Tweet
THE COLOUR IS NOT IMPORTANT
Fedor Lukyanov
Gazeta
March 6 2008
Russia
At his nighttime press conference after being elected president of
Russia, Dmitriy Medvedev only touched on onesubject related to foreign
policy. He confirmed that Moscow's priority is the CIS, and promised
that his firstvisit would be to one of the Commonwealth countries. That
could be considered nothing more than a formality, were it notfor the
interesting processes that are unfolding in the neighbouring states
and which are yet again changing the overalldisposition.
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict over gas deliveries flares up so
regularly that it has almost become routine. But thistime the clash
was different. Because the confronting sides were not Moscow and Kiev,
but the two top Ukrainian leaders - President Yushchenko and Prime
Minister Tymoshenko.
The head of government got carried away and torpedoed the accords
reached previously by the head of state with hisRussian counterpart.
The fact of the keen competition between the branches of power
is nothing new in itself, such things happen quiteoften even in
countries where democracy is well established. It is something else
that is surprising. The instrument of foreign policy rivalry is an
external force - the Russian gas monopoly, the same one that had
hitherto only beencastigated for interference in the affairs of our
sovereign neighbours.
Three and a half years ago it was events in Ukraine that were the
turning point for the whole of Russia's policyin the post-Soviet
area. The activeness that was displayed proved so counterproductive
that it was decided to review thecourse. Moscow abandoned attempts
to participate in political games inside the neighbouring states,
choosing themercantilist approach: Pay up, and do what you like. If you
can, because we will create the most unfavourable externalconditions
possible for you.
Since that time the Kremlin has striven to distance itself from the
seething passions in first one, then anotherformer Soviet republic.
Which has not protected Russia from all kinds of accusations (the
hand of Moscow is customarily discovered everywhere), but it has
enabled it to spare its resources and its nerves.
But now we see the unexpected fruits of this policy.
Viktor Yushchenko, the leader of the "Orange Revolution," is apparently
becoming Gazprom's chief ally on the question of deliveries and
transit of raw materials, while on the other side of the barricade
is YuliyaTymoshenko, symbol of that very same revolution.
It is noteworthy that the politician for whose sake the Russian
president risked his own reputation in 2004 - Viktor Yanukovych -
and his party are scarcely to be heard in this clash.
We could, of course, engage in schadenfreude: Look what the Ukrainian
revolutionaries have come to, when in order to settle their arguments
with one another they have to appeal to the sworn enemies of Ukrainian
democracy and risk thenation's energy security. But something else is
more interesting. The situation that has developed indicates thatthe
post-Soviet countries really are entering a new stage of development,
in which the ideologized and geopoliticizedapproach that is typical
of the period of formation gives way to pragmatic calculation.
In other words, the role of the external factor is undergoing a
reinterpretation, and is changing from a bugaboo (in the case of
Russia) or a beautiful dream (in the case of Europe) into a normal
component of the politicalenvironment.
Another example of the same kind is the political crisis in Yerevan.
Turbulent demonstrations following elections - that situation is
widespread in the post-Soviet space. Wherever theelections are
contested to even the slightest degree, the opposition raises the
question of mass abuses and vote-riggingduring the poll. But until now
an unwritten rule has operated - the OSCE's international observers
have been thearbiters in the dispute. If they expressed doubt as to
the honesty and fairness of the elections, that was the signalfor
the start of a large-scale political campaign (which often led to
regime change). But if the observers certified theevent as democratic,
subsequent attempts to dispute the result quickly faded.
In Armenia, that rule was broken.
The observers deemed that the elections complied with European
standards. However, the opposition, under theleadership of ex-President
Levon Ter-Petrosyan, ignored the verdict, continuing firmly to demand
the return of the"stolen victory."
The imposition of a state of emergency froze the situation, but
apparently this is not the end, only a pause, and thesubsequent
scenario is hard to predict.
People have become accustomed to seeing election cataclysms in the
CIS countries from the standpoint of thegeopolitical rivalry between
Russia and the West.
There have practically always been forces towards which Moscow was
sympathetic, and those who were seen as adherents of the Western path
of development.
In Armenia no geopolitical gambles were made, and that is easy to
explain. The country is in a very difficultposition, squeezed not
so much between two unfriendly states - Azerbaijan and Turkey -
as between two insoluble problems- the Karabakh problem and the
genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Unless these are
resolved a breakthroughin development is impossible, but compromise
is unacceptable to the national consciousness. In this situation
rivalrybetween the great powers carries the risk of particularly grave
consequences, and the absence of progress in resolvingthe main issues
creates heightened political tension, which has indeed flared up in
connection with these elections.
Be that as it may, what is happening in Armenia has internal causes
and motive forces, which came as a surprise both to Moscow and to the
Western capitals. The reincarnation of the country's first president
was not seriously part ofanyone's plans. And what is to be done about
it now is not quite clear.
The attitude of the Yerevan demonstrators to the OSCE's opinion is
quite revealing. After the presidentialelection in Georgia, where the
observers' mission initially quickly recognized the voting as fair,
then began tohave doubts, but later confirmed its initial opinion,
the institution's reputation suffered. Incidentally, thefinal verdict,
published a couple of days ago and couched in a more critical tone
than the comments made hot on theheels of the event, strengthens
suspicions of the existence of opportunist motives for the evaluation.
So the role of the external factor in the post-Soviet space is
changing, or rather, the previous black-and-whitepicture is being
replaced by one that is much more multicoloured. This opens up new
opportunities and sets tasks for theleadership of Russia. Especially
since one of the key problems that Dmitriy Medvedev will have to
tackle is to look for allies.
And to that end it will be necessary to change the detached position
that Moscow has held in relations with itsneighbours in the past
three years. True, it is even more important not to forget the lessons
learned after the failure in the maydan [square: allusion to Orange
Revolution].
Fedor Lukyanov
Gazeta
March 6 2008
Russia
At his nighttime press conference after being elected president of
Russia, Dmitriy Medvedev only touched on onesubject related to foreign
policy. He confirmed that Moscow's priority is the CIS, and promised
that his firstvisit would be to one of the Commonwealth countries. That
could be considered nothing more than a formality, were it notfor the
interesting processes that are unfolding in the neighbouring states
and which are yet again changing the overalldisposition.
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict over gas deliveries flares up so
regularly that it has almost become routine. But thistime the clash
was different. Because the confronting sides were not Moscow and Kiev,
but the two top Ukrainian leaders - President Yushchenko and Prime
Minister Tymoshenko.
The head of government got carried away and torpedoed the accords
reached previously by the head of state with hisRussian counterpart.
The fact of the keen competition between the branches of power
is nothing new in itself, such things happen quiteoften even in
countries where democracy is well established. It is something else
that is surprising. The instrument of foreign policy rivalry is an
external force - the Russian gas monopoly, the same one that had
hitherto only beencastigated for interference in the affairs of our
sovereign neighbours.
Three and a half years ago it was events in Ukraine that were the
turning point for the whole of Russia's policyin the post-Soviet
area. The activeness that was displayed proved so counterproductive
that it was decided to review thecourse. Moscow abandoned attempts
to participate in political games inside the neighbouring states,
choosing themercantilist approach: Pay up, and do what you like. If you
can, because we will create the most unfavourable externalconditions
possible for you.
Since that time the Kremlin has striven to distance itself from the
seething passions in first one, then anotherformer Soviet republic.
Which has not protected Russia from all kinds of accusations (the
hand of Moscow is customarily discovered everywhere), but it has
enabled it to spare its resources and its nerves.
But now we see the unexpected fruits of this policy.
Viktor Yushchenko, the leader of the "Orange Revolution," is apparently
becoming Gazprom's chief ally on the question of deliveries and
transit of raw materials, while on the other side of the barricade
is YuliyaTymoshenko, symbol of that very same revolution.
It is noteworthy that the politician for whose sake the Russian
president risked his own reputation in 2004 - Viktor Yanukovych -
and his party are scarcely to be heard in this clash.
We could, of course, engage in schadenfreude: Look what the Ukrainian
revolutionaries have come to, when in order to settle their arguments
with one another they have to appeal to the sworn enemies of Ukrainian
democracy and risk thenation's energy security. But something else is
more interesting. The situation that has developed indicates thatthe
post-Soviet countries really are entering a new stage of development,
in which the ideologized and geopoliticizedapproach that is typical
of the period of formation gives way to pragmatic calculation.
In other words, the role of the external factor is undergoing a
reinterpretation, and is changing from a bugaboo (in the case of
Russia) or a beautiful dream (in the case of Europe) into a normal
component of the politicalenvironment.
Another example of the same kind is the political crisis in Yerevan.
Turbulent demonstrations following elections - that situation is
widespread in the post-Soviet space. Wherever theelections are
contested to even the slightest degree, the opposition raises the
question of mass abuses and vote-riggingduring the poll. But until now
an unwritten rule has operated - the OSCE's international observers
have been thearbiters in the dispute. If they expressed doubt as to
the honesty and fairness of the elections, that was the signalfor
the start of a large-scale political campaign (which often led to
regime change). But if the observers certified theevent as democratic,
subsequent attempts to dispute the result quickly faded.
In Armenia, that rule was broken.
The observers deemed that the elections complied with European
standards. However, the opposition, under theleadership of ex-President
Levon Ter-Petrosyan, ignored the verdict, continuing firmly to demand
the return of the"stolen victory."
The imposition of a state of emergency froze the situation, but
apparently this is not the end, only a pause, and thesubsequent
scenario is hard to predict.
People have become accustomed to seeing election cataclysms in the
CIS countries from the standpoint of thegeopolitical rivalry between
Russia and the West.
There have practically always been forces towards which Moscow was
sympathetic, and those who were seen as adherents of the Western path
of development.
In Armenia no geopolitical gambles were made, and that is easy to
explain. The country is in a very difficultposition, squeezed not
so much between two unfriendly states - Azerbaijan and Turkey -
as between two insoluble problems- the Karabakh problem and the
genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Unless these are
resolved a breakthroughin development is impossible, but compromise
is unacceptable to the national consciousness. In this situation
rivalrybetween the great powers carries the risk of particularly grave
consequences, and the absence of progress in resolvingthe main issues
creates heightened political tension, which has indeed flared up in
connection with these elections.
Be that as it may, what is happening in Armenia has internal causes
and motive forces, which came as a surprise both to Moscow and to the
Western capitals. The reincarnation of the country's first president
was not seriously part ofanyone's plans. And what is to be done about
it now is not quite clear.
The attitude of the Yerevan demonstrators to the OSCE's opinion is
quite revealing. After the presidentialelection in Georgia, where the
observers' mission initially quickly recognized the voting as fair,
then began tohave doubts, but later confirmed its initial opinion,
the institution's reputation suffered. Incidentally, thefinal verdict,
published a couple of days ago and couched in a more critical tone
than the comments made hot on theheels of the event, strengthens
suspicions of the existence of opportunist motives for the evaluation.
So the role of the external factor in the post-Soviet space is
changing, or rather, the previous black-and-whitepicture is being
replaced by one that is much more multicoloured. This opens up new
opportunities and sets tasks for theleadership of Russia. Especially
since one of the key problems that Dmitriy Medvedev will have to
tackle is to look for allies.
And to that end it will be necessary to change the detached position
that Moscow has held in relations with itsneighbours in the past
three years. True, it is even more important not to forget the lessons
learned after the failure in the maydan [square: allusion to Orange
Revolution].