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DON'T BE AFRAID OF KOSOVO
Memli Krasniqi
Today's Zaman
July 22 2008
Turkey
After more than eight years under United Nations administration and
following a two-year internationally mediated negotiation process
that failed to reach an agreed solution to its political status,
on Feb. 17 this year Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia.
Most Western countries, led by the United States and major European
countries, were quick to recognize the new state and establish
diplomatic relations with it. Five months later, 43 countries from all
continents formally recognize Kosovo's statehood and many others have
announced they will soon follow suit. Nevertheless, there are countries
that have opposed Kosovo's independence, citing various motives,
of which the fear that Kosovo may present a precedent for other
disputed territories was the most frequent. Such was Russia's stance,
in contrast to the US position that Kosovo is a sui generis case and
cannot be used as a model for settling any other conflicts. Russia's
position, influenced by a traditional alliance with Serbia and its
newfound "global power" attitude, resonated with countries that feared
a possible Kosovo precedent, due to their having as of yet unsolved
territorial problems within their borders; mainly in the Caucasus,
but also elsewhere. Countries like Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan
all fit into this category, but by buying into Russia's argument,
they have not done themselves a favor. On the contrary, they have
indirectly given some worth to Russia's insincere claim.
The war in Kosovo presented the last stage of the disintegration
of former Yugoslavia, within which Kosovo enjoyed a de facto equal
status with Serbia, and its conclusion was reached only after
NATO's air campaign against Yugoslav and Serbian army, police and
paramilitary forces. Following Serbia's withdrawal, Kosovo was
placed under a UN-led international administration with a NATO-led
military presence to guarantee its security. Regular rounds of
internationally monitored free and fair elections have been held
over the years and homegrown democratic institutions have been
established with great success. Throughout, Kosovo has progressed
significantly in all areas and has been committed to fulfilling
the benchmarks requested by its international trustees. The best
example is Kosovo's Constitution, which provides generous rights
and provisions for its minority communities, unmatched even in most
liberal countries with long democratic traditions. On the whole, it
may be said that Kosovo represents the best example of post-conflict
international state-building.
None of the above has taken place in any of the so-called frozen
conflicts. In addition, the multilateral nature of the international
community's involvement in Kosovo before, during and after the conflict
is in contrast to the conflicts in the post-Soviet space. There, Russia
was arguably the main, if not only, power broker. Its political and
military support for separatist movements during the conflicts is well
documented and it still maintains a military presence in the disputed
territories of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, in various
"peacekeeping" capacities. Furthermore, Russia has issued passports
to these provinces' inhabitants and many of them have participated in
Russian elections. Overall, the impression is that these provinces
probably pursue independence as a vehicle to later join the Russian
Federation as additional federal subjects. Further, Russia's alliance
with Armenia is another obstacle to a possible resolution of the status
of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. There, as in the other "frozen
conflicts" in the post-Soviet space, Russia wields major influence
and uses this fact to pressure the countries involved in various ways.
Russia's opposition to Kosovo's independence by claiming it presents a
precedent for other disputed territories is not based on principles,
but on pure geopolitical interests. Countries like Georgia, Moldova
and Azerbaijan should not underpin Russia's claims with actions
that essentially go against their interests. The path that these
countries should choose is that paved by their Western allies, of
recognizing Kosovo's independence, due to the unique circumstances of
the conflict there and the post-conflict developments it underwent. If
the leaders of the breakaway provinces look up to Kosovo for a model,
the countries involved should make clear that Kosovo is different
and its conduct cannot serve as an example. In effect, they should
recognize the independence of Kosovo. By doing that, they would
articulate a firm stance that their problems need original solutions,
not based on Kosovo's model.
Memli Krasniqi
Today's Zaman
July 22 2008
Turkey
After more than eight years under United Nations administration and
following a two-year internationally mediated negotiation process
that failed to reach an agreed solution to its political status,
on Feb. 17 this year Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia.
Most Western countries, led by the United States and major European
countries, were quick to recognize the new state and establish
diplomatic relations with it. Five months later, 43 countries from all
continents formally recognize Kosovo's statehood and many others have
announced they will soon follow suit. Nevertheless, there are countries
that have opposed Kosovo's independence, citing various motives,
of which the fear that Kosovo may present a precedent for other
disputed territories was the most frequent. Such was Russia's stance,
in contrast to the US position that Kosovo is a sui generis case and
cannot be used as a model for settling any other conflicts. Russia's
position, influenced by a traditional alliance with Serbia and its
newfound "global power" attitude, resonated with countries that feared
a possible Kosovo precedent, due to their having as of yet unsolved
territorial problems within their borders; mainly in the Caucasus,
but also elsewhere. Countries like Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan
all fit into this category, but by buying into Russia's argument,
they have not done themselves a favor. On the contrary, they have
indirectly given some worth to Russia's insincere claim.
The war in Kosovo presented the last stage of the disintegration
of former Yugoslavia, within which Kosovo enjoyed a de facto equal
status with Serbia, and its conclusion was reached only after
NATO's air campaign against Yugoslav and Serbian army, police and
paramilitary forces. Following Serbia's withdrawal, Kosovo was
placed under a UN-led international administration with a NATO-led
military presence to guarantee its security. Regular rounds of
internationally monitored free and fair elections have been held
over the years and homegrown democratic institutions have been
established with great success. Throughout, Kosovo has progressed
significantly in all areas and has been committed to fulfilling
the benchmarks requested by its international trustees. The best
example is Kosovo's Constitution, which provides generous rights
and provisions for its minority communities, unmatched even in most
liberal countries with long democratic traditions. On the whole, it
may be said that Kosovo represents the best example of post-conflict
international state-building.
None of the above has taken place in any of the so-called frozen
conflicts. In addition, the multilateral nature of the international
community's involvement in Kosovo before, during and after the conflict
is in contrast to the conflicts in the post-Soviet space. There, Russia
was arguably the main, if not only, power broker. Its political and
military support for separatist movements during the conflicts is well
documented and it still maintains a military presence in the disputed
territories of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, in various
"peacekeeping" capacities. Furthermore, Russia has issued passports
to these provinces' inhabitants and many of them have participated in
Russian elections. Overall, the impression is that these provinces
probably pursue independence as a vehicle to later join the Russian
Federation as additional federal subjects. Further, Russia's alliance
with Armenia is another obstacle to a possible resolution of the status
of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. There, as in the other "frozen
conflicts" in the post-Soviet space, Russia wields major influence
and uses this fact to pressure the countries involved in various ways.
Russia's opposition to Kosovo's independence by claiming it presents a
precedent for other disputed territories is not based on principles,
but on pure geopolitical interests. Countries like Georgia, Moldova
and Azerbaijan should not underpin Russia's claims with actions
that essentially go against their interests. The path that these
countries should choose is that paved by their Western allies, of
recognizing Kosovo's independence, due to the unique circumstances of
the conflict there and the post-conflict developments it underwent. If
the leaders of the breakaway provinces look up to Kosovo for a model,
the countries involved should make clear that Kosovo is different
and its conduct cannot serve as an example. In effect, they should
recognize the independence of Kosovo. By doing that, they would
articulate a firm stance that their problems need original solutions,
not based on Kosovo's model.