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  • Medvedev Makes Splash In Baku

    MEDVEDEV MAKES SPLASH IN BAKU
    Shahin Abbasov

    ISN, Switzerland
    Monday, 07 July 2008

    The Russian president pulls out all the stops in Azerbaijan, but is
    it more style than substance?

    Russian leader Dmitry Medvedev concluded 3 July talks with Azerbaijani
    President Ilham Aliyev by pronouncing Baku to be Moscow's "strategic
    partner." Meanwhile, the head of the Kremlin-controlled conglomerate
    Gazprom, Alexei Miller, announced that talks would soon begin on
    the Russian firm's purchase of Azerbaijani gas. But experts remain
    unconvinced that the upbeat rhetoric surrounding Medvedev's visit
    will lead to any change in the existing bilateral relationship.

    During their meeting in Baku, Medvedev and Aliyev issued a declaration
    of friendship and presided over the signing of four intergovernmental
    agreements covering such areas as customs and privatization. The
    friendship declaration was vaguely worded and short on specifics,
    although Russia did seem to endorse Baku's position that any political
    settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should not undermine
    Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, according to a report distributed
    by the APA news agency. At the same time, Medvedev was non-committal
    in his public comments, saying that Russia favors resolution of the
    Karabakh conflict through direct talks between the Azerbaijani and
    Armenian presidents.

    The two sides expressed a desire for better coordination in
    the security sphere, and announced an intention to complete the
    delimitation of their shared border. In another section of the
    friendship declaration, Baku and Moscow pledged to promote a "central
    role in international affairs" for the United Nations.

    Miller, the Gazprom CEO, made perhaps the biggest news of the visit,
    telling journalists that Russia and Azerbaijan had agreed to start
    talks covering the purchases of Azerbaijani gas. "Azerbaijan will
    become another country where Gazprom can buy gas while just few years
    ago, our [Russian] gas was purchased by Azerbaijan," Miller said. He
    declined to speculate on how much gas Gazprom was hoping to buy from
    Azerbaijan, saying only that the company was prepared pay market
    prices to obtain "maximum volume."

    While on its surface the Kremlin's ability to cajole Azerbaijan
    into talking about gas sales may seem like a diplomatic coup. But
    Azerbaijani experts are skeptical that Medvedev's visit alone will
    prompt Baku to make a geopolitical shift in Moscow's direction.

    Elhan Shahinoglu, head of the Baku-based Atlas non-governmental
    think-tank, suggested that Aliyev, not wanting to antagonize Russia,
    was stringing Medvedev and Gazprom along, essentially playing for
    time. "Baku will try to delay the issue [of gas sales] for as long
    as possible," Shahinoglu said to EurasiaNet.

    According to Shahinoglu, Baku would prefer not to see Russia become a
    middleman for Azerbaijani gas exports to Europe. Instead, Azerbaijani
    officials are more interested in pursuing the US- and EU-supported
    Nabucco project, which would evade Russia and link Caspian Basin
    natural gas directly to European markets. The dilemma for Baku is
    that Nabucco has not yet received the final go-ahead, and remains
    stuck in the feasibility-study stage.

    Another question mark for Azerbaijani export plans is the fact that
    Turkmenistan has yet to make a firm commitment to shipping gas
    via a trans-Caspian pipeline that would connect into the Nabucco
    network. Such uncertainty reinforces Baku's inclination to "not rush
    with answer to Russia's offer," Shahinoglu said.

    Baku-based energy expert Ilham Shaban believes that, at present,
    the maximum amount of gas that Azerbaijan is willing to sell
    Russia annually is 1 billion cubic meters. In addition, Azerbaijani
    officials are disinclined to accede to Gazprom's desire to purchase
    large volumes from the Shah Deniz field. "Baku is unlikely to agree
    to sell gas from Shah Deniz to Russia," Shaban told EurasiaNet.

    Other experts, such as political scientist Hikmet Hajizade, say
    that while Russia currently seems keen on energy cooperation with
    Azerbaijan, that stance would change quickly if Nabucco became a
    reality. Azerbaijani participation in Nabucco would automatically
    transform Baku and Moscow into bitter competitors. In this event,
    Hajizade added, Moscow would likely institute economic and diplomatic
    policies designed to coerce Baku.

    Shahinoglu, the think-tank expert, predicted that if Baku pursues
    an export strategy that is not to Moscow's liking, then the Kremlin
    would retaliate in other areas. "It is likely that Russia will use
    the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to pressure Baku," he said.

    Shahinoglu and other experts are also wary of Russia's tendency to
    use corporate investment as a cudgel to compel former Soviet states
    to follow the Kremlin's line. Many Russian firms, especially energy
    companies, are awash in capital and are always on the outlook to
    obtain stakes in neighboring countries' infrastructures, such as
    energy distribution networks. During his visit to Baku, Medvedev was
    accompanied by large group of Russia's business leaders, including
    Gazprom's Miller, LukOil President Vagit Alekperov, and VTB Bank
    chairman Andrei Kostin.

    While Shahinoglu characterized the current state of Azerbaijani-Russian
    relations as "normal," he and other experts pointed to a trouble
    spot on the immediate horizon. The dilemma concerns a border spat
    involving two Azerbaijani villages - Xraxoba and Uryanoba, located
    in the Khachmaz Region along the border with the Russian autonomous
    republic of Dagestan.

    The two villages were transferred to Russia for a period of 20 years
    during Soviet times, and although the transfer agreement expired in
    2004, Russia has shown no signs of returning the settlements.

    Indeed, the fate of the villages is perhaps the largest impediment
    to the completion of border delimitation, as the residents of those
    villages have received Russian citizenship and have been thoroughly
    integrated in Russia's political and economic system.
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