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State Department Documents and Publications, USA
June 25, 2008
Speeches: Invigorating the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership
STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS RELEASE
Wed, 25 Jun 2008
Matt Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs
Turgot Ozal Memorial Lecture at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Washington, DC
June 24, 2008
As prepared for delivery
Like Turkey itself, U.S.-Turkey relations have navigated remarkable
transitions over the past 50 years. Today, we are living in perhaps
the most exciting period. Timeworn cliches about Turkey, such as
"bulwark against the Soviet Union," or "NATO Ally since the Korean
War," or "bridge between East and West" are being updated with new
concepts, such as "energy hub" and "vibrant emerging market."
All of these cliches retain a certain degree of truth. But, they
reflect a static and simplified view of U.S.-Turkish relations. Today,
the U.S. government's appreciation of Turkey's geo-strategic
significance is evolving in new and positive ways. Today, we are
starting to understand Turkey's multiple identities. Turkey is not
merely a bridge; it is a society whose soul lies in both East and
West, with a strategic and cultural reach extending from Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Caucasus to the Balkans, Berlin,
and Amsterdam. At the same time, Turkey is a strategic link between
North and South, lying at the center of an extended Black Sea region
that connects the European Union, Russia, and Ukraine with the Middle
East.
With a more sophisticated appreciation of Turkey's economic,
diplomatic, and cultural might, the United States enjoys new
opportunities to pursue the shared interests and common values that
unite our two great countries. No factor is more significant in
elevating Turkey's strategic relevance today than its vibrant
democracy. Turkey's constitutional principles of democracy,
secularism, and the rule of law can inspire reformers in the broader
Middle East and beyond who seek the same political and economic
freedoms, and the same opportunities to improve their societies as do
the citizens of the Turkish Republic.
We are thus in the process of updating our strategic concepts. To
understand more deeply the opportunities before us, we should first
take a brief look backward at how U.S.-Turkey relations have developed
over the past decade.
During the 1990's, Turkey began fully to enjoy the fruits of Turgut
Ozal's groundbreaking reforms, and Prime Minister Erdogan has
continued this important reform effort. Ankara and Washington
recognized an opportunity to build a new bilateral relationship. Our
Cold War conception of Turkey as the cornerstone of NATO's Southern
Flank, blunting Soviet ambitions and hosting key NATO military assets
and Incirlik Airbase, was becoming outdated. As Turkey's economy grew,
so did its demand for energy, along with its ambitions to reconnect
with Turkic populations in the Caucasus and Central Asia. At the same
time, the United States sought to help the newly independent states of
Central Asia and the Caucasus cement their independence by connecting
their economies to European and global markets. Azerbaijani President
Heydar Aliyev and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev welcomed
international investors to help develop the Caspian Basin's mammoth
oil and gas reserves. Then-Turkish President Suleyman Demirel worked
with these leaders, and with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze,
to develop a revitalized concept of the Great Silk Road in the version
of an East-West Corridor of oil and natural gas pipelines.
And so, a new U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership was born, with energy
as a centerpiece. The United States and Turkey worked together in
pursuit of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the South
Caucasus Gas Pipeline (SCP) to connect Azerbaijan's oil and natural
gas reserves with European and global markets. Meanwhile, Turkey was
developing a strategic partnership with Israel, bringing together the
Middle East's only two democracies at that time to pursue their common
security and economic interests.
At the outset of President George W. Bush's administration, the
U.S. sought to build on the strong energy cooperation outlined above
to generate a deeper, East-West dynamic in Central Asia and the
Caucasus. Our goal was to help the young independent states of these
regions secure their sovereignty and liberty by linking them to
Europe, world markets, and Euro-Atlantic institutions via the corridor
being established by the BTC and SCP pipelines. Turkey would be the
gateway. Reflecting this vision, the National Security Council and
State Department reorganized their bureaucratic structures to
encourage a philosophical shift toward these countries' deeper
connection to Europe as independent actors. The Caucasus and Central
Asia were grouped with Turkey, which the Administration viewed as
these countries' crucial partner in connecting with European and
global markets, and with Euro-Atlantic security institutions.
This approach proved to be of crucial importance in the aftermath of
September 11. The East-West Corridor we had been building from Turkey
and the Black Sea through Georgia and Azerbaijan and across the
Caspian became the strategic air corridor, and the lifeline, into
Afghanistan allowing the United States and our coalition partners to
conduct Operation Enduring Freedom. Uzbekistan emerged as crucial in
launching and then sustaining this multi-national effort from the
airbase at Karshi Khanabad. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan
immediately offered blanket over flight clearances, while Kyrgyzstan
allowed use of the Manas Airbase, which evolved into our crucial
logistics hub for Operation Enduring Freedom after Uzbekistan
rescinded U.S. access to Karshi Khanabad.
U.S. efforts to establish these operational relationships advanced on
the foundation of our cooperation with Turkey in preceding years on
the East-West Corridor. Turkey's contributions to the war in
Afghanistan grew much deeper. Turkey has now commanded the
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan twice. Former
Grand National Assembly Speaker and Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin
served as NATO's civilian representative in Kabul. And, Turkey now
leads a provincial reconstruction team in Wardak Province north of
Kabul. Security cooperation in Afghanistan thus emerged as a
cornerstone of strategic partnership between the United States and
Turkey. At NATO's recent Bucharest Summit, Turkey and the United
States joined our other Allies and Alliance partners to renew our
long-term commitment to security and stability in Afghanistan. We have
pledged to provide the forces, resources and flexibility necessary for
success, so Afghanistan may never again become a haven for terrorists.
Our success in sustaining and strengthening U.S.-Turkey cooperation in
Afghanistan is particularly significant given the severe strains the
war in Iraq initially placed on our two countries' relations. In late
2002, many of us responsible for U.S. policy toward Turkey anticipated
a joint effort in Iraq that would elevate U.S.-Turkey relations to a
new and unprecedented strategic level. Turkey would help the United
States better understand the challenges ahead of us in Iraq, both in
terms of the approaching military campaign and Iraq's post-war
reconstruction; and the United States would work with Turkey to
counter the PKK terrorist threat emanating from northern Iraq, while
helping to cushion Turkey's economy against any exogenous shocks that
might result from war along Turkey's southern border.
Scholars will long debate what went wrong in the lead-up to the
Turkish Grand National Assembly's vote on March 1, 2003. The bottom
line is that the Turkish Parliament's sovereign decision to decline
the U.S. requests to transit troops and equipment through Turkey and
into Iraq set U.S.-Turkey relations into a tailspin and shattered our
concept of strategic partnership.
Despite this, we worked hard to salvage U.S.-Turkey relations. The
United States offered an $8 billion assistance package as a sign of
Allied friendship to ease what we feared could be short-term economic
shocks to Turkey's economy from the war in Iraq. Ankara eventually
declined our offer, just as Washington declined Ankara's offer in
October 2003 of Turkish troops for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Still, we tried to move ahead. We viewed 2004 as a potentially key
year for restoring the U.S.-Turkey partnership. It began with Prime
Minister Erdogan's visit to the White House in January. That June,
Prime Minister Erdogan joined G8 leaders in Sea Island Georgia to
discuss cooperation to advance democracy in the broader Middle East,
and then hosted the NATO Summit in Istanbul. We hoped these events
would help Turkey showcase its strategic value to the European Union
as a democracy with a predominantly Muslim population and strong
traditions of secularism and the rule of law. In December 2004, the
European Council decided to commence accession negotiations with
Ankara, and the talks began in October 2005, with strong U.S. support.
Despite this positive momentum, U.S.-Turkey relations remained stalled
over the issue of PKK terrorism. Since 2006, we have made important
progress in undercutting the PKK's financial, operational, and
political support mechanisms in Europe - through a robust combination
of political pressure and information sharing. Then-Foreign Minister
Gul graciously praised these efforts. But, the continued presence of
PKK bases in northern Iraq led many Turkish citizens from all walks of
life to resent what they perceived as the U.S. treating Turkey's
primary terrorist (and national security) threat differently than we
treated Al Qaida. As a result, the popularity of the United States
shrank to record low-levels, reaching a depressing 9 percent in
mid-2007.
The November 2007 Oval Office meeting between President Bush and Prime
Minister Erdogan marked a decisive turning point. President Bush's
designation of the PKK as "an enemy of Turkey, an enemy of Iraq, and
therefore an enemy of the United States," signaled a new approach by
Washington. The intensive information sharing authorized by President
Bush has opened a new chapter in security cooperation between the
United States, Turkey, and Iraq. It has also cleared the way for
deeper cooperation not only on security, but on energy and democracy
as well.
With that historical context in place, I would like to look forward to
what we are doing now to deepen our strategic partnership with
Turkey. The "Shared Vision" document concluded by Secretary Rice and
then-Foreign Minister Gul in July 2006 outlines a structured dialogue
between our two governments in pursuit of the strategic interests and
values our two countries share. Our cooperation focuses on three broad
areas: energy and economy, security, and democracy.
As I noted above, cooperation on energy in the late 1990's formed a
cornerstone of the U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership, resulting in a
successful "first phase" of Caspian development anchored by BTC for
oil and SCP for gas. Today, we are focusing on the next phase of
Caspian development, looking to the Caspian Basin and Iraq to help
reduce Europe's dependence on a single Russian company, Gazprom, which
provides 25 percent of all gas consumed in Europe. Gazprom provides 25
percent of Europe's overall gas consumption in Europe and 80 to 100
percent of gas to countries in Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, and the
Baltic region. Turkey's dependence on Gazprom, at 65 percent, is
significant. Turkey also will need additional new sources of gas to
help diversify its supplies.
Our goal is to develop a "Southern Corridor" of energy infrastructure
to transport Caspian and Iraqi oil and gas to Turkey and Europe. The
Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) and Nabucco natural gas pipelines are key
elements of the Southern Corridor. Azerbaijan provides the most
promising near-term option for Turkey and the EU in its pursuit of
diversified gas supplies from the Caspian Sea region. Azerbaijan
possesses sufficient gas reserves to fill TGI, while providing some
gas for domestic, Georgian and Turkish consumption, as well as for the
Nabucco pipeline. However, gas in the ground does no good. Companies
need access to these resources to develop them for Turkey and
Europe. These two pipeline projects alone could provide Europe up to
44 billion cubic meters (BCM) of new gas supplies over the next seven
to twelve years, of which 20 BCM (a not insignificant amount) will
hopefully come from Azerbaijan, the rest from Iraq and the Caspian
Basin. Gazprom, by comparison, currently exports 160 BCM to
Europe. So, TGI and Nabucco could add to European markets more than
one-quarter of the gas currently supplied by Gazprom. Such competition
is crucial to ensuring that natural gas prices in Europe are set by
market forces.
To achieve these goals, Turkey and Azerbaijan must work together to
resolve their dispute over the commercial terms for the transit of
natural gas across Turkey and onward into Europe, including by the TGI
and Nabucco pipelines. Once this dispute is resolved, Azerbaijan is
more likely to be able to conclude gas sales and purchase agreements
with European investors required to advance these two major pipeline
projects. Turkey could come to be seen as a reliable gas transit
state, elevating its strategic importance to the European Union as the
crucial partner linking enormous gas supplies in the Caspian region
and Iraq with European markets. With the inauguration of the
Turkey-Greece gas inter-connection last November, it is now possible
to export gas from Azerbaijan's sector of the Caspian Sea to Greece
and the EU-15 via Georgia and Turkey.
Potential gas supplies in Turkmenistan and Iraq can provide the
crucial additional volumes beyond those in Azerbaijan to realize the
Southern Corridor. Washington and Ankara are working together with
Baghdad to help Iraq develop its own large natural gas reserves for
both domestic consumption and for export to Turkey and the EU. I have
the honor to co-chair the U.S.-Turkey-Iraq Trilateral Working Group on
Natural Gas, which aims to attract U.S., Turkish, and other
international investment to Iraq's natural gas fields, much of which
awaits Iraq's national hydrocarbon law, and then export Iraqi gas to
Turkey and onward via the Nabucco Pipeline.
Energy is only one component of the growing economic partnership
between the U.S. and Turkey, albeit, a crucial one. We are also
working to deepen our trade relationship, which has lagged behind our
energy and security cooperation for years. My friend and colleague,
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy, and Business
Affairs, Dan Sullivan, co-chairs the U.S.-Turkey Economic Partnership
Commission (EPC) with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Under
Secretary Ertugrul Apakan. Our EPC is indeed making important progress
in deepening trade and investment between our two countries. And, as
Turkey's economy continues to grow, it helps drive investment and
economic development in Iraq and beyond.
On security, the second cluster of interests identified in our "Shared
Vision" document, the United States and Turkey are deepening an
impressive record of cooperation. Turkey was already making major
contributions to Iraq's stabilization even before the November 5
meeting in the Oval Office that catalyzed our collaboration against
PKK terrorists. Turkey has been a leader of the Iraq Neighbors
process, and in fact, initially proposed the concept. Turkey's
training of Iraqi political parties has contributed to the
normalization of Iraq's political life. And, Ankara's logistical
support has been crucial to providing Coalition forces and Iraqi
civilians with water, fuel, and electricity.
In Afghanistan, I have already mentioned Turkey's important
contributions to ISAF and provincial reconstruction. During the Paris
Conference earlier this month, Turkey increased its original $100
million humanitarian assistance pledge for Afghanistan to $200
million. Turkish firms have invested $1.5 billion in projects in
Afghanistan since 2002, including schools and mosques, hospitals and
health clinics, bridges and water wells. Turkey is also leading an
effort to create a special investment zone along Afghanistan's border
with Pakistan, which could play a key role in stabilizing that
volatile region.
In the Middle East, Turkey's close and constructive relations with
Israel and its Arab neighbors have enabled Turkey to play a
constructive role in encouraging progress towards peace. On the
economic front, Turkey is working with Israel and the Palestinians to
build an industrial estate in the southern West Bank that, when
established, will generate economic development and job opportunities
for Palestinians. On the political front, Turkey helped make last
winter's Annapolis conference a success, encouraging Syria to attend
even in Iran's absence. Turkey is facilitating a new round of indirect
discussions between Syria and Israel. In these ways, Turkey
demonstrates its indispensability in helping the Euro-Atlantic
Community better understand the broader Middle East and develop
successful strategies to advance peace and freedom in this extended
region.
On Iran, while we recognize Turkey's longstanding relationship with
its southern neighbor, and their economic ties, we look to Ankara to
be a regional leader and continue to reinforce the international
community's demands that Iran cease its nuclear enrichment
program. These demands have been expressed in numerous UN Security
Council resolutions. Moving forward, we need the strong commitment of
Turkey and all our friends in the international community to send the
message to the regime in Tehran that we are united in pressing Iran to
change its behavior.
We anticipate that Turkey will maintain and deepen its close ties with
Israel that developed into a strategic partnership in the 1990's, and
is based on the two countries shared democratic values. Turkey is
making important contributions to maintaining peace and restoring
stability to Israel's northern neighbor, Lebanon. And, Turkey can play
an important role in supporting economic growth in the Palestinian
territories.
In Europe, the United States remains convinced that Turkey's eventual
membership in the European Union will benefit Europe and Turkey
alike. Turkey's blend of democracy, secularism, and rule of law can
help us all deepen our understanding of how to integrate our Muslim
populations into our mainstream societies while countering extremist
recruiters. Meanwhile, Europe's criteria for accession to the EU
provide a set of incentives for sustained reforms which, while in
Turkey's national interests, are often politically difficult to make.
The United States remains firmly committed to offering all possible
support to UN efforts to foster a just and lasting Cyprus
settlement. Our goal is reunification of the island into a bi-zonal,
bi-communal federation that builds on the body of work assembled over
the past four decades. We are pleased by the discussions between the
parties that have emerged since the constructive meeting between the
two leaders in March, which led to reopening of the Ledra Street
crossing and technical discussions between working groups in
preparation for the resumption of comprehensive settlement talks under
UN auspices. We also welcomed the May 23 statement by the two leaders,
which set the goals for a re-unified Cyprus. We hope to see
comprehensive talks resume over the next month or so. We believe the
two communities themselves must generate the solution to the
longstanding division of the island. We will consider appointing a new
U.S. Cyprus Coordinator once the parties on the island express their
readiness for such a move by the United States.
We share our European Allies' hope that Turkey and Armenia will soon
normalize their relations. This will involve a decision by Turkey to
restore diplomatic relations and reopen its border with Armenia, and
Armenia's recognition of its existing border with Turkey. We hope such
steps will also lead to a heartfelt discussion of the shared and
tragic past of these two friends of the United States.
In the Black Sea region, the United States and Turkey are working
together to advance democracy in Georgia as our Georgian friends
pursue their NATO aspirations. Turkey can play an important role in
resolving the conflict in Abkhazia, drawing on its large Abkhaz
Diaspora, which is anxious to invest in Abkhazia, Georgia, and thereby
stimulate cooperation and reconciliation. More broadly in the Black
Sea, the United States strongly supports Turkey's leadership in
Operation Black Sea Harmony to foster maritime security cooperation
with Russia, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Georgia against threats
of proliferation and terrorism. We also welcome strong information
sharing between Operation Black Sea Harmony and NATO's Operation
Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean Sea.
Our third cluster of common interests, the advance of democratic and
market economic reform, reflects the values shared by our two
countries. Turkey's unique historical experience ensures it cannot be
a model for any country. But, its legacy of over a century and a half
of modernizing reforms can inspire those in Iraq, the rest of the
broader Middle East, and beyond who seek the same political and
economic freedoms as Turkey's citizens have come to enjoy. The
democratic system that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk launched 85 years ago
affords Turkey its greatest strategic significance in this day and
age. It is precisely the advance of democracy, secularism, and the
rule of law that can ensure separation of mosque and state, advance
political and individual freedoms, and blunt efforts of extremist
recruiters. We welcome the Turkish Government's reform of Article 301
of the Penal Code, and look forward to a new and invigorated effort to
enact further reforms required to fulfill Turkey's EU aspirations. The
economic reforms launched by President Turgut Ozal in the 1980's have
helped transform Turkey into one of the most promising emerging
markets in the world. Sound fiscal policies have allowed Turkey to
weather the severe financial crises of the 1990's and 2001, and orient
its economy toward fulfilling its EU aspirations.
We support the Turkish Government as it pursues this reform agenda. As
President Bush said following the U.S.-EU Summit in Slovenia June 10:
"We strongly believe Turkey ought to be a member of the EU, and we
appreciate Turkey's record of democratic and free market reforms, and
working to realize its EU aspirations."
But, as we know from our own experience in the United States, the job
of building democracy is never done. Political ideologies must adjust
to broader societal change. It took our country nearly a century to
abolish slavery, and only now, 145 years later, has an African
American emerged as a top Presidential candidate. In Turkey, some
political leaders argue they are trying to adjust the vision of
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk to a new era; their opponents contend these
efforts aim to undermine Kemalism and the constitutional principles of
secularism, democracy, and the rule of law.
The current closure case against the ruling AK Party is where these
arguments come to a head. What is clear to me as a U.S. official is
that Turkey's democratic system is the product of Turkey's historical
experience, and remains vibrant. As in the past, Turkish democracy
will work through this current and difficult challenge. In the end, a
democracy requires that voters determine their country's political
future, and Turkey's voters made clear decisions during elections
twice in 2007. Turkish leaders, including President Gul and Prime
Minister Erdogan, have underscored the crucial importance of
maintaining the separation of mosque and state through the
constitutional principle of secularism as a central element of
Turkey's democratic system. Ultimately, we are confident our Turkish
Allies will rely on their Anatolian traditions of pragmatism and
tolerant faith, combined with a modern embrace of scientific learning,
to resolve the current controversy in a way that strengthens Turkish
democracy.
In summary, U.S.-Turkish relations now enjoy a new and modern agenda,
which differs profoundly from our partnership during the Cold War
era. We have reshaped our bilateral agenda radically during the
administration of President George W. Bush. Having weathered some
serious difficulties, the U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership is broader
and richer than any time in the past. Our relations are based on
common interests and shared values. Today, the United States
appreciates Turkey as a key Euro Atlantic ally that uniquely enjoys
multiple identities as a European, Middle Eastern, Eurasian, Balkan,
Black Sea, and Mediterranean country. Our cooperation on energy,
security, and democracy provide the foundation for a partnership that
is more deeply and genuinely strategic than any time in the past. As
we contemplate the threats that will confront the Euro-Atlantic
community in the coming decade, Turkey has emerged as an indispensable
partner. Maximizing the potential of our strategic partnership will
require the next U.S. administration to keep all these factors in
mind, and require Turkey to sustain political and economic reforms
even when tempted by its propensity to avoid tough decisions.
June 25, 2008
Speeches: Invigorating the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership
STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS RELEASE
Wed, 25 Jun 2008
Matt Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs
Turgot Ozal Memorial Lecture at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Washington, DC
June 24, 2008
As prepared for delivery
Like Turkey itself, U.S.-Turkey relations have navigated remarkable
transitions over the past 50 years. Today, we are living in perhaps
the most exciting period. Timeworn cliches about Turkey, such as
"bulwark against the Soviet Union," or "NATO Ally since the Korean
War," or "bridge between East and West" are being updated with new
concepts, such as "energy hub" and "vibrant emerging market."
All of these cliches retain a certain degree of truth. But, they
reflect a static and simplified view of U.S.-Turkish relations. Today,
the U.S. government's appreciation of Turkey's geo-strategic
significance is evolving in new and positive ways. Today, we are
starting to understand Turkey's multiple identities. Turkey is not
merely a bridge; it is a society whose soul lies in both East and
West, with a strategic and cultural reach extending from Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Caucasus to the Balkans, Berlin,
and Amsterdam. At the same time, Turkey is a strategic link between
North and South, lying at the center of an extended Black Sea region
that connects the European Union, Russia, and Ukraine with the Middle
East.
With a more sophisticated appreciation of Turkey's economic,
diplomatic, and cultural might, the United States enjoys new
opportunities to pursue the shared interests and common values that
unite our two great countries. No factor is more significant in
elevating Turkey's strategic relevance today than its vibrant
democracy. Turkey's constitutional principles of democracy,
secularism, and the rule of law can inspire reformers in the broader
Middle East and beyond who seek the same political and economic
freedoms, and the same opportunities to improve their societies as do
the citizens of the Turkish Republic.
We are thus in the process of updating our strategic concepts. To
understand more deeply the opportunities before us, we should first
take a brief look backward at how U.S.-Turkey relations have developed
over the past decade.
During the 1990's, Turkey began fully to enjoy the fruits of Turgut
Ozal's groundbreaking reforms, and Prime Minister Erdogan has
continued this important reform effort. Ankara and Washington
recognized an opportunity to build a new bilateral relationship. Our
Cold War conception of Turkey as the cornerstone of NATO's Southern
Flank, blunting Soviet ambitions and hosting key NATO military assets
and Incirlik Airbase, was becoming outdated. As Turkey's economy grew,
so did its demand for energy, along with its ambitions to reconnect
with Turkic populations in the Caucasus and Central Asia. At the same
time, the United States sought to help the newly independent states of
Central Asia and the Caucasus cement their independence by connecting
their economies to European and global markets. Azerbaijani President
Heydar Aliyev and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev welcomed
international investors to help develop the Caspian Basin's mammoth
oil and gas reserves. Then-Turkish President Suleyman Demirel worked
with these leaders, and with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze,
to develop a revitalized concept of the Great Silk Road in the version
of an East-West Corridor of oil and natural gas pipelines.
And so, a new U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership was born, with energy
as a centerpiece. The United States and Turkey worked together in
pursuit of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the South
Caucasus Gas Pipeline (SCP) to connect Azerbaijan's oil and natural
gas reserves with European and global markets. Meanwhile, Turkey was
developing a strategic partnership with Israel, bringing together the
Middle East's only two democracies at that time to pursue their common
security and economic interests.
At the outset of President George W. Bush's administration, the
U.S. sought to build on the strong energy cooperation outlined above
to generate a deeper, East-West dynamic in Central Asia and the
Caucasus. Our goal was to help the young independent states of these
regions secure their sovereignty and liberty by linking them to
Europe, world markets, and Euro-Atlantic institutions via the corridor
being established by the BTC and SCP pipelines. Turkey would be the
gateway. Reflecting this vision, the National Security Council and
State Department reorganized their bureaucratic structures to
encourage a philosophical shift toward these countries' deeper
connection to Europe as independent actors. The Caucasus and Central
Asia were grouped with Turkey, which the Administration viewed as
these countries' crucial partner in connecting with European and
global markets, and with Euro-Atlantic security institutions.
This approach proved to be of crucial importance in the aftermath of
September 11. The East-West Corridor we had been building from Turkey
and the Black Sea through Georgia and Azerbaijan and across the
Caspian became the strategic air corridor, and the lifeline, into
Afghanistan allowing the United States and our coalition partners to
conduct Operation Enduring Freedom. Uzbekistan emerged as crucial in
launching and then sustaining this multi-national effort from the
airbase at Karshi Khanabad. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan
immediately offered blanket over flight clearances, while Kyrgyzstan
allowed use of the Manas Airbase, which evolved into our crucial
logistics hub for Operation Enduring Freedom after Uzbekistan
rescinded U.S. access to Karshi Khanabad.
U.S. efforts to establish these operational relationships advanced on
the foundation of our cooperation with Turkey in preceding years on
the East-West Corridor. Turkey's contributions to the war in
Afghanistan grew much deeper. Turkey has now commanded the
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan twice. Former
Grand National Assembly Speaker and Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin
served as NATO's civilian representative in Kabul. And, Turkey now
leads a provincial reconstruction team in Wardak Province north of
Kabul. Security cooperation in Afghanistan thus emerged as a
cornerstone of strategic partnership between the United States and
Turkey. At NATO's recent Bucharest Summit, Turkey and the United
States joined our other Allies and Alliance partners to renew our
long-term commitment to security and stability in Afghanistan. We have
pledged to provide the forces, resources and flexibility necessary for
success, so Afghanistan may never again become a haven for terrorists.
Our success in sustaining and strengthening U.S.-Turkey cooperation in
Afghanistan is particularly significant given the severe strains the
war in Iraq initially placed on our two countries' relations. In late
2002, many of us responsible for U.S. policy toward Turkey anticipated
a joint effort in Iraq that would elevate U.S.-Turkey relations to a
new and unprecedented strategic level. Turkey would help the United
States better understand the challenges ahead of us in Iraq, both in
terms of the approaching military campaign and Iraq's post-war
reconstruction; and the United States would work with Turkey to
counter the PKK terrorist threat emanating from northern Iraq, while
helping to cushion Turkey's economy against any exogenous shocks that
might result from war along Turkey's southern border.
Scholars will long debate what went wrong in the lead-up to the
Turkish Grand National Assembly's vote on March 1, 2003. The bottom
line is that the Turkish Parliament's sovereign decision to decline
the U.S. requests to transit troops and equipment through Turkey and
into Iraq set U.S.-Turkey relations into a tailspin and shattered our
concept of strategic partnership.
Despite this, we worked hard to salvage U.S.-Turkey relations. The
United States offered an $8 billion assistance package as a sign of
Allied friendship to ease what we feared could be short-term economic
shocks to Turkey's economy from the war in Iraq. Ankara eventually
declined our offer, just as Washington declined Ankara's offer in
October 2003 of Turkish troops for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Still, we tried to move ahead. We viewed 2004 as a potentially key
year for restoring the U.S.-Turkey partnership. It began with Prime
Minister Erdogan's visit to the White House in January. That June,
Prime Minister Erdogan joined G8 leaders in Sea Island Georgia to
discuss cooperation to advance democracy in the broader Middle East,
and then hosted the NATO Summit in Istanbul. We hoped these events
would help Turkey showcase its strategic value to the European Union
as a democracy with a predominantly Muslim population and strong
traditions of secularism and the rule of law. In December 2004, the
European Council decided to commence accession negotiations with
Ankara, and the talks began in October 2005, with strong U.S. support.
Despite this positive momentum, U.S.-Turkey relations remained stalled
over the issue of PKK terrorism. Since 2006, we have made important
progress in undercutting the PKK's financial, operational, and
political support mechanisms in Europe - through a robust combination
of political pressure and information sharing. Then-Foreign Minister
Gul graciously praised these efforts. But, the continued presence of
PKK bases in northern Iraq led many Turkish citizens from all walks of
life to resent what they perceived as the U.S. treating Turkey's
primary terrorist (and national security) threat differently than we
treated Al Qaida. As a result, the popularity of the United States
shrank to record low-levels, reaching a depressing 9 percent in
mid-2007.
The November 2007 Oval Office meeting between President Bush and Prime
Minister Erdogan marked a decisive turning point. President Bush's
designation of the PKK as "an enemy of Turkey, an enemy of Iraq, and
therefore an enemy of the United States," signaled a new approach by
Washington. The intensive information sharing authorized by President
Bush has opened a new chapter in security cooperation between the
United States, Turkey, and Iraq. It has also cleared the way for
deeper cooperation not only on security, but on energy and democracy
as well.
With that historical context in place, I would like to look forward to
what we are doing now to deepen our strategic partnership with
Turkey. The "Shared Vision" document concluded by Secretary Rice and
then-Foreign Minister Gul in July 2006 outlines a structured dialogue
between our two governments in pursuit of the strategic interests and
values our two countries share. Our cooperation focuses on three broad
areas: energy and economy, security, and democracy.
As I noted above, cooperation on energy in the late 1990's formed a
cornerstone of the U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership, resulting in a
successful "first phase" of Caspian development anchored by BTC for
oil and SCP for gas. Today, we are focusing on the next phase of
Caspian development, looking to the Caspian Basin and Iraq to help
reduce Europe's dependence on a single Russian company, Gazprom, which
provides 25 percent of all gas consumed in Europe. Gazprom provides 25
percent of Europe's overall gas consumption in Europe and 80 to 100
percent of gas to countries in Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, and the
Baltic region. Turkey's dependence on Gazprom, at 65 percent, is
significant. Turkey also will need additional new sources of gas to
help diversify its supplies.
Our goal is to develop a "Southern Corridor" of energy infrastructure
to transport Caspian and Iraqi oil and gas to Turkey and Europe. The
Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) and Nabucco natural gas pipelines are key
elements of the Southern Corridor. Azerbaijan provides the most
promising near-term option for Turkey and the EU in its pursuit of
diversified gas supplies from the Caspian Sea region. Azerbaijan
possesses sufficient gas reserves to fill TGI, while providing some
gas for domestic, Georgian and Turkish consumption, as well as for the
Nabucco pipeline. However, gas in the ground does no good. Companies
need access to these resources to develop them for Turkey and
Europe. These two pipeline projects alone could provide Europe up to
44 billion cubic meters (BCM) of new gas supplies over the next seven
to twelve years, of which 20 BCM (a not insignificant amount) will
hopefully come from Azerbaijan, the rest from Iraq and the Caspian
Basin. Gazprom, by comparison, currently exports 160 BCM to
Europe. So, TGI and Nabucco could add to European markets more than
one-quarter of the gas currently supplied by Gazprom. Such competition
is crucial to ensuring that natural gas prices in Europe are set by
market forces.
To achieve these goals, Turkey and Azerbaijan must work together to
resolve their dispute over the commercial terms for the transit of
natural gas across Turkey and onward into Europe, including by the TGI
and Nabucco pipelines. Once this dispute is resolved, Azerbaijan is
more likely to be able to conclude gas sales and purchase agreements
with European investors required to advance these two major pipeline
projects. Turkey could come to be seen as a reliable gas transit
state, elevating its strategic importance to the European Union as the
crucial partner linking enormous gas supplies in the Caspian region
and Iraq with European markets. With the inauguration of the
Turkey-Greece gas inter-connection last November, it is now possible
to export gas from Azerbaijan's sector of the Caspian Sea to Greece
and the EU-15 via Georgia and Turkey.
Potential gas supplies in Turkmenistan and Iraq can provide the
crucial additional volumes beyond those in Azerbaijan to realize the
Southern Corridor. Washington and Ankara are working together with
Baghdad to help Iraq develop its own large natural gas reserves for
both domestic consumption and for export to Turkey and the EU. I have
the honor to co-chair the U.S.-Turkey-Iraq Trilateral Working Group on
Natural Gas, which aims to attract U.S., Turkish, and other
international investment to Iraq's natural gas fields, much of which
awaits Iraq's national hydrocarbon law, and then export Iraqi gas to
Turkey and onward via the Nabucco Pipeline.
Energy is only one component of the growing economic partnership
between the U.S. and Turkey, albeit, a crucial one. We are also
working to deepen our trade relationship, which has lagged behind our
energy and security cooperation for years. My friend and colleague,
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy, and Business
Affairs, Dan Sullivan, co-chairs the U.S.-Turkey Economic Partnership
Commission (EPC) with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Under
Secretary Ertugrul Apakan. Our EPC is indeed making important progress
in deepening trade and investment between our two countries. And, as
Turkey's economy continues to grow, it helps drive investment and
economic development in Iraq and beyond.
On security, the second cluster of interests identified in our "Shared
Vision" document, the United States and Turkey are deepening an
impressive record of cooperation. Turkey was already making major
contributions to Iraq's stabilization even before the November 5
meeting in the Oval Office that catalyzed our collaboration against
PKK terrorists. Turkey has been a leader of the Iraq Neighbors
process, and in fact, initially proposed the concept. Turkey's
training of Iraqi political parties has contributed to the
normalization of Iraq's political life. And, Ankara's logistical
support has been crucial to providing Coalition forces and Iraqi
civilians with water, fuel, and electricity.
In Afghanistan, I have already mentioned Turkey's important
contributions to ISAF and provincial reconstruction. During the Paris
Conference earlier this month, Turkey increased its original $100
million humanitarian assistance pledge for Afghanistan to $200
million. Turkish firms have invested $1.5 billion in projects in
Afghanistan since 2002, including schools and mosques, hospitals and
health clinics, bridges and water wells. Turkey is also leading an
effort to create a special investment zone along Afghanistan's border
with Pakistan, which could play a key role in stabilizing that
volatile region.
In the Middle East, Turkey's close and constructive relations with
Israel and its Arab neighbors have enabled Turkey to play a
constructive role in encouraging progress towards peace. On the
economic front, Turkey is working with Israel and the Palestinians to
build an industrial estate in the southern West Bank that, when
established, will generate economic development and job opportunities
for Palestinians. On the political front, Turkey helped make last
winter's Annapolis conference a success, encouraging Syria to attend
even in Iran's absence. Turkey is facilitating a new round of indirect
discussions between Syria and Israel. In these ways, Turkey
demonstrates its indispensability in helping the Euro-Atlantic
Community better understand the broader Middle East and develop
successful strategies to advance peace and freedom in this extended
region.
On Iran, while we recognize Turkey's longstanding relationship with
its southern neighbor, and their economic ties, we look to Ankara to
be a regional leader and continue to reinforce the international
community's demands that Iran cease its nuclear enrichment
program. These demands have been expressed in numerous UN Security
Council resolutions. Moving forward, we need the strong commitment of
Turkey and all our friends in the international community to send the
message to the regime in Tehran that we are united in pressing Iran to
change its behavior.
We anticipate that Turkey will maintain and deepen its close ties with
Israel that developed into a strategic partnership in the 1990's, and
is based on the two countries shared democratic values. Turkey is
making important contributions to maintaining peace and restoring
stability to Israel's northern neighbor, Lebanon. And, Turkey can play
an important role in supporting economic growth in the Palestinian
territories.
In Europe, the United States remains convinced that Turkey's eventual
membership in the European Union will benefit Europe and Turkey
alike. Turkey's blend of democracy, secularism, and rule of law can
help us all deepen our understanding of how to integrate our Muslim
populations into our mainstream societies while countering extremist
recruiters. Meanwhile, Europe's criteria for accession to the EU
provide a set of incentives for sustained reforms which, while in
Turkey's national interests, are often politically difficult to make.
The United States remains firmly committed to offering all possible
support to UN efforts to foster a just and lasting Cyprus
settlement. Our goal is reunification of the island into a bi-zonal,
bi-communal federation that builds on the body of work assembled over
the past four decades. We are pleased by the discussions between the
parties that have emerged since the constructive meeting between the
two leaders in March, which led to reopening of the Ledra Street
crossing and technical discussions between working groups in
preparation for the resumption of comprehensive settlement talks under
UN auspices. We also welcomed the May 23 statement by the two leaders,
which set the goals for a re-unified Cyprus. We hope to see
comprehensive talks resume over the next month or so. We believe the
two communities themselves must generate the solution to the
longstanding division of the island. We will consider appointing a new
U.S. Cyprus Coordinator once the parties on the island express their
readiness for such a move by the United States.
We share our European Allies' hope that Turkey and Armenia will soon
normalize their relations. This will involve a decision by Turkey to
restore diplomatic relations and reopen its border with Armenia, and
Armenia's recognition of its existing border with Turkey. We hope such
steps will also lead to a heartfelt discussion of the shared and
tragic past of these two friends of the United States.
In the Black Sea region, the United States and Turkey are working
together to advance democracy in Georgia as our Georgian friends
pursue their NATO aspirations. Turkey can play an important role in
resolving the conflict in Abkhazia, drawing on its large Abkhaz
Diaspora, which is anxious to invest in Abkhazia, Georgia, and thereby
stimulate cooperation and reconciliation. More broadly in the Black
Sea, the United States strongly supports Turkey's leadership in
Operation Black Sea Harmony to foster maritime security cooperation
with Russia, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Georgia against threats
of proliferation and terrorism. We also welcome strong information
sharing between Operation Black Sea Harmony and NATO's Operation
Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean Sea.
Our third cluster of common interests, the advance of democratic and
market economic reform, reflects the values shared by our two
countries. Turkey's unique historical experience ensures it cannot be
a model for any country. But, its legacy of over a century and a half
of modernizing reforms can inspire those in Iraq, the rest of the
broader Middle East, and beyond who seek the same political and
economic freedoms as Turkey's citizens have come to enjoy. The
democratic system that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk launched 85 years ago
affords Turkey its greatest strategic significance in this day and
age. It is precisely the advance of democracy, secularism, and the
rule of law that can ensure separation of mosque and state, advance
political and individual freedoms, and blunt efforts of extremist
recruiters. We welcome the Turkish Government's reform of Article 301
of the Penal Code, and look forward to a new and invigorated effort to
enact further reforms required to fulfill Turkey's EU aspirations. The
economic reforms launched by President Turgut Ozal in the 1980's have
helped transform Turkey into one of the most promising emerging
markets in the world. Sound fiscal policies have allowed Turkey to
weather the severe financial crises of the 1990's and 2001, and orient
its economy toward fulfilling its EU aspirations.
We support the Turkish Government as it pursues this reform agenda. As
President Bush said following the U.S.-EU Summit in Slovenia June 10:
"We strongly believe Turkey ought to be a member of the EU, and we
appreciate Turkey's record of democratic and free market reforms, and
working to realize its EU aspirations."
But, as we know from our own experience in the United States, the job
of building democracy is never done. Political ideologies must adjust
to broader societal change. It took our country nearly a century to
abolish slavery, and only now, 145 years later, has an African
American emerged as a top Presidential candidate. In Turkey, some
political leaders argue they are trying to adjust the vision of
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk to a new era; their opponents contend these
efforts aim to undermine Kemalism and the constitutional principles of
secularism, democracy, and the rule of law.
The current closure case against the ruling AK Party is where these
arguments come to a head. What is clear to me as a U.S. official is
that Turkey's democratic system is the product of Turkey's historical
experience, and remains vibrant. As in the past, Turkish democracy
will work through this current and difficult challenge. In the end, a
democracy requires that voters determine their country's political
future, and Turkey's voters made clear decisions during elections
twice in 2007. Turkish leaders, including President Gul and Prime
Minister Erdogan, have underscored the crucial importance of
maintaining the separation of mosque and state through the
constitutional principle of secularism as a central element of
Turkey's democratic system. Ultimately, we are confident our Turkish
Allies will rely on their Anatolian traditions of pragmatism and
tolerant faith, combined with a modern embrace of scientific learning,
to resolve the current controversy in a way that strengthens Turkish
democracy.
In summary, U.S.-Turkish relations now enjoy a new and modern agenda,
which differs profoundly from our partnership during the Cold War
era. We have reshaped our bilateral agenda radically during the
administration of President George W. Bush. Having weathered some
serious difficulties, the U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership is broader
and richer than any time in the past. Our relations are based on
common interests and shared values. Today, the United States
appreciates Turkey as a key Euro Atlantic ally that uniquely enjoys
multiple identities as a European, Middle Eastern, Eurasian, Balkan,
Black Sea, and Mediterranean country. Our cooperation on energy,
security, and democracy provide the foundation for a partnership that
is more deeply and genuinely strategic than any time in the past. As
we contemplate the threats that will confront the Euro-Atlantic
community in the coming decade, Turkey has emerged as an indispensable
partner. Maximizing the potential of our strategic partnership will
require the next U.S. administration to keep all these factors in
mind, and require Turkey to sustain political and economic reforms
even when tempted by its propensity to avoid tough decisions.