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THE EXPERIENCED POLITICAL JUGGLER
Editorial
Ready for a second bluff
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
Published on May 02, 2008
Armenia
The congress of the pro-opposition factions which is to be convened
today, as well as the speech to be made by Levon Ter-Petrosyan should
provide an answer to the question when the ex-President is going to
proceed with speculating the difficulties currently faced by the
country and thus resort to the tactics of `bluff' periodically.
After all, it was not the task of overcoming the situation that
underlay Ter-Petrosyan's tactics of sponsoring the pre-electoral
developments, but rather, the goal of generating dissatisfaction, as
this might at least ensure the rehabilitation of his own image. And
Ter-Petrosyan was unable to do more than that, since a skillful
speculation of the existing dissatisfaction could have disoriented only
some part of society, but it wasn't enough for being elected a
president.
So, although the first stage of the skillful bluff did not ensure L.
Ter-Petrosyan's victory on February 19, the candidate did manage to
develop the image of an uncompromising pro-opposition figure in the
eyes of a significant part of society.
Thereafter, there began the second stage of generating bluffs, when the
candidate, having 21 percent of votes was using the skillfulness of a
juggler to insist that he had received 65 percent, as a matter of fact.
And this resulted in the well-known events of March 1-2, which secured
the `internationalization' of the speculated bluff which, on the one
hand, was advantageous to the author and on the other hand, contained a
serious hazard for L. Ter-Petrosyan.
The thing is that neither the Constitutional Court appeals against the
results of the February 19 elections nor the speeches of L.
Ter-Petrosyan's proponents from the tribunals of PACE and the United
States convinced the international community that the opposition leader
had held a victory in the February 19 elections. The incontrovertible
evidence of the fact is the international observers' well-known
assessments which have recently been included in the resolution adopted
by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
According to those assessments, the international community proposed a
resolution to the Armenian authorities and opposition, based on two
clear-cut theses.
The first is the package of requirements addressed to the authorities.
They include an independent inquiry into the March 1-2 events, release
of the individuals who didn't use violence, the elimination of the
temporary restrictions on the freedom of marches and demonstrations etc.
The second package concerns the opposition. It contains a requirement
to recognize the results of the February 19 elections or else, to apply
to the European Court of Human Rights.
It should be noted that when the pro-Ter-Petrosyan camp came to know
that the new authorities of Armenia intended to follow the letter and
spirit of the PACE Resolution, i.e. to comply with the proposals within
the period of 3 months, and demand that the opposition do the same,
they began showing serious signs of concern.
First, they started voicing complaints in the address of the
international community which demanded that the legitimacy of the new
Armenian authorities be recognized. Then they passed on to the next
step, i.e. declared of the intention of Ter-Petrosyan's proponents to
apply to the European Court. By this, the international community
received a false confirmation of the fact that the Armenian opposition
was ready to dispute not only the figures published by the Central
Election Commission, but also the conclusion of an observation group
representing such a rigorous body as the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
A question arises as to what this step could have meant in the context
of the further development of Armenia's internal political situation.
The answer is obvious. By way of using such trick, Ter-Petrosyan and
his proponents `froze' the process of complying with the resolution and
as a matter of fact, gained time not only for applying to the European
Court but also making the next step on the political arena.
This testifies to the fact that the congress of the pro-opposition
factions promises to become the third stage of the political bluff
raffled by Ter-Petrosyan.
If the opposition had really been convinced of the invulnerability of
the facts available to it and the arguments deriving thereof, it would
have applied to the European Court right after the Constitutional Court
passed its decision on March 8. As a matter of fact, it was with the
purpose of not complying with the PACE requirement that the belated
intention of applying to the European Court was publicized a month's
later. So, L. Ter-Petrosyan intends to continue his bluff and bring it
to an end. And this means that the political juggler has already done
certain calculations and is sure that he will manage to cheat the local
and foreign `spectator' this time as well. What is such certainty
accounted for?
First: In case of agreeing to a dialogue on any condition,
Ter-Petrosyan will be deprived of the only serious political tool, i.e.
the people's dissatisfaction, without which he will be unable to
continue the bluff he started several months ago. Furthermore, the
absence of a dialogue and the trials of the participants of the March
1-2 events still allow him to maintain the `aureole' of a persecuted
creature.
Second: The changing international-economic situation, which will
inevitably lead to the increase of prices in the course of the coming
months, will certainly arouse discontent among the socially vulnerable.
Third: After the presidential elections of Armenia, the international
community has been making new efforts towards achieving the signature
of a document on the basic principles of the settlement of the Karabakh
conflict, and after the presidential elections of Azerbaijan, this will
bring our country and its leadership face-to-face with serious external
challenges.
Editorial
Ready for a second bluff
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
Published on May 02, 2008
Armenia
The congress of the pro-opposition factions which is to be convened
today, as well as the speech to be made by Levon Ter-Petrosyan should
provide an answer to the question when the ex-President is going to
proceed with speculating the difficulties currently faced by the
country and thus resort to the tactics of `bluff' periodically.
After all, it was not the task of overcoming the situation that
underlay Ter-Petrosyan's tactics of sponsoring the pre-electoral
developments, but rather, the goal of generating dissatisfaction, as
this might at least ensure the rehabilitation of his own image. And
Ter-Petrosyan was unable to do more than that, since a skillful
speculation of the existing dissatisfaction could have disoriented only
some part of society, but it wasn't enough for being elected a
president.
So, although the first stage of the skillful bluff did not ensure L.
Ter-Petrosyan's victory on February 19, the candidate did manage to
develop the image of an uncompromising pro-opposition figure in the
eyes of a significant part of society.
Thereafter, there began the second stage of generating bluffs, when the
candidate, having 21 percent of votes was using the skillfulness of a
juggler to insist that he had received 65 percent, as a matter of fact.
And this resulted in the well-known events of March 1-2, which secured
the `internationalization' of the speculated bluff which, on the one
hand, was advantageous to the author and on the other hand, contained a
serious hazard for L. Ter-Petrosyan.
The thing is that neither the Constitutional Court appeals against the
results of the February 19 elections nor the speeches of L.
Ter-Petrosyan's proponents from the tribunals of PACE and the United
States convinced the international community that the opposition leader
had held a victory in the February 19 elections. The incontrovertible
evidence of the fact is the international observers' well-known
assessments which have recently been included in the resolution adopted
by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
According to those assessments, the international community proposed a
resolution to the Armenian authorities and opposition, based on two
clear-cut theses.
The first is the package of requirements addressed to the authorities.
They include an independent inquiry into the March 1-2 events, release
of the individuals who didn't use violence, the elimination of the
temporary restrictions on the freedom of marches and demonstrations etc.
The second package concerns the opposition. It contains a requirement
to recognize the results of the February 19 elections or else, to apply
to the European Court of Human Rights.
It should be noted that when the pro-Ter-Petrosyan camp came to know
that the new authorities of Armenia intended to follow the letter and
spirit of the PACE Resolution, i.e. to comply with the proposals within
the period of 3 months, and demand that the opposition do the same,
they began showing serious signs of concern.
First, they started voicing complaints in the address of the
international community which demanded that the legitimacy of the new
Armenian authorities be recognized. Then they passed on to the next
step, i.e. declared of the intention of Ter-Petrosyan's proponents to
apply to the European Court. By this, the international community
received a false confirmation of the fact that the Armenian opposition
was ready to dispute not only the figures published by the Central
Election Commission, but also the conclusion of an observation group
representing such a rigorous body as the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
A question arises as to what this step could have meant in the context
of the further development of Armenia's internal political situation.
The answer is obvious. By way of using such trick, Ter-Petrosyan and
his proponents `froze' the process of complying with the resolution and
as a matter of fact, gained time not only for applying to the European
Court but also making the next step on the political arena.
This testifies to the fact that the congress of the pro-opposition
factions promises to become the third stage of the political bluff
raffled by Ter-Petrosyan.
If the opposition had really been convinced of the invulnerability of
the facts available to it and the arguments deriving thereof, it would
have applied to the European Court right after the Constitutional Court
passed its decision on March 8. As a matter of fact, it was with the
purpose of not complying with the PACE requirement that the belated
intention of applying to the European Court was publicized a month's
later. So, L. Ter-Petrosyan intends to continue his bluff and bring it
to an end. And this means that the political juggler has already done
certain calculations and is sure that he will manage to cheat the local
and foreign `spectator' this time as well. What is such certainty
accounted for?
First: In case of agreeing to a dialogue on any condition,
Ter-Petrosyan will be deprived of the only serious political tool, i.e.
the people's dissatisfaction, without which he will be unable to
continue the bluff he started several months ago. Furthermore, the
absence of a dialogue and the trials of the participants of the March
1-2 events still allow him to maintain the `aureole' of a persecuted
creature.
Second: The changing international-economic situation, which will
inevitably lead to the increase of prices in the course of the coming
months, will certainly arouse discontent among the socially vulnerable.
Third: After the presidential elections of Armenia, the international
community has been making new efforts towards achieving the signature
of a document on the basic principles of the settlement of the Karabakh
conflict, and after the presidential elections of Azerbaijan, this will
bring our country and its leadership face-to-face with serious external
challenges.