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TURKEY'S ROLE IN THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN TALKS
Kerem Yildirim
Journal of Turkish Weekly
July 14 2008
Turkey
Besides from using the discourse of "being a bridge between Europe and
the Middle East", Turkey is trying to construct a new bridge. This
construction is being utilized via the recent mediating role for
Turkey in the Syria-Israel talks. This new role for Turkey is a step
in the general process about the evolution of the Turkish foreign
policy. As recent policy-makers and experts such as Ahmet Davutoglu
argues; Turkey tries to have a mediating role in the region. Turkey
tries to establish a peaceful region in which it can guarantee its
escalation as a regional power.
As a pivotal state between various frozen or ongoing conflict zones
such as Arab-Israeli conflict or ethnic struggles in the Caucasus,
Turkey has couple of national interests in its new role. Most
importantly, spill-over effects of the regional conflicts may cause
difficulties for the Turkish domestic politics. For instance, Northern
Iraq always have a special place in the Turkish foreign policy unlike
perfunctorial relations with other Arab Middle East. Developed upon oil
and mere trade interetsts, Turkey's relations with Arab Middle East
except Iraq remains inferior compared to EU and West. However, PKK
insurgencies originating from Northern Iraq and the shaky conditions
after the US involvement of 2003 forced Turkey to have an active
foreign policy in N. Iraq. This involvement's main reason is the
threat which may stimulate seperatist movements within Turkey. In
addition, the specific conflict between Arab states and Israel has
a detrimental effect for Turkey's international initiatives such
as promoting regional trade as well as creating a stable Middle
East in which Turkey can develop its cultural, economic and even
political ties. Also, in a general perspective, Arab-Israeli conflict
hinders Turkey from developing commonalities with both sides of the
conflict. Turkish-Israeli relations developed in 1990's solely on a
security aspect, no cultural ties were introduced. Relations with
Arab states were worse, Turkish political elite disregarded these
states as relations with EU was the main subject of the Turkish
foreign policy. Therefore, Turkish-led mediations may bring a chance
for Turkey to prove itself worthy for both Syria and Israel and thus
mediation may lead to a new phase of co-operation in the region.
Compared to its relationship with Israel, Turkey's connections with
Syria remains underdeveloped. Arguably, most important reason for this
underdevelopment is the inertial and inflexible circles of the Syrian
and Turkish bureaucratic elite. In addition, Syria's statist economy
with a Ba'athist flavor as well as Syrian ties with Iran also decrease
the degree of rapprochement between Syria and Turkey. Even if Bashar
Al-Assad's view on foreign policy is more liberal than his hawkish
father, relations remain limited to an extent. Also, as an historical
yet important point, it is noteworthy to underline the crisis that
drag Turkey and Syria to the brink of war ten years ago as Syria was
protecting the seperatist PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. This could be
overcomed after the 1998 Adana Agreement in which Syria pledged not to
upset the Turkish national interests. However, national consciousness
in both societies may hinder a full rapprochement as Syrians on the
other hand argued for the legal title of Turkey's Hatay Province
(Alexandretta) up until recently. In this sense, mediatory role for
Turkey in this conflict may ameliorate the Turkish relationship
with Syria that started to develop only for the last couple of
years. Turkey-led talks may establish conflict building mechanisms for
Turkish-Syrian relations and may support the relationship in a positive
manner. This rapprochement is vital given the Turkish policy to gain
strategic depth in the Middle East. This depth requires having soft
power capabilities such as culture and values. This capability can
be only achieved through having good neighborly relations. Otherwise,
Turkey is obliged to remain stiff in its regional relations.
Turkish-Israel relationship's deepening dates back to
mid-1980's. Experts mention several common characteristics for both
countries. For instance, both Israel and Turkey have a constructivist
discourse in relation to their identities. Referring to Kemal Kirisci,
both Turkey and Israel try to promote their national interests in the
Middle East which is identified as a Hobbesian world with conflicts and
zero-sum games that toughens the conflicts. On the other hand, both
countries argue for a "Western" identity in which Israel and Turkey
try to construct themselves a Kantian international sphere. With the
EU membership on the table, Turkey tries to highlight cooperation as
well as peaceful interdependence. In the same vein, Israel emphasizes
its democratic values as well as its cultural connections with the
West. In other words, both countries try to survive an identity crisis
between the Middle East and Europe. Both countries also point out
their European identity to solve this identity crisis. In addition to
this common narrative about identity, Israel and Turkey had important
military agreements in mid-90's. Consecutive governments and top
military staff in the Turkish policy circles continued this security
relations. Referring to Barry Buzan's reasoning, experts tried to
categorize Israel and Turkey in the same security community. In other
words, both countries were being evaluated as having the same notions
about threat perception as well as having mutual sympathy against each
other. This sympathy was related to the notion about "sharing the
same frontiers and being on the same side". The same frontiers were
seperatist actions and radical Islamic movements. These same threat
perceptions brought security cooperation with itself. Also, Turkey
was enable to take advantage of the Israel Lobby in the United States
against the Armenian Lobby and its claims. Therefore, Turkish-Israeli
relations gained ground in 1990's as Turkish-Syrian relations were
deteroirating. In mid-90's, Turkish-Israeli relationship was even
expected to bipolarize the region into two camps with Iran and Syria
consociating against the Turkish-Israeli security agreement. However,
this rapport with Israel seems to lose momentum in the last couple
of years.
Part of the Israel Lobby, the Anti-Defamation League, changed its
deportment last summer as Abraham Foxman, US national director of the
ADL, stated that the Armenian claims about genocide were plausible
and accurate. Therefore, Turkey seems to fall into contempt in the
American Israel Lobby. Yet, it is important to underline that the
Jewish Lobby in the US and Israeli foreign policy differs excessively
in various subjects. Still, ADL's statements created a detraction
campaing in the Turkish media which affected the Turkish-Israeli
relations indirectly. In addition to this estrangement, Turkey
started to condemn Israel's unilateral actions in Gaza Strip since
2004 when Turkey threatened Israel with "reviewing the bilateral
relations in the light of these unilateral operations." In this
respect, both countries needed a kick-start for stopping this
recession. An unfortunate point was that the recession came along
the intensification of the Middle Eastern conflicts as the US invaded
Iraq in 2003. Stimulation of the Turkish-Israeli relationship started
in the November 2007 with Mahmoud Abbas and Shimon Peres having
speeches in the Turkish Parliament. In addition, Turkey pledged to
develop West Bank via Turkish businessmen and thus creating new job
opportunities and welfare for the region. This Turkish proposition
was alluring for both Palestinian Authority and Israel given that
this initiative would enhance the peace talks. These two recent
developments and the Turkish mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks
may hopefully stimulate the bilateral relations with Israel as well
as creating confidence-building mechanisms in the Middle East. These
mechanism are important given that Turkey may have an important role
for balancing the conflicts in the region.
Besides from these bilateral aspects, Turkish mediation in these recent
talks may increase Turkey's ability in conflict resolution. This
is an important occasion for Turkish diplomatic spheres to gain
first-hand experience. If these talks end with an impressive outcome,
new chances for Turkish mediation may be on the way. In the final
analysis, Turkish foreign policy's increasing activist manner would
evolve the European Union's perception about Turkish membership. A
proactive Turkey with conflict resolving mechanisms means a lot for
Turkey's EU ideals. Therefore, as mentioned above, Kirisci's assesment
about Turkey being betweeen two polars, namely the Middle East and
Europe, would create a chain reaction. This chain reaction means
that Turkish diplomats and foreign policy spheres can not seperate
Turkish politics in the Middle East and European Union. Also, even
if there are various subjects in the Turkey's EU membership process,
Turkish geostrategic location and its proximity to various conflict
zones is an important aspect. Thus, Turkey's increasing role as a
arbitrator would have an effect for its EU policy.
If Turkey really struggles to change its "advocate the status quo"
foreign policy, this recent mediation process is an indispensable
occasion. Turkey has the chance to establish various opportunities
with its role as a mediator. Turkey may develop its international
place in a peaceful Middle East as well as stimulating its bilateral
relations with Syria and Israel. Besides from these regional aspects,
Turkish mediation will even have a positive effect upon its EU
aspirations. Therefore, recent talks between Syria and Israel under
Turkish mediation has the capacity to change the Middle East as well
as Turkey.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Kerem Yildirim
Journal of Turkish Weekly
July 14 2008
Turkey
Besides from using the discourse of "being a bridge between Europe and
the Middle East", Turkey is trying to construct a new bridge. This
construction is being utilized via the recent mediating role for
Turkey in the Syria-Israel talks. This new role for Turkey is a step
in the general process about the evolution of the Turkish foreign
policy. As recent policy-makers and experts such as Ahmet Davutoglu
argues; Turkey tries to have a mediating role in the region. Turkey
tries to establish a peaceful region in which it can guarantee its
escalation as a regional power.
As a pivotal state between various frozen or ongoing conflict zones
such as Arab-Israeli conflict or ethnic struggles in the Caucasus,
Turkey has couple of national interests in its new role. Most
importantly, spill-over effects of the regional conflicts may cause
difficulties for the Turkish domestic politics. For instance, Northern
Iraq always have a special place in the Turkish foreign policy unlike
perfunctorial relations with other Arab Middle East. Developed upon oil
and mere trade interetsts, Turkey's relations with Arab Middle East
except Iraq remains inferior compared to EU and West. However, PKK
insurgencies originating from Northern Iraq and the shaky conditions
after the US involvement of 2003 forced Turkey to have an active
foreign policy in N. Iraq. This involvement's main reason is the
threat which may stimulate seperatist movements within Turkey. In
addition, the specific conflict between Arab states and Israel has
a detrimental effect for Turkey's international initiatives such
as promoting regional trade as well as creating a stable Middle
East in which Turkey can develop its cultural, economic and even
political ties. Also, in a general perspective, Arab-Israeli conflict
hinders Turkey from developing commonalities with both sides of the
conflict. Turkish-Israeli relations developed in 1990's solely on a
security aspect, no cultural ties were introduced. Relations with
Arab states were worse, Turkish political elite disregarded these
states as relations with EU was the main subject of the Turkish
foreign policy. Therefore, Turkish-led mediations may bring a chance
for Turkey to prove itself worthy for both Syria and Israel and thus
mediation may lead to a new phase of co-operation in the region.
Compared to its relationship with Israel, Turkey's connections with
Syria remains underdeveloped. Arguably, most important reason for this
underdevelopment is the inertial and inflexible circles of the Syrian
and Turkish bureaucratic elite. In addition, Syria's statist economy
with a Ba'athist flavor as well as Syrian ties with Iran also decrease
the degree of rapprochement between Syria and Turkey. Even if Bashar
Al-Assad's view on foreign policy is more liberal than his hawkish
father, relations remain limited to an extent. Also, as an historical
yet important point, it is noteworthy to underline the crisis that
drag Turkey and Syria to the brink of war ten years ago as Syria was
protecting the seperatist PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. This could be
overcomed after the 1998 Adana Agreement in which Syria pledged not to
upset the Turkish national interests. However, national consciousness
in both societies may hinder a full rapprochement as Syrians on the
other hand argued for the legal title of Turkey's Hatay Province
(Alexandretta) up until recently. In this sense, mediatory role for
Turkey in this conflict may ameliorate the Turkish relationship
with Syria that started to develop only for the last couple of
years. Turkey-led talks may establish conflict building mechanisms for
Turkish-Syrian relations and may support the relationship in a positive
manner. This rapprochement is vital given the Turkish policy to gain
strategic depth in the Middle East. This depth requires having soft
power capabilities such as culture and values. This capability can
be only achieved through having good neighborly relations. Otherwise,
Turkey is obliged to remain stiff in its regional relations.
Turkish-Israel relationship's deepening dates back to
mid-1980's. Experts mention several common characteristics for both
countries. For instance, both Israel and Turkey have a constructivist
discourse in relation to their identities. Referring to Kemal Kirisci,
both Turkey and Israel try to promote their national interests in the
Middle East which is identified as a Hobbesian world with conflicts and
zero-sum games that toughens the conflicts. On the other hand, both
countries argue for a "Western" identity in which Israel and Turkey
try to construct themselves a Kantian international sphere. With the
EU membership on the table, Turkey tries to highlight cooperation as
well as peaceful interdependence. In the same vein, Israel emphasizes
its democratic values as well as its cultural connections with the
West. In other words, both countries try to survive an identity crisis
between the Middle East and Europe. Both countries also point out
their European identity to solve this identity crisis. In addition to
this common narrative about identity, Israel and Turkey had important
military agreements in mid-90's. Consecutive governments and top
military staff in the Turkish policy circles continued this security
relations. Referring to Barry Buzan's reasoning, experts tried to
categorize Israel and Turkey in the same security community. In other
words, both countries were being evaluated as having the same notions
about threat perception as well as having mutual sympathy against each
other. This sympathy was related to the notion about "sharing the
same frontiers and being on the same side". The same frontiers were
seperatist actions and radical Islamic movements. These same threat
perceptions brought security cooperation with itself. Also, Turkey
was enable to take advantage of the Israel Lobby in the United States
against the Armenian Lobby and its claims. Therefore, Turkish-Israeli
relations gained ground in 1990's as Turkish-Syrian relations were
deteroirating. In mid-90's, Turkish-Israeli relationship was even
expected to bipolarize the region into two camps with Iran and Syria
consociating against the Turkish-Israeli security agreement. However,
this rapport with Israel seems to lose momentum in the last couple
of years.
Part of the Israel Lobby, the Anti-Defamation League, changed its
deportment last summer as Abraham Foxman, US national director of the
ADL, stated that the Armenian claims about genocide were plausible
and accurate. Therefore, Turkey seems to fall into contempt in the
American Israel Lobby. Yet, it is important to underline that the
Jewish Lobby in the US and Israeli foreign policy differs excessively
in various subjects. Still, ADL's statements created a detraction
campaing in the Turkish media which affected the Turkish-Israeli
relations indirectly. In addition to this estrangement, Turkey
started to condemn Israel's unilateral actions in Gaza Strip since
2004 when Turkey threatened Israel with "reviewing the bilateral
relations in the light of these unilateral operations." In this
respect, both countries needed a kick-start for stopping this
recession. An unfortunate point was that the recession came along
the intensification of the Middle Eastern conflicts as the US invaded
Iraq in 2003. Stimulation of the Turkish-Israeli relationship started
in the November 2007 with Mahmoud Abbas and Shimon Peres having
speeches in the Turkish Parliament. In addition, Turkey pledged to
develop West Bank via Turkish businessmen and thus creating new job
opportunities and welfare for the region. This Turkish proposition
was alluring for both Palestinian Authority and Israel given that
this initiative would enhance the peace talks. These two recent
developments and the Turkish mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks
may hopefully stimulate the bilateral relations with Israel as well
as creating confidence-building mechanisms in the Middle East. These
mechanism are important given that Turkey may have an important role
for balancing the conflicts in the region.
Besides from these bilateral aspects, Turkish mediation in these recent
talks may increase Turkey's ability in conflict resolution. This
is an important occasion for Turkish diplomatic spheres to gain
first-hand experience. If these talks end with an impressive outcome,
new chances for Turkish mediation may be on the way. In the final
analysis, Turkish foreign policy's increasing activist manner would
evolve the European Union's perception about Turkish membership. A
proactive Turkey with conflict resolving mechanisms means a lot for
Turkey's EU ideals. Therefore, as mentioned above, Kirisci's assesment
about Turkey being betweeen two polars, namely the Middle East and
Europe, would create a chain reaction. This chain reaction means
that Turkish diplomats and foreign policy spheres can not seperate
Turkish politics in the Middle East and European Union. Also, even
if there are various subjects in the Turkey's EU membership process,
Turkish geostrategic location and its proximity to various conflict
zones is an important aspect. Thus, Turkey's increasing role as a
arbitrator would have an effect for its EU policy.
If Turkey really struggles to change its "advocate the status quo"
foreign policy, this recent mediation process is an indispensable
occasion. Turkey has the chance to establish various opportunities
with its role as a mediator. Turkey may develop its international
place in a peaceful Middle East as well as stimulating its bilateral
relations with Syria and Israel. Besides from these regional aspects,
Turkish mediation will even have a positive effect upon its EU
aspirations. Therefore, recent talks between Syria and Israel under
Turkish mediation has the capacity to change the Middle East as well
as Turkey.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress