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CALCULATIONS FOR TWO?
Mikhail Rostovsky
WPS Agency
What the Papers Say
July 2, 2008 Wednesday
Why Russia should expand cooperation with Kazakhstan; Despite
Russia's economic and emotional upswing during the Putin era,
Moscow's capabilities in our erstwhile zone of exclusive influence
have been shrinking with every passing year. Kazakhstan is Russia's
most promising partner within the CIS.
The direction of development in the former USSR has remained unchanged
since 1991. Despite Russia's economic and emotional upswing during the
Putin era, Moscow's capabilities in our erstwhile zone of exclusive
influence have been shrinking with every passing year.
In recent years, a new political elite has emerged in Georgia -
an elite with a very definite mindset. Take the current Cabinet in
Tbilisi. Of its 18 members, eleven - including the prime minister
- are under 40 years old. One lady minister - Economic Development
Minister Ekaterina Sharashidze, 34 - is able to boast dual US-Georgian
citizenship. Twelve of her colleagues have either studied or worked
in America or other Western nations.
A few years ago, Moscow still had a chance of attaching Georgia to
itself and giving NATO the finger. This would have required finding
some way of reuniting Georgia and Abkhazia, with Russia guaranteeing
that both sides would abide by agreements. But these days, according
to experts, there is no longer any way of stopping Georgia's steady
drift toward NATO.
The most that Moscow can do now is take revenge on Tbilisi for its
pro-NATO policies by separating Abkhazia from Georgia forever. Even
this, however, is uncertain. Russian political analyst Ruslan
Saidov says: "Sooner or later, the Abkhazians and the Georgians will
reach agreement directly - and Moscow will be a third wheel. What
has Abkhazia achieved over the past 16 years? Freeing itself from
Georgia's dominance? But is it really preferable to have Russians
and Armenians outnumbering ethnic Abkhazians in Abkhazia itself? For
Sukhumi, friendship with Moscow was a necessary tactical move. But
tactics have a habit of changing periodically."
Another sore point for us is Ukraine; things don't look as hopeless
for Moscow there. Yet the best we can expect is that Ukraine will
end up neutral.
By 2017, barring any tectonic shifts in Ukrainian politics, Sevastopol
will be known as a former city of Russian naval glory. The Black Sea
Fleet is already falling apart due to disastrous funding shortages. But
the main problem is that Moscow simply has no arguments capable of
persuading Kiev to extend the treaty allowing our Fleet to remain in
the Crimea.
Our offer to raise the rent we pay for the Black Sea Fleet base as of
2017 is not a convincing argument. Kiev's demand for the Russian Navy's
withdrawal is based on high-level state ideology considerations; and
an ideological argument can only be defeated by another ideological
argument, not money. But what kind of ideological project can we
produce for Kiev? The "Slavic brotherhood" idea has only amusement
value these days.
Very similar dynamics are being observed in almost all other former
Soviet states.
A high-ranking official source says: "Of course, Russia's national
interests require integration with other CIS countries - but our
country is now being run like a business corporation, and that system
of values lacks the concept of national interests. It only knows the
concept of profits. Russia Inc. doesn't need integration. After all,
that would mean having to share the profits."
A source from the Cabinet staff is even less sentimental: "Integration
assumes specific benefits for the participants. But what would Russia
gain from integration, exactly? Our economy wouldn't benefit - after
all, most of our import and export trade is outside the CIS. Thus,
it isn't clear what the positive effect of integration would be -
aside from political dividends."
Most of Russia's elite has reconciled itself to the idea that
everything will continue moving in the same direction as it's moving
now. Many even see a positive side to that. If Russia's current
direction of development remains unchanged, we won't become "another
Britain" at all; we shall become something far less attractive.
The British economy owes its success to high-tech industry, developed
infrastructure, and small business. But in Russia, despite all the fuss
about nanotechnology, everything still comes down to raw materials.
After all, there are no oceans dividing Russia from the other former
Soviet states. They are still our neighbors.
Let's assume that the European republics of the former USSR do not
present any security concerns. But then there is Central Asia -
which certainly won't be admitted into the European Union.
Each of the Central Asian states is "unhappy" in its own way, but they
have this much in common: the long-term threat of a powerful crisis
and transformation into part of a Central Asian Islamic caliphate. If
something like that does happen, Russia certainly wouldn't be able to
stand aside. Yes, we are separated from Central Asia by Kazakhstan -
but Nazarbayev's state cannot act as a buffer all on its own.
In 2001, the threat of a large-scale regional crisis in Central Asia
was averted thanks to the American invasion of Afghanistan. But
although almost seven years have passed, the Yanks still haven't
managed any radical changes for the better in Afghanistan. Thus, it
appears that Russia will mostly have to rely on itself. Then again,
there is another country - similar to Russia in terms of mindset
and political structure - which would also face mortal peril in the
event of a Central Asian crisis. That country is the abovementioned
Kazakhstan. It's worth noting that Kazakhstan made its latest
integration proposal to Russia as recently as last month.
In May, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan proposed gradual
measures to integrate the economies of Kazakhstan and Russia. A senior
official source in Moscow comments as follows: "Kazakhstan has long
since chosen its model: maneuvering between three centers of power -
Russia, China, and the West. Therefore, I find it hard to believe that
Kazakhstan will now agree to pursue integration with Russia for real,
rather than just talking about it."
The skeptics may be right this time as well - but if integration
between Russia and Kazakhstan is possible at all, there has never
been a more favorable moment for it than now, and there probably
won't be a more favorable time in the future. After all, the threat
of destabilization in Central Asia is not the only thing that unites
our two countries.
Both Russia and Kazakhstan have experienced rapid economic growth
due to oil prices reaching record highs. But neither country has any
chance of becoming the Eurasian equivalent of a country such as Qatar.
The Astana presidential administration has entrusted none other than
the Contemporary Development Institute in Moscow with working out
part of a long-term development plan for Kazakhstan. Note that the
Institute is known as President Dmitri Medvedev's think-tank. Medvedev
himself chairs its board of trustees.
What kind of plan might the officials of Russia and Kazakhstan come up
with? Clearly, there is absolutely no question of surrendering national
sovereignty. But partial unification of pipeline systems and other
transport systems, along with attempts to cooperate in introducing
new technologies - such plans wouldn't be entirely unfeasible. In
both areas, the chances of success are correlated with project
size. Besides, Moscow and Astana have already shown that they are
capable of reaching agreement on specific issues. Although it's not
the done thing to mention it publicly, Russian-Kazakh "friendship"
in the nuclear sector is very close.
If Moscow and Astana can manage to create an economic integration
nucleus, that in itself would be a great step forward. After all, the
powerful European Union of today started out as the modest European
Coal and Steel Community, established with the aim of reconciling
France and Germany.
Of course, all potential consequences should be calculated thoroughly
before going ahead with any integration project such as the proposed
alliance with Kazakhstan. But it is also very important to avoid
missing the bus.
Mikhail Rostovsky
WPS Agency
What the Papers Say
July 2, 2008 Wednesday
Why Russia should expand cooperation with Kazakhstan; Despite
Russia's economic and emotional upswing during the Putin era,
Moscow's capabilities in our erstwhile zone of exclusive influence
have been shrinking with every passing year. Kazakhstan is Russia's
most promising partner within the CIS.
The direction of development in the former USSR has remained unchanged
since 1991. Despite Russia's economic and emotional upswing during the
Putin era, Moscow's capabilities in our erstwhile zone of exclusive
influence have been shrinking with every passing year.
In recent years, a new political elite has emerged in Georgia -
an elite with a very definite mindset. Take the current Cabinet in
Tbilisi. Of its 18 members, eleven - including the prime minister
- are under 40 years old. One lady minister - Economic Development
Minister Ekaterina Sharashidze, 34 - is able to boast dual US-Georgian
citizenship. Twelve of her colleagues have either studied or worked
in America or other Western nations.
A few years ago, Moscow still had a chance of attaching Georgia to
itself and giving NATO the finger. This would have required finding
some way of reuniting Georgia and Abkhazia, with Russia guaranteeing
that both sides would abide by agreements. But these days, according
to experts, there is no longer any way of stopping Georgia's steady
drift toward NATO.
The most that Moscow can do now is take revenge on Tbilisi for its
pro-NATO policies by separating Abkhazia from Georgia forever. Even
this, however, is uncertain. Russian political analyst Ruslan
Saidov says: "Sooner or later, the Abkhazians and the Georgians will
reach agreement directly - and Moscow will be a third wheel. What
has Abkhazia achieved over the past 16 years? Freeing itself from
Georgia's dominance? But is it really preferable to have Russians
and Armenians outnumbering ethnic Abkhazians in Abkhazia itself? For
Sukhumi, friendship with Moscow was a necessary tactical move. But
tactics have a habit of changing periodically."
Another sore point for us is Ukraine; things don't look as hopeless
for Moscow there. Yet the best we can expect is that Ukraine will
end up neutral.
By 2017, barring any tectonic shifts in Ukrainian politics, Sevastopol
will be known as a former city of Russian naval glory. The Black Sea
Fleet is already falling apart due to disastrous funding shortages. But
the main problem is that Moscow simply has no arguments capable of
persuading Kiev to extend the treaty allowing our Fleet to remain in
the Crimea.
Our offer to raise the rent we pay for the Black Sea Fleet base as of
2017 is not a convincing argument. Kiev's demand for the Russian Navy's
withdrawal is based on high-level state ideology considerations; and
an ideological argument can only be defeated by another ideological
argument, not money. But what kind of ideological project can we
produce for Kiev? The "Slavic brotherhood" idea has only amusement
value these days.
Very similar dynamics are being observed in almost all other former
Soviet states.
A high-ranking official source says: "Of course, Russia's national
interests require integration with other CIS countries - but our
country is now being run like a business corporation, and that system
of values lacks the concept of national interests. It only knows the
concept of profits. Russia Inc. doesn't need integration. After all,
that would mean having to share the profits."
A source from the Cabinet staff is even less sentimental: "Integration
assumes specific benefits for the participants. But what would Russia
gain from integration, exactly? Our economy wouldn't benefit - after
all, most of our import and export trade is outside the CIS. Thus,
it isn't clear what the positive effect of integration would be -
aside from political dividends."
Most of Russia's elite has reconciled itself to the idea that
everything will continue moving in the same direction as it's moving
now. Many even see a positive side to that. If Russia's current
direction of development remains unchanged, we won't become "another
Britain" at all; we shall become something far less attractive.
The British economy owes its success to high-tech industry, developed
infrastructure, and small business. But in Russia, despite all the fuss
about nanotechnology, everything still comes down to raw materials.
After all, there are no oceans dividing Russia from the other former
Soviet states. They are still our neighbors.
Let's assume that the European republics of the former USSR do not
present any security concerns. But then there is Central Asia -
which certainly won't be admitted into the European Union.
Each of the Central Asian states is "unhappy" in its own way, but they
have this much in common: the long-term threat of a powerful crisis
and transformation into part of a Central Asian Islamic caliphate. If
something like that does happen, Russia certainly wouldn't be able to
stand aside. Yes, we are separated from Central Asia by Kazakhstan -
but Nazarbayev's state cannot act as a buffer all on its own.
In 2001, the threat of a large-scale regional crisis in Central Asia
was averted thanks to the American invasion of Afghanistan. But
although almost seven years have passed, the Yanks still haven't
managed any radical changes for the better in Afghanistan. Thus, it
appears that Russia will mostly have to rely on itself. Then again,
there is another country - similar to Russia in terms of mindset
and political structure - which would also face mortal peril in the
event of a Central Asian crisis. That country is the abovementioned
Kazakhstan. It's worth noting that Kazakhstan made its latest
integration proposal to Russia as recently as last month.
In May, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan proposed gradual
measures to integrate the economies of Kazakhstan and Russia. A senior
official source in Moscow comments as follows: "Kazakhstan has long
since chosen its model: maneuvering between three centers of power -
Russia, China, and the West. Therefore, I find it hard to believe that
Kazakhstan will now agree to pursue integration with Russia for real,
rather than just talking about it."
The skeptics may be right this time as well - but if integration
between Russia and Kazakhstan is possible at all, there has never
been a more favorable moment for it than now, and there probably
won't be a more favorable time in the future. After all, the threat
of destabilization in Central Asia is not the only thing that unites
our two countries.
Both Russia and Kazakhstan have experienced rapid economic growth
due to oil prices reaching record highs. But neither country has any
chance of becoming the Eurasian equivalent of a country such as Qatar.
The Astana presidential administration has entrusted none other than
the Contemporary Development Institute in Moscow with working out
part of a long-term development plan for Kazakhstan. Note that the
Institute is known as President Dmitri Medvedev's think-tank. Medvedev
himself chairs its board of trustees.
What kind of plan might the officials of Russia and Kazakhstan come up
with? Clearly, there is absolutely no question of surrendering national
sovereignty. But partial unification of pipeline systems and other
transport systems, along with attempts to cooperate in introducing
new technologies - such plans wouldn't be entirely unfeasible. In
both areas, the chances of success are correlated with project
size. Besides, Moscow and Astana have already shown that they are
capable of reaching agreement on specific issues. Although it's not
the done thing to mention it publicly, Russian-Kazakh "friendship"
in the nuclear sector is very close.
If Moscow and Astana can manage to create an economic integration
nucleus, that in itself would be a great step forward. After all, the
powerful European Union of today started out as the modest European
Coal and Steel Community, established with the aim of reconciling
France and Germany.
Of course, all potential consequences should be calculated thoroughly
before going ahead with any integration project such as the proposed
alliance with Kazakhstan. But it is also very important to avoid
missing the bus.