Tweet
ARMENIA: SUMMER OF DISCONTENT
ISN
June 25 2008
Switzerland
As tensions continue to simmer, Armenia's opposition leader
Ter-Petrosian, hopes to take advantage of the government's
unpopularity.
By Richard Giragosian in Yerevan for ISN Security Watch (24/06/08)
Just two months since the inauguration of Armenia's third president,
simmering political tension continues to plague the new government
of President Serzh Sarkisian.
Although triggered by a disputed 19 February presidential contest,
the underlying causes of Armenia's post-election crisis include
several unresolved problems, ranging from widening socio-economic
disparities to a pronounced political polarization.
Unlike past political crises, however, Armenia's traditionally
fractured and marginalized opposition has been able to unite behind
the leadership of former president Levon Ter-Petrosian.
After spending a decade in political seclusion, Ter-Petrosian emerged
last year to pose a significant challenge to the country's ruling
elite, putting himself forward as a presidential candidate.
The return of the country's first post-Soviet president surprised
many observers and threatened to upset the long-planned transition
from outgoing President Robert Kocharian, constitutionally prevented
from seeking a third term, to his chosen successor, Prime Minister
Serzh Sarkisian.
Ironically, the Ter-Petrosian campaign represented a direct threat to
both Kocharian and Sarkisian, the very same leaders who forced him
to resign in 1998 amid an atmosphere of nationalist recriminations
over Ter-Petrosian's alleged willingness to adopt an unacceptably
moderate approach to the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with
neighboring Azerbaijan.
Given the circumstances of his forced resignation, as well as
the authorities' concerted attempts to link much of the country's
problems to his administration, Ter-Petrosian faced an uphill battle
throughout the presidential campaign. His efforts were also hindered
by the overwhelming power of incumbency, which was exerted through
the use of "administrative resources" leveraging the influence of
state resources and offices.
As a result, Ter-Petrosian faced a pronounced disadvantage in
both articulating his platform and countering the authorities'
assertions. Yet the disparity between the rival Ter-Petrosian and
Sarkisian campaigns was most profound in terms of access to the
media, with the country's broadcast media dominated by an overly
pro-government bias and alternative opposition and independent media
outlets under pressure and threat.
In a private meeting with ISN Security Watch, Ter-Petrosian noted
the difficulties but asserted that "the timing of my return to
politics was not based on any personal ambition but was driven by the
compelling need to correct the dangerous and irresponsible policies
of the Kocharian regime," which he argued "put the country on the
wrong path" by only "fueling corruption and an abuse of power."
Armenia, he claimed, was increasingly becoming a "banditocracy"
where "a criminal class emerged to pillage and plunder the country's
strategic assets and whose leaders were leaving a legacy of moral
and political bankruptcy for the next generation of Armenians."
It was against this backdrop that the elections were won outright by
Sarkisian, avoiding a second-round ballot.
Although the election results were disputed and marred by reports of
serious voting irregularities, the more significant implication from
the pre-election period was that the opposition was denied a fair
contest, leaving the ordinary voter with little choice and even less
voice. This also fueled a post-election crisis, with the opposition
resorting to mass rallies and public demonstrations in the streets,
reflecting a sense that public demands and personal rights were
blatantly ignored or denied by the authorities.
It was at this point that Ter-Petrosian was able to reach far beyond
the core group of his supporters and opposition activists, bridging
the normally apathetic and politically uncommitted citizenry. For the
first time, he has managed to forge a broad-based consensus bolstered
by his pledge to spur true political change and not simply a personal
return to power - a claim for which the jury is still out.
Ter-Petrosian reiterated his willingness "to serve less than a full
[five-year] term as president," offering instead to "hold the office
[of president] for two or three years, as a period of sufficient time
to allow for the implementation of broad, lasting and meaningful
reforms, as well as a sincere effort to combat corruption in the
country."
Fanning the flames As tension mounted, opposition demonstrators
staged increasingly serious mass protests, overnight vigils and even
hunger strikes.
In turn, the authorities, acting on the orders of Kocharian in his last
days in office, over-reacted to the crisis, culminating in an open and
violent clash between opposition demonstrators and riot police on 1
March that left at least 10 dead, many injured and even more arrested.
The confrontation prompted the authorities to introduce a one-month
state of emergency, complete with sweeping restrictions on the
media and on the freedoms of assembly and speech. Yet the state of
the emergency only deferred, rather than defeated the confrontation
between the state and the opposition. By resorting to the imposition
of virtual martial law under the terms of a state of emergency as
an immediate reaction to the crisis, the authorities only fanned the
flames of political discord and discontent.
Interestingly, it also demonstrated an inverse relationship between
regime security and state stability, whereby each step to secure the
regime posed an equal and corresponding move toward destabilizing
the state.
In Ter-Petrosian's opinion, the state of the emergency merely confirmed
the "desperation and fear of an illegitimate regime" and tended
to reveal that the Armenian authorities were concerned solely with
"maintaining power in order to reproduce the regime in another form."
Yet in the weeks after the end of the state of emergency and a
seemingly peaceful return to normalcy, the continued tension suggested
that the crisis was far from resolved and that the country was even
farther from reconciliation.
Hot summer Most recently, the opposition staged a mass rally on 20
June, with between 10-15,000 supporters demonstrating against the
Armenian government and demanding sweeping political change.
This demonstration was a key test for the opposition and its success
ensured that the momentum for political change could be sustained
through the hot summer months, a period known for relative political
inactivity.
The 20 June rally was also an important opportunity for Ter-Petrosian
to maintain pressure on the authorities, a necessity if the opposition
movement was to uphold the momentum of its political strategy.
In his public address to the demonstrators, Ter-Petrosian stressed
two priorities. First, to demonstrate the "firm resolve of the people
to the government and the international community" that despite the
election results, the "free and conscious people of Armenia reject"
and view the government as "illegitimate." Second, the release of all
opposition supporters ("political prisoners" in Ter-Petrosian's words)
from police detention, followed by dialogue with the government.
Ter-Petrosian also reiterated his demand for "early presidential and
parliamentary elections" as a "solution" to the crisis.
Although the adherence to such a maximalist position may seem
unrealistic, as an initial bargaining chip it may actually be a
prudent position prior to entering into a political dialogue with
the authorities.
The issue of dialogue is also significant as a means of addressing
the polarization of politics in Armenia, especially as even prior to
Armenia's recent post-election crisis, this political polarization
had been defined largely by a division based on affiliations to a
narrow set of political leaders and parties. For the past decade,
for example, such political polarization was manifested by a division
between supporters of the ruling elite and a largely fractured and
fragmented opposition.
In terms of national politics, neither camp demonstrated much more
than a desire to simply attain or maintain power, offering little in
terms of strategic vision or policy alternatives.
At the same time, there has been an equally profound economic divide,
driven by widening inequalities in wealth and income. But most
importantly, it is the combination of this political polarization
and economic division that has now resulted in deep fissures within
Armenian society as a whole.
Yet even in the face of these political challenges and a crisis
of confidence, the more serious threat to stability stems not from
political polarization, but from mounting economic pressure.
More specifically, with the new Armenian government weakened by
internal discord and a lack of legitimacy, the onset of a new economic
crisis represents one of the most significant threats to security
and stability in Armenia.
Opportunity knocking?
As for Ter-Petrosian, he believes that this time things could be
different and he is taking every advantage of the fact that, as he
sees it, "the Armenian people are clearly different this time, with
little fear and even less patience for the political status quo,"
and the new government is also different, beset by a "profound
unpopularity and an absence of trust."
But it will be from within the broader economic context that the new
Armenian government will face its next serious challenge.
Thus, it seems that even beyond the context of the current political
crisis, the new Armenian government faces an even more challenging
economic crisis against a backdrop of simmering tension and impatience.
But even as Ter-Petrosian has admitted, the "course of reform and
change needed to correct the path toward a law-based society is
difficult and far from certain in Armenia."
Richard Giragosian is an analyst specializing in international
relations, with a focus on economics, security and political
developments in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and the
Asia-Pacific region. He has served as a Professional Staff Member
of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress and is a regular
contributor to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). Giragosian
is also a contributing analyst for Jane's Information Group.
ISN
June 25 2008
Switzerland
As tensions continue to simmer, Armenia's opposition leader
Ter-Petrosian, hopes to take advantage of the government's
unpopularity.
By Richard Giragosian in Yerevan for ISN Security Watch (24/06/08)
Just two months since the inauguration of Armenia's third president,
simmering political tension continues to plague the new government
of President Serzh Sarkisian.
Although triggered by a disputed 19 February presidential contest,
the underlying causes of Armenia's post-election crisis include
several unresolved problems, ranging from widening socio-economic
disparities to a pronounced political polarization.
Unlike past political crises, however, Armenia's traditionally
fractured and marginalized opposition has been able to unite behind
the leadership of former president Levon Ter-Petrosian.
After spending a decade in political seclusion, Ter-Petrosian emerged
last year to pose a significant challenge to the country's ruling
elite, putting himself forward as a presidential candidate.
The return of the country's first post-Soviet president surprised
many observers and threatened to upset the long-planned transition
from outgoing President Robert Kocharian, constitutionally prevented
from seeking a third term, to his chosen successor, Prime Minister
Serzh Sarkisian.
Ironically, the Ter-Petrosian campaign represented a direct threat to
both Kocharian and Sarkisian, the very same leaders who forced him
to resign in 1998 amid an atmosphere of nationalist recriminations
over Ter-Petrosian's alleged willingness to adopt an unacceptably
moderate approach to the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with
neighboring Azerbaijan.
Given the circumstances of his forced resignation, as well as
the authorities' concerted attempts to link much of the country's
problems to his administration, Ter-Petrosian faced an uphill battle
throughout the presidential campaign. His efforts were also hindered
by the overwhelming power of incumbency, which was exerted through
the use of "administrative resources" leveraging the influence of
state resources and offices.
As a result, Ter-Petrosian faced a pronounced disadvantage in
both articulating his platform and countering the authorities'
assertions. Yet the disparity between the rival Ter-Petrosian and
Sarkisian campaigns was most profound in terms of access to the
media, with the country's broadcast media dominated by an overly
pro-government bias and alternative opposition and independent media
outlets under pressure and threat.
In a private meeting with ISN Security Watch, Ter-Petrosian noted
the difficulties but asserted that "the timing of my return to
politics was not based on any personal ambition but was driven by the
compelling need to correct the dangerous and irresponsible policies
of the Kocharian regime," which he argued "put the country on the
wrong path" by only "fueling corruption and an abuse of power."
Armenia, he claimed, was increasingly becoming a "banditocracy"
where "a criminal class emerged to pillage and plunder the country's
strategic assets and whose leaders were leaving a legacy of moral
and political bankruptcy for the next generation of Armenians."
It was against this backdrop that the elections were won outright by
Sarkisian, avoiding a second-round ballot.
Although the election results were disputed and marred by reports of
serious voting irregularities, the more significant implication from
the pre-election period was that the opposition was denied a fair
contest, leaving the ordinary voter with little choice and even less
voice. This also fueled a post-election crisis, with the opposition
resorting to mass rallies and public demonstrations in the streets,
reflecting a sense that public demands and personal rights were
blatantly ignored or denied by the authorities.
It was at this point that Ter-Petrosian was able to reach far beyond
the core group of his supporters and opposition activists, bridging
the normally apathetic and politically uncommitted citizenry. For the
first time, he has managed to forge a broad-based consensus bolstered
by his pledge to spur true political change and not simply a personal
return to power - a claim for which the jury is still out.
Ter-Petrosian reiterated his willingness "to serve less than a full
[five-year] term as president," offering instead to "hold the office
[of president] for two or three years, as a period of sufficient time
to allow for the implementation of broad, lasting and meaningful
reforms, as well as a sincere effort to combat corruption in the
country."
Fanning the flames As tension mounted, opposition demonstrators
staged increasingly serious mass protests, overnight vigils and even
hunger strikes.
In turn, the authorities, acting on the orders of Kocharian in his last
days in office, over-reacted to the crisis, culminating in an open and
violent clash between opposition demonstrators and riot police on 1
March that left at least 10 dead, many injured and even more arrested.
The confrontation prompted the authorities to introduce a one-month
state of emergency, complete with sweeping restrictions on the
media and on the freedoms of assembly and speech. Yet the state of
the emergency only deferred, rather than defeated the confrontation
between the state and the opposition. By resorting to the imposition
of virtual martial law under the terms of a state of emergency as
an immediate reaction to the crisis, the authorities only fanned the
flames of political discord and discontent.
Interestingly, it also demonstrated an inverse relationship between
regime security and state stability, whereby each step to secure the
regime posed an equal and corresponding move toward destabilizing
the state.
In Ter-Petrosian's opinion, the state of the emergency merely confirmed
the "desperation and fear of an illegitimate regime" and tended
to reveal that the Armenian authorities were concerned solely with
"maintaining power in order to reproduce the regime in another form."
Yet in the weeks after the end of the state of emergency and a
seemingly peaceful return to normalcy, the continued tension suggested
that the crisis was far from resolved and that the country was even
farther from reconciliation.
Hot summer Most recently, the opposition staged a mass rally on 20
June, with between 10-15,000 supporters demonstrating against the
Armenian government and demanding sweeping political change.
This demonstration was a key test for the opposition and its success
ensured that the momentum for political change could be sustained
through the hot summer months, a period known for relative political
inactivity.
The 20 June rally was also an important opportunity for Ter-Petrosian
to maintain pressure on the authorities, a necessity if the opposition
movement was to uphold the momentum of its political strategy.
In his public address to the demonstrators, Ter-Petrosian stressed
two priorities. First, to demonstrate the "firm resolve of the people
to the government and the international community" that despite the
election results, the "free and conscious people of Armenia reject"
and view the government as "illegitimate." Second, the release of all
opposition supporters ("political prisoners" in Ter-Petrosian's words)
from police detention, followed by dialogue with the government.
Ter-Petrosian also reiterated his demand for "early presidential and
parliamentary elections" as a "solution" to the crisis.
Although the adherence to such a maximalist position may seem
unrealistic, as an initial bargaining chip it may actually be a
prudent position prior to entering into a political dialogue with
the authorities.
The issue of dialogue is also significant as a means of addressing
the polarization of politics in Armenia, especially as even prior to
Armenia's recent post-election crisis, this political polarization
had been defined largely by a division based on affiliations to a
narrow set of political leaders and parties. For the past decade,
for example, such political polarization was manifested by a division
between supporters of the ruling elite and a largely fractured and
fragmented opposition.
In terms of national politics, neither camp demonstrated much more
than a desire to simply attain or maintain power, offering little in
terms of strategic vision or policy alternatives.
At the same time, there has been an equally profound economic divide,
driven by widening inequalities in wealth and income. But most
importantly, it is the combination of this political polarization
and economic division that has now resulted in deep fissures within
Armenian society as a whole.
Yet even in the face of these political challenges and a crisis
of confidence, the more serious threat to stability stems not from
political polarization, but from mounting economic pressure.
More specifically, with the new Armenian government weakened by
internal discord and a lack of legitimacy, the onset of a new economic
crisis represents one of the most significant threats to security
and stability in Armenia.
Opportunity knocking?
As for Ter-Petrosian, he believes that this time things could be
different and he is taking every advantage of the fact that, as he
sees it, "the Armenian people are clearly different this time, with
little fear and even less patience for the political status quo,"
and the new government is also different, beset by a "profound
unpopularity and an absence of trust."
But it will be from within the broader economic context that the new
Armenian government will face its next serious challenge.
Thus, it seems that even beyond the context of the current political
crisis, the new Armenian government faces an even more challenging
economic crisis against a backdrop of simmering tension and impatience.
But even as Ter-Petrosian has admitted, the "course of reform and
change needed to correct the path toward a law-based society is
difficult and far from certain in Armenia."
Richard Giragosian is an analyst specializing in international
relations, with a focus on economics, security and political
developments in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and the
Asia-Pacific region. He has served as a Professional Staff Member
of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress and is a regular
contributor to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). Giragosian
is also a contributing analyst for Jane's Information Group.