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FROZEN CONFLICTS THAW
Russia Profile
March 12 2008
Russia
The concept of frozen conflicts, an end to hostilities with no
resolution, is becoming more and more of an anachronism these days.
In post-Soviet countries and in autonomous republics, the political
equivalent of antifreeze has been thrown on the tense situations.
On Mar. 4, the situation in the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh
quickly took a turn for the worse. Starting at 5 a.m., eight to 13
soldiers died in an exchange of gunfire between the armed forces of
Azerbaijan and the army of the unrecognized NKR. (Although, it is not
really a secret to anybody that officers and soldiers from Armenia
serve in Karabakh.)
That evening, the ministries of the two countries reported that the
conflict had subsided after a few hours. According to the Armenian
side, eight Azerbaijani military servicemen were killed and two NKR
servicemen were wounded. The Azerbaijani sources said 12 Armenian
servicemen were killed while one Azerbaijani serviceman and two
civilians from the Geranboy district were killed. Four Azerbaijani
servicemen were wounded.
This information, however, will most likely be rechecked and
corrected. But still, for the sake of comparison, we can say that in
all of last year, 30 people were killed during fire exchanges along
the cease-fire line (which is called the "front line" in Baku and
in Yerevan).
This hot spot in the former Soviet Union stands out from the rest.
First of all, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the most intensive
of any armed confrontation in the former Soviet Union. It started as
an internal conflict in 1988 and grew into an international affair
by 1991, lasting for three years.
Compared to other breakaway republics, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Transdnestr, Karabakh had the largest number of victims, refugees and
temporarily displaced persons. Moreover, there are no international
peacemaking efforts in Karabakh to appease the conflicting sides.
Instead, there is just a Ceasefire Agreement signed in May of 1994,
and the sides are separated by a front line. The only mediating body
is the Minsk OSCE group, the inefficiency of which has already given
rise to a number of legends.
Svante Cornell, a Swedish expert on the Karabakh conflict, maintains
that the region's geopolitical significance and the risk of the
conflict growing into a war that would engulf it entirely, ranks the
Karabakh first among all conflicts in the post-Soviet Eurasia.
"This is the only conflict that everyone talked about, with certain
grounds, as the conflict that carries the threat of a 'third world
war,'" he argued. "This is the only conflict in the Caucasus that
involves two independent states as the main participants. Russia
can be considered as a part in the Abkhazia conflict, but not one
of the main ones, while Armenia is definitely one of the two main
participants. But, more importantly, this conflict is roaring in
immediate vicinity of three states, each of which claims to play the
role of a regional power center - Russia, Turkey and Iran."
At different points in time, both Turkey and Iran considered the
possibility of becoming directly involved in the conflict, and each
time it would trigger a wave of protest in Russia, Cornell said.
Incidentally, the violation of the ceasefire on March 4 was not
unexpected. In 2007, the number of skirmishes and fire fights on the
front line increased nearly three-fold. The sides regularly test each
other's endurance. The regional arms race (thank God it's not about
nuclear arms yet) is, to some extent, a stabilizing factor. Both
sides are afraid of a big war. They fear not only human losses, but
also spoiling the image of the authorities (the legitimacy of which
depends on the Karabakh factor, in many respects).
This is why any aggravation of the situation carries much higher
risk for the whole Southern Caucasus region, as well as for the CIS
as a whole. However, the March "military alert" in Karabakh is just
a continuation of a tendency that started three years ago.
This tendency can be defined as an antifreeze of ethno-political
conflicts. Today (especially after the March incident), the term
"frozen conflicts," which is used in practically all international
political and legal documents, should be tossed aside. It is morally
outdated. A freeze implies the lack of any dynamics (either positive
or negative) in the development of the conflict. There are indeed
dynamics on the territory of the former Soviet Union, although they
cannot be considered positive.
There were numerous attempts to change the status quo of the conflict
zones in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 1997, 1998 and in 2001,
such efforts were made in Abkhazia. However, until the year 2004,
these attempts did not adhere to a cogent strategy.
The situation changed in 2004, when the United States and the European
Union stirred up the issue of international recognition of Kosovo's
independence. In the United States and the EU, recognizing Kosovo
is considered "a special case" because of the overwhelming Albanian
majority and the region's unique political history.
In Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, Transdnestr and Nagorny Karabakh, the
Kosovo case is seen as a legal precedent. This means that the elites
of states recognized by the UN (Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan) had
aimed to "solve the problem of territorial integrity" before Kosovo
proclaimed its independence. After Kosovo's recognition this year,
states with territorial integrity issues have started increasing
their militarist rhetoric.
Azerbaijani leaders (starting with the country's president and
trickling down to high-ranking military officers) have mentioned,
on numerous occasions, that they are willing to go to any lengths,
including military measures, to restore the country's territorial
integrity.
The majority of the people also share this position. Sociological
research shows that 60 percent support a coercive solution to the old
conflict. Recently Ilkham Aliyev once again stressed the fact that his
country is ready to fight to the death. "Azerbaijan's military budget
is $1.3 billion, and it will continue to increase. We are purchasing
defense technology, airplanes and ammunition in preparation to liberate
occupied territories, and we are prepared to do it," he said during
a meeting with veterans of the Karabakh war in the Khanlar District.
The Nagorny Karabakh region was a zone of Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict even before NKR proclaimed its independence in September of
1991, when the Soviet Union still existed, and the conflict was not
international. The logical question is how advantageous it really is
for Armenia and the breakaway region to provoke the republic whose
establishment is already prepared for harsh action.
On the other hand, it would also be wrong to say that Baku is ready
for a full-scale invasion of Karabakh (where the Armenian forces
have strong fortifications). There will be a presidential election in
Azerbaijan in November 2008. Of course, the patriotic theme will be
central to the campaign. However, victims of any conflict and military
failures could have a boomerang effect on the country's political elite
and the president's popularity rating. This is why it is important
to realize that patriotic rhetoric is one matter, while real actions
are a completely different one. This is why the existence of some
"protocol of Baku sages" about attacking Karabakh as a result of
Armenia's internal political crisis also seems very doubtful.
But what, then, is behind the most recent violation of the cease-fire
in the conflict zone? Firstly, this violation is definitely not the
first one. Comments and reports of some information agencies prove
that much. But during this month's incident, the number of victims
(no matter whose version you believe) is greater. A collision of this
scale and level of intensity has not taken place at the front line
for a long time.
Secondly, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are living in such a state
that the conflict is not simply a factor of political life. It is a
factor of identification, and it is visible even in some everyday
details (especially in Azerbaijan, which was defeated in 1994,
but has definitely not accepted this defeat). In this situation,
even the nerves of an officer or soldier at the front line might be
of critical importance, and any mistake might prove to be fateful.
You do not need to receive instructions from the command center or
packets from the main headquarters for this kind of a situation. Both
societies are "worked up," especially those in Azerbaijan, where the
idea of revenge is gaining more and more popularity. Any spark might
cause a big fire.
Thirdly, the latest collision in Karabakh took place in the post-Kosovo
period. Despite everything that is said about the unique nature of
self-determination in this ex-Serbian autonomy, it is obvious that
today the proclamation of independence of the new state in Pristina
encourages more friction between post-Soviet states and breakaway
republics. Some of them need to fight for being recognized even if
the recognition comes the day after tomorrow, not tomorrow.
Others want to finally dismiss the subject of territorial integrity.
What if tomorrow there is a new ideology and Kosovo stops being
so unique?
Thus, Kosovo's self-determination is objectively promoting not peace,
but further conflict in post-Soviet states. This much is obvious from
the almost simultaneous aggravations of the situation in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.
Ilkham Aliyev is correct saying: "As you see, norms of international
law are violated in the world, and this has a negative influence on
conflict settlement. The factor of power and strength is still the
decisive one, and we'll reach our goal."
Actually, when there are no criteria for officially recognizing
de-facto states and when the mechanisms of conflict resolution are
reduced to politically correct small talk, the factor of strength
becomes, as the classics once put it, "the midwife of history."
Essentially, the main goal of any negotiations today should be
the elimination of the strength factor as the decisive component
of "conflict resolution." You can move toward compromises and
concessions only based on the agreement that there is no alternative to
non-military means of conflict settlement. Although, if the strength
factor became the main question in the Balkans, why are the mighty
of this world so sure that it won't be the same in Southern Caucasus,
where traditions of political violence are just as deep-rooted as in
Europe's powder keg?
Sergey Markedonov is the head of the Interethnic Relations Department
at Moscow's Institute of Political and Military Analysis.
Russia Profile
March 12 2008
Russia
The concept of frozen conflicts, an end to hostilities with no
resolution, is becoming more and more of an anachronism these days.
In post-Soviet countries and in autonomous republics, the political
equivalent of antifreeze has been thrown on the tense situations.
On Mar. 4, the situation in the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh
quickly took a turn for the worse. Starting at 5 a.m., eight to 13
soldiers died in an exchange of gunfire between the armed forces of
Azerbaijan and the army of the unrecognized NKR. (Although, it is not
really a secret to anybody that officers and soldiers from Armenia
serve in Karabakh.)
That evening, the ministries of the two countries reported that the
conflict had subsided after a few hours. According to the Armenian
side, eight Azerbaijani military servicemen were killed and two NKR
servicemen were wounded. The Azerbaijani sources said 12 Armenian
servicemen were killed while one Azerbaijani serviceman and two
civilians from the Geranboy district were killed. Four Azerbaijani
servicemen were wounded.
This information, however, will most likely be rechecked and
corrected. But still, for the sake of comparison, we can say that in
all of last year, 30 people were killed during fire exchanges along
the cease-fire line (which is called the "front line" in Baku and
in Yerevan).
This hot spot in the former Soviet Union stands out from the rest.
First of all, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the most intensive
of any armed confrontation in the former Soviet Union. It started as
an internal conflict in 1988 and grew into an international affair
by 1991, lasting for three years.
Compared to other breakaway republics, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Transdnestr, Karabakh had the largest number of victims, refugees and
temporarily displaced persons. Moreover, there are no international
peacemaking efforts in Karabakh to appease the conflicting sides.
Instead, there is just a Ceasefire Agreement signed in May of 1994,
and the sides are separated by a front line. The only mediating body
is the Minsk OSCE group, the inefficiency of which has already given
rise to a number of legends.
Svante Cornell, a Swedish expert on the Karabakh conflict, maintains
that the region's geopolitical significance and the risk of the
conflict growing into a war that would engulf it entirely, ranks the
Karabakh first among all conflicts in the post-Soviet Eurasia.
"This is the only conflict that everyone talked about, with certain
grounds, as the conflict that carries the threat of a 'third world
war,'" he argued. "This is the only conflict in the Caucasus that
involves two independent states as the main participants. Russia
can be considered as a part in the Abkhazia conflict, but not one
of the main ones, while Armenia is definitely one of the two main
participants. But, more importantly, this conflict is roaring in
immediate vicinity of three states, each of which claims to play the
role of a regional power center - Russia, Turkey and Iran."
At different points in time, both Turkey and Iran considered the
possibility of becoming directly involved in the conflict, and each
time it would trigger a wave of protest in Russia, Cornell said.
Incidentally, the violation of the ceasefire on March 4 was not
unexpected. In 2007, the number of skirmishes and fire fights on the
front line increased nearly three-fold. The sides regularly test each
other's endurance. The regional arms race (thank God it's not about
nuclear arms yet) is, to some extent, a stabilizing factor. Both
sides are afraid of a big war. They fear not only human losses, but
also spoiling the image of the authorities (the legitimacy of which
depends on the Karabakh factor, in many respects).
This is why any aggravation of the situation carries much higher
risk for the whole Southern Caucasus region, as well as for the CIS
as a whole. However, the March "military alert" in Karabakh is just
a continuation of a tendency that started three years ago.
This tendency can be defined as an antifreeze of ethno-political
conflicts. Today (especially after the March incident), the term
"frozen conflicts," which is used in practically all international
political and legal documents, should be tossed aside. It is morally
outdated. A freeze implies the lack of any dynamics (either positive
or negative) in the development of the conflict. There are indeed
dynamics on the territory of the former Soviet Union, although they
cannot be considered positive.
There were numerous attempts to change the status quo of the conflict
zones in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 1997, 1998 and in 2001,
such efforts were made in Abkhazia. However, until the year 2004,
these attempts did not adhere to a cogent strategy.
The situation changed in 2004, when the United States and the European
Union stirred up the issue of international recognition of Kosovo's
independence. In the United States and the EU, recognizing Kosovo
is considered "a special case" because of the overwhelming Albanian
majority and the region's unique political history.
In Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, Transdnestr and Nagorny Karabakh, the
Kosovo case is seen as a legal precedent. This means that the elites
of states recognized by the UN (Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan) had
aimed to "solve the problem of territorial integrity" before Kosovo
proclaimed its independence. After Kosovo's recognition this year,
states with territorial integrity issues have started increasing
their militarist rhetoric.
Azerbaijani leaders (starting with the country's president and
trickling down to high-ranking military officers) have mentioned,
on numerous occasions, that they are willing to go to any lengths,
including military measures, to restore the country's territorial
integrity.
The majority of the people also share this position. Sociological
research shows that 60 percent support a coercive solution to the old
conflict. Recently Ilkham Aliyev once again stressed the fact that his
country is ready to fight to the death. "Azerbaijan's military budget
is $1.3 billion, and it will continue to increase. We are purchasing
defense technology, airplanes and ammunition in preparation to liberate
occupied territories, and we are prepared to do it," he said during
a meeting with veterans of the Karabakh war in the Khanlar District.
The Nagorny Karabakh region was a zone of Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict even before NKR proclaimed its independence in September of
1991, when the Soviet Union still existed, and the conflict was not
international. The logical question is how advantageous it really is
for Armenia and the breakaway region to provoke the republic whose
establishment is already prepared for harsh action.
On the other hand, it would also be wrong to say that Baku is ready
for a full-scale invasion of Karabakh (where the Armenian forces
have strong fortifications). There will be a presidential election in
Azerbaijan in November 2008. Of course, the patriotic theme will be
central to the campaign. However, victims of any conflict and military
failures could have a boomerang effect on the country's political elite
and the president's popularity rating. This is why it is important
to realize that patriotic rhetoric is one matter, while real actions
are a completely different one. This is why the existence of some
"protocol of Baku sages" about attacking Karabakh as a result of
Armenia's internal political crisis also seems very doubtful.
But what, then, is behind the most recent violation of the cease-fire
in the conflict zone? Firstly, this violation is definitely not the
first one. Comments and reports of some information agencies prove
that much. But during this month's incident, the number of victims
(no matter whose version you believe) is greater. A collision of this
scale and level of intensity has not taken place at the front line
for a long time.
Secondly, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are living in such a state
that the conflict is not simply a factor of political life. It is a
factor of identification, and it is visible even in some everyday
details (especially in Azerbaijan, which was defeated in 1994,
but has definitely not accepted this defeat). In this situation,
even the nerves of an officer or soldier at the front line might be
of critical importance, and any mistake might prove to be fateful.
You do not need to receive instructions from the command center or
packets from the main headquarters for this kind of a situation. Both
societies are "worked up," especially those in Azerbaijan, where the
idea of revenge is gaining more and more popularity. Any spark might
cause a big fire.
Thirdly, the latest collision in Karabakh took place in the post-Kosovo
period. Despite everything that is said about the unique nature of
self-determination in this ex-Serbian autonomy, it is obvious that
today the proclamation of independence of the new state in Pristina
encourages more friction between post-Soviet states and breakaway
republics. Some of them need to fight for being recognized even if
the recognition comes the day after tomorrow, not tomorrow.
Others want to finally dismiss the subject of territorial integrity.
What if tomorrow there is a new ideology and Kosovo stops being
so unique?
Thus, Kosovo's self-determination is objectively promoting not peace,
but further conflict in post-Soviet states. This much is obvious from
the almost simultaneous aggravations of the situation in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.
Ilkham Aliyev is correct saying: "As you see, norms of international
law are violated in the world, and this has a negative influence on
conflict settlement. The factor of power and strength is still the
decisive one, and we'll reach our goal."
Actually, when there are no criteria for officially recognizing
de-facto states and when the mechanisms of conflict resolution are
reduced to politically correct small talk, the factor of strength
becomes, as the classics once put it, "the midwife of history."
Essentially, the main goal of any negotiations today should be
the elimination of the strength factor as the decisive component
of "conflict resolution." You can move toward compromises and
concessions only based on the agreement that there is no alternative to
non-military means of conflict settlement. Although, if the strength
factor became the main question in the Balkans, why are the mighty
of this world so sure that it won't be the same in Southern Caucasus,
where traditions of political violence are just as deep-rooted as in
Europe's powder keg?
Sergey Markedonov is the head of the Interethnic Relations Department
at Moscow's Institute of Political and Military Analysis.