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Eurasia Daily Monitor
May 9, 2008 -- Volume 5, Issue 89
THE WEST CAN RESPOND MORE EFFECTIVELY TO RUSSIA'S ASSAULT ON GEORGIA:
PART III
by Vladimir Socor
International silence about the ethnic cleansing of Georgians from
Abkhazia is a striking feature of the continuing debate on the
Russia-Georgia conflict. Moscow's overt moves in recent days to annex
Abkhazia politically and militarily capitalize on that ethnic cleansing and
would render it irreversible. The international silence on this issue
resembles that surrounding the cleansing of Azeris with Russian support from
Armenian-occupied districts of Azerbaijan.
The current crisis over Abkhazia offered Western officials and
international organizations a chance to break their long silence and address
this issue at the policy level. None did so, however, in contrast to the
same officials' and organizations' successful insistence on reversing the
ethnic cleansing in Kosova. Only the European Union's External Affairs
Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, made a reference to EU humanitarian
aid for -internally displaced persons- from Abkhazia, responding to
questions during the debate just held the European Parliament on the
Abkhazia crisis (EP press release, May 7).
Unwittingly the EU came close to condoning the forcible population and
border shifts in Abkhazia by extending travel visa facilitations to Russian
passport holders there, while denying those facilitations to all Georgian
passport holders (including those driven out of Abkhazia). The EU can no
longer plead absent-mindedness on this issue, and the Commission seems to be
working now on visa facilitation for Georgian citizens, despite continuing
reluctance of several European governments.
With Western governments seemingly reluctant to irritate Russia over
Abkhazia, the unresolved issue of ethnic cleansing can be approached at this
stage at the level of humanitarian law, human rights, and property rights. A
first initiative in this regard would seem particularly appropriate for the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe's (PACE) session next month.
Such an issue belongs indisputably to the core of PACE's responsibilities.
Even the Russian delegation's usual allies there would find it hard to
dispute that substantive point. Procedurally, its scheduling as an urgent
item for the June session would seem a natural response from PACE to the
current crisis in Abkhazia. The Russian veto can and does prevent the OSCE
from addressing that issue, but Russia has no such power in the Council of
Europe and PACE.
The recent international conference in Baku on conflicts on the
territories of GUAM states (April 15-16) helped identify opportunities for
legal action in international courts on behaf of the victims of ethnic
cleansing. For example, Georgian expellees and their associations can
initiate legal action to challenge the unlawful takeover of their properties
by Russian or Abkhaz authorities in that territory.
The Russian military, not the Abkhaz (17 percent of the region's
pre-conflict population) evicted the Georgian population (45 percent of the
pre-conflict population) from Abkhazia by force. Yet Moscow has put an
Abkhaz face on that act, thereby turning the Abkhaz from ad hoc allies into
long-term hostages to Russian policy. Using a similar method, Russia is now
attempting to put an Abkhaz face on the downing of one or more Georgian
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in internationally recognized Georgian air
space.
Following the downing of one UAV on April 20, the only proven case in
the current crisis, Abkhaz authorities claimed to have downed two Georgian
UAVs on May 4 and another one on May 8, using -Abkhaz- ground-based
antiaircraft installations. (Interfax, Itar-Tass, Apsnypress, May 4-8).
The three latter cases seem to be empty propaganda claims. In the
April 20 incident, a Russian MIG-29 was filmed destroying the Georgian UAV
and was then tracked flying into Russian air space (see EDM, April 21). In
that incident, Russia initially denied the facts strenuously, then changed
its story and attributed the shooting to -Abkhaz air defenses.- Abkhaz
political and military authorities then took up that tack for the other
purported incidents in that series.
Georgia has requested the United Nations Secretary General's Special
Representative for Georgia, Jean Arnault, political head of the United
Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) deployed in Abkhazia, to
institute immediately an investigation regarding the presence and use of air
defense systems by -Abkhaz- forces and to report on the investigation's
results (press release, May 5). UN action is paralyzed, however, by Russia's
veto power. Moscow will use this power to prevent the UN from ascertaining
that nominally Abkhaz combat hardware is, in fact, Russian-supplied and
Russian-manned.
This situation raises major issue of international law and air safety
that seem to be relegated to oblivion by international organizations and
governments. Even the United States hesitated for two weeks before
acknowledging through the White House spokeswoman that a Russian plane had,
in fact, downed the UAV in Georgian air space (press release, May 6).
Moscow's statements that the Abkhaz possess air defense systems need
to be investigated for their ramifications. These statements signify that
Russia is, by its own admission, arming an unlawful force, a non-state,
rogue actor by any definition, with weapons that can potentially threaten
the safety of any type of flight over that part of Georgia's air space. The
purported -Abkhaz- military cannot be assumed to use those missiles
competently when they, or Russian crews on loan, decide to use them. It can
be assumed that civilian flights are at risk. Along with Russia's retention
of the Gudauta base with its airport in the same area, from which the MIG-29
apparently took off, and the -unaccounted-for treaty-limited equipment- of
Russian heavy weaponry in Abkhazia, the militarization of this region is
another major issue that is overdue for open international discussion.
--Vladimir Socor
May 9, 2008 -- Volume 5, Issue 89
THE WEST CAN RESPOND MORE EFFECTIVELY TO RUSSIA'S ASSAULT ON GEORGIA:
PART III
by Vladimir Socor
International silence about the ethnic cleansing of Georgians from
Abkhazia is a striking feature of the continuing debate on the
Russia-Georgia conflict. Moscow's overt moves in recent days to annex
Abkhazia politically and militarily capitalize on that ethnic cleansing and
would render it irreversible. The international silence on this issue
resembles that surrounding the cleansing of Azeris with Russian support from
Armenian-occupied districts of Azerbaijan.
The current crisis over Abkhazia offered Western officials and
international organizations a chance to break their long silence and address
this issue at the policy level. None did so, however, in contrast to the
same officials' and organizations' successful insistence on reversing the
ethnic cleansing in Kosova. Only the European Union's External Affairs
Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, made a reference to EU humanitarian
aid for -internally displaced persons- from Abkhazia, responding to
questions during the debate just held the European Parliament on the
Abkhazia crisis (EP press release, May 7).
Unwittingly the EU came close to condoning the forcible population and
border shifts in Abkhazia by extending travel visa facilitations to Russian
passport holders there, while denying those facilitations to all Georgian
passport holders (including those driven out of Abkhazia). The EU can no
longer plead absent-mindedness on this issue, and the Commission seems to be
working now on visa facilitation for Georgian citizens, despite continuing
reluctance of several European governments.
With Western governments seemingly reluctant to irritate Russia over
Abkhazia, the unresolved issue of ethnic cleansing can be approached at this
stage at the level of humanitarian law, human rights, and property rights. A
first initiative in this regard would seem particularly appropriate for the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe's (PACE) session next month.
Such an issue belongs indisputably to the core of PACE's responsibilities.
Even the Russian delegation's usual allies there would find it hard to
dispute that substantive point. Procedurally, its scheduling as an urgent
item for the June session would seem a natural response from PACE to the
current crisis in Abkhazia. The Russian veto can and does prevent the OSCE
from addressing that issue, but Russia has no such power in the Council of
Europe and PACE.
The recent international conference in Baku on conflicts on the
territories of GUAM states (April 15-16) helped identify opportunities for
legal action in international courts on behaf of the victims of ethnic
cleansing. For example, Georgian expellees and their associations can
initiate legal action to challenge the unlawful takeover of their properties
by Russian or Abkhaz authorities in that territory.
The Russian military, not the Abkhaz (17 percent of the region's
pre-conflict population) evicted the Georgian population (45 percent of the
pre-conflict population) from Abkhazia by force. Yet Moscow has put an
Abkhaz face on that act, thereby turning the Abkhaz from ad hoc allies into
long-term hostages to Russian policy. Using a similar method, Russia is now
attempting to put an Abkhaz face on the downing of one or more Georgian
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in internationally recognized Georgian air
space.
Following the downing of one UAV on April 20, the only proven case in
the current crisis, Abkhaz authorities claimed to have downed two Georgian
UAVs on May 4 and another one on May 8, using -Abkhaz- ground-based
antiaircraft installations. (Interfax, Itar-Tass, Apsnypress, May 4-8).
The three latter cases seem to be empty propaganda claims. In the
April 20 incident, a Russian MIG-29 was filmed destroying the Georgian UAV
and was then tracked flying into Russian air space (see EDM, April 21). In
that incident, Russia initially denied the facts strenuously, then changed
its story and attributed the shooting to -Abkhaz air defenses.- Abkhaz
political and military authorities then took up that tack for the other
purported incidents in that series.
Georgia has requested the United Nations Secretary General's Special
Representative for Georgia, Jean Arnault, political head of the United
Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) deployed in Abkhazia, to
institute immediately an investigation regarding the presence and use of air
defense systems by -Abkhaz- forces and to report on the investigation's
results (press release, May 5). UN action is paralyzed, however, by Russia's
veto power. Moscow will use this power to prevent the UN from ascertaining
that nominally Abkhaz combat hardware is, in fact, Russian-supplied and
Russian-manned.
This situation raises major issue of international law and air safety
that seem to be relegated to oblivion by international organizations and
governments. Even the United States hesitated for two weeks before
acknowledging through the White House spokeswoman that a Russian plane had,
in fact, downed the UAV in Georgian air space (press release, May 6).
Moscow's statements that the Abkhaz possess air defense systems need
to be investigated for their ramifications. These statements signify that
Russia is, by its own admission, arming an unlawful force, a non-state,
rogue actor by any definition, with weapons that can potentially threaten
the safety of any type of flight over that part of Georgia's air space. The
purported -Abkhaz- military cannot be assumed to use those missiles
competently when they, or Russian crews on loan, decide to use them. It can
be assumed that civilian flights are at risk. Along with Russia's retention
of the Gudauta base with its airport in the same area, from which the MIG-29
apparently took off, and the -unaccounted-for treaty-limited equipment- of
Russian heavy weaponry in Abkhazia, the militarization of this region is
another major issue that is overdue for open international discussion.
--Vladimir Socor