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______________________________________________
Hou se Committee on Foreign Affairs
Congressman Howard L. Berman (D-CA), chairman
Verbatim, as delivered
June 18, 2008
Opening Statement by Chairman Howard L. Berman at hearing, "The
Caucasus:
Frozen Conflicts and Closed Borders"
Between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea lie the countries of the
Caucasus - Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Due to disputes that
have festered over the course of many years, there are enough
compelling questions involving these three countries and their
neighbors to occupy us all day long. During the course of this
hearing I'd like to focus on the frozen conflicts affecting economic
and political integration in the region, and how U.S. foreign policy
is responding to them.
I'd like to start with one of the most puzzling and problematic
matters: the Turkish land blockade of Armenia, in place since
1993. It's a punishing policy that holds the Armenian economy back and
enormously increases the cost of much of Armenia's trade with other
nations.
The land blockade is also, quite possibly, illegal, as it seems to
breach Turkey's undertaking in the 1922 Treaty of Kars to keep its
border-crossings with Armenia open. And it violates the spirit of the
World Trade Organization, of which both Turkey and Armenia are
members.
It's baffling why Ankara would want to pursue this land blockade,
which also harms the economy of eastern Turkey, and is therefore
clearly contrary to its own interests. It's no secret that many
Turkish businessmen, especially in the east, have been lobbying for
lifting the land blockade.
It also seems manifestly contrary to the strategic interests of
Turkey, which purports to be a solid member of the Western alliance.
Without an outlet to Turkey or Azerbaijan, Armenia is forced to rely
on its connections to two of Turkey's historical rivals, Russia and
Iran - and given how antithetical the Iranian regime is to the
secular, modern Turkish government, it seems odd that Ankara would
want to undertake any actions that will enhance Tehran's influence in
Yerevan.
Furthermore, the land blockade has done absolutely nothing to persuade
Armenia to alter its policies on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue - the
ostensible cause of the land blockade in the first place. Nor is
there any prospect that it will do so. Armenia has demonstrated its
resolve to support the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey is more
likely to win influence with the Armenian government if it pursues a
policy of good-neighborliness than if it slams the border closed.
Why hasn't the State Department - which opposes the land blockade -
spoken out more forcefully on this matter? Certainly it's in our
interest to diminish Iran's influence among its neighbors, not to
enhance it. Ambassador Fried, I'm hoping you'll lay out for us the
steps our government has taken and is taking to convince our ally
Turkey to end, once and for all, this counter-productive practice of
closed borders.
And by no means is Turkey Armenia's only problem in the region. I'm
deeply concerned by the series of increasingly bellicose statements
made over the past year about Nagorno-Karabakh by senior Azerbaijani
officials, as well as the steady increase in Azerbaijan's defense
budget as that nation acquires more oil wealth. The serious breakdown
earlier this year in the 14-year-old cease-fire has been widely blamed
on Azerbaijani provocations. Mr. Ambassador, how do you see this
situation, and what is the status of negotiations over
Nagorno-Karabakh?
Turning to Georgia, in recent weeks, we've seen increasingly
aggressive Russian behavior toward the region of Abkhazia: Moscow has
established official ties with the separatist government there, issued
passports and citizenship to its residents, dispatched a Russian jet
to down a Georgian reconnaissance craft, and deployed railway troops
to the region under dubious pretenses.
It was dispiriting to hear the new Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev,
dismiss offers of foreign mediation of this conflict during his first
official meeting in early June with Georgian President Mikhail
Saakashvilli. Although the United States and the European Union
expressed support for the Georgian President's peace initiatives
during their recent summit in Slovenia, follow-up efforts by EU
foreign policy chief Javier Solana and your deputy Matt Bryza to
encourage peace talks have garnered little traction. Mr. Ambassador,
what steps will this Administration take in the coming months to help
prevent further escalation of this conflict? And do you support calls
for the Russian-dominated CIS peacekeeping force to be replaced by a
neutral EU contingent as one means of mitigating the conflict?
And finally, I'd like to address an issue with long-term implications
for U.S. foreign policy throughout the region: the prospect of
democratization and political development in the South Caucasus.
Lately in the wake of elections in the region, there has been a
worrying trend of large-scale protests and forceful police
reaction. This explosive combination has the effect of silencing the
opposition and strengthening ruling political regimes in a region that
is still struggling to establish its democratic credentials.
Last fall, the Georgian government imposed a sweeping state of
emergency following demonstrations by thousands of protesters over a
government that appeared out of touch with the people. Armenia
experienced violent clashes that left eight people dead following
March presidential elections. And Azerbaijan could suffer a similar
fate during its presidential elections in October, as the government
is already cracking down on the media and opposition.
Mr. Ambassador, we would welcome your assessment of the democratic
prospects of these countries, which are of such great strategic
importance to the United States. Given unstable regimes and
considerable political acrimony, what is the potential for fostering
sustainable dialogue on a multi-party, parliamentary level? I would
also be grateful if you could address the question of how the
U.S. administration is holding these governments accountable for human
rights abuses, while at the same time working to achieve lasting peace
between them.
It's a tall order; we don't have all the time in the world to address
all the matters we'd like to today, so I'm going to stop at this point
and turn to my colleague and friend Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the ranking
member of the committee, for any comments she may wish to make.
Hou se Committee on Foreign Affairs
Congressman Howard L. Berman (D-CA), chairman
Verbatim, as delivered
June 18, 2008
Opening Statement by Chairman Howard L. Berman at hearing, "The
Caucasus:
Frozen Conflicts and Closed Borders"
Between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea lie the countries of the
Caucasus - Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Due to disputes that
have festered over the course of many years, there are enough
compelling questions involving these three countries and their
neighbors to occupy us all day long. During the course of this
hearing I'd like to focus on the frozen conflicts affecting economic
and political integration in the region, and how U.S. foreign policy
is responding to them.
I'd like to start with one of the most puzzling and problematic
matters: the Turkish land blockade of Armenia, in place since
1993. It's a punishing policy that holds the Armenian economy back and
enormously increases the cost of much of Armenia's trade with other
nations.
The land blockade is also, quite possibly, illegal, as it seems to
breach Turkey's undertaking in the 1922 Treaty of Kars to keep its
border-crossings with Armenia open. And it violates the spirit of the
World Trade Organization, of which both Turkey and Armenia are
members.
It's baffling why Ankara would want to pursue this land blockade,
which also harms the economy of eastern Turkey, and is therefore
clearly contrary to its own interests. It's no secret that many
Turkish businessmen, especially in the east, have been lobbying for
lifting the land blockade.
It also seems manifestly contrary to the strategic interests of
Turkey, which purports to be a solid member of the Western alliance.
Without an outlet to Turkey or Azerbaijan, Armenia is forced to rely
on its connections to two of Turkey's historical rivals, Russia and
Iran - and given how antithetical the Iranian regime is to the
secular, modern Turkish government, it seems odd that Ankara would
want to undertake any actions that will enhance Tehran's influence in
Yerevan.
Furthermore, the land blockade has done absolutely nothing to persuade
Armenia to alter its policies on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue - the
ostensible cause of the land blockade in the first place. Nor is
there any prospect that it will do so. Armenia has demonstrated its
resolve to support the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey is more
likely to win influence with the Armenian government if it pursues a
policy of good-neighborliness than if it slams the border closed.
Why hasn't the State Department - which opposes the land blockade -
spoken out more forcefully on this matter? Certainly it's in our
interest to diminish Iran's influence among its neighbors, not to
enhance it. Ambassador Fried, I'm hoping you'll lay out for us the
steps our government has taken and is taking to convince our ally
Turkey to end, once and for all, this counter-productive practice of
closed borders.
And by no means is Turkey Armenia's only problem in the region. I'm
deeply concerned by the series of increasingly bellicose statements
made over the past year about Nagorno-Karabakh by senior Azerbaijani
officials, as well as the steady increase in Azerbaijan's defense
budget as that nation acquires more oil wealth. The serious breakdown
earlier this year in the 14-year-old cease-fire has been widely blamed
on Azerbaijani provocations. Mr. Ambassador, how do you see this
situation, and what is the status of negotiations over
Nagorno-Karabakh?
Turning to Georgia, in recent weeks, we've seen increasingly
aggressive Russian behavior toward the region of Abkhazia: Moscow has
established official ties with the separatist government there, issued
passports and citizenship to its residents, dispatched a Russian jet
to down a Georgian reconnaissance craft, and deployed railway troops
to the region under dubious pretenses.
It was dispiriting to hear the new Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev,
dismiss offers of foreign mediation of this conflict during his first
official meeting in early June with Georgian President Mikhail
Saakashvilli. Although the United States and the European Union
expressed support for the Georgian President's peace initiatives
during their recent summit in Slovenia, follow-up efforts by EU
foreign policy chief Javier Solana and your deputy Matt Bryza to
encourage peace talks have garnered little traction. Mr. Ambassador,
what steps will this Administration take in the coming months to help
prevent further escalation of this conflict? And do you support calls
for the Russian-dominated CIS peacekeeping force to be replaced by a
neutral EU contingent as one means of mitigating the conflict?
And finally, I'd like to address an issue with long-term implications
for U.S. foreign policy throughout the region: the prospect of
democratization and political development in the South Caucasus.
Lately in the wake of elections in the region, there has been a
worrying trend of large-scale protests and forceful police
reaction. This explosive combination has the effect of silencing the
opposition and strengthening ruling political regimes in a region that
is still struggling to establish its democratic credentials.
Last fall, the Georgian government imposed a sweeping state of
emergency following demonstrations by thousands of protesters over a
government that appeared out of touch with the people. Armenia
experienced violent clashes that left eight people dead following
March presidential elections. And Azerbaijan could suffer a similar
fate during its presidential elections in October, as the government
is already cracking down on the media and opposition.
Mr. Ambassador, we would welcome your assessment of the democratic
prospects of these countries, which are of such great strategic
importance to the United States. Given unstable regimes and
considerable political acrimony, what is the potential for fostering
sustainable dialogue on a multi-party, parliamentary level? I would
also be grateful if you could address the question of how the
U.S. administration is holding these governments accountable for human
rights abuses, while at the same time working to achieve lasting peace
between them.
It's a tall order; we don't have all the time in the world to address
all the matters we'd like to today, so I'm going to stop at this point
and turn to my colleague and friend Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the ranking
member of the committee, for any comments she may wish to make.