KOSOVO EFFECT
http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=1270
10 .03.2008
Would Kosovo independence affect other conflicts across the globe? What
would be the future international order as other disgruntled regions
in different parts of the world aspire for independent status? The
emerging scenario aftermath of the Kosovo independence in February 2008
has raised such issues. The ripple effect seems to have already felt
in different parts of the world as the conflict zones such as Abkhazia
in the Caucasus have reiterated their right to self-determination.
Two issues need to be looked seriously in the above context. First,
whether federalism is still a plausible and workable framework
for distinct units in a multi-ethnic, pluralistic society to work
together? Or every distinct unit in a federation must enjoy the right
to have self-determination at will?
This is a matter of common concern for all pluralistic countries,
as the domino-effect of secession in societies like India, Russia,
China can well be imagined in which the violence-ridden regions like
Kashmir (India), Chechnya (Russia), Xinjiang (China) have already
undergone violent turmoil.
Second, how can the differences between the Centre and unit be resolved
amicably in a federation without pulling the relations in opposite
direction beyond adjustable limits? Arend Lijphart's 'consociational
model' can be considered a just device to bring different units on
a platform to work under certain commonly agreed principles. Former
Russian President Boris Yeltsin's attempt as reflected in the Union
Treaty of 1992 somehow endeavoured to achieve this goal. But, it is
true that there can not be any fixed formula as every situation has
its own dynamics. As the theory of cultural relativism holds, it is
not only precarious but also disastrous to apply a particular set of
principles to resolve all the conflicts.
The Kosovo problem came to limelight since the Balkan crisis that
gained momentum in the 1990s. The Milosevic regime's course might
have exaggerated the crisis, but it is more power politics between
regional and global powers that led to further aggravation of the
situation. Russia's desire to maintain the unity of Serbia is not only
characterised by its Slavic attachment to the region but also due to
fear of ripple effect of independence to its neighbourhood. President
Putin's statement "Kosovo is a terrible precedent, and it breaks
up the entire system of international relations that existed for
decades and even centuries" appears cogent as the spiralling effect
of the emerging situation might affect the structure of international
relations, if not properly balanced.
So far Kosovo has been recognised by few countries. Till the end of
February only thirty states have recognized its independence. Countries
like the US, UK, France, Germany and Turkey have supported the
independence where as countries like Russia, China, Spain, Georgia,
and Greece have opposed the move. Among the former Soviet republics,
the Baltic States have expressed their support where as countries
like Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have declared
their opposition to recognize Serbia's breakaway region.
The sudden impact of Kosovo independence on the Caucasian region has
already been felt as Abkhazia the breakaway of region of Georgia has
demanded recognition of its independence. Georgia is afraid that any
recognition of Kosovo independence may fuel similar sentiments in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Similarly the Armenian Foreign Minister
Vartan Oskanian complained of international double standard, arguing
"Granting independence to Kosovo, the international community violated
the legal norms but forgot Karabakh." It can be mentioned that both
Armenia and Azerbaijan have conflicting interests in Nagorno-Karabakh
and the developments in Kosovo would likely to be interpreted
differently by both these countries.
Azerbaijan has already declared the independence of Kosovo
'illegal'. The Central Asian states like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan have expressed opposition against the declaration
of independence.
India too has expressed reservation over this issue as any recognition
of independent Kosovo might encourage separatists in Kashmir to raise
their demands more violently. This region in the past has witnessed
much bloodshed and now it may prove difficult for India to risk siding
with Kosovo.
Similarly, Russia's problem in its southern part such as Chechnya
and Dagestan is well known. The debilitating potentials of Kosovo
developments in fomenting religious fundamentalism and terrorism in the
guise of self-determination cannot be ruled out. The Chechen radical
leader Doku Umarov has already revealed his vision of a Caucasian
caliphate and he may well use the Kosovo incident to further his
activities in the region.
Both India along with Russia had signed in 1994 the declaration
on the protection of interests of multiethnic and pluralistic
societies. Hence, in this background the Kosovo crisis needs to be
seen as a factor in the evolving order of international relations as
a challenge (as well as opportunity) to multiethnic and pluralistic
societies. It is true that right to self determination is a noble
principle recognised by international law, but its misinterpretation
and misapplication may bring devastating consequences in an age in
which religion and ethnicity based violence is a common norm. Hence,
at the present juncture it would be difficult to say whether Kosovo
independence would bring stability in the Balkans or lead to a flurry
of such movements in other parts of the world. However, the Kosovo
independence would likely affect the evolving international scenario
especially in the Eurasian region in which the changing contours of
power politics have thrown up new power alignments driven by great
power ambitions.
The author is a research faculty at Centre for Central Eurasian
Studies, University of Mumbai, India.
http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=1270
10 .03.2008
Would Kosovo independence affect other conflicts across the globe? What
would be the future international order as other disgruntled regions
in different parts of the world aspire for independent status? The
emerging scenario aftermath of the Kosovo independence in February 2008
has raised such issues. The ripple effect seems to have already felt
in different parts of the world as the conflict zones such as Abkhazia
in the Caucasus have reiterated their right to self-determination.
Two issues need to be looked seriously in the above context. First,
whether federalism is still a plausible and workable framework
for distinct units in a multi-ethnic, pluralistic society to work
together? Or every distinct unit in a federation must enjoy the right
to have self-determination at will?
This is a matter of common concern for all pluralistic countries,
as the domino-effect of secession in societies like India, Russia,
China can well be imagined in which the violence-ridden regions like
Kashmir (India), Chechnya (Russia), Xinjiang (China) have already
undergone violent turmoil.
Second, how can the differences between the Centre and unit be resolved
amicably in a federation without pulling the relations in opposite
direction beyond adjustable limits? Arend Lijphart's 'consociational
model' can be considered a just device to bring different units on
a platform to work under certain commonly agreed principles. Former
Russian President Boris Yeltsin's attempt as reflected in the Union
Treaty of 1992 somehow endeavoured to achieve this goal. But, it is
true that there can not be any fixed formula as every situation has
its own dynamics. As the theory of cultural relativism holds, it is
not only precarious but also disastrous to apply a particular set of
principles to resolve all the conflicts.
The Kosovo problem came to limelight since the Balkan crisis that
gained momentum in the 1990s. The Milosevic regime's course might
have exaggerated the crisis, but it is more power politics between
regional and global powers that led to further aggravation of the
situation. Russia's desire to maintain the unity of Serbia is not only
characterised by its Slavic attachment to the region but also due to
fear of ripple effect of independence to its neighbourhood. President
Putin's statement "Kosovo is a terrible precedent, and it breaks
up the entire system of international relations that existed for
decades and even centuries" appears cogent as the spiralling effect
of the emerging situation might affect the structure of international
relations, if not properly balanced.
So far Kosovo has been recognised by few countries. Till the end of
February only thirty states have recognized its independence. Countries
like the US, UK, France, Germany and Turkey have supported the
independence where as countries like Russia, China, Spain, Georgia,
and Greece have opposed the move. Among the former Soviet republics,
the Baltic States have expressed their support where as countries
like Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have declared
their opposition to recognize Serbia's breakaway region.
The sudden impact of Kosovo independence on the Caucasian region has
already been felt as Abkhazia the breakaway of region of Georgia has
demanded recognition of its independence. Georgia is afraid that any
recognition of Kosovo independence may fuel similar sentiments in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Similarly the Armenian Foreign Minister
Vartan Oskanian complained of international double standard, arguing
"Granting independence to Kosovo, the international community violated
the legal norms but forgot Karabakh." It can be mentioned that both
Armenia and Azerbaijan have conflicting interests in Nagorno-Karabakh
and the developments in Kosovo would likely to be interpreted
differently by both these countries.
Azerbaijan has already declared the independence of Kosovo
'illegal'. The Central Asian states like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan have expressed opposition against the declaration
of independence.
India too has expressed reservation over this issue as any recognition
of independent Kosovo might encourage separatists in Kashmir to raise
their demands more violently. This region in the past has witnessed
much bloodshed and now it may prove difficult for India to risk siding
with Kosovo.
Similarly, Russia's problem in its southern part such as Chechnya
and Dagestan is well known. The debilitating potentials of Kosovo
developments in fomenting religious fundamentalism and terrorism in the
guise of self-determination cannot be ruled out. The Chechen radical
leader Doku Umarov has already revealed his vision of a Caucasian
caliphate and he may well use the Kosovo incident to further his
activities in the region.
Both India along with Russia had signed in 1994 the declaration
on the protection of interests of multiethnic and pluralistic
societies. Hence, in this background the Kosovo crisis needs to be
seen as a factor in the evolving order of international relations as
a challenge (as well as opportunity) to multiethnic and pluralistic
societies. It is true that right to self determination is a noble
principle recognised by international law, but its misinterpretation
and misapplication may bring devastating consequences in an age in
which religion and ethnicity based violence is a common norm. Hence,
at the present juncture it would be difficult to say whether Kosovo
independence would bring stability in the Balkans or lead to a flurry
of such movements in other parts of the world. However, the Kosovo
independence would likely affect the evolving international scenario
especially in the Eurasian region in which the changing contours of
power politics have thrown up new power alignments driven by great
power ambitions.
The author is a research faculty at Centre for Central Eurasian
Studies, University of Mumbai, India.