspectives for International and Regional Security'
conference held in Yerevan, Armenia (14-15 January 2008).
A holistic approach to security and conflict resolution in the
Caucasus Caspian Region
I am pleased to be participating in this important conference on the
topic of the Wider Black Sea and perspectives for regional and
international security. I am particularly pleased that this conference
is taking place in Armenia. It is right that Armenia should be
considered as a Black Sea Region country as indeed is the case with the
other countries of the South Caucasus. The region is a natural
extension of the Black Sea Area.
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been sovereign nation states only
for a short time in modern history. In this period they have been
trying to develop their international profile and define themselves in
the context of the international community. This has not been an easy
process. The relations between the three countries are at best
complicated. Trilateral relations are weak or non existent, bilateral
relations between Georgia and Armenia and Georgia and Azerbaijan are on
many issues difficult and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations are as you all
know at the moment based on a fragile cease fire.
For this reason we have seen a trend in the last three years whereby
the three countries have stopped describing themselves as South
Caucasus countries or from even discussing South Caucasus regional
co-operation, to other frameworks that they find more comfortable.
Georgia now prefers to define itself as a Black Sea country. Azerbaijan
emphasises its membership of GUAM and of the Islamic Conference
Organisation. Armenia describes itself as part of Eurasia and boasts of
its ability to develop special relations with Europe and the Middle
East, thanks largely to the well entrenched Armenian communities.
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia benefit from optimising their
relationships with nearby regional frameworks depending on whatever
they perceive to be their national interests and security. This process
is ongoing and all three countries now have a multi tiered network of
relations. The strategic geographic location of the South Caucasus
means that the three countries can have a foot in both East and West,
both north and south. Indeed this may be the time to zoom out and see
the region from a wider angle. However there is an important caveat
that needs to be made and I want to flag this up right at the beginning
because if ignored this can be an extremely negative factor. Whatever
configuration may exist in terms of regional cooperation, alliances, or
participation in international organisations there will always remain a
need for the three countries of the South Caucasus to organise the
relations between them bilaterally and trilaterally. History,
Geography, demography and a range of other issues necessitate this and
the full potential of the three countries will never be able to be
fully realised until this is achieved. In the last two or three years
all attempts to build relations between the three South Caucasus
countries seems to have stopped. The Saakashvili government in Tbilisi
that sees its neighbourhood as a constraint on its declared ambitions
of full integration with the Euro-Atlantic institutions rather than an
opportunity. This approach is wrong. Georgia should feel equally
comfortable as a European, Black Sea and Caucasian country, simply
because it is all three. For as long as the Karabakh conflict remains
unresolved and Armenian ` Azerbaijani relations remain problematic the
onus is on Georgia to maintain the necessary dialogue in the South
Caucasus, a process that needs also to be supported by the
international community. They also seem to be taking the line of least
resistance and shunning South Caucasus co-operation and opting for
easier options.
Having stated this in clear terms I know want to move on to discuss why
this notwithstanding we need to zoom out to a wider region if we want
to consider both the problems of the region and their solutions and the
potential of the region and the proper use of this potential for the
benefit of its inhabitants.
What is going on in the South Caucasus cannot be seen any more simply
from a local perspective. The regions prospects cannot be understood
unless the potential of the region as a connector between Asia and
Europe and Russia and the Middle East is appreciated and understood.
Last year I had the honour to serve as co-rapporteur for the Caucasus
Caspian Commission. Chaired by the Foreign Minister of Slovenia it
brought together twenty distinguished personalities from the European
Union, the United States, Russia and the Region. Its ten thousand word
report was published last month. As is sometimes the case with these
kind of initiatives where one is trying to build consensus between
people of very different views the report is in many aspects a fudge:
stating the obvious and not quite following through on some key ideas.
The report does however for the first time discuss this global
potential of the South Caucasus and invites the local governments to
have the foresight and vision to see beyond the present problems to a
future that can potentially be much brighter.
Nowhere is this more necessary than in Armenia. If I am to understand
correctly some of the arguments I have heard over the years the
security of Armenia as a country, and of the people of Nagorno Karabakh
in particular, is forever going to be dependent on hundreds of square
kilometres of empty land that has been cleansed of its population and
heavily mined. This cannot be right. The greatest asset of the Armenian
nation is its ability of its people to interact with others and pursue
commerce, culture and business. The highly successful Armenian
communities from Los Angeles to Beirut, from Moscow to Tehran, from
Paris to Aleppo are a proof of this. Armenia's strength does not come
from barbed wire and mine fields, it comes from its ability to develop
as a trade and commercial hub for the region. This requires open
borders and good relations with all neighbours. Armenia must therefore
look at its security from a different paradigm. The question therefore
is how does one embark on building a security framework that can allow
this to be achieved.
The report of the Caucasus-Caspian Commission speaks of a need for a
`more holistic approach to security involving all the states of the
region and other interested parties. This approach should aim to
establish a new security arrangement that can help build trust between
the states of the Caucasus-Caspian region and their neighbours,
introduce where appropriate a European perspective as an alternative
and put to a halt the slow but steady process of militarisation of the
region'. The report than talks about the need `to start an
international debate that could lead to an inclusive CSCE type process
that will consider the region's security challenges'.
In this second and last part of my presentation I want to discuss
further this idea and how it can be taken forward, emphasising that
since the Caucasus-Caspian Commission has finished its work and
dissolved I now speak only as Executive Director of LINKS.
Many believe that the time has come for a CSCE type arrangement for the
region that would create a mechanism for the countries of the region,
plus the interested outside powers, to come together in a framework
that, like the CSCE was comfortable for all players and with an agenda
wide enough for all participants to see a benefit. Nearly two decades
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union there are still issues
arising from the new situation created by that process that need to be
resolved. Issues of borders and citizenship between the ex Soviet
republics, the future of the unrecognised entities, relations with
third countries and the all important issue of the security of the
countries of the region from new and old threats.
The success of the CSCE was based on its inclusivity and on the
principle of consensus. A Caucasus-Caspian Security and Co-operation
Conference can only succeed if all the interested parties are
represented and if they all see some benefit in the process.
One may ask why this role could not be taken on by the OSCE. Others
disagree, saying that the OSCE whilst bringing in the experience of the
last decades also has certain baggage that it would be better for the
new arrangement not to have to carry. Also important players like Iran,
and possibly China will need to be brought into the new arrangement if
it is to be taken seriously.
Iran poses a particularly challenging problem given its stand off with
the international community on the issue of nuclear energy development.
However Iran in the Caucasus has overall been a constructive player.
Its participation in a Caucasus-Caspian security arrangement is not
only essential given the geography and its ties with the region, but
may even be a positive way in which it can be engaged on an issue of
common interest.
Many questions arise on the timing and remit of such a new arrangement.
The CSCE took more than a decade to come to fruition with the approval
of the Helsinki Final Act. A process in the Caucasus-Caspian Region
need not take so long but will nonetheless be complex and difficult to
negotiate.
The remit of a new initiative also poses questions.
¢ Should it, like the CSCE, have three baskets or should it focus on
raw security?
Whilst issues of governance and human dimension will pose tremendous
challenges to any new framework, given the diversity of political
systems now straddling each other in the region, many believe that what
is needed is a holistic approach that addresses security threats from
all its angles, including for example environment
¢ Should it limit itself to the South Caucasus or should it look at the
Caspian Region and also deal with sensitive issues such as Caspian Sea
delineation? Azerbaijan has security concerns related to the Caspian
that would make consideration of the issues surrounding this part of
the region essential
¢ And finally can the issue of the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Nagorno Karabakh also be dealt with in this framework. Here again
there are two schools of thought ` the first argues that putting these
three complicated conflicts in the remit of the new initiative will
essentially kill it before it starts given the failure of the
international community so far to solve these problems. However a
counter argument is that there is a better chance of these conflicts
being solved within the broader framework of a Caucasus Caspian
security arrangement where everybody's concerns can be addressed and
where concessions can be mutually negotiated as part of a wider
framework.
The conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh hang like
the `sword of Damocles' over the South Caucasus. They have drained the
region politically, economically and emotionally. Different sides have
different views as to how the conflicts started and why. They
articulate this in long expositions that are not always rational nor
historically sound. Yet despite the fact that to the outsider it is
clear that the region must move on and start tackling the wider, even
more serious challenges, it would be a big mistake to underestimate the
deep emotions that underpin the intransigent positions of the different
sides.
The international community has over the last decade and a half
struggled to manage the conflicts. Its best achievement has been in
stopping them flaring up again. The UN in Abkhazia, the OSCE in South
Ossetia and the United States, Russia and France, working in the
framework of the OSCE Minsk process in Nagorny Karabakh have put
considerable effort in resolving the conflicts, so far without any
results. Sometimes we are told that progress is being registered in the
negotiations on Karabakh and the co-chair are indicating the likelihood
of a breakthrough soon. Yet even if this happens, this is likely to be
the beginning of a difficult negotiation process rather than the end.
A political solution, even if one assumes the good will of all the
parties, is always going to be difficult, as the two principles:
territorial integrity and self determination compete for legitimacy.
The political discourse in the region ` both in the Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia, and in the unrecognised territories, adhere to an
absolutist approach to sovreignity with little consideration for the
process of globalisation that increasingly push towards integration.
Some discussion is starting on alternatives to this absolutist vision.
It needs to be encouraged.
There is an urgent need to break the vicious circle that perpetuates
the problem and the trends described above may be creating an
opportunity for this to happen. For this to work there must be very
clear and tangible gains for all sides and concessions that will not
require any of the sides to abandon their entrenched positions. Whilst
the three conflicts are very different and have a different dynamic
there are common features and possibility for a common (or similar)
approach to their resolution.
This will require as a basic minimum
¢ the end of the isolation of the unrecognised entities;
¢ the end of even the pretence on the part of the unrecognised entities
that they are independent states, but without necessarily their
acceptance to being part of a larger state;
¢ a much more robust international commitment to the peace process and
to the region long term.
Another important regional issue is connected with the Turkish-Armenian
relations. I very much hope that in the near future we can see these
relations normalised. However if the two countries on their own are not
able to free themselves from the baggage of history, perhaps within the
context of a Caucasus-Caspian Security and Co-operation Conference they
will.
In the meantime both on Karabakh and Abkhazia, on Turkish ` Armenian
Relations and Caspian Sea Delineation a much more comprehensive debate
needs to take place amongst civil society. Security in the 21st century
is no longer the prerogative of diplomats and generals; it is no longer
about barbed wire land mines and buffer zones. It requires populations
that are aware of the issues and about leaders who have the vision, as
well as the strength and the courage to pursue difficult and sometimes
unpopular decisions.
Karabakh hang like the `sword of Damocles'
14 January 2008 [15:55] - Today.Az
A speech of Mr. Dennis Sammut (Executive Director, LINKS) made on
`Wider Black Sea: Perspectives for International and Regional Security'
conference held in Yerevan, Armenia (14-15 January 2008).
A holistic approach to security and conflict resolution in the
Caucasus Caspian Region
I am pleased to be participating in this important conference on the
topic of the Wider Black Sea and perspectives for regional and
international security. I am particularly pleased that this conference
is taking place in Armenia. It is right that Armenia should be
considered as a Black Sea Region country as indeed is the case with the
other countries of the South Caucasus. The region is a natural
extension of the Black Sea Area.
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been sovereign nation states only
for a short time in modern history. In this period they have been
trying to develop their international profile and define themselves in
the context of the international community. This has not been an easy
process. The relations between the three countries are at best
complicated. Trilateral relations are weak or non existent, bilateral
relations between Georgia and Armenia and Georgia and Azerbaijan are on
many issues difficult and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations are as you all
know at the moment based on a fragile cease fire.
For this reason we have seen a trend in the last three years whereby
the three countries have stopped describing themselves as South
Caucasus countries or from even discussing South Caucasus regional
co-operation, to other frameworks that they find more comfortable.
Georgia now prefers to define itself as a Black Sea country. Azerbaijan
emphasises its membership of GUAM and of the Islamic Conference
Organisation. Armenia describes itself as part of Eurasia and boasts of
its ability to develop special relations with Europe and the Middle
East, thanks largely to the well entrenched Armenian communities.
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia benefit from optimising their
relationships with nearby regional frameworks depending on whatever
they perceive to be their national interests and security. This process
is ongoing and all three countries now have a multi tiered network of
relations. The strategic geographic location of the South Caucasus
means that the three countries can have a foot in both East and West,
both north and south. Indeed this may be the time to zoom out and see
the region from a wider angle. However there is an important caveat
that needs to be made and I want to flag this up right at the beginning
because if ignored this can be an extremely negative factor. Whatever
configuration may exist in terms of regional cooperation, alliances, or
participation in international organisations there will always remain a
need for the three countries of the South Caucasus to organise the
relations between them bilaterally and trilaterally. History,
Geography, demography and a range of other issues necessitate this and
the full potential of the three countries will never be able to be
fully realised until this is achieved. In the last two or three years
all attempts to build relations between the three South Caucasus
countries seems to have stopped. The Saakashvili government in Tbilisi
that sees its neighbourhood as a constraint on its declared ambitions
of full integration with the Euro-Atlantic institutions rather than an
opportunity. This approach is wrong. Georgia should feel equally
comfortable as a European, Black Sea and Caucasian country, simply
because it is all three. For as long as the Karabakh conflict remains
unresolved and Armenian ` Azerbaijani relations remain problematic the
onus is on Georgia to maintain the necessary dialogue in the South
Caucasus, a process that needs also to be supported by the
international community. They also seem to be taking the line of least
resistance and shunning South Caucasus co-operation and opting for
easier options.
Having stated this in clear terms I know want to move on to discuss why
this notwithstanding we need to zoom out to a wider region if we want
to consider both the problems of the region and their solutions and the
potential of the region and the proper use of this potential for the
benefit of its inhabitants.
What is going on in the South Caucasus cannot be seen any more simply
from a local perspective. The regions prospects cannot be understood
unless the potential of the region as a connector between Asia and
Europe and Russia and the Middle East is appreciated and understood.
Last year I had the honour to serve as co-rapporteur for the Caucasus
Caspian Commission. Chaired by the Foreign Minister of Slovenia it
brought together twenty distinguished personalities from the European
Union, the United States, Russia and the Region. Its ten thousand word
report was published last month. As is sometimes the case with these
kind of initiatives where one is trying to build consensus between
people of very different views the report is in many aspects a fudge:
stating the obvious and not quite following through on some key ideas.
The report does however for the first time discuss this global
potential of the South Caucasus and invites the local governments to
have the foresight and vision to see beyond the present problems to a
future that can potentially be much brighter.
Nowhere is this more necessary than in Armenia. If I am to understand
correctly some of the arguments I have heard over the years the
security of Armenia as a country, and of the people of Nagorno Karabakh
in particular, is forever going to be dependent on hundreds of square
kilometres of empty land that has been cleansed of its population and
heavily mined. This cannot be right. The greatest asset of the Armenian
nation is its ability of its people to interact with others and pursue
commerce, culture and business. The highly successful Armenian
communities from Los Angeles to Beirut, from Moscow to Tehran, from
Paris to Aleppo are a proof of this. Armenia's strength does not come
from barbed wire and mine fields, it comes from its ability to develop
as a trade and commercial hub for the region. This requires open
borders and good relations with all neighbours. Armenia must therefore
look at its security from a different paradigm. The question therefore
is how does one embark on building a security framework that can allow
this to be achieved.
The report of the Caucasus-Caspian Commission speaks of a need for a
`more holistic approach to security involving all the states of the
region and other interested parties. This approach should aim to
establish a new security arrangement that can help build trust between
the states of the Caucasus-Caspian region and their neighbours,
introduce where appropriate a European perspective as an alternative
and put to a halt the slow but steady process of militarisation of the
region'. The report than talks about the need `to start an
international debate that could lead to an inclusive CSCE type process
that will consider the region's security challenges'.
In this second and last part of my presentation I want to discuss
further this idea and how it can be taken forward, emphasising that
since the Caucasus-Caspian Commission has finished its work and
dissolved I now speak only as Executive Director of LINKS.
Many believe that the time has come for a CSCE type arrangement for the
region that would create a mechanism for the countries of the region,
plus the interested outside powers, to come together in a framework
that, like the CSCE was comfortable for all players and with an agenda
wide enough for all participants to see a benefit. Nearly two decades
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union there are still issues
arising from the new situation created by that process that need to be
resolved. Issues of borders and citizenship between the ex Soviet
republics, the future of the unrecognised entities, relations with
third countries and the all important issue of the security of the
countries of the region from new and old threats.
The success of the CSCE was based on its inclusivity and on the
principle of consensus. A Caucasus-Caspian Security and Co-operation
Conference can only succeed if all the interested parties are
represented and if they all see some benefit in the process.
One may ask why this role could not be taken on by the OSCE. Others
disagree, saying that the OSCE whilst bringing in the experience of the
last decades also has certain baggage that it would be better for the
new arrangement not to have to carry. Also important players like Iran,
and possibly China will need to be brought into the new arrangement if
it is to be taken seriously.
Iran poses a particularly challenging problem given its stand off with
the international community on the issue of nuclear energy development.
However Iran in the Caucasus has overall been a constructive player.
Its participation in a Caucasus-Caspian security arrangement is not
only essential given the geography and its ties with the region, but
may even be a positive way in which it can be engaged on an issue of
common interest.
Many questions arise on the timing and remit of such a new arrangement.
The CSCE took more than a decade to come to fruition with the approval
of the Helsinki Final Act. A process in the Caucasus-Caspian Region
need not take so long but will nonetheless be complex and difficult to
negotiate.
The remit of a new initiative also poses questions.
¢ Should it, like the CSCE, have three baskets or should it focus on
raw security?
Whilst issues of governance and human dimension will pose tremendous
challenges to any new framework, given the diversity of political
systems now straddling each other in the region, many believe that what
is needed is a holistic approach that addresses security threats from
all its angles, including for example environment
¢ Should it limit itself to the South Caucasus or should it look at the
Caspian Region and also deal with sensitive issues such as Caspian Sea
delineation? Azerbaijan has security concerns related to the Caspian
that would make consideration of the issues surrounding this part of
the region essential
¢ And finally can the issue of the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Nagorno Karabakh also be dealt with in this framework. Here again
there are two schools of thought ` the first argues that putting these
three complicated conflicts in the remit of the new initiative will
essentially kill it before it starts given the failure of the
international community so far to solve these problems. However a
counter argument is that there is a better chance of these conflicts
being solved within the broader framework of a Caucasus Caspian
security arrangement where everybody's concerns can be addressed and
where concessions can be mutually negotiated as part of a wider
framework.
The conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh hang like
the `sword of Damocles' over the South Caucasus. They have drained the
region politically, economically and emotionally. Different sides have
different views as to how the conflicts started and why. They
articulate this in long expositions that are not always rational nor
historically sound. Yet despite the fact that to the outsider it is
clear that the region must move on and start tackling the wider, even
more serious challenges, it would be a big mistake to underestimate the
deep emotions that underpin the intransigent positions of the different
sides.
The international community has over the last decade and a half
struggled to manage the conflicts. Its best achievement has been in
stopping them flaring up again. The UN in Abkhazia, the OSCE in South
Ossetia and the United States, Russia and France, working in the
framework of the OSCE Minsk process in Nagorny Karabakh have put
considerable effort in resolving the conflicts, so far without any
results. Sometimes we are told that progress is being registered in the
negotiations on Karabakh and the co-chair are indicating the likelihood
of a breakthrough soon. Yet even if this happens, this is likely to be
the beginning of a difficult negotiation process rather than the end.
A political solution, even if one assumes the good will of all the
parties, is always going to be difficult, as the two principles:
territorial integrity and self determination compete for legitimacy.
The political discourse in the region ` both in the Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia, and in the unrecognised territories, adhere to an
absolutist approach to sovreignity with little consideration for the
process of globalisation that increasingly push towards integration.
Some discussion is starting on alternatives to this absolutist vision.
It needs to be encouraged.
There is an urgent need to break the vicious circle that perpetuates
the problem and the trends described above may be creating an
opportunity for this to happen. For this to work there must be very
clear and tangible gains for all sides and concessions that will not
require any of the sides to abandon their entrenched positions. Whilst
the three conflicts are very different and have a different dynamic
there are common features and possibility for a common (or similar)
approach to their resolution.
This will require as a basic minimum
¢ the end of the isolation of the unrecognised entities;
¢ the end of even the pretence on the part of the unrecognised entities
that they are independent states, but without necessarily their
acceptance to being part of a larger state;
¢ a much more robust international commitment to the peace process and
to the region long term.
Another important regional issue is connected with the Turkish-Armenian
relations. I very much hope that in the near future we can see these
relations normalised. However if the two countries on their own are not
able to free themselves from the baggage of history, perhaps within the
context of a Caucasus-Caspian Security and Co-operation Conference they
will.
In the meantime both on Karabakh and Abkhazia, on Turkish ` Armenian
Relations and Caspian Sea Delineation a much more comprehensive debate
needs to take place amongst civil society. Security in the 21st century
is no longer the prerogative of diplomats and generals; it is no longer
about barbed wire land mines and buffer zones. It requires populations
that are aware of the issues and about leaders who have the vision, as
well as the strength and the courage to pursue difficult and sometimes
unpopular decisions.