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THAWING OUT
By Sergei Markedonov
Russia Profile, Russia
http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=Inte rnational&articleid=a1209552191
April 30 2008
How Will the New President Handle Frozen Conflicts?
One of the most important and pointed questions facing Dmitry Medvedev
in terms of Russia's foreign policy is the country's relations with
de-facto states in the post-Soviet space. There are few other foreign
policy problems that are as closely tied to security inside Russia,
while the ethno-political situations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
directly influence the situation in Russia's North Caucasus.
The confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh
resulted in a significant movement of Armenian immigrants to Russia's
Krasnodar and Stavropol regions. The number of Armenians in Kuban
increased by 42.5 percent from 1989 to 2001. As a result, the "Armenian
issue" became one of the most important social and political factors
in the Krasnodar region, and anti-Armenian rhetoric became a method
of political legitimization for the region's elite. Another example
of interrelated ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus is the problem of
Ossetia. The Georgian-Ossetian conflict became the first interethnic
conflict in post-Soviet Georgia, and developed into a large-scale armed
confrontation from January 1991 to July 1992. This struggle exerted
significant influence on the course of the first interethnic conflict
on Russian territory--the Ossetian-Ingush conflict. The military
phase of this conflict occurred in October and November of 1992.
As a result of the escalation of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, around
43,000 refugees from South Ossetia and the inner regions of Georgia
arrived in North Ossetia in the early 1990s. The refugees facilitated
a radicalization of ethno-nationalist sentiments in North Ossetian
society; they became mass supporters of North Ossetian radicals, who
demanded the preservation of their republic's territorial integrity
in the dispute with Ingushetia over the Prigorodny district.
In much the same way, Georgia's problems with Abkhazia contributed
to the consolidation of Adyg ethno-nationalist movements in
Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and Adygea, as well as
to the activation of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the
Caucasus, which played a significant role in the Georgian-Abkhazian
conflict of 1992-1993. These ethno-nationalist groups remain important
participants, although often undeclared and unrecognized, in the
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.
The meltdown
It is important to remember that Medvedev will be acting in much more
complicated circumstances than his predecessor. The fragmentation of
ethnic groups within the CIS only began during Vladimir Putin's time
in office; moreover, there is now an active thawing of conflicts that
were considered frozen during the Putin years.
Before 2008, the attempts to change the status quo in the conflict
zones were not part of a systematic strategy, but this changed when
the international community began recognizing the independence
of Kosovo. And even though the official position of Washington
and Brussels is that Kosovo's self-determination is "unique,"
in the capitals of the de-facto states, Kosovo is seen as a legal
precedent. For Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, Kosovo is not a legal
precedent, but a political one, seen as an important step toward the
eventual loss of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and the
self-proclaimed Transdnestr republic.
This year has already seen other important developments. The largest
armed confrontations in Nagorno-Karabakh since the end of military
action in May 1994 occurred in March. Additionally, on March 21,
the Russian State Duma approved an appeal to the federal government
and the president to examine the possibility of legal recognition
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And a day before that, the outgoing
Armenian president Robert Kocharyan declared that it might be possible
to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh if Azerbaijan withdraws from the OSCE
Minsk group.
The world is watching
Putin's successor must carefully examine the background of the de-facto
states. In the first years of the 21st century, the political role of
these states has grown noticeably. Before, they were seen as nothing
more than a consequence of ethno-political conflicts in the post-Soviet
space. As British researcher Laurence Browers pointed out, "Instead
of seeing these formations as an independent political environment,
de-facto states are only seen in the context of their relationship
with external players and world processes." This attitude explains
the terms "breakaway republics" and "separatist states," adopted by
Western political scientists to refer to these areas. These terms gave
rise to the supposition that "breakaway" republics could potentially
"return," and such a return would be considered a "resolution of
the ethno-political conflict" and the restoration of the territorial
integrity of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova was equated with the
resolution of these conflicts. As a result of such an approach, the
domestic political processes in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdnestr
and Nagorno-Karabakh were viewed as temporary phenomena that would
be eliminated as soon as the existing status quo was broken and their
status determined.
In the 1990s, Russian politicians and diplomats shared this
approach. As long as levers of influence on the political authorities
of Georgia and Moldova were preserved, Moscow was not eager to
intensify the dialogue with Tiraspol, Sukhumi, and Tskhinvali. In
Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia initially consented to international
conflict regulation under the auspices of the OSCE. In the case of
Transdnestr, Moscow, along with Kiev, became a guarantor of the peace
process. Moscow's main achievement in the 1990s was not allowing the
conflicts to thaw. Moscow's position regarding the de-facto states
that share a common border with Russia -- South Ossetia and Abkhazia
-- was much more active. In 1998, Moscow prevented an escalation of
the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict in the Gal region of eastern Abkhazia.
The year 2003 became a kind of Rubicon for Russian political
attitudes toward the frozen conflict zones. The failure of Dmitry
Kozak's plan to create a united federated Moldovan state that would
include Transdnestr, and the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia, definitively
eliminated Moldova and Georgia from Moscow's orbit. From this point on,
the Kremlin began to consider the de-facto formations as independent
entities that have their own significance.
The increase of the geopolitical role of these regions occurred
in large part due to formally external causes--the ethno-political
self-determination in the Balkans. As a result, in 2006 the independent
Republic of Montenegro appeared on the world map for the first
time since 1918. In 2008, 33 states recognized the independence of
Kosovo. And even though Montenegro, unlike Kosovo, never existed as an
unrecognized state, the possibility of a violation of the principle of
territorial integrity and ethno-political self-determination aroused
a heightened interest in the country by the leaders of de-facto states.
The response of the leaders of these de-facto states to the events
in the Balkans forced Russia's political leaders to take a more
drastic position on the unrecognized post-Soviet republics. Russian
representatives, beginning with Vladimir Putin, announced a "universal"
approach to the Kosovo problem, saying that if Kosovo can be granted
full independence, it should not be denied to Abkhazia or South
Ossetia. "I do not want to say that Russia will also immediately
recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia as independent and sovereign
states," Putin said, "but such precedents exist in international
politics. In order to be fair, in the interest of all the people
living in certain territories, we need commonly recognized universal
principles for the resolution of such problems." Yet Putin's
"universal" approach is hardly universal. He does not extend the
Kosovo precedent to Nagorno-Karabakh, limiting its precedent-setting
to Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdnestr. This attitude can be
explained by the fact that Moscow has had a much more constructive
relationship with Azerbaijan than with Moldova and Georgia, and is
trying once again to not aggravate its relations with Baku.
Putin's approach also found support among experts in the United States
and Europe, who stopped viewing the situation as a case of Russia
meddling in the domestic affairs of Georgia and Moldova. For the first
time since the 1990s, Western political scientists began mentioning the
de-facto states as not simply the consequences of unresolved "frozen"
conflicts, but as formations that have their own internal dynamics and
are capable of transformations. In the words of British expert Thomas
de Vaal, "Many external observers mistakenly consider Abkhazia as
simply a Russian puppet state. Of course, Russia uses its undetermined
status for its own purposes, but Sergey Bagapsh, the acting president,
was elected despite Moscow's wishes, and many Abkhazians are not
happy with creeping annexation by Moscow." De Vaal also asks:
"How long can we go on denying their right to independence? This
is not a simple matter. But the alternative--keeping the conflicts
frozen and keeping whole territories as the world's 'orphans'--is
also unacceptable." Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman have also urged
American and European politicians to be realistic, and doubt that
the West will risk confrontation with Russia solely for the sake of
Georgia preserving its jurisdiction over South Ossetia.
Cooperation goes a long way
The countries that host the frozen conflict zones have also changed
their behavior. In 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili started demonstratively
violating the Dagomys Treaty that set the rules and format for
conflict regulation in 1992. "If the Dagomys Treaty does not permit
raising a Georgian flag on the territory of the Tskhinvali district
[the official name of South Ossetia in Georgia], I am ready to leave
this treaty." Then, in spring 2006, Moldova and Ukraine decided to
use economic instruments to change their customs policies to break
the Transdnestr "separatists." With this action, Kiev changed its
role from a guarantor of the peace process into an ally of one of
the conflict sides. Late that summer, Georgia seized the Kodor Gorge
in a military operation, violating the Moscow Treaty of 1994, which
regulated the peacemaking operation in Abkhazia, and attempted to
change the status quo in the conflict.
Russia's policy with regard to the de-facto states has been based,
first of all, on maintaining the status quo not as an end in
itself, but as a mechanism of counteraction to the "thawing" of the
conflicts. But this status quo is changing. Additionally, no official
representative of Moscow has ever expressed prejudice against the
territorial integrity of Moldova, Georgia or Azerbaijan. However,
Moscow's political patronage allows the de-facto states to work
toward final self-determination and in 2006, there was a parade of
referendums in these states. These referendums were more legitimate
than those held in the conditions of open conflict in the early 1990s
and demonstrated that Transdnestr, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh all
have their own working legislative systems.
These referendums are another step toward final self-determination,
but the success of this project depends in many respects on Russia's
actions. Russia must convince the international community that
it wants to continue to play a stabilizing role in Transdnestr,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Additionally, only Russia can shepherd
the development of democratization and modernization in these
regions, which will benefit them in the long run, whether or not
they become independent states. And finally, political recognition
of these regions is much more important for Russia than legal
recognition. After all, the United States works with Taiwan and
finances social projects in Nagorno-Karabakh without any declarations
recognizing these states. Israel has an active working relationship
with Somaliland without announcing official support for the former
British protectorate. Naturally, the UK itself "works" with the
subjects of the former empire and the fact of legal recognition is not
crucial here either. The most important thing is political cooperation
and cooperation in the field of security, and the expectation of a
favorable political situation. Russia should not force an acceleration
of the process of official recognition for the de-facto states. Right
now it is much more important to bring them out of the shadows,
to provide them with political support and to appeal to political
realism. After all, Russia is the only country that can explain that
the disintegration of the Soviet Union will only be complete after
the post-Soviet reality is taken into account.
Sergey Markedonov, is the Head of the Interethnic Relations Department
at Moscow's Institute of Political and Military Analysis.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Sergei Markedonov
Russia Profile, Russia
http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=Inte rnational&articleid=a1209552191
April 30 2008
How Will the New President Handle Frozen Conflicts?
One of the most important and pointed questions facing Dmitry Medvedev
in terms of Russia's foreign policy is the country's relations with
de-facto states in the post-Soviet space. There are few other foreign
policy problems that are as closely tied to security inside Russia,
while the ethno-political situations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
directly influence the situation in Russia's North Caucasus.
The confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh
resulted in a significant movement of Armenian immigrants to Russia's
Krasnodar and Stavropol regions. The number of Armenians in Kuban
increased by 42.5 percent from 1989 to 2001. As a result, the "Armenian
issue" became one of the most important social and political factors
in the Krasnodar region, and anti-Armenian rhetoric became a method
of political legitimization for the region's elite. Another example
of interrelated ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus is the problem of
Ossetia. The Georgian-Ossetian conflict became the first interethnic
conflict in post-Soviet Georgia, and developed into a large-scale armed
confrontation from January 1991 to July 1992. This struggle exerted
significant influence on the course of the first interethnic conflict
on Russian territory--the Ossetian-Ingush conflict. The military
phase of this conflict occurred in October and November of 1992.
As a result of the escalation of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, around
43,000 refugees from South Ossetia and the inner regions of Georgia
arrived in North Ossetia in the early 1990s. The refugees facilitated
a radicalization of ethno-nationalist sentiments in North Ossetian
society; they became mass supporters of North Ossetian radicals, who
demanded the preservation of their republic's territorial integrity
in the dispute with Ingushetia over the Prigorodny district.
In much the same way, Georgia's problems with Abkhazia contributed
to the consolidation of Adyg ethno-nationalist movements in
Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and Adygea, as well as
to the activation of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the
Caucasus, which played a significant role in the Georgian-Abkhazian
conflict of 1992-1993. These ethno-nationalist groups remain important
participants, although often undeclared and unrecognized, in the
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.
The meltdown
It is important to remember that Medvedev will be acting in much more
complicated circumstances than his predecessor. The fragmentation of
ethnic groups within the CIS only began during Vladimir Putin's time
in office; moreover, there is now an active thawing of conflicts that
were considered frozen during the Putin years.
Before 2008, the attempts to change the status quo in the conflict
zones were not part of a systematic strategy, but this changed when
the international community began recognizing the independence
of Kosovo. And even though the official position of Washington
and Brussels is that Kosovo's self-determination is "unique,"
in the capitals of the de-facto states, Kosovo is seen as a legal
precedent. For Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, Kosovo is not a legal
precedent, but a political one, seen as an important step toward the
eventual loss of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and the
self-proclaimed Transdnestr republic.
This year has already seen other important developments. The largest
armed confrontations in Nagorno-Karabakh since the end of military
action in May 1994 occurred in March. Additionally, on March 21,
the Russian State Duma approved an appeal to the federal government
and the president to examine the possibility of legal recognition
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And a day before that, the outgoing
Armenian president Robert Kocharyan declared that it might be possible
to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh if Azerbaijan withdraws from the OSCE
Minsk group.
The world is watching
Putin's successor must carefully examine the background of the de-facto
states. In the first years of the 21st century, the political role of
these states has grown noticeably. Before, they were seen as nothing
more than a consequence of ethno-political conflicts in the post-Soviet
space. As British researcher Laurence Browers pointed out, "Instead
of seeing these formations as an independent political environment,
de-facto states are only seen in the context of their relationship
with external players and world processes." This attitude explains
the terms "breakaway republics" and "separatist states," adopted by
Western political scientists to refer to these areas. These terms gave
rise to the supposition that "breakaway" republics could potentially
"return," and such a return would be considered a "resolution of
the ethno-political conflict" and the restoration of the territorial
integrity of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova was equated with the
resolution of these conflicts. As a result of such an approach, the
domestic political processes in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdnestr
and Nagorno-Karabakh were viewed as temporary phenomena that would
be eliminated as soon as the existing status quo was broken and their
status determined.
In the 1990s, Russian politicians and diplomats shared this
approach. As long as levers of influence on the political authorities
of Georgia and Moldova were preserved, Moscow was not eager to
intensify the dialogue with Tiraspol, Sukhumi, and Tskhinvali. In
Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia initially consented to international
conflict regulation under the auspices of the OSCE. In the case of
Transdnestr, Moscow, along with Kiev, became a guarantor of the peace
process. Moscow's main achievement in the 1990s was not allowing the
conflicts to thaw. Moscow's position regarding the de-facto states
that share a common border with Russia -- South Ossetia and Abkhazia
-- was much more active. In 1998, Moscow prevented an escalation of
the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict in the Gal region of eastern Abkhazia.
The year 2003 became a kind of Rubicon for Russian political
attitudes toward the frozen conflict zones. The failure of Dmitry
Kozak's plan to create a united federated Moldovan state that would
include Transdnestr, and the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia, definitively
eliminated Moldova and Georgia from Moscow's orbit. From this point on,
the Kremlin began to consider the de-facto formations as independent
entities that have their own significance.
The increase of the geopolitical role of these regions occurred
in large part due to formally external causes--the ethno-political
self-determination in the Balkans. As a result, in 2006 the independent
Republic of Montenegro appeared on the world map for the first
time since 1918. In 2008, 33 states recognized the independence of
Kosovo. And even though Montenegro, unlike Kosovo, never existed as an
unrecognized state, the possibility of a violation of the principle of
territorial integrity and ethno-political self-determination aroused
a heightened interest in the country by the leaders of de-facto states.
The response of the leaders of these de-facto states to the events
in the Balkans forced Russia's political leaders to take a more
drastic position on the unrecognized post-Soviet republics. Russian
representatives, beginning with Vladimir Putin, announced a "universal"
approach to the Kosovo problem, saying that if Kosovo can be granted
full independence, it should not be denied to Abkhazia or South
Ossetia. "I do not want to say that Russia will also immediately
recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia as independent and sovereign
states," Putin said, "but such precedents exist in international
politics. In order to be fair, in the interest of all the people
living in certain territories, we need commonly recognized universal
principles for the resolution of such problems." Yet Putin's
"universal" approach is hardly universal. He does not extend the
Kosovo precedent to Nagorno-Karabakh, limiting its precedent-setting
to Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdnestr. This attitude can be
explained by the fact that Moscow has had a much more constructive
relationship with Azerbaijan than with Moldova and Georgia, and is
trying once again to not aggravate its relations with Baku.
Putin's approach also found support among experts in the United States
and Europe, who stopped viewing the situation as a case of Russia
meddling in the domestic affairs of Georgia and Moldova. For the first
time since the 1990s, Western political scientists began mentioning the
de-facto states as not simply the consequences of unresolved "frozen"
conflicts, but as formations that have their own internal dynamics and
are capable of transformations. In the words of British expert Thomas
de Vaal, "Many external observers mistakenly consider Abkhazia as
simply a Russian puppet state. Of course, Russia uses its undetermined
status for its own purposes, but Sergey Bagapsh, the acting president,
was elected despite Moscow's wishes, and many Abkhazians are not
happy with creeping annexation by Moscow." De Vaal also asks:
"How long can we go on denying their right to independence? This
is not a simple matter. But the alternative--keeping the conflicts
frozen and keeping whole territories as the world's 'orphans'--is
also unacceptable." Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman have also urged
American and European politicians to be realistic, and doubt that
the West will risk confrontation with Russia solely for the sake of
Georgia preserving its jurisdiction over South Ossetia.
Cooperation goes a long way
The countries that host the frozen conflict zones have also changed
their behavior. In 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili started demonstratively
violating the Dagomys Treaty that set the rules and format for
conflict regulation in 1992. "If the Dagomys Treaty does not permit
raising a Georgian flag on the territory of the Tskhinvali district
[the official name of South Ossetia in Georgia], I am ready to leave
this treaty." Then, in spring 2006, Moldova and Ukraine decided to
use economic instruments to change their customs policies to break
the Transdnestr "separatists." With this action, Kiev changed its
role from a guarantor of the peace process into an ally of one of
the conflict sides. Late that summer, Georgia seized the Kodor Gorge
in a military operation, violating the Moscow Treaty of 1994, which
regulated the peacemaking operation in Abkhazia, and attempted to
change the status quo in the conflict.
Russia's policy with regard to the de-facto states has been based,
first of all, on maintaining the status quo not as an end in
itself, but as a mechanism of counteraction to the "thawing" of the
conflicts. But this status quo is changing. Additionally, no official
representative of Moscow has ever expressed prejudice against the
territorial integrity of Moldova, Georgia or Azerbaijan. However,
Moscow's political patronage allows the de-facto states to work
toward final self-determination and in 2006, there was a parade of
referendums in these states. These referendums were more legitimate
than those held in the conditions of open conflict in the early 1990s
and demonstrated that Transdnestr, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh all
have their own working legislative systems.
These referendums are another step toward final self-determination,
but the success of this project depends in many respects on Russia's
actions. Russia must convince the international community that
it wants to continue to play a stabilizing role in Transdnestr,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Additionally, only Russia can shepherd
the development of democratization and modernization in these
regions, which will benefit them in the long run, whether or not
they become independent states. And finally, political recognition
of these regions is much more important for Russia than legal
recognition. After all, the United States works with Taiwan and
finances social projects in Nagorno-Karabakh without any declarations
recognizing these states. Israel has an active working relationship
with Somaliland without announcing official support for the former
British protectorate. Naturally, the UK itself "works" with the
subjects of the former empire and the fact of legal recognition is not
crucial here either. The most important thing is political cooperation
and cooperation in the field of security, and the expectation of a
favorable political situation. Russia should not force an acceleration
of the process of official recognition for the de-facto states. Right
now it is much more important to bring them out of the shadows,
to provide them with political support and to appeal to political
realism. After all, Russia is the only country that can explain that
the disintegration of the Soviet Union will only be complete after
the post-Soviet reality is taken into account.
Sergey Markedonov, is the Head of the Interethnic Relations Department
at Moscow's Institute of Political and Military Analysis.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress