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CAN THE FPM FIND PURPOSE WITH BAABDA OFF THE TABLE?
Rabih Haddad
The Daily Star, Lebanon
June 12 2008
MP Michel Aoun and his Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) have had a single
overriding goal since the party's founding nearly five years ago: to
pave the way for his rise to the presidency. It has been no secret,
and indeed they have made public announcements on several occasions,
that the only presidential candidate they fully supported was Aoun.
Now that Parliament has elected Michel Sleiman as president, and
its once populous fan-base is beginning to dwindle, the FPM must
take action quickly to re-orient the party and answer many important
questions. Can Aoun run again in six years? If not, what is the FPM's
new aim? Has too much time been spent marketing Aoun rather than the
party? Is there an FPM without Aoun?
There are obvious answers to some of the questions, but ones that
need to be formalized nonetheless.
For example, there are few scenarios in which Aoun, who was born in
1935 and will subsequently be 79 years old in six years, will be a
viable candidate for the presidency in 2014. Assuming Aoun will not
run for president in 2014, the FPM must transform from a vehicle
designed to deliver Aoun to the presidency into an entity that has
more sustenance and political views than him alone.
The FPM's current charter reads like an off-the-shelf manifesto,
with generic goals such as "people are individuals," "people are born
equal and die equal" and "to guarantee Lebanese sovereignty." This
will need to change, in order to define a unique concept and mission.
While up until now most of the FPM's decisions, and even debatably
its political alliances, have been guided by the question of which
decision would increase Aoun's chances to become president, now
deliberations may need to take place in a different matter.
The FPM has choices. It could, for example, build a niche for itself
as an on-the-fence party that would moderate between the March 14
and March 8 factions. Or it could continue to develop its current
alliances and serve a joint Christian-Shiite constituency. Numerous
other options exist as well, although none are as clear-cut as the
goal of a Aoun presidency.
Over the next six years, FPM members, recruiters and supporters are
going to have a tougher time persuading the voting public (notably
Christians) that there is more to their party than the now-defunct
dream of a Michel Aoun as president, that they have more to offer. The
really difficult question will be: What else can the FPM offer?
The 2009 parliamentary elections will no doubt be a make-or-break event
for the FPM. It will have a much more difficult time convincing people
to vote for a party which is losing ground daily, rather than one led
by a president in waiting, as appeared to be the case during the 2005
elections. This is further confirmed by the pre-emptive campaigning
and rallies being organized by Aoun. It seems clear to all, including
Aoun himself, that there is a lot at stake for his movement.
The problem facing Aoun, and the FPM for that matter, is that unlike
most typical Western democracies, Lebanon's voting public, unlike
its leaders, are not particularly swayed by external factors such as
US foreign-policy shifts, the economy and UN resolutions. Instead,
the prevailing system is one of political inheritance in which the
majority of votes are won and lost through last-minute political and
feudal alliances.
This system may well work against Aoun and the FPM in the next
election. Although he is doing very well among certain groups,
such as Shiites in Kesrouan and Metn, and Tashnak loyalists in the
Armenian community, Aoun's bread and butter - middle- and upper-class
Christians who have only relatively recently become politically active
- are beginning to have second thoughts. The situation has not been
aided by Michel Murr's recent deviation, the row with Bkirki, and
his inability to reach the presidency.
It is difficult to imagine a core voter for the Lebanese Forces or the
Phalange Party changing camps. Decades of family tradition and voting
habits are to be considered. Also, the Lebanese Forces especially
seems to have significant momentum on its side. On the other hand,
Aoun's Christian base, which is to some extent relatively new, seems
to be showing signs of weakness.
Aoun's claim to the Christian majority is threatened, if not
lost. However, the next election will define his legacy: Will he prove
to have been the founder and cornerstone of a sustainable political
entity that will continue beyond 2009, or simply the presidential
favorite who never was?
The only thing certain is that his strategy must change if he
hopes to avoid a major defeat in 2009, and even then, it must be a
strategy that focuses more on the FPM's other MPs and less on Aoun
himself. This is something that he has thus far seemed unable to
do. What apparently is not evident to Aoun and FPM members is that
to preserve the ideology and long-term goals that Aoun stands for,
he needs to begin to stand aside.
Rabih Haddad
The Daily Star, Lebanon
June 12 2008
MP Michel Aoun and his Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) have had a single
overriding goal since the party's founding nearly five years ago: to
pave the way for his rise to the presidency. It has been no secret,
and indeed they have made public announcements on several occasions,
that the only presidential candidate they fully supported was Aoun.
Now that Parliament has elected Michel Sleiman as president, and
its once populous fan-base is beginning to dwindle, the FPM must
take action quickly to re-orient the party and answer many important
questions. Can Aoun run again in six years? If not, what is the FPM's
new aim? Has too much time been spent marketing Aoun rather than the
party? Is there an FPM without Aoun?
There are obvious answers to some of the questions, but ones that
need to be formalized nonetheless.
For example, there are few scenarios in which Aoun, who was born in
1935 and will subsequently be 79 years old in six years, will be a
viable candidate for the presidency in 2014. Assuming Aoun will not
run for president in 2014, the FPM must transform from a vehicle
designed to deliver Aoun to the presidency into an entity that has
more sustenance and political views than him alone.
The FPM's current charter reads like an off-the-shelf manifesto,
with generic goals such as "people are individuals," "people are born
equal and die equal" and "to guarantee Lebanese sovereignty." This
will need to change, in order to define a unique concept and mission.
While up until now most of the FPM's decisions, and even debatably
its political alliances, have been guided by the question of which
decision would increase Aoun's chances to become president, now
deliberations may need to take place in a different matter.
The FPM has choices. It could, for example, build a niche for itself
as an on-the-fence party that would moderate between the March 14
and March 8 factions. Or it could continue to develop its current
alliances and serve a joint Christian-Shiite constituency. Numerous
other options exist as well, although none are as clear-cut as the
goal of a Aoun presidency.
Over the next six years, FPM members, recruiters and supporters are
going to have a tougher time persuading the voting public (notably
Christians) that there is more to their party than the now-defunct
dream of a Michel Aoun as president, that they have more to offer. The
really difficult question will be: What else can the FPM offer?
The 2009 parliamentary elections will no doubt be a make-or-break event
for the FPM. It will have a much more difficult time convincing people
to vote for a party which is losing ground daily, rather than one led
by a president in waiting, as appeared to be the case during the 2005
elections. This is further confirmed by the pre-emptive campaigning
and rallies being organized by Aoun. It seems clear to all, including
Aoun himself, that there is a lot at stake for his movement.
The problem facing Aoun, and the FPM for that matter, is that unlike
most typical Western democracies, Lebanon's voting public, unlike
its leaders, are not particularly swayed by external factors such as
US foreign-policy shifts, the economy and UN resolutions. Instead,
the prevailing system is one of political inheritance in which the
majority of votes are won and lost through last-minute political and
feudal alliances.
This system may well work against Aoun and the FPM in the next
election. Although he is doing very well among certain groups,
such as Shiites in Kesrouan and Metn, and Tashnak loyalists in the
Armenian community, Aoun's bread and butter - middle- and upper-class
Christians who have only relatively recently become politically active
- are beginning to have second thoughts. The situation has not been
aided by Michel Murr's recent deviation, the row with Bkirki, and
his inability to reach the presidency.
It is difficult to imagine a core voter for the Lebanese Forces or the
Phalange Party changing camps. Decades of family tradition and voting
habits are to be considered. Also, the Lebanese Forces especially
seems to have significant momentum on its side. On the other hand,
Aoun's Christian base, which is to some extent relatively new, seems
to be showing signs of weakness.
Aoun's claim to the Christian majority is threatened, if not
lost. However, the next election will define his legacy: Will he prove
to have been the founder and cornerstone of a sustainable political
entity that will continue beyond 2009, or simply the presidential
favorite who never was?
The only thing certain is that his strategy must change if he
hopes to avoid a major defeat in 2009, and even then, it must be a
strategy that focuses more on the FPM's other MPs and less on Aoun
himself. This is something that he has thus far seemed unable to
do. What apparently is not evident to Aoun and FPM members is that
to preserve the ideology and long-term goals that Aoun stands for,
he needs to begin to stand aside.